

254

The Geneva Agreement

ON THE CESSATION OF
HOSTILITIES IN VIET NAM
(IC/42/REV.2, 20 JULY 1954)



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AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

The Geneva Agreement on Vietnam is currently the most misrepresented international document. Inquiries by us prove that it was virtually impossible to obtain its full text from any of the usual reference sources. We have, therefore, decided to reproduce the document in its entirety. Included is the Conference's Final Declaration of July 21, 1954, as well as a U.S. Statement made at the concluding session by Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith.

—Ed.

CHAPTER I—PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Article 1

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (see Map No. 1).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

Article 2

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 3

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of

such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

Article 4

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

Article 5

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 6

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 7

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

Article 8

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation lines shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at

any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 9

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by road or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

CHAPTER II—PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

Article 10

The Commanders of the Forces on each side on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel on the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 11

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a.m. (local time)
on 27 July 1954

Central Viet-Nam at 8.00 a. m. (local time)
on 1 August 1954

Southern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a. m. (local
time) on 11 August 1954

It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be
taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 12

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces with-

draw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

Article 13

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

Article 14

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notice shall be given by the

withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

Article 15

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement:

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and trans-

fers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:

—meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island

—northern coast of Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines

—meridian of Campha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date

of the entry into force of the present Agreement):

Forces of the French Union

Hanoi perimeter 80 days
Haiduong perimeter 100 days
Haiphong perimeter 300 days

Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam

Ham Tan and Xuyenmoc
provisional assembly area .. 80 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional
assembly area—
first instalment 80 days
Plaine des Jongs provisional
assembly area 100 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional
assembly area—
second instalment 100 days
Point Camau provisional
assembly area 200 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional
assembly area—
last instalment 300 days

**CHAPTER III—BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH
TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND
MUNITIONS. MILITARY BASES**

Article 16

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted

to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there.

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion — or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below;

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the place and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 17

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the

introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited;

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Com-

mission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 18

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

Article 19

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 20

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

- Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;
- Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nha-trang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

CHAPTER IV—PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

Article 21

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

- (a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances

of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.

CHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

Article 22

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 23

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 24

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit

no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockades of any kind in Viet-Nam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

Article 25

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 26

The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 27

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general ceasefire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at

a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . . .) They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regrouping plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operation of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

37. The International Commission shall act through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the

Joint Commission, or of one of the parties; undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42.

42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put in effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfil the tasks provided for in article 3.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th day of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Namese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the
People's Army of Viet-Nam
TA-QUANG-BUU,

*Vice-Minister of National Defense of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam*

For the Commander-in-Chief of the
French Union Forces in Indo-China
Brigadier-General DELTEIL

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

I. DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY
DEMARCATON LINE AND THE
DEMILITARIZED ZONE

(Article 1 of the Agreement; Reference Map:
Indo-China 1/100,000)

(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows, reading from east to west: the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cua Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.

(b) The demilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

II. GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL
ASSEMBLY AREAS

(Article 15 of the Agreement; Reference Maps:
Indo-China 1/400,000)

(a) NORTH VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces

1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the north-east.

In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.

2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Song-Van-Uc three kilometres north-east of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khe. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.

3. *A corridor contained between:*

In the south, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (South-west of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;

In the north, a line running along the

Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.

Note: Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of the Song Van-Uc.

Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Haiduong

A straight line running from the Rapids canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat)

(b) CENTRAL VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel

The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Nagi and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.

(c) SOUTH VIET-NAM

Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

The boundaries of these areas are as follows:

1. *Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan Area*

Western boundary: The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.

Northern boundary: Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.

2. *Plaine des Joncs Area*

Northern boundary: The Viet-Nam-Cambodia frontier.

Western boundary: A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.

Southern boundary: Course of the Fleuve Anterieur (Mekong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometres east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.

Eastern boundary: A straight line from Hung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier south of Doi-Bao-Voi.

3. Point Camau Area

Northern boundary: The Song-Cai-lon from its mouth to its junction with the Rach-Nuoc-Trong, thence the Rach-Nuoc-Trong to the bend five kilometres north-east of Ap-Xeo-La. Thereafter a line to the Ngau-Dua Canal and following that Canal as far as Vinh-Hung. Finally, from Vinh-Hung a north-south line to the sea.

GENEVA CONFERENCE INDO-CHINA

FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

[IC/43/Rev. 2, 21 July 1954, Original: French]

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence

and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a

view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Nameese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties

except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam are respected

Following is the text of a statement made by Under Secretary Walter B. Smith at the concluding Indochina plenary session at Geneva on July 21.

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented

to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954,² as follows:

In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.



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A CHOICE FOR AMERICANS

A "third Vietnam war"?

That's exactly how Newsweek (11/16/73) describes the present state of affairs in South Vietnam. And the New York Times calls the Peace Agreement a "dead letter" (12/9/73).

Should these developments in South Vietnam still concern us? YES.

Over 50,000 Vietnamese soldiers have been killed since the Peace Agreement was signed on January 27, 1973 — in operations assisted by American technicians, equipped with American bombs, funded by American tax dollars. That's more than the total number of U.S. soldiers killed in Vietnam and almost ten times as many battlefield deaths as occurred in the recent Middle East war. Yet many Americans believe the Vietnam war is "over" for us.

This indirect U.S. involvement now threatens to become direct. The resumption of U.S. bombing — a possibility "The State Department has been examining" (New York Times, 11/29/73) — is the logical end of the collision course our government is on. All observers agree that the huge Saigon army cannot survive on its own without American air power.

Our government may intend for the Peace Agreement to become a "dead letter" but we don't have to let it happen. The Agreement remains the *only* alternative to the horror that most Americans oppose — a new full-scale war with the U.S. more deeply involved.

Every American needs to know how the Peace Agreement is being violated and how public opinion can end U.S. intervention in Indochina for once and for all.

WHAT THE PEACE AGREEMENT SAYS:

The Peace Agreement contains a public and legally binding commitment by the U.S. to withdraw totally from Vietnam.

The basic principles of the Agreement are clear and simple — the U.S. promised to end *all forms* of intervention in Vietnam and in return got back the POW's, thus permitting the Vietnamese in South Vietnam to engage in a *political* competition for power based on a *military* cease-fire.

The Agreement has achieved certain great changes. It ended U.S. bombing of Vietnam, withdrew U.S. troops, brought all our POW's home on schedule and gave international diplomatic approval to a specific process by which the Vietnamese could achieve self-determination.

But after the POW's came home, our government ignored the remaining articles of the Agreement.

THE AGREEMENT STILL REQUIRES THE U.S. TO:

■ *"not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam" (Article 4);*

BUT: In 1974 (fiscal year) the Nixon administration is sending the Saigon regime of General Thieu at least \$813 million in military aid and plans an additional \$1 billion in aid to modernize and enlarge Saigon's army (New York Times, 1/6/74). "U.S. aid to Thieu's police continues to flow richly through a series of semi-camouflaged channels" at the rate of \$15 million per year (Time, 9/17/73).

■ *totally withdraw all military and political advisors from South Vietnam (Article 5);*

BUT: The U.S. has sent 8,000 "civilian" advisors and technicians to work for the military and police apparatus for three to five more years (NYT, 12/7/73).

■ *"not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people" (Article 9);*

BUT: The U.S. is imposing General Thieu through huge amounts of financial aid. The U.S. remains the most vital lifeline to the military and economic stability of the (Thieu) government... American economists in Saigon have no doubt that if the U.S. withdrew or if it further curtailed aid, (Thieu's) already faltering economy would simply collapse. Nor could the country survive without American help" (NYT, 8/19/73).

■ *"stop all its military activities against (North Vietnam) by ground, air and naval forces" (Article 2);*

BUT: "The U.S. has resumed military reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam" and "officials of the State and Defense Departments said today" (NYT, 8/19/73).



Handcuffs used to shackle Saigon's political prisoners were manufactured by Smith and Wesson Company, Massachusetts. U.S. aid to Thieu's prison system continues despite Agreement ban.

■ *"contribute to . . . postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)" (Article 21);*

BUT: "President Nixon asked Congress yesterday to authorize a \$2.9 billion military and economic aid program (for Indochina) that pointedly omitted any reconstruction assistance for North Vietnam" (Washington Post, 5/2/73).

These facts indicate that the fighting in South Vietnam is not just between Vietnamese but heavily involves the U.S. through its dollars and advisors. *It is a new form of the same war with U.S. involvement more evident than hidden from the American people.*

OUR 'ALLY' GENERAL THIEU

The U.S.-supported Thieu regime in Saigon has violated the Peace Agreement to the extent that "The implementation of the agreement by the Saigon side has been virtually non-existent" (Porter, Current History, 12/73).

The Peace Agreement recognizes the Saigon regime and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (what the U.S. calls the 'Viet Cong') as co-equal administrations in South Vietnam. It provides these rules for political competition between them: first, stop the shooting; second, restore civil liberties; third, free all civilian prisoners; fourth, form a National Council to organize elections; and finally, hold "genuinely free and democratic general elections" to create a single new government for South Vietnam. This is the "political solution" both sides agreed to implement.

To accomplish all this, the Agreement requires Saigon and the PRG to:

■ "stop all offensive (military) actions against each other" (Article 3);

BUT: Since the Agreement was signed, Saigon "has continued to fight to regain all positions it had lost just before the ceasefire and . . . it has continued to seek and attack Communist units wherever it could find them" (W. Post, 3/1/73). Thieu's U.S.-equipped air force has carried out "large scale air attacks" against PRG villages (NYT, 11/25/73). "The Saigon government has failed to issue (the) emphatic public instructions to its forces to honor the agreement that the Communists have issued" (Washington Star-News, 3/7/73).

■ "respect the ceasefire and . . . settle all matters of contention through negotiations and avoid all armed conflict" (Article 10);

BUT: Thieu ordered his police: "If a stranger enters your village, shoot him in the head" (Time, 2/5/73).



Saigon air force repeatedly bombed PRG-controlled Loc Ninh village in Nov. and Dec., 1973, destroying

■ release all civilian prisoners (Article 8) and "not deny or delay their return for any reason" (Protocol), and protect the civilian political prisoners against "all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment" (Protocol);

BUT: According to Amnesty International, "upwards of 100,000 civilians remain in detention . . . the prisons of General Thieu are filled not just with members of the PRG, but also with thousands of non-Communist members of his opposition" (Report on Political Prisoners in South Vietnam). Released prisoners "describe existence in the Saigon regime's prisons as an eternity of mistreatment and torture" (Newsweek, 7/23/73).



Neutralist Ngo Ba Thanh, released in September, 1973, from Thieu's prison because of international protest, was attacked by Saigon police on October 15 when she tried to hold a press conference.

■ "Insure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of the press . . . freedom of political activities . . . freedom of movement" etc. (Article 11);

BUT: Saigon — already a severe police-state — "has become more restrictive since the agreement took effect, rather than less" (W. Post, 3/1/73). It "will not permit hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist-held areas to return to their homes after the ceasefire takes effect and will punish them if they try" (W. Post, 1/25/73). Thieu's regime bans labor strikes, peace demonstrations and outlaws neutralism.

■ join with neutralist forces to form a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to "organize free and democratic general elections" (Article 12);

BUT: "the Saigon government has no plans to go through with elections that the communist side would participate in," according to a speech by Thieu (W. Post News Service, 12/31/73).

THE P.R.G.'S POSITION

Unlike Thieu, the PRG calls repeatedly for



Flags change as Quang Tri city shifts from Saigon PRG control in 1972. Agreement recognizes Saigon and the PRG as co-equal administrations in South Vietnam.

cording to the PRG, it upholds the Agreement because it feels better prepared for serious political competition than Thieu. It knows that the Vietnamese people yearn for real peace and reconstruction — which Thieu's regime cannot offer.

Reporters who visited PRG-governed villages have described the PRG's use of educational classes, posters, radio broadcasts of the text and distribution of copies of the Agreement to encourage popular support for it. According to an American newsman, in the PRG territory "barely literate peasants accuse the (Saigon) government of violating this or that specific article of the Paris Agreement" (W. Post 3/11/73).

After repeated warnings, the PRG recently has begun to strike back to defend its zone against the assaults Thieu has been launching ever since the Agreement was signed. But the PRG defines its actions as defensive and limited to counter-attacks and, unlike Thieu, continues to call for implementation of the Agreement.

While it is impossible to know in each instance, a review of the evidence indicates that Saigon and the U.S. have been primarily responsible for initiating most of the fighting.

On January 4, 1974, one year to the month after the Agreement was signed, "President Nguyen Van Thieu called on his troops today to attack the (PRG) in their own territory" (NYT, 1/5/73) — an act which places the Agreement in imminent peril.



Presidents Nixon and Thieu.



Los Angeles peace activists demonstrate in front of Computer Sciences Corporation to protest its U.S.-sponsored contracts for expanding Saigon's civilian surveillance system.

AN AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY

The U.S. is responsible for Thieu's violations of the Agreement because the Saigon regime — called "essentially the creation of the U.S." in the Pentagon Papers — remains *totally dependent* on our military and economic aid for its existence. Last year, U.S. tax dollars accounted for 80% of Saigon's operating costs. This means Thieu could not so completely violate the agreement without the approval of the Nixon White House.

The U.S. is now sending Thieu \$1.150 *billion* in military and economic aid (Congressional Hearings for FY 1974). The Nixon administration is even "supplying from its own stockpiles in Asia the fuel required by South Vietnam's military forces" (W. Post, 11/30/73).

People around the world look to the U.S. to prevent Thieu from trampling the Agreement to death.

SAVING THE AGREEMENT IN 1974

The Nixon administration can be made to honor the Agreement if the public makes a strong effort to end the war. Illegal acts and cover-up policies by the White House can be halted by a determined public opinion and an active Congress.

For the first time, both Houses of Congress in 1973 went on record against any direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam, stopped the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, and attempted to curb the Presidency's war-making powers. But Congress still is reluctant to end the war. Public pressure in the coming year must be expanded to counter the Administration's intense lobbying efforts.

Largely as a result of public concern, Congress cut \$1 billion from this year's White House request for aid to Saigon. Getting Congress to cut new White House requests is the best way we can work to save lives, end the disgrace of supporting the Thieu dictatorship and prevent the renewal of all-out war.

In the coming year politicians will be unusually sensitive to public opinion and independent of the White House — because of the Watergate scandals. Pressure can be effective in the primaries and general elections, and the budget hearings which begin in the spring and climax in the late fall of 1974.

If we want to keep America out of "another Vietnam war," then our first task is to get America totally out of this Vietnam war.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

The 1974 INDOCHINA PEACE PLEDGE is a basic tool for generating pressure in your community on Congress. Adopted by a wide range of national organizations, the PLEDGE commits community institutions and Congressional representatives to a ban against direct U.S. military re-intervention in Indochina, support of the Peace Agreement and an end to U.S. aid for the Saigon police apparatus. The full text of the PLEDGE is printed below.

Ask your church, neighborhood group, club, union or student council to formally *endorse* the PLEDGE.

Then take the endorsements to your Congressional representatives or candidates and ask them to sign the PLEDGE as a way of committing their support for legislation which terminates U.S. involvement.

We can build a sustained campaign by lobbying with the Indochina Peace Pledge, writing letters to Congress, leafletting, making phone calls, showing a film and joining demonstrations. Many of us need to do a few of these things rather than waiting for a few people to do everything.

1974 INDOCHINA PEACE PLEDGE

We call upon our elected officials to actively support legislation to:

1. Preclude Direct U.S. Military Involvement

by positively prohibiting the renewal of United States air, sea or land combat operations and the use of United States military or paramilitary advisors in Indochina.

2. Encourage a political settlement based on the Peace Agreement signed by the U.S.

by withholding nonhumanitarian aid to either party in South Vietnam which does not comply with the Agreement which provides for a cease-fire and for the restoration of the basic freedoms of press, speech, meeting, political belief and movement for the people of South Vietnam.

3. End United States police aid

by opposing all direct and indirect United States funding of police and prison systems in Indochina, particularly those funds used in South Vietnam for the continued imprisonment and torture of political prisoners whose release is called for by the Peace Agreement.

Return endorsements to Coalition to Stop Funding the War, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

This brochure was prepared by the Indochina Peace Campaign for use in a united program sponsored by U.S. peace organizations. Their goal is to end U.S. intervention in Indochina by working to have the Peace Agreement honored, to free the South Vietnamese political prisoners and to terminate U.S. aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol (Phnom Penh) regimes. The groups cooperating in this national joint effort include: American Friends Service Committee; Clergy and Laity Concerned; Episcopal Peace Fellowship; Fellowship of Reconciliation; Indochina Resource Center; Indochina Mobile Education Project; Indochina Peace Campaign; International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Prisoners; Medical Aid for Indochina; People's Coalition for Peace and Justice; SANE; Vietnam Resource Center; War Resisters League; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Union of Vietnamese in the U.S.; and the Strike for Peace.

Contact any of them for further information and literature.

Additional copies of this brochure can be obtained from:

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
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Saigon air force repeatedly bombed PRG-controlled Loc Ninh village in Nov. and Dec., 1973, destroying this church and other civilian places.

■ release all civilian prisoners (Article 8) and "not deny or delay their return for any reason" (Protocol), and protect the civilian political prisoners against "all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment" (Protocol);

BUT: According to Amnesty International, "upwards of 100,000 civilians remain in detention . . . the prisons of General Thieu are filled not just with members of the PRG, but also with thousands of non-Communist members of his opposition" (Report on Political Prisoners in South Vietnam). Released prisoners "describe existence in the Saigon regime's prisons as an eternity of mistreatment and torture" (Newsweek, 7/23/73).



Neutralist Ngo Ba Thanh, released in September, 1973, from Thieu's prison because of international protest, was attacked by Saigon police on October 15 when she tried to hold a press conference.

■ "Insure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of the press . . . freedom of political activities . . . freedom of movement" etc. (Article 11);

BUT: Saigon — already a severe police-state — "has become more restrictive since the agreement took effect, rather than less" (W. Post, 3/1/73). It "will not permit hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist-held areas to return to their homes after the ceasefire takes effect and will punish them if they try" (W. Post, 1/25/73). Thieu's regime bans labor strikes, peace demonstrations and outlaws neutralism.

■ join with neutralist forces to form a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to "organize free and democratic general elections" (Article 12);

BUT: "the Saigon government has no plans to go through with elections that the communist side would participate in," according to a speech by Thieu (W. Post News Service, 12/31/73).

THE P.R.G.'S POSITION

Unlike Thieu, the PRG calls repeatedly for strict implementation of the Agreement. Ac-



Flags change as Quang Tri city shifts from Saigon PRG control in 1972. Agreement recognizes Saigon the PRG as co-equal administrations in South Vietn

According to the PRG, it upholds the Agreement because it feels better prepared for serious political competition than Thieu. It knows that the Vietnamese people yearn for real peace and reconstruction — which Thieu's regime cannot offer.

Reporters who visited PRG-governed villages have described the PRG's use of educational classes, posters, radio broadcasts of the text and distribution of copies of the Agreement to encourage popular support for it. According to an American newsman, in the PRG territory "barely literate peasants accuse the (Saigon) government of violating this or that specific article of the Paris Agreement" (W. Post, 3/11/73).

After repeated warnings, the PRG recently has begun to strike back to defend its zone against the assaults Thieu has been launching ever since the Agreement was signed. But the PRG defines its actions as defensive and limited to counter-attacks and, unlike Thieu, continues to call for implementation of the Agreement.

While it is impossible to know in each instance, a review of the evidence indicates that Saigon and the U.S. have been primarily responsible for initiating most of the fighting.

On January 4, 1974, one year to the month after the Agreement was signed, "President Nguyen Van Thieu called on his troops today to attack the (PRG) in their own territory" (NYT, 1/5/73) — an act which places the Agreement in imminent peril.



Presidents Nixon and Thieu.



Los Angeles peace activists demonstrate in front of Computer Sciences Corporation to protest its U.S.-sponsored contracts for expanding Saigon's civilian surveillance system.

AN AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY

The U.S. is responsible for Thieu's violations of the Agreement because the Saigon regime — called "essentially the creation of the U.S." in the Pentagon Papers — remains *totally dependent* on our military and economic aid for its existence. Last year, U.S. tax dollars accounted for 80% of Saigon's operating costs. This means Thieu could not so completely violate the agreement without the approval of the Nixon White House.

The U.S. is now sending Thieu \$1.150 *billion* in military and economic aid (Congressional Hearings for FY 1974). The Nixon administration is even "supplying from its own stockpiles in Asia the fuel required by South Vietnam's military forces" (W. Post, 11/30/73).

People around the world look to the U.S. to prevent Thieu from trampling the Agreement to death.

SAVING THE AGREEMENT IN 1974

The Nixon administration can be made to honor the Agreement if the public makes a strong effort to end the war. Illegal acts and cover-up policies by the White House can be halted by a determined public opinion and an active Congress.

For the first time, both Houses of Congress in 1973 went on record against any direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam, stopped the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, and attempted to curb the Presidency's war-making powers. But Congress still is reluctant to end the war. Public pressure in the coming year must be expanded to counter the Administration's intense lobbying efforts.

Largely as a result of public concern, Congress cut \$1 billion from this year's White House request for aid to Saigon. Getting Congress to cut new White House requests is the best way we can work to save lives, end the disgrace of supporting the Thieu dictatorship and prevent the renewal of all-out war.

In the coming year politicians will be unusually sensitive to public opinion and independent of the White House — because of the Watergate scandals. Pressure can be effective in the primaries and general elections, and the budget hearings which begin in the spring and climax in the late fall of 1974.

If we want to keep America out of "another Vietnam war," then our first task is to get America totally out of this Vietnam war.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

The 1974 INDOCHINA PEACE PLEDGE is a basic tool for generating pressure in your community on Congress. Adopted by a wide range of national organizations, the PLEDGE commits community institutions and Congressional representatives to a ban against direct U.S. military re-intervention in Indochina, support of the Peace Agreement and an end to U.S. aid for the Saigon police apparatus. The full text of the PLEDGE is printed below.

Ask your church, neighborhood group, club, union or student council to formally *endorse* the PLEDGE.

Then take the endorsements to your Congressional representatives or candidates and ask them to sign the PLEDGE as a way of committing their support for legislation which terminates U.S. involvement.

We can build a sustained campaign by lobbying with the Indochina Peace Pledge, writing letters to Congress, leafletting, making phone calls, showing a film and joining demonstrations. Many of us need to do a few of these things rather than waiting for a few people to do everything.

1974 INDOCHINA PEACE PLEDGE

We call upon our elected officials to actively support legislation to:

1. Preclude Direct U.S. Military Involvement

by positively prohibiting the renewal of United States air, sea or land combat operations and the use of United States military or paramilitary advisors in Indochina.

2. Encourage a political settlement based on the Peace Agreement signed by the U.S.

by withholding nonhumanitarian aid to either party in South Vietnam which does not comply with the Agreement which provides for a cease-fire and for the restoration of the basic freedoms of press, speech, meeting, political belief and movement for the people of South Vietnam.

3. End United States police aid

by opposing all direct and indirect United States funding of police and prison systems in Indochina, particularly those funds used in South Vietnam for the continued imprisonment and torture of political prisoners whose release is called for by the Peace Agreement.

Return endorsements to Coalition to Stop Funding the War, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

This brochure was prepared by the Indochina Peace Campaign for use in a united program sponsored by U.S. peace organizations. Their goal is to end U.S. intervention in Indochina by working to have the Peace Agreement honored, to free the South Vietnamese political prisoners and to terminate U.S. aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol (Phnom Penh) regimes. The groups cooperating in this national joint effort include: American Friends Service Committee; Clergy and Laity Concerned; Episcopal Peace Fellowship; Fellowship of Reconciliation; Indochina Resource Center; Indochina Mobile Education Project; Indochina Peace Campaign; International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Prisoners; Medical Aid for Indochina; People's Coalition for Peace and Justice; SANE; Vietnam Resource Center; War Resisters League; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Union of Vietnamese in the U.S.A.; Women's Strike for Peace.

Contact any of them for further information and literature.

Additional copies of this brochure can be obtained from:

The Indochina Peace Campaign
181 Pier Avenue
Santa Monica, CA 90405
213-392-3942

or


IPC
2 Brookline St.
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
617-492-0489

David Nesmith
4247 Olden
Fremont, Calif. 94538




YOUR CONTRIBUTION:

- is an expression of brotherhood with the Vietnamese people
- *provides badly needed supplies for the victims of the US bombing in Vietnam*



COLLECTE VIETNAM
PO BOX 283 STATION OUTREMONT
MONTREAL, CANADA.

collecte - vietnam
P.O. BOX 283 STATION OUTREMONT - MONTREAL - CANADA



WINTER EMERGENCY CAMPAIGN TO HELP
VICTIMS OF U.S. BOMBING



U.S. B-52 Stratofortress.



LET'S HELP


Collecte Vietnam

**IN BUILDING THE WINTER
EMERGENCY CAMPAIGN**

MY DREAM

*My big dream
Is to be a worker
Building schools
And cities.
The schools will have nice roofs
Of bright red tiles,
And the cities, many tall buildings.
The schools will have lots of classrooms
And playgrounds and volley-ball fields;
The cities will have broad avenues
Ponds with cool water and parks...
Of course I'll build factories
With chimneys scraping the sky,
And swimming-pools too,
Where in the afternoon I'll learn to swim.*

DIEU KHANH
(9 years old)



Quantity of American
bombs dropped in:



**...destroyed
schools...**

COLLECTE VIETNAM

PO BOX 283, STATION OUTREMONT,
MONTREAL , CANADA

Vietnam is still receiving 110,000 tons of American bombs per month. This means that more bombs have been dropped during Nixon's presidency than at any other time in human history -- 4.3 million tons! Vietnam now has an estimated 20 million bomb craters. It has also been officially confirmed that the equivalent of 400 Hiroshima's have taken place. Since 1968, six million people have been killed wounded or made refugees in Vietnam.

One half of all American bombs have been anti-personnel bombs designed to explode on contact with people. They respect no race, creed, age or sex.


As more and more areas of South Vietnam come under local popular control, the needs of the people's administration have increased. As the damage from the bombing is more vicious than ever and the area is more extensive, the need for medicine, food, housing and all supplies is proportionately greater.

The Vietnamese people need help NOW to continue their resistance against the genocide and ecocide brought about by the U.S. air force.

WHAT CAN YOU DO?

COLLECTE VIETNAM offers you an opportunity through the WINTER CAMPAIGN to give concrete aid to the victims of this war crime.

JOIN US IN GIVING
AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
WHERE THE NEED IS GREATEST.



The intentions of the men who were in charge of planning our war effort in Vietnam could not have been made clearer than by some of the kinds of bombs they chose to use. According to a paper delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science by Professors Pfeiffer and Westing in 1972, "at least 50% of all bombs dropped on Indochina are what are called 'anti-personnel bombs'." The purpose of an anti-personnel weapon is best illustrated by the "Dragontooth" mine (MK-36 system). These four-inch mines which are dropped in quantities of 8,000 by a single aircraft, have been described in the following way by Air Force spokesmen: "If a person steps on it, it could blow his foot off. If a truck runs over it, it won't blow the tire." Anti-personnel fragmentation bombs are devised for flesh, they cannot pierce or destroy steel or concrete. Upon explosion, a mother bomb will send out hundreds of thousands of steel pellets, jagged fragments or razor-sharp flechettes. One such commonly used weapon is the "pineapple" bomb. When a single aircraft drops its load of these bombs the effect is equivalent to 13,160 infantrymen each firing one clip from an M-16 rifle simultaneously into the bombed area. The only difference here is that the "Pineapple" bomb is only effective against civilians, not soldiers who are most often protected by sandbags, bunkers and helmets.



...children...

There wasn't a night when we thought we'd live until morning... never a morning we thought we'd survive until night. Did our children cry? Oh, yes and we did also. I just stayed in my cave. I didn't see the sunlight for two years. What did I think about? Oh, I used to repeat, 'please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come.'

COLLECTE VIETNAM,
PO Box 283, Station Outremont,
Montreal, Canada.



...churches...

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Fred Branfman, Project Air War,
Washington D.C.

Jean Guy Vaillancourt, Prof.
Université de Montréal, Quebec.

Clive Ansley, Prof.
University of Windsor, Ontario.

Sheila Daar, Editor,
Rampart.

Canadian Coalition of War
Resister, Montreal,
American Refugee Service,

American Committee for solidarity
with the Vietnamese people,
San Francisco, California.



ALLEN NEWS

TOM ALLEN FOR CONGRESS
MARYLAND'S 8TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
7119 WISCONSIN AVE. BETHESDA
654-6807

inside:

- MESSAGE FROM TOM
- WHAT THE STUDENTS ARE DOING
- BIOGRAPHY OF TOM ALLEN
- "ALLEN CALLS FOR GENERATION PEACE TREATY"
- ORGANIZATIONS, INDIVIDUALS ENDORSING TOM
- HOW YOU CAN HELP

A STUDENT-TO-PARENT CAMPAIGN

GET TOGETHER WITH TOM ALLEN

Tom Allen is running for Congress in the Democratic primary on September 15th under the theme of "Leadership for a Change." The students working in Tom's campaign began this special student-to-parent campaign to urge their fellow students to join them in working within the system for a man who will make the system work. We need your help.

A large group of enthusiastic people of all ages is working together for Tom Allen. They believe that he is a man who can legislate for an America where problems which have been ignored for too long are dealt with effectively. In our campaign we are breaking down barriers to communication so that, together, we can attack our problems rationally.

We believe that Tom Allen is the man you'd like to see in Congress. Unfortunately, you cannot vote in this election, but your parents can represent your viewpoint at the polls. Please read over this newsletter, show it to your parents, and talk with them about Tom and the upcoming primary election. By also talking to your neighbors and relatives about Tom, and asking them to vote for him, you can help elect Tom to Congress.

We have enclosed a postcard that we'd like you to fill out and return to us. Please talk to your parents about Tom Allen and give us some of your time so that we can get the constructive changes America needs.

A STUDENT-TO-PARENT CAMPAIGN

BY AUTHORITY: FRANK KETCHAM



Message from Tom

WE NEED A NEW CONGRESS

We need legislators who will speak out, initiate legislation, and vote for the interests of the people, not the special interests of a few powerful lobbies.

We need a modernization of the Congress, especially the House of Representatives.

After all, what is it that continues our mindless military escalation in South East Asia and in the Arms Race?

That stifles debate on such critical issues as the Cooper-Church Amendment?

That provides farm subsidies to the rich, while millions starve?

That tolerates the wiretapping, preventive detention, and no-knock provisions of the D.C. Crime Bill?

The answer is simple: In every case the culprit is the Congress--a Congress governed by old men made powerful by the practice of selecting committee chairmen on the basis of length of service. This Seniority System that places men from rural, non-competitive districts in positions of great power is out of place in the America of today. I do not deprecate age or experience. But the talents of other qualified Congressmen more responsive to the needs of America cannot be ignored.

What are some of the facts about the Seniority System?

FACT #1...The average age of the leaders in the House is seventy.

FACT #2...The average Committee Chairman has served 28 years.

FACT #3...Nine of the present twenty-one chairmen of standing committees in the House of Representatives are from the rural South.

Can there be any doubt about why Congress fails to respond to the desires of its people?

The members of the House have two-year terms so that they can, and must, be responsible to the people's legitimate demands, or lose their seats. However, the Seniority System defeats this principle of our government by allowing men to distort and delay legislation that is so desperately needed.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

If our nation is to survive we must ensure that committee chairmen are responsive to the people. In this connection I am pledged to support and initiate responsible Congressional Reform. I will support for Majority Leader such men as Representatives Richard Bolling, Morris Udall, or James O'Hara, who have long been associated with progressive reform. I support the one-man-one-vote principle of selecting chairmen. This would provide to each Congressman the same rights and opportunities by assuring each constituency an equal voice in the Congress.

As it stands now, the "Committee on Committees" nominates a slate of committee chairmen that is voted on as a whole by the Majority Party Caucus. The Congressional Reform I will work for would have the Speaker of the House nominate committee chairmen, who would be approved individually by the Caucus.

Most importantly, I will work in January with those progressive members of Congress to demand in Caucus that men such as Mendel Rivers (South Carolina) of the Armed Services Committee, John McMillan (South Carolina) of the D.C. Committee, and George Mahon (Texas) of the Appropriations Committee not be continued as chairmen of their committees.

The Congressional Reform and modernization that I have outlined is possible. The Seniority System is neither a law nor a rule of the House. It is a custom that has gradually taken hold since it originated in 1910. There are progressive members of Congress and other candidates across the nation this year who, like me, will work for Congressional Reform that is long overdue.

Come join me in my campaign and with Congressional Reform we will end the Vietnam War now.

Come join me in my campaign and together we will provide a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family; we will provide financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes to rebuild and revitalize slums and blighted areas.

Come join me in my campaign and together we shall eliminate the paradox of poverty amid plenty by opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity.

Come join me in my campaign and together we shall work within the system to make the system work.

Come join me in my campaign for LEADERSHIP FOR A CHANGE.

Tom Allen

What we're doing

In Tom Allen's campaign, students are not just envelope-stuffers; they do work which would not be trusted to the young in most campaigns. In our campaign, the research department is headed by Bruce Adams, a '70 graduate of Princeton. The canvassing is designed, organized, and led by Lucy McLeiland, a '70 graduate of Smith College. The press releases and other informative material on the campaign are written by Mark Melnicove, a student at Princeton. Lisa Knapp, a student at B.C.C. and Beth Lerch, a student at Walter Johnson High, are in charge of all volunteers. Jim Danaher and Eric Savage, two students at Good Counsel High, are the advance men for our field operations. Additionally, we have a youthful corps of 300 volunteers that helps us out in the campaign with any work that needs to be done, such as canvassing, telephoning, research, travelling with Tom as he makes his campaign stops, typing, artwork, and so forth. Throughout the campaign, the students work in accord with the adults for a common goal -- the election of Tom Allen to Congress.

WE NEED YOUR HELP

If your parents are Democrats, you can get them to vote for Tom. By distributing literature, by canvassing, and by talking about Tom with all your friends, you can help acquaint the voters with his policies. By voter registration and driving voters to the polls you can personally affect Tom's total vote tally.

Whether you work once a month, once a week, or every day,
YOU CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE.

They're with us, too

The Student Political Action Committee (SPAC), a progressive high school organization of 300 students, endorsed Tom Allen after listening to all the major candidates answer questions on their positions. The coordinator of SPAC, Peter Grunwald, a student at Walt Whitman High School, stated the position of the state-wide group by commenting, "We're only endorsing candidates we're sure of, not the lesser of two evils. So far Tom is the only candidate we've endorsed."

The Alliance for Democratic Reform, the Montgomery County branch of the New Democratic Coalition of Maryland, endorsed Allen at a general membership meeting early in the campaign. ADR was formed in 1968 by the supporters of Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and George McGovern for the Presidency. ADR's president, Ray Vickery said, "Tom Allen's candidacy alone holds out the greatest possible hope for reform of the Congress and the Democratic Party."

Rose Kramer and David Hackett are the co-chairmen of the "Concerned Democrats for Allen Committee." Mr. Hackett is a close friend and advisor to the Kennedy family (a chief assistant to John and Robert), and was also one of the original designers of the VISTA program. Mrs. Kramer, former president of the School Board and County Council member in this county, said, "Tom Allen represents the wave of the future, a future which will offer real opportunity for the young, minority groups, and all Americans. Tom Allen will make a difference because he so completely represents a populist view of America and this is the vision that is needed so desperately today."

ALLEN FOR CONGRESS

WHO IS TOM ALLEN?

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESS, MARYLAND'S 8TH DISTRICT

- BUILDER AND INNOVATOR.....**Current president of Community Systems & Design, Inc., a non-profit corporation to provide quality, low-cost housing to low and middle income families.
- HUMANITARIAN.....**In the front ranks of the civil rights movement since Selma; former VISTA Conference designer-leader; member of Suburban Maryland Fair Housing and Episcopal Diocese of Washington Committee on Race.
- FRIEND OF THE POOR.....**Policy Planner in OEO, which led to his becoming executive director of POMCO, an organization representing the poor of Montgomery County.
- PEACE ADVOCATE.....**A firm supporter of an immediate withdrawal from Viet Nam, Tom has been active with youth, business leaders, and other groups in mobilizing support for peace.
- DECORATED COMBAT VETERAN....**Earned Bronze Star and Purple Heart, as a combat officer in the South Pacific in World War II.
- MENTAL HEALTH LEADER.....**Extensive work with the Alcoholism Council of Montgomery County and the county Mental Health Association.
- LIFELONG DEMOCRAT.....**As a chairman of the Dollars for Democrats and as consultant on human relations for Democratic candidates, Tom Allen has been in the forefront of progressive action in the Democratic party.
- CLERGY.....**Served as Rector of St. Luke's Church in Bethesda for 12 years.
- FATHER AND FAMILY MAN.....**An 18-year resident of Montgomery County, Tom and Jane, and their children, Chris, Andrew and Lindsey live in Potomac where Jane works as a consulting psychologist.

A STUDENT-TO-PARENT CAMPAIGN

WE NEED YOUR HELP

WHEATON NEWS

July 8, 1970

Allen Calls For Generation Peace Treaty

Tom Allen Democratic candidate for Congress in Maryland's congressional district called for a peace treaty between the generations.

He said the majority of parents supported the desires for change and improvement called for by young and with equal conviction opposed violence as a means of dissent. Calling for a new alliance of parents and children, Allen said "this is a natural alliance of father and son working together for the same goals."

He said these goals were peace both here and abroad and a reordering of our national priorities along people-oriented lines.

Allen pointed to the disturbing indicators that showed a concerted effort to malign America's youngsters and students and make them a target for violence and physical attack by unthinking and emotionally impressionable men.

The independent Democratic candidate urged all parents join him in declaring peace with their own family and help to form a third force to build bridge of trust and respect between the generations through participation in his campaign.

WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW:

--Fill out and return the enclosed postcard

--Call or come in to our campaign headquarters anytime, 9am to 9pm, any day of the week. We'll be there with lots of work to be done.

HEADQUARTERS OFFICE:
7119 Wisconsin Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Phone: 654-6807

ALLEN FOR CONGRESS

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DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESS, MARYLAND'S 8TH DISTRICT

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HEADQUARTERS OFFICE:
7119 Wisconsin Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20014
Phone: 654-6807

Rose Kramer Backs Allen In Candidacy for Congress

By Kirk Scharfenberg.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Montgomery County Councilwoman Rose Kramer has agreed to serve as cochairman of a citizens group supporting Democrat Tom Allen in his bid for Congress from Maryland's Eighth District.

Mrs. Kramer, who is not a candidate for re-election, is the first elected Democrat to publicly support the 49-year-old Allen, a former Episcopal clergyman.

Montgomery's Democratic organization as a whole has endorsed Thomas Hale Boggs, the 29-year-old son of Rep. Hale Boggs (D-La.).

In addition to serving as co-chairman of the Concerned Democrats for Allen, Mrs. Kramer is cochairman of a citizens group supporting Democratic Councilman William

Greenhalgh in his race for county executive.

Like Boggs, Greenhalgh is the choice of the Montgomery Democrats' volunteer organization and he is coordinating the activities of the organization slate that includes Boggs.

Boggs' supporters yesterday played down the significance of Mrs. Kramer's endorsement of Allen, noting that she has often acted independently of the county's Democratic organization.

However, Allen will undoubtedly cite Mrs. Kramer's support in rebutting charges by Boggs that Allen appeals only to a "small segment" of the Democratic Party and could not win against incumbent Rep. Gilbert Gude, a Republican, in the November general election.

Mrs. Kramer said yesterday that she was supporting Allen

because of his record of social activism in the county. Boggs, she said, has not been "conspicuously involved" in Montgomery affairs.

The Eighth District includes all of Montgomery County and parts of Howard and Anne Arundel Counties.

Greenhalgh noted yesterday that Mrs. Kramer became co-chairman of his citizens group before he won the endorsement of the Democratic organization.

**YOU CAN HELP
TOM ALLEN TOO**

CALL

654-6807

ANYTIME