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VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

U.S. Assistance on Information Matters and U.S. Psychological or Propaganda Operations

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church presiding. Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman), Church, and Gore. Senator CHURCH. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The principal purpose of this morning's meeting is to continue the committee's consideration of the operation of various U.S. programs in Vietnam.

First, the committee will hear testimony from Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., of California, who was in Vietnam only a few weeks ago. I am sure that his observations will be of interest and assistance to the committee.

Following Congressman McCloskey's testimony, the committee will hear testimony concerning U.S. activities to assist the Vietnamese Government on information matters and the scope of U.S. psychological or propaganda operations generally.

The United States is engaged in a broad-scale program to assist and promote the Government of Vietnam through the use of the entire spectrum of the communications media, from leaflet drops to television. I hope that this hearing will develop the full facts concerning the nature and extent of these activities. But of far greater significance than the specifics of what is being done in Vietnam is the underlying policy which presumes that it is proper and in the national interest for the U.S. Government to engage in propaganda activities in behalf of a foreign government.

There is also the question of whether the Congress in passing the Smith-Mundt Act, the USIA's basic statutory authority contemplated such a role for the Government's official overseas information agency.

However, the witness here to discuss U.S. programs in Vietnam, Mr. Edward J. Nickel, a career officer of the USIA, who is Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, is not responsible

for the policy which thrust the USIA into that role. His job is only to implement that policy.

We will now hear from Congressman McCloskey.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR., REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE 11TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In testifying before you today, I would like you to know first of the limitations on the accuracy of any opinions I may give.

EXPERIENCE OF WITNESS

As a Marine Corps Reserve officer, I have been a student of counter-insurgency warfare since the late 1950's and was privileged to participate in the last large-scale combat exercise in this field prior to our landing of combat troops in Vietnam in the spring of 1965. I applied for an active duty Marine Corps assignment to Vietnam in the fall of 1965, which was rejected; in the following year, I was offered the opportunity to serve as an AID provincial adviser in Vietnam but declined. Since being elected to the Congress in 1967, I have been able to visit Vietnam only twice, once for a period of 11 days just prior to the Tet offensive of January-February 1968, and more recently, for a period of 6 days in February of this year.

I tried to visit the same areas last month which I had seen 2 years earlier in order to appraise the progress of pacification, and more particularly the so-called Vietnamization program. Aside from headquarters briefings and the study of captured enemy documents and prisoner interrogations, I spent the bulk of my time in the hamlets and villages where the pacification program is being conducted, and with the infantrymen and advisers engaged in field operations.

My most recent observations and inquiries were limited to four of Vietnam's 44 Provinces, but I believe the northerly two Provinces, Binh Dinh and Quang Nam, to be fairly representative of the coastal portions of the I and II Corps areas, and the southerly Provinces, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, to reflect the range of problems faced in the delta and the territory surrounding Saigon. Since all four of these Provinces are rated fairly near the bottom for security purposes under the hamlet evaluation system (28th, 37th, 34th, and 35th, respectively, as of January), it is possible that my conclusions will be a little more pessimistic than the overall situation justifies. These conclusions are certainly susceptible of a considerable range of error in any event, but they represent my best judgment and I have no hesitancy in presenting them for your evaluation and comparison with those of our military and State Department personnel.

ORDINARY LIVING CONDITIONS IN I AND II CORPS AREAS

About 6 million people, roughly one-third of the population, reside in the I and II Corps areas. Ninety percent of them live within a few miles of the coast in fertile valleys which are bordered by rugged and heavily forested mountains.

The ordinary manner of living in the rural areas of Vietnam is in hamlets of a few hundred people. The Vietnamese rural hamlet is ordinarily a very pleasant place. The people are courteous, affectionate toward their families, respectful toward their elders and reverent about their ancestry. A family can grow its own food in the equivalent of 2 or 3 acres of land. The climate is mild and the soil fertile. There is no need, and I could observe little inclination, for leaving the area of one's home. I doubt that there are many places in the world where people can live in closer harmony with their land and environment than in the coastal provinces of the I and II Corps areas.

EFFECT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR IN I AND II CORPS AREAS

In waging counterinsurgency war in this area over the past several years, I was advised that we have destroyed 307 of the original 555 hamlets of Quang Nam Province.

I flew over miles and miles of area south and southwest of Danang where nearly every hamlet had been destroyed that was not within a mile of the main highway or larger settlements. Tree lines, hedgerows, and gravesites are all that remain.

The purpose for this destruction was to deny rice, cover, and support to the Vietcong, as well as to the North Vietnamese units operating in the adjacent mountainous areas.

In one interior valley of pleasant hamlets and productive soil which was pointed out to me 2 years ago, some 20,000 people have been forcibly evacuated to refugee camps along the coastal highway and their hamlets destroyed by either bombing, artillery fire or the action of individual soldiers.

The result has been predictable. One high-ranking CORDS officer told me that he estimated at least one-third of the Vietnamese people in Quang Nam Province to be hostile to the American military presence.

In the 5th Marine regimental tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) southwest of Danang, for example, the bulk of the casualties in 1969 came from booby traps. Infantrymen from the regiment discovered over 1,200 booby traps during the year, of which about half were detonated causing 95 KIA's (killed in action) and 1,195 WIA's (wounded for action), many of them amputees. Thus in 1 year's time the odds of being killed or wounded by a booby trap in this particular regimental area were about 1 in 2 for the 2,400-odd marine riflemen in the regiment.

Under these circumstances, I do not think enough can be said for the courage, morale, and patriotic service of American troops and the officers who lead them.

EFFECTIVENESS OF RESETTLEMENT AND TRAINING EFFORTS

In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, I visited hamlets which had originally been destroyed and defoliated, but which were in the process of resettlement. In Quang Nam Province thus far, some 63 of the 307 hamlets destroyed are being reoccupied as the Government seeks to expand the areas under Government control.

The protection of these hamlets is being assigned to PF and PSDF forces as the American forces are withdrawn, but I observed no evidence that the people were learning any great sense of commitment

to the Saigon government as they returned to their lands and commenced rebuilding homes and restoring land to production.

From a military standpoint, if U.S. troop withdrawals continue, I would predict that the entire coastal area from Binh Dinh north to the DMZ (demilitarized zone) will fall to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese within 90 days after the last American troops withdraw.

There seems little hope that the fragile institutions of hamlet and village government will survive increasing North Vietnamese and VC pressures once American troops are withdrawn.

Withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division last year and the pending withdrawal of additional brigades from the coastal areas has already caused an increase in enemy activities; remaining American units are required to expand their tactical areas of responsibility to the breaking point.

In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, for example, battalions of the 1st Marine Division and 173d Airborne Brigades, respectively, have been required to cover over 100 square miles each by breaking down into platoons and small units located at considerable distances from one another. It is presently requiring the full abilities and efforts of these units to maintain a status quo with small units of local VC and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units operating in the adjacent mountainous areas.

Of the rural hamlets I visited in both provinces, it was apparent that local RF/PF (Regional Forces/Popular Forces) and PSDF (Peoples' Self-Defense Forces) forces would be unable to protect any individual hamlet in the event that U.S. Main unit forces were withdrawn. While the ARVN divisions in I Corps are deemed excellent by U.S. troop commanders who have been working with them, no American officer was willing to predict that such units alone could withstand a determined assault by NVA units presently operating in I Corps or located just across the DMZ or Laotian frontier.

There appears to be no reasonable expectation that an additional 18 months of resettlement and training of local forces would be sufficient to withstand the historic attitudes of a large percentage of the populace, exacerbated by our clear and destroy and defoliation policies of years past.

SITUATION IN THE DELTA

A different situation exists in the delta in my judgment. There, on flat terrain, with an absence of jungle and mountain cover except in the areas close to the Cambodian border and the U Minh forest pacification has progressed far more rapidly. The province chiefs and adviser teams in the two provinces I visited, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, had achieved a far greater cohesion at the hamlet and village level, and prosperity and security have been materially advanced in the past 2 years. American combat troops have not operated in the delta since the 9th Infantry Division vacated the area in late 1969.

The number of VC-controlled hamlets has been substantially reduced and VC local forces and guerrillas have been prevented from any major interference with commerce and communications.

Perhaps the best indication of Government success in the area has been the progress in arming the PSDF. A decision to issue arms to large numbers of civilians 2 years ago would have been unthinkable; most such weapons would have ended up in the hands of the VC.

In the hamlets I visited in Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong Provinces, however, the large number of RF/PF available plus arms issued to the PSDF had caused the hamlet chief to feel relatively secure against anything but a major NVA or VC attack.

A qualification should be noted here, however. It is not entirely certain that the loyalty of either the RF/PF or PSDF is so assured as to guarantee against infiltration by the VC. One instance was cited to me where one individual had caused an entire PSDF squad to defect to the VC.

Also, a hard-core Communist prisoner told me, in an hour-long interviewing that Americans were getting a distorted view of the true views of the rural South Vietnamese, since we only talked to them in the presence of armed forces. This prisoner, a deceptively sweet-appearing lady who had been the VC mayor of My Tho, the Province capital for Dinh Tuong Province, indicated that "resolve, not numbers, will determine the final issue."

I would tend to agree.

The military and pacification progress in III and IV Corps, coupled with the terrain there, could permit a maintenance of the status quo, solely by South Vietnamese troops, barring a major NVA invasion from the Cambodian border. Should such an invasion occur, the issue will be squarely up to the abilities and resolve of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) divisions presently stationed in the southerly half of Vietnam. From hearsay only, I gather that most American military officers have grave doubts of the abilities of most of the ARVN units involved, and that the issue would be significantly in doubt.

ULTIMATE RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL

From what I could determine, nearly all Vietnamese, both North and South, desire reunification. If the NVA and VC resolve and willingness to undergo hardship remains firm, it would be my judgment that upon our withdrawal that they will ultimately succeed in forcing, first, a coalition government on the South and ultimately a reunification of their country.

I can see no reason why a U.S. presence of over 18 months will affect the ultimate result any differently than if we continue to withdraw, having all of our troops, both combat and support, home by the end of June 1971.

We have tended to equate "progress" with a guarantee of ultimate success. There has indeed been progress, but to obtain it, we have been required to militarize South Vietnam and to create a political structure which far outweighs the South Vietnamese economy's capacity to fund.

To cite an example, one hamlet I visited, with a population of less than 1,000, had local PF protection costing over 1.5 million piasters per year, and a civil administration costing another 1.5 million piasters per year. The total tax revenues from this hamlet were less than one-quarter million piasters per year, about a 12-to-1 ratio. These figures do not include the cost of the central government or American military and economic assistance. Repeated for some 10,500 existing hamlets in Vietnam, it is apparent that the operating expenses of the Saigon government, merely to maintain the status quo, are staggering.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CONCLUDE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

In conclusion, I would like to say a word in support of the Mathias resolution to terminate the Gulf of Tonkin authority, as well as comment on the responsibility of Congress, as opposed to the executive branch, in bringing American involvement in Vietnam to an early conclusion.

I had occasion to refer recently, Mr. Chairman, to the Federalist papers of Alexander Hamilton, particularly Nos. 24 and 26, where he was urging adoption of the Federal Constitution. It seems to me that the following statements of Mr. Hamilton are worthy of consideration by both Houses of Congress today:

The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.

I think that puts the burden on the Congress of the United States to determine how long we fund this conflict, and if we face that issue between now and November.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF PACIFICATION

I would be pleased to answer any questions. I think the summation of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is this: Pacification in the northern half is not successful and cannot be successful. In the south half of the country it is succeeding, but its continued success will depend on the ability in the—

Senator GORE. I did not understand you after the conjunction "but."

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I said in the north.

Senator GORE. I understood that part of it.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. In the south half of the country, in my judgment, pacification is proceeding successfully and can be successful, but only if the ARVN, South Vietnamese army units, are capable of withstanding a determined assault from across the Cambodian border in the future and that issue would be very much in doubt both on the quality of the ARVN troops in the south and on their resolve to fight.

Senator GORE. What dividing line do you choose between the northern part of the country and the southern part of the country?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Well, it is not precisely between the four corps areas, Mr. Senator. It is the nature of the terrain in the north half of the country, the mountainous jungle, heavily covered terrain where the rice paddies go right up against the areas of cover and concealment, these are the areas, in my judgment, where pacification cannot succeed. As you get down into the delta where the terrain is flat, where there is no heavily jungled cover, where there is no way in which troops can conceal themselves to come back into the villages and get their rice, in those areas pacification has been successful and is succeeding, in my judgement. But its continued success requires the prevention from intrusion of major NVA units. Every time major NVA units have come

into the area, the guerrilla incidents have increased and the loyalties of the people have become far more tenuous.

Senator GORE. May I continue with a question or two, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Certainly.

LOYALTY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO HANOI AND SAIGON

Senator GORE. Is there any loyalty, if that is the right term, on either side? Is it a matter of fear? This has been difficult for me to comprehend.

Mr. McCloskey. This is an impression, Senator, because I share your committee staff's feeling that it is very difficult for an American to understand what a Vietnamese thinks from what he says. But I would appraise the situation that there is very little loyalty to the Saigon government and there is very little love for the Hanoi government amongst the rural peasantry of South Vietnam; that the overwhelming bulk of the people, over 80 percent of them, would prefer peace at any price regardless of who happened to govern them; and that loyalty to a central government located in a city far away is a term that is not appropriate to apply to the rural countryside in Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Senator GORE. What is your assessment of their attitude toward American military presence?

Mr. McCloskey. Again that would be an impression that I could not guarantee as to its accuracy, but I see no reason for them not to accept the presence of anyone who is giving them a million piasters a year, to any village that would elect a village chief.

I can understand why a village might happily welcome the Americans who bring them the million piasters. But I do not think there is any long-range love for Americans.

Senator GORE. Did you mean to imply that the measure of the bounty was the election of a chief who was friendly to us or what do you mean to suggest?

Mr. McCloskey. I do not detect any bitter hatred of Americans amongst the villagers who seem to bear our artillery fire and our aircraft bombardment, but whom we pay a million piasters a year to any village that will elect a village chief. But I do not detect any love on their part for us either, and I suspect, and this is only an impression and not testimony under oath, but I suspect everyone in Vietnam would welcome the day when the last American has left Vietnam.

USE OF BOOBY TRAPS

Senator GORE. I notice you described the effective use of booby-traps. Can such traps be effective without at least the tacit approval and cooperation of the natives?

Mr. McCloskey. No, sir. Those areas south of—southwest of Danang where tremendous boobytrap casualties are occurring in the very areas that our troops go into day after day after day and in which the populace on the surface of things is at least passive if not

friendly to us, but obviously in those areas a large percentage of the people are willing to support the Vietcong that operate amongst them.

Senator GORE. I am asking you not out of information, but out of interest. If American GI's in small numbers are stationed in isolated villages, are they particularly vulnerable because of differences in physical appearance?

Mr. McCloskey. I do not know that, sir. The boobytrap casualties that the young men are suffering occur when they go out on patrol either day or night into areas in which they can operate in the daytime without too much fear of receiving sniper fire. We have been able to hold VC and NVA units at bay by our power. If they mass three men at one time, we hit them with artillery or bombing or we land a helicopter full of troops and go after them, but the troops are still there. The enemy are still there. They are not showing themselves. They have adjusted their tactics to match our firepower, but they are out there sowing boobytraps every night and those boobytraps are causing casualties to us in an overwhelming percentage. The fact they are able to sow these boobytraps night after night so that when our troops go out on a path they might hit a tripwire with a detonation which may cause 2.3 casualties every time the boobytrap is detonated means they are getting the support of the local populace in the countryside or they would not be able to do that.

When I say support, I do not mean that the local populace are loving the VC more than they love Saigon, but they are not willing to commit themselves.

Senator GORE. If the natives are to avoid the boobytraps, they must at least know where they are or have some knowledge of them.

Mr. McCloskey. The greatest advance by the Marine units that I observed was their growing sophistication in discovering boobytraps by locating the means by which the Vietnamese signal their location, perhaps two bamboo sticks left pointing to a "V" in a certain trail junction and apparently any Vietnamese in the area knows that means there is a boobytrap some distance away.

The American troops are gaining greater knowledge to deal with this situation.

Senator GORE. At least we are not slow to catch on.

Mr. McCloskey. We are not slow, but the penalty of failure can be that you lose both legs, sir.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. I think, Congressman McCloskey, your statement was excellent.

LIKELY RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

Is it your judgment that, after we have left Vietnam, two things are likely to happen; the present Government is likely to be replaced in Saigon by some form of coalition government and the two halves of Vietnam are likely to be reunited?

Mr. McCloskey. That is correct. Just by way of example, in the village capital, in the village hut that goes for a city hall in the provinces in the north, there is a plaque on the wall that says "The Nation Overall" in Vietnamese; and the map is of all of Vietnam, North and South, not just South Vietnam. I could find no indication

on the part of anyone that South Vietnam was considered a permanent and independent nation as we would have it.

Senator CHURCH. In your judgment, then, the overwhelming sentiment in both North and South Vietnam is to reunify the country.

Mr. McCloskey. I think I can say honestly—I have never been to North Vietnam—the resolve that keeps them coming 800 miles south to try to unify the country would so indicate.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

American policy for years has been to keep Vietnam divided, as well as to support and sustain an anti-Communist government in Saigon that would be closely allied with our country. From your testimony I understand there is no evidence whatever that that objective has been abandoned by the present Administration—

Mr. McCloskey. I would have to agree.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). And that that objective will not be achieved once American forces leave.

Mr. McCloskey. Senator, let me make a qualification to my prior answer. I did detect in the President's speech early after his election the mention of a peace based on the Geneva accords of 1954, and such a peace would presuppose the reunification of Vietnam within 2 years because that was the understanding under the Geneva accords of 1954. Unfortunately, I have seen no other mention by this Administration of a concurrence that they would accept a peace based on the Geneva accords which involved a unification of Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. The policy by which we fought this war has hardly been directed at a reunified Vietnam. Yet this will very likely occur by the forces that we have been opposing.

Mr. McCloskey. Correct.

U.S. PERCEPTION OF AND POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA QUESTIONED

Senator CHURCH. I think the inability of the U.S. Government to know how the people of Vietnam really feel, what their political values are, and what their national objectives may be, has been evident throughout the whole course of our involvement in that country. It is also reflected in what has just happened in Cambodia.

From the contacts that I have had with the State Department and from the briefings that this committee has been given, it was unanticipated that Prince Sihanouk would be displaced in Cambodia. In fact, official opinion plus informed expert opinion here had it that if anyone was secure in Southeast Asia, it was Sihanouk.

This clearly demonstrates the fragility of any policy on our part which seeks objectives that are intimately indigenous, and the futility of attempting to win a civil war in a country such as Vietnam with a foreign army.

In the face of that experience, why are we not disengaging American military forces from Southeast Asia generally, especially from Laos and Thailand, before we find ourselves confronted with questions of honor, commitment, and the other political consequences that flow from such a predicament?

Did you have an opportunity in your trip to visit Thailand or Laos?

Mr. McCloskey. No, sir. I have not had the privilege of visiting the other countries.

I think that the great lesson of Vietnam is that in a land where people are wedded to their soil, and their tradition, and their history, that to try to say to a country of 17.5 million people, "We will impose a government of our type, of our choice," in a country which has no real reason to have any cohesion with any government—these people live very happily in their own villages and are unwilling to make a commitment to any kind of government—that in that kind of a country, the use of American firepower is almost immoral.

SENATOR CHURCH. Immoral. Immoral is perhaps not strong enough a term. After all, you mentioned that 307 villages out of 555 had been destroyed in one province alone by American firepower.

MR. McCLOSKEY. I would say this, Senator. That where we seek to lead the world to a peace through law and the only legal precedents we look to are the Hague Convention and perhaps the Nuremberg agreement where we said wanton destruction of villages was a war crime, there is no way we could state that our policy of destroying Vietnamese villages to deny rice and support to the VC that operate in the vicinity and in some respects out of those villages is not of the same level to be condemned as we did in Nuremberg when we executed German officers for pursuing a policy of wanton destruction of villages, and if a war has to be fought by destroying people's homes because so many of the people who live in an area are sympathetic to the enemy, then I do not think America should ever again fight such a war with our weapons in such a country.

SENATOR CHURCH. I concur wholeheartedly in what you said. If we had just left those people alone, if we had just stayed out of their affairs, none of this terrible agony, none of this wanton destruction, none of this mass killing would have occurred on the scale that has taken place. And, ironically, the security interests of the United States would not have been affected one iota.

Our Vietnam policy has been touched with madness; this foreign adventure is undoubtedly the greatest catastrophe that has ever occurred in the history of our country overseas.

I appreciate very much your testimony. I think it has been very helpful.

THE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Congressman, I am sorry I was a bit late. I read your statement, and I know something of your views. I expect anything I ask you may be repetitive and yet I do not think it hurts to go over one or two points.

U.S. OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

You have made very clear your views about the destruction of the villages. The Senator from Idaho mentioned our objective of creating a government there that was friendly to us. How do you see the objective of our policy and activity in Vietnam? What does it strike you that we seek to achieve there?

MR. McCLOSKEY. Well, I think, quite honestly, that the North Vietnamese have characterized it properly, and that is to permanently divide that country preventing Communist domination of the entire country, that our policy has been to divide it and to furnish such military and economic assistance as is necessary to preserve its division.

THE CHAIRMAN. Does that strike you as being a valid objective?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. No, sir; I think that in the long run you can trace most trouble spots in the world to countries that were divided—Germany, Korea, the Israelis—

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if they did achieve their announced objective, it would not be in the interests of this country. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. My feeling is that any divided country is a potential source of world war III and that it should be our national policy to seek a reunification of Vietnam and Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose our people would say we are perfectly willing to reunify it provided it is on our terms and if they will accept our views as to what kind of government they will have; will they not? Our people will not object to Vietnam's reunification providing they accept our terms.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO END U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I think if this issue is fairly debated, Senator, that the people will decide it at the polls in November. This was the reason for my quote from Alexander Hamilton because the Congress of the United States has it within its power to stop our involvement in Vietnam just as much as the President does.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you propose that that be done?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I would propose a continuing withdrawal over a period not to exceed 18 months offering sanctuary to any Vietnamese who chose to leave the country because he felt imperiled by our withdrawal.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I did not understand. You said the Congress had the power to stop the war. What did you have in mind about the Congress—cutting off the money?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Two ways, sir; I thought that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, under which President Johnson indicated he felt he had this power, should be terminated effective December 31, 1970. I think I would extend that now to 1971. Also under the Constitution where we are given the sole power to provide for a standing army for a period not to exceed 2 years, I think that means exactly what it says and perhaps we should attach to appropriations measures this year the qualification that the Congress will vote only such funds as are sufficient to permit our continuing and steady withdrawal with all American troops to be out at the end of fiscal 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution under consideration and will actively consider it on Friday, I think, in the Mathias resolution, but I understand from the letter they gave us that the Administration's position is that repeal of the Tonkin Gulf would not affect the President's right to continue the war. He is not relying on it. This President says he is not relying on the Tonkin Gulf resolution for his right to carry on the war. So I do not think that would do it.

The money business I think would do it. Do you think there is a majority of the Congress that would vote that?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Not right now, Senator, but I think as this matter is debated between now and November and congressional candidates, all of whom run for office in November, are forced to a yes or no answer on the question, "Will you or will you not fund money to continue

our indefinite involvement in Vietnam?" that that issue may be determined by the American people, and I think exactly that is what the framers of the American Constitution had in mind when they said one body will face election every 2 years.

I have heard different figures from the Pentagon but if our strength—we had the equivalent of 12 combat infantry divisions in Vietnam, 108 maneuver battalions. Every time one division is brought home, I have heard the Pentagon say it saves this country \$1.5 billion in the defense budget, so it is merely a matter of multiplying that sum of money by bringing our troops home and attaching a rider in the appropriation bills when they come before the House and Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes the votes. I have been under the impression that a very strong majority of the House supports the war.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Yes, sir. When I was elected to the Congress in 1967, I think I was the only Republican opposed to the war. Perhaps there were two or three others. But I noticed in October last year 64 Republicans signed a resolution drafted by Paul Findley of Illinois. They supported the President in his expressed determination to withdraw all American troops at the earliest practicable date, and I suspect by next November a majority even in the House of Representatives will support the Administration on this as troops are beginning to be withdrawn on a steady, continued rate.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if your judgment as to their sentiment is true, then it is very hopeful that something can be done.

POSSIBILITY OF CONGRESS'S ENDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

This is a drastic step. I am inclined to favor it; do not misunderstand that. I think this war is the greatest tragedy that this country has ever encountered, but our people are not conditioned to the policy of directly challenging a President of the United States.

Have you seen George Reedy's book about our Presidency? There was a portion of it in Look magazine which was entitled, "Do We Need a Kick?" Did you see that?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I have not seen that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very interesting book. I mean it is a very good one. As you remember, Mr. Reedy had considerable experience in the White House and the sort of royal attitude and regal attitude that developed in recent years about it.

I do not know whether we can do it or not. I think it is something to consider. Your views that it might come about ought to be encouraging to the President to give him backing to move out of this place quickly.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I have supported what he has done thus far, Senator. I think that the studied and orderly withdrawal have taken out almost a third of the American combat troops in the first 9 months since he commenced the withdrawal and that this is consistent with the views I express today. I am concerned with whether or not that withdrawal will continue. Within the next 3 to 9 months I suspect that the status quo will change in Vietnam as American troops continue to be withdrawn because it is a very tenuous situation there in the north, and if those American troops continue to be withdrawn over the next year, I suspect that the balance of power will change between the conflicting elements.

NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate may be too interested in precedents. It has been accused of being precedent ridden, but take this case: I cannot think offhand of a war of any consequence having been stopped by one side gradually withdrawing without any negotiated agreement with regard to the ending of the war.

If I thought this could take place, as you described it, I certainly would be for it if it would happen in a reasonable period of a year or 2 years. I know of no precedent, and therefore it, among other reasons, makes me very skeptical that this is going to happen. What I anticipate as much more likely to happen is that a number of troops will be withdrawn but a very large contingent will be left with the most sophisticated weapons which will give logistics support to the best troops of the Vietnamese government and they kind of stay there in a kind of a stalemate in a modification of the enclave theory. This could go on for 5 or 10 years without a negotiated settlement.

This is the only reason. It is a practical matter. The most similar war to this is the war of the French in the same country after being there 100 years. How did they end their war? They did not just walk off. They went to Geneva and had a cease-fire and had a negotiated and agreed upon settlement called the Geneva Accord.

It is hard for me to believe that if we are really serious about ending the war with a clean-cut end to it, if that is not the procedure most likely to bring that about.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL COULD RESULT IN VIETNAMESE ACCOMMODATION

Mr. McCloskey. Senator, this is speculation, of course, but as American troops continue to withdraw, and assuming that the Vietnamese who have become quite adept with our artillery, gain an increasing sophistication in the use of helicopters and communication and logistics in which they have a particularly grave problem, and assuming that they are able to build a South Vietnamese army that can hold its own, the very nature of Vietnam, as an 800 mile long country with roughly 15 ARVN divisions matched against an equal number of North Vietnamese and Vietcong, in my judgment will require the South Vietnamese forces to retire into a modified enclave giving up much of the northern coasts, some of the central highlands, some of the III Corps area, and concentrating around Saigon. If this happens, bearing in mind there will be over a million men in South Vietnam under arms and there never have been over 200,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong opposed to them, the South Vietnamese retiring and becoming stronger as their lines grow less, the North Vietnamese grow weaker as they fight a longer distance from home, you would have the Vietnamese people, a very pragmatic people, not desirous of continuing the execution of each other.

For example, I think of the four province chiefs where I had visited, two of them were from the north. Three-eighths of the Saigon government, their house of delegates, are from the north; three-eighths of the North Vietnamese leadership is from the south.

I think as a pragmatic people faced with the destruction of their country by foreign forces over all these years, they will reach some accommodation between themselves which will bring their war to an

end, and I do not see that the continuing American military presence will contribute to that settlement. I think it is counterproductive when we destroy villages, kill people, arm increasing numbers of the peasantry. We are prolonging the conflict by our presence there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so too.

Mr. McCloskey. We could not train these people from 1960 to 1970, Senator. I doubt 3 years instead of 18 months remaining there will change the balance.

U.S. RESPONSE TO VC PROVOCATION DURING WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. What do you anticipate will happen if we get down to 300,000 men and the Vietcong become impatient and attack a city or do something provocative? Do we continue to deescalate? The President was implicit in his statement that if they did not sort of cooperate and make it easier for us to get out, he would retaliate.

Mr. McCloskey. I think it is very noteworthy in the President's two speeches that when he spoke of the possibility of retaliation he referred only to the danger to U.S. forces. He made it clear in both of those speeches, one of which was very carefully worked out by him personally, that a threat to the South Vietnamese need not provoke our retaliation, but only a threat to U.S. forces would do so. I do not think we need fear a Dunkirk. I do not know of any U.S. unit in Vietnam which would be left there without sufficient firepower and air support to defend itself in the process of withdrawal.

QUESTION IS ONE OF MOST FEASIBLE WAY TO END WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Do not misunderstand me. I am for ending the war in any way we can do it, but which is the most feasible and likely way to do it and which could come the soonest? It seems to me that the traditional political settlement by which nearly every war I can think of has been ended is the one that has the most promise, but if the other will work, I am for that too.

I do not criticize doing it. It is a question of how much time we allow. This Administration has been in nearly a year and 3 months. That is becoming a very substantial time period to look for results. There has been a decrease in the casualties, it is true, but they are still quite substantial.

EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION

I have a few more specific questions. While you were there did you notice any signs of defoliation of the countryside?

Mr. McCloskey. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it extensive?

Mr. McCloskey. Well, let me put it this way: In the coastal plains of the north they have had to move the people into within a mile or so of the main roads in the cities and they have moved them out of their villages and destroyed their villages in the interior valleys that go back from the coast because of the desire to deny rice to the Vietcong.

Several officers pointed out to me that in the interior valleys whenever there was the indication of someone growing a crop back there, whether it was civilians left behind or people who had gone back to their homes or Vietcong, the planes were instructed to go in and imme-

diately defoliate any crops that were being grown in the interior valleys.

In the two hamlets that I visited which are being revisited, that is close to 550 in Quang Nam, 307 were destroyed, some 63 have now been resettled or they are in the process of resettlement. When I spoke with the villagers in those towns being resettled, they spoke of the fact they could not grow coconuts as they had and they pointed out the coconut trees which had been destroyed or defoliated with chemicals at the time the village had been destroyed back in 1966 or 1967, whenever it had occurred. So in the resettlement process while they can restore the rice paddies and grow some younger trees for reproduction, it is going to be a long time before they restore some of those trees that have been hurt by the defoliation.

The CHAIRMAN. We really do not know enough about the ultimate effect of defoliants to know how long it will be or how permanent is the destruction by the chemical; do we?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I can only say what I have observed, Senator, I do not know. But I did see people tilling ricefields in areas which they told me had been defoliated in the last 2 or 3 years. What the crops will be and who will suffer from them I do not know, but they were actually tilling the soil.

The CHAIRMAN. There was one article in the paper which said we had defoliated an amount of territory approximately equal to the State of Massachusetts.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I could believe that from what I saw, sir, because these interior valleys that stretch away from the coast are considered free fire zones and apparently we defoliate anything growing there as part of this rice denial program, but they are substantial areas. I would say there are hundreds of square miles of areas where every village had been razed to the ground.

WITNESS' SERVICE IN MARINE CORPS

The CHAIRMAN. How long has it been since you have been in the Marines? When did you get out?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I served in the Marine Corps in Korea as a platoon leader in 1951. I was released to inactive duty in 1952. I stayed in the Reserve until 1965. I was on active duty in Operation Silver Lance at the time the 1st Marine Brigade was sent to the Gulf of Tonkin in March of 1965. I tried to remain as an infantry officer when I was a civilian between 1952 and 1967 when I went to Congress.

CIVILIAN KNOWLEDGE OF FREE FIRE ZONES

The CHAIRMAN. I had a letter this morning from a former marine in my hometown, Fayetteville, dated March 12. It says:

This past week saw five marines charged with murder. There are elements surrounding this that I do not understand. Civilians in this instance were supposed to be in a free fire zone. I don't know what a free fire zone is. The term wasn't in currency when I was a Marine. However, I take it to mean a zone where anything that moves is a candidate for sudden death. I am very concerned about how such information on a zone of this sort is disseminated to the civilians in the area, especially in light of the fact that the area was an enemy-held territory. Did these unfortunate souls know that this part of their land was off limits to them? Who told them and how?

Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I do not, sir.

The areas that we flew over and the hamlets which I visited in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh in the north, there were obviously free fire zones where nothing stood; but there were people walking around down in those areas, and this is what I spoke of in my testimony. The greatest single attachment that the Vietnamese has, in my judgment, is to his lands and they are not going to be easily moved off the lands even at the cost of the risk if they remain. They risk remaining in the zone, even with signs showing the limits of the village and the limits of the free fire zone.

The CHAIRMAN. How did we propose to tell the people they were in a free fire zone and to get out? Did we go through any motions? Did USIA tell them or not?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Well, I only know this by hearsay. I have not seen the operations, but I understand that in a cordon and search operation, or search and destroy, they will attempt to have people in aircraft with megaphones telling people where to go and why and what is going to be the free fire zone and what isn't and scatter thousands and thousands of leaflets. But I do not think we are ever going to be sure with that kind of information that there are 10 percent who will not get the word. And the result has been in that particular country a lot of innocent people have been killed.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very risky to go about talking from a helicopter. They could shoot it down; could they not? We have been losing on the average about one and one-tenth helicopters per day in recent months. Did I see that in the paper recently?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. The figures seem very staggering. I could not verify the precise figures.

SITUATION OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I would like your comment on the next paragraph of this letter. He says:

No matter how you look at it, you cannot escape the fact that it would not have happened if we had not been there in the first place. We have put our young men in an impossible situation. They are damned if they do and they are dead if they don't.

I thought that was a rather striking way to put it. I am speaking of our own young men who are now being accused of murder.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I think they are the finest young men in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. I say if they did not do what they did, they are very likely to be dead; are they not? They think they would in any case. They are being put into an intolerable situation.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. The reaction time of a marine rifleman to a situation which may or may not cause his death very seldom permits judicious decision. I think Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "Sober reflection is not required in the presence of an uplifted knife." And to that rifleman walking in a rice paddy, the question of whether he is a civilian or enemy certainly does not give him much time or opportunity and certainly not the inclination to take the chance.

The CHAIRMAN. The next sentence says:

The only possible answer to me is to remove them from this situation. If we don't, we can expect more of the same, and we will have to bear our share of the blame.

He goes on for several pages. It is quite an interesting letter. He says the time is far past when we should have stopped and asked ourselves where it is that we are going. It is a very interesting letter from a marine.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ENDING VIETNAMESE WAR

I appreciate very much your taking the time to come here. You are very optimistic, I think. I hope you are correct about the attitude of the Congress. I am not nearly in as close touch with the House, as you are and, therefore, I certainly do not wish to challenge your judgment. All I can say is I hope. When I look at some of the actions recently taken on military affairs, the urgency with which they wish to give jets to Taiwan and more money to Korea with which to fight, it does not seem to me they have become very pacific in their attitude. They seem to be much more eager to heat up the war than they are to calm it down, but I certainly hope you are correct in your judgment that they would not do it. I feel the Senate has moved very strongly in that direction.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I would not suggest that we have anywhere near a majority which would do as I say, Senator, with respect to cutting off the money or indeed stopping the Gulf of Tonkin authority, but I suspect with those November elections looming that perhaps the 92d Congress may be of a little different persuasion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is encouraging. After all, the final justification for our system of government is that the people do have an opportunity to make such a change this fall if they wish to take it. If they do not wish to take it, if they do not wish to make this a major issue, of course, they do not have to and we can continue. But you are quite right and I have confidence and faith in the efficiency and workability of our system. So many of us have been here too long perhaps or at least very long and we become impatient, I guess, too impatient, with the slowness with which these decisions are finally reached, especially when you are concerned with such a tragic situation as this war.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Speaking for myself, I am very happy to see you there who can interpret what the war is about and give and bring to it an estimate and a judgment which not many people have had and which will be very important to the Congress.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been very helpful to have your testimony this morning and such testimony is one of the main reasons that maybe what you say about the judgment of the people in the coming election will come about.

Thank you very much.

WITNESSES' VIEWS ON VIETNAM WAR

Mr. Reporter, I want to put in the record an interview with the Congressman.

Mr. Congressman, do you know the interview by Lou Cannon? It does not have a date on it. Was it in February? Put it in the record. (The information referred to follows:)

[February, 1970]

MARINE VETERAN TOURS VIETNAM—GOP CONGRESSMAN SAYS WAR "IMMORAL"

(By Lou Cannon)

WASHINGTON.—A Republican congressman and former Marine officer has returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam convinced that the United States must speed its withdrawal from "this immoral war."

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey of California, the man who came to Congress in 1967 by defeating Shirley Temple Black and others in a special election, inspected Vietnam on a weeklong trip sponsored by Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

This 90-member group of essentially anti-Pentagon congressmen from both parties paid for McCloskey's \$968 round trip fare to Vietnam in an effort to assess military strategy and withdrawal progress there.

McCloskey, a decorated Marine combat officer in the Korean war and a counter-intelligence reserve officer who later helped participate in guerilla war planning, emerged from his second inspection of Vietnam more critical of the U.S. role than ever before.

The California congressman believes that President Nixon, "while preserving his options," is actually embarked on a policy that will leave between 200,000 and 250,000 American support troops in Vietnam and frustrate the opportunity for a coalition settlement ending the war.

McCloskey also came away convinced that news reports of battles showing many Communists are killed in proportion to the American casualties are seriously misleading. He says the casualty figures of his own Marine regiment, the 5th, show that the United States is taking the majority of its casualties from booby traps in situations where the enemy takes no casualties at all.

But McCloskey's strongest-held perceptions appeared to involve neither military strategy nor political timetables but the U.S. participation in the war itself.

"I flew over miles and miles of areas where the hamlets and villages had been totally destroyed," McCloskey said. "I have real reservations that this policy is anything but a war crime. If you look back to Nuremberg and our policy in 1946, we insisted that it was a war crime to wantonly destroy villages."

McCloskey visited Vietnam two years ago shortly after his election to Congress.

While he was sharply critical then of the policy the United States was pursuing, he tended to view the war from the perspective of an essentially military man who was convinced the country was caught up in a war it could not win.

"When I was there two years ago it was not apparent to me that we were pursuing a scorched earth policy," McCloskey said. "No one told me and I didn't observe it. This time the difference was immediately apparent."

McCloskey said that the policy of destroying villages in the north and coastal areas has now been largely abandoned because it has been "counterproductive." But in these areas, up to one-third of the people may be living in refugee centers and McCloskey says he is convinced that the areas, now occupied by I Corps and II Corps, would quickly go Communist when the American forces withdraw.

It is the "scorched earth" policy that clearly concerns McCloskey the most. *"This bothers me more than My Lai," he says.*

He does not want to comment on the guilt or innocence of anyone accused of the purported My Lai murders, but he says that the "underlying facts" are the orders to destroy villages.

"The only purpose of destroying villages was that they gave occasional shelter to the VC that came into them or provided rice for the VC," McCloskey believes. "It's exactly what we executed Germans for doing."

The situation, he found, was different in the delta area south and west of Saigon than in the I Corps and II Corps area.

Here, McCloskey discovered some "real progress" in helping villages to establish a modicum of local democracy and defense. He thinks it conceivable that the South Vietnamese forces in the delta might be able to survive on their own after American withdrawal.

But even in the delta, McCloskey is sharply critical of American policy.

THE UNHEEDED VOICES

WHILE PROFESSORS IN SOUTHERN ILLINOIS GET READY FOR THE "POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION OF VIETNAM," THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES SPEAK OUT ON THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY.



"REPRESSION EQUALS BETRAYAL OF THE PEOPLE": *South Vietnamese students protest police occupation of Saigon University, August 1970. AID's Public Safety Division supplies and trains the Thieu-Ky regime's police.*



August, 1970: Demonstration at the National Assembly to protest election frauds. "STOP THE AMERICANS FROM USING ELECTIONS TO CREATE A NEW TRAITOROUS DIEM DICTATORSHIP!" Until recently slogans did not mention Americans directly.



*Saigon, August 1970: Effigies of Thieu
and Ky.*



A comment on American educational programming for Vietnam: "WE DEMAND REVISION OF FOREIGN [AMERICAN] INSPIRED EDUCATIONAL POLICY. ENOUGH BRAINWASHING!" For eight years SIU has carried out education programs in Vietnam under grants for \$2 million from AID.

AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF KENT STATE

PROF. JERRY LEWIS
Dept. of Sociology
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

NOON, THURS., OCT. 29 MASUR AUD., BG. 10

MORATORIUM GREETING CARDS

Before ordering holiday greeting cards this year, look at ours. The Moratorium Committee will again have greeting cards suitable for Christmas use, or for other occasions. These original, non-sectarian cards can be obtained from Committee members

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SAT. 31 OCT. RALLY at LAFAYETTE PARK

BUSSES WILL LEAVE FROM BLDG. 1 at 10:30 AM

END THE WAR NOW

SAT. OCT. 31

BRING ALL TROOPS HOME NOW!

Behind the smokescreen of presidential press conferences, the murderous war rolls on and on. Promises of future troop withdrawals cannot hide the steady flow of flag-draped coffins nor the maimed G.I.'s whose totals now exceed the wounded of World Wars I or II.

Devastation of the land and the slaughter of civilians continues under the mask of "Vietnamization" as the U.S. Government tries to impose the corrupt warlords of Saigon upon the Vietnamese people who desire only an end to a quarter-century of war.

The cost of the war is ripping our country apart: Inflation, unemployment, the cost-of-living, and higher taxes continue to plague the American people. Crisis conditions face the Blacks, the poor, minority groups, and youth.

In 30 or more cities across the U.S., people from all walks of life will be registering their votes for peace in marches and rallies on October 31st, demanding *Immediate Withdrawal of All U.S. Troops and Arms from Southeast Asia*. Join this pre-election day peace demonstration.

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THE VIETNAM MORATORIUM COMMITTEE
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3 VETERANS OF VIETNAM



YOUR CHANCE TO FIND OUT WHAT'S REALLY HAPPENING FROM
EX-CAPTAIN ROBERT JOHNSON (WEST POINT '65) AND TWO
OTHER MEN WHO HAVE BEEN THERE. ASK THEM YOURSELVES!



NOON, THURS., DEC. 10
NIH, BLDG. 10, MASUR AUD.

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All Concerned Employees
Federal Employees for Peace-Parklawn
Viet Nam Moratorium Committee at NIH/NIMH

sponsors:

speaker: DICK GREGORY

in front of building 1

12 noon

May 4th

Thursday

EMERGENCY MORATORIUM

EMERGENCY MORATORIUM

Thursday

May 4th

12 noon

in front of building 1

speaker: DICK GREGORY

sponsors:

All Concerned Employees

Federal Employees for Peace-Parklawn

Viet Nam Moratorium Committee at NIH/NIMH

CALL TO ACTION

JUNE 26-27 WASHINGTON, D.C.

In order to exercise our First Amendment right as citizens to petition Congress for a **redress** of grievances, a group of more than 150 of us came to Washington on May 24th. We carried our petition (copy enclosed) to the House of Representatives and presented it to Speaker Carl Albert. He said he would "refer the matter to an appropriate committee."

Considering his reply totally inadequate, 94 of us refused to leave the Capitol "until Congress acts to decide to end the war." We deliberately committed an act of civil disobedience by remaining, were arrested and jailed—most for the first time.

REDRESS: AN EMERGENCY ACTION

We viewed our petitioning of May 24th as a beginning, knowing the only way we can demonstrate our seriousness is to continue our protest. We now want you to join us in a second petitioning of Congress for an end to the war. This time we want to confront the Senate—not with 150, but with many hundreds. We do so both as a response to the escalated air war in Indochina, and to the Constitutional crisis at home, created by an administration that has put aside any pretense of yielding to Congressional or public will.

OUR PLANS

Most of us who came before—including those who were arrested—intend to return to Washington on **Monday evening, June 26th**. We will gather between **6 and 7 P.M.** at the **Quality Motel, 415 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.** There we will discuss and finalize the precise plans for the presentation of our **redress** petition the next day at the Senate. This evening meeting, June 26th, is crucial, both to develop a common sense of purpose and action, and to provide time to begin projecting how we can continue and expand our protest to the war.

ARRANGEMENTS

Hotel rooms have been reserved, subject to confirmation a few days before June 26th, so **PLEASE CONTACT THE REDRESS OFFICE IF YOU ARE PLANNING TO COME: (202) 785-3111, 1322 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.** Each person is responsible for their own transportation and hotel accommodations.

OUR BASIC PRINCIPLES

Our purpose remains that of bringing all American ground, air, naval, and economic involvement in Indochina to an immediate end. We believe that domestic protest is, perhaps, the only remaining restraint on the total destruction of the societies of Indochina, so we act on the basis of these four principles:

- 1. We are, for the most part, of the professions—arts, sciences, religious and academic disciplines.** We will cooperate with other organizations, and we welcome support in our attempt to reach all other sectors of society, but we wish, at this time, to mobilize large numbers of professionals like ourselves in our resistance to the war.
- 2. We shall continue to embrace the basic American principle of a restored constitutionality and a redress of grievances.** We are convinced of the appropriateness and effectiveness of this principle, and of the possibility of bringing together people of divergent views with this principle.
- 3. We wish also to create an expanding circle of people committed to non-violent civil disobedience.** We believe that sustained and increasingly wide-spread civil disobedience will have a profound political impact and could be a major force in ending the war.
- 4. We stand on the Nuremberg principle of the responsibility of citizens to oppose their country's war crimes.** Though the actions we propose are modest, we take seriously the question of the individual's responsibility in a country that has lapsed into daily crimes of war.

In all these ways, we are a group of citizens convinced that responsibility lies in opposing the crimes of our own society even to the point of non-violent civil disobedience. We seek your support and hope that you will join us in Washington, June 26-27.

BANDUNG (ASIAN-AFRICAN) CONFERENCE, April, 1955
from George McT. Kahin, "The Asian-African Conf.," Cornell U. Press, 1956

20 countries attended

29 countries attended: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambo, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, N.Viet, S.Viet, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, Sudan.
Idea originated with Indonesia in spring, 1954.

pl3: "Norodom's approach was gentle and indirect, but it was clear to the delegates what he was driving at [China]. As did the Laotian delegation, he supported the Five Principles of Co-Existence, but he went further, stating that Cambo was 'independent and neutral,' steering a course 'towards the community of neutral nations--among them India and Burma.' Having taken this position, Cambo, he said, had 'the dangerous privilege of standing the test and application of the Pancha Shila [Five Principles]....It will be the task of the more powerful nations to set the example, to give proofs and guarantees to the smaller nations.'"

Thailand espec. worried about subversion and their 3 mill Chinese citizens.

In Final Communique, participants pledged to ~~xx~~ principles including:

"5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations
"6a Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
b Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries."

PRIME MINISTER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU's Closing Speech Apr. 24, 1955:

"Europe has got~~x~~ into the habit of thinking -- also other great countries in America or Europe, whatever their political persuasion may be -- that their quarrels are the world's ~~w~~ quarrels, and therefore the world must submit to them this way or that way. Well, I do not quite follow that reasoning. I do not want anybody to quarrel in Europe, Asia or America, but if at least others quarrel, why should I quarrel and why should I be ~~x~~ dragged into their quarrels and wars? I just do not understand it. Therefore, I hope we shall keep away from these quarrels and exercise our will not to ~~w~~ quarrel."...

"Are we copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians? What are we? We are Asians or Africans. We are none else. If we are camp followers of Russia or America or any other country of Europe, it is, if I may say so, not very creditable to our dignity, our new independence, our new freedom, our new spirit~~x~~ and our ~~xx~~ new self-reliance."

Africa and Asia are "sister continents"

he moved very slowly. I said we had to make it to the little apple tree by the garage. We grabbed for it and just then we were hit by a wall of water and I lost him. He just slipped away into the water.

Jack Clark
Rapid City, S.D.

Dear Editor:
I was saddened to learn of the catastrophe that befell Rapid City, S.D., on June 10. As a citizen of a country subjected to so many artificial catastrophes over a period of so many years, I pay homage to the victims in Rapid City and sincerely sympathize with the families in their grief.

Allow me to alert American public opinion to the fact that the U.S. government is attacking directly and indirectly the dikes of the Red River in North Vietnam, which might cause, at the time of the rising of the water level from next July to October, a disaster a thousand times greater than that of Rapid City, a disaster affecting millions of people.

Will you permit such a genocide to be committed?

Sincerely yours,
Nguyen H. Dong
(letter of June 17 to the International Herald Tribune from a Vietnamese living in France.)



QUOTES FROM NIXON'S SPEECH, MAY 8, 1972

AS I ANNOUNCED IN MY REPORT
TO THE NATION TWELVE DAYS AGO,
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
IN RESISTING THIS INVASION HAS
BEEN LIMITED TO AIR AND NAVAL
STRIKES ON MILITARY TARGETS
IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM.



THROUGHOUT THE WAR IN
VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES
HAS EXERCISED A DEGREE
OF RESTRAINT UNPRECEDENTED
IN THE ANNALS OF WAR.



artwood



BY SIMPLY GETTING OUT WE
WOULD ONLY WORSEN THE
BLOODSHED.



YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE

At the Nuremberg trials the principle was accepted that individuals cannot morally and legally hide behind "orders from above." In a democracy each citizen is responsible for domestic and foreign policy; his voice and his vote determine decisions in Washington. You by your study or indifference, by your silence or your letters to your Senators, you are shaping United States policy concerning Vietnam. Participate vigorously in the Vietnam Emphasis of your church.

If you want a leaflet on what to read or how to handle this issue in your local church write to: Service Center, 7820 Reading Road, Cincinnati, Ohio 45237, and ask for free copies of WHAT CAN I DO ABOUT VIETNAM? and VIETNAM PRIMER: POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

Joint Program of the Board of Missions and the Board of Christian Social Concerns of The Methodist Church
Order free of charge (except for postage and handling in quantity: 20 copies 25¢, 50 copies 45¢, 100 copies 65¢) from

SERVICE CENTER

7820 Reading Road • Cincinnati, Ohio 45237



VIETNAM YOUR WAR

A WORLD VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR

Some American Methodists support President Johnson in his Vietnam policy. They agree with his comment that "If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or American protection." The position of many Americans is that of the Marine who wrote, "I am fighting to protect and maintain a democratic society . . . I don't like being here, but I am doing a job that must be done. I am fighting an inevitable enemy that must be fought, now or later." The sincerity of those who support the war cannot be doubted and must be respected. Also, whatever the position we take, we all share a common concern for the Americans who face danger in Vietnam as they perform the tasks that their government has set for them.

On the other hand, there are American Methodists who either have grave doubts about the President's policy or are definitely opposed to it. For example, on November 12, 1966, the Council of Bishops said: "As the Council of Bishops of The Methodist Church, we announce our readiness for representatives of our church to assemble with other representative religious leaders of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and indeed of all the world's great religious traditions, to assess our common obligations to all humanity in this crucial hour and to deliberate on what initiatives people of all religious persuasion might undertake in order to avert disaster. Such a world consultation might well take place in Asia or at any other location which could be unitedly determined."

All Americans serving their government in the war in Vietnam do not see it in the same way. For example one soldier wrote to his parents: "Today we went on a mission and I'm not very proud of myself, my friends, or my country. We burned every hut in sight. It was a small rural network of villages and the people were incredibly poor. My unit burned and plundered their meager possessions." An American relief worker asked, "Do you understand what it is like to live in an 'insecure' area and to have a plane unload its bombs and then strafe your village

without mercy because someone fired at him with a rifle? Can you begin to imagine the horror of being in a village where the planes come in dropping fragmentation bombs to drive the people into the open and then following with napalm and phosphorous bombs to get an 'effective kill'? Do you know that at least five civilians are killed or wounded for every one combatant in Vietnam?"

At its annual meeting in Portland, Oregon April 10-13, 1967, The Methodist Board of Christian Social Concerns² by a vote of 38 to 0 with 3 abstentions said, "This carnage cannot be the will of God and we must with all our energy demand that it cease. . . . We urge the United States government immediately to initiate necessary steps leading to the withdrawal of all of its forces from Vietnam in a manner to be determined by negotiation."

In January, 1967 the Annual Meeting of The Methodist Board of Missions affirmed that "The Methodist Church should work with great urgency at this time to bring an end to the war in Vietnam."

In June, 1967 the General Board of the National Council of Churches urged the United States to stop unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam and to seek United Nations assistance in ending the war. Theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Harvey Cox; scholars; senators such as Wayne Morse, and Thurston Morton; the editors of Saturday Review, The Christian Century, and Commonweal; Methodist bishops; and many others have opposed United States policy so strongly that this war is the most unpopular since the Mexican War of 1848.

THE ISOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES

A great many nations and church bodies believe that United States policy in Vietnam is either questionable, immoral, imperialistic

¹ For the full text of this letter, write to Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, Room 1510, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027, and ask for the leaflet "We Burned Every Hut." 5¢, 40¢/1.

² This Board was established in 1960 "to lift up before the members of the church . . . the Christian concern for social righteousness, to analyze the issues which confront the nation and the world . . . and to propose Christian lines of action."

or illegal. Whereas in the Second World War we had powerful European allies and in the Korean War the sanction of the United Nations Security Council, in the Vietnam war only three small Asian and two Pacific nations with a total population of about 100 million are giving us military assistance (South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Australia). Moreover, even in some of these nations public opinion is not solidly behind the governments. In Australia the party which had in its platform a plank opposing Australian participation in the war polled 42 per cent of the vote. In New Zealand President Goodman of The Methodist Church stated publicly in May, 1965, "The decision to send a combat unit to fight in Vietnam will be as deeply regretted as it has been opposed by a large cross-section of New Zealand citizens."

At a peace rally in New York City, Gunner Myrdal, the famous Swedish scholar, declared that not a single government in Europe would dare send a squad of soldiers to Vietnam in support of United States policy, that the American government was increasingly entering into political and moral isolation, and that the Vietnam war had caused the world to disassociate itself from American foreign policy. In April, 1967 Foreign Minister Fanfani of Italy criticized United States resumption of air attacks on North Vietnam. In the summer of 1966 the annual conference of The Methodist Church in Great Britain adopted almost unanimously a resolution which condemned "the misguided policy pursued by the United States government throughout this conflict."

A CONTINUATION OF FRENCH POLICY

In 1875 the French bombarded Taiwan and Foochow to break the already tenuous hold which China had over Indochina. Long before then French troops had entered that area at the urging of Catholic converts to help a political leader sympathetic to French interests.

Toward the end of the Second World War President Roosevelt favored a trusteeship for Indochina until it was able to plan its own government. An eight-year war of rebellion

took place under Ho Chi Minh, who had been an ally of the Free French and the United States. Finally persistent and strong opposition to the war among French citizens and the defeat at Dien Bien Phu caused France to quit Indochina.

CONCERN ABOUT OUR ROLE IN VIETNAM

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 affirmed: 1—that the 17th parallel was "provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as a political or territorial boundary;" 2—that in July, 1956, general elections should be held; 3—that no foreign power should establish military bases in Vietnam.

Many governments and many church leaders believe that the United States has violated these three provisions. Three months after the Geneva Agreements President Eisenhower wrote to Diem concerning economic aid for the purpose of "developing and maintaining a strong viable state." Diem and the United States refused to do anything about elections under international supervision. As is well known, we first sent military advisors



to Diem in 1955 and later established many military bases manned by American troops. The Geneva Agreements assumed the unity of Vietnam. "Foreign" military presence applies much more to United States than to North Vietnamese soldiers.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BY-PASSED THE UNITED NATIONS

If the United Nations is to become strong, it must be used. It will be as weak as or as strong as its members make it. In Vietnam the United States has acted unilaterally without the agreement or support of the United Nations. All members of the United Nations have promised to take all disputes to the UN before using force. Our case for bombing North Vietnam would have been stronger if we had taken whatever evidence we had of North Vietnam aggression against the United States destroyers Maddox and Turner to the Security Council.³

Especially tragic has been American lack of confidence in Secretary-General U Thant, a Buddhist from Southeast Asia. During 1963 and 1964, while Adlai Stevenson was Ambassador to the UN, U Thant arranged two opportunities for representatives of Hanoi and Washington to talk, but Washington did not agree. In recent months Thant has repeatedly urged that the United States unconditionally stop bombing North Vietnam, declaring that he is confident that such action will help bring about negotiations, but the bombing is not only continued, it is escalated. Bishop Henry Knox Sherrill of the Episcopal Church once said, "No nation is good enough or wise enough to chart its own course without the moral restraint of other nations."

A DISTORTED VIEW OF COMMUNISM

The leaders of churches and governments abroad often suggest that concerning communism the United States be less emotional and more thoughtful. Communist governments have been cruel and oppressive, espe-

cially in their earlier years, but they also enjoy the support of many of their citizens because of their elevation of the status of women, their emphasis upon child care, their attention to universal education, and their expansion of health services. There is much variation in Communist societies. The growing interest in international cooperation of Communist nations is demonstrated by their contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations and to specialized agencies such as World Health, UNESCO, and UNICEF.

The chief defense against communism is internal strength. If a nation has honest and representative government, if the people have a satisfactory measure of economic security and social justice, if there is a sincere attachment to democracy and religion by the people, communism has no appeal. Many Vietnamese Buddhists do not want a Communist government but they are equally opposed to continued American military presence.

UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER IMMODERATE AND MERCILESS

It seems to some Americans that we are fighting a strong and powerful enemy who hides in the jungle and strikes mercilessly without warning. But to many governments and churches our image is like that of the Soviet Union waging war against Finland. The United States, the greatest military power on earth, is using its most sophisticated weapons against a peasant people of 15 million with virtually no air force or navy. We seem like the sportsmen of the last century who killed buffalo from trains speeding across the prairie.

Weapons which destroy the innocent along with the guilty are being used in all parts of Vietnam. The anti-personnel bomb contains 600 spheres, each of which contains 200 pellets, which fly out in all directions when the bomb nears the ground. Tons of napalm not only burn huts and crops but reach a temperature of 1,000 degrees upon human flesh which it literally melts into grotesque shapes, if the person survives. For a Christian the comment that the Vietcong are also cruel is no answer.

³ A group of scholars competent in international law has published a book of 160 pages, *Vietnam and International Law*, in which it is stated; "The U. S. has not fulfilled its obligation toward the UN. It failed to seek a peaceful solution as prescribed by the Charter." Cokesbury, \$2.

**Give Some Time
to Help
Unsell the War**

Public Service Announcements for Television.




1. CITIZEN :60

Video: Testimonial by Henry Fonda

Audio: When I was a kid, I used to be really proud of this country. I thought that this was a country that cared about people, no matter who they were or where they came from.

But now, when I see my country engaged in an endless war, a pushbutton war in which American pilots and electronic technicians are killing thousands of Asians, without even seeing who they kill . . . when I see us each week stepping up the tonnage of bombs dropped on Indochina . . . then I don't feel so proud any more. Because I thought that was what the bad countries did . . . not my country.

What can you do about it? Well, this is still a democracy, isn't it?



2. PEACE PLAN :30

Video: Footage of approaching aircraft, bombs falling, exploding on the ground.

Audio: The ground war was ending. Our troops were coming home. However, there was one thing we were leaving behind . . . an air war worse than ever.

Even before we hit Hanoi and Haiphong, our airplanes were dropping over 50,000 tons of bombs in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This was more than 2½ Hiroshimas every month. And now it has exploded into more and more and more.

It seems our government's peace plan is a bomb.

God Help Us.

3. THANK GOD :30

Video: Words on screen with quick flash of still photos.

Audio: The American Government has 450,000 of our men back from Vietnam.

Thank God for that.

The American casualties have fallen from 1,400 a month to less than 100.

Thank God for that.

But the American Government is still dropping 1,500 tons of bombs every day on the mothers, women and children of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

God help us.



7. MOTHER BOMB :60

Video: An older woman sitting in her living room.

Audio: Our Air Force has developed a new kind of bomb. It's called the Mother Bomb. Each Mother Bomb contains 640 baby bombs, which are full of hard, steel pellets. The Mother Bombs release the Baby Bombs, which explode and scatter the pellets over an area the size of ten football fields . . . with enough force to puncture the head, or chest or stomach of a North Vietnamese soldier, or a water buffalo . . . or a baby.

We're dropping thousands and thousands of these Mother Bombs on the people of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Let's hear it for Motherhood and the flag.



8. I AM WAR :30

Video: Man in a dark suit, dramatically lit against a black background.

Audio: I am war. Help me kill. All you have to do . . . is do nothing.

Don't protest. Don't write your congressman.

In fact, you can do me a favor. Don't even think about me.

I am war. Help me kill.



9. UNCLE SAM :60


Video: Uncle Sam describes an electronic sensor.

Audio: If you're wondering about your Southeast Asia, well, it's going just fine. We've figured out ways to keep on killing lots of them without them killing lots of us.

This thing that looks like a jungle plant is an electronic device that we drop from an airplane. Whenever a warm body comes near it on the ground, it sends out a signal and we send our bombers and zap that target good and proper! The only drawback is we're never sure whether we killed an enemy or a friend, a child, or even a water buffalo. But what's new, we kill 'em good and dead, and we never get our hands dirty.

Makes you kind of proud, doesn't it?

What can you do about it? Well, this is democracy, isn't it?



4. COMPUTER :30

Video: Shots of a computer's rotating reels and print-out sheets.

Audio: In background, voices of pilot and ground control operator, relaying messages about bombing raid: "We have target lock-in..." "Roger, final for full ordnance delivery..." "we have delivery..." "looks like a jackpot..." "system recycle..."

Anncr. (VO): They keep finding new ways to end the war. Yet somehow the killing goes on and on.



5. JUNGLE :60

Video: Newsmen standing in jungle, demonstrating electronic sensor.

Audio: Reporting from the Ho Chi Minh Trail to show you one of the new developments here in Southeast Asia. This may look like an ordinary plant. Actually, it's a sensor device. When a warm body comes near this weapon, the information is transmitted to a computer, then to aircraft and drones who drop the bombs.

The only drawback is that sometimes what comes near it is an animal, a child, a woman. . . .

Sound of a bomb falling as screen goes to black.

Anncr. (VO): Our policy in Vietnam is a bomb.



6. CHARLIE SUTTON :60

Video: An ordinary citizen is seen walking his dog on a smalltown street.

Audio: **Anncr. (VO):** Charlie Sutton is the foreman of a packing plant in Wilkesville, Ohio, belongs to the All-City Bowling League, and likes to walk his dog on Sunday morning. He contributes regularly to the United Crusade, T Salvation Army, and the Seventh Street Congregational Church. He also contributes regularly to the new war in Southeast Asia; the air war.

Just last week, Charlie helped pay for the bombing of about seven villages, about 200 farms, about 3,000 men, women and children.

What can he do about it? Well, this is still a democracy, isn't it?



10. SHRINKING AMERICAN :60

Video: Man standing next to a bomb, holding a dollar bill, getting smaller and smaller as the spot progresses.

Audio: You and this dollar bill have a lot in common. Look at it this way: You've written your Congressman to end the war. But the bombs keep on falling.

You've protested and signed petitions. But the bombs keep on falling.

So if you think the government values you and your opinion, I've got news for you:

The American dollar isn't the only thing that's shrinking.




11. WE BOMB :60

Video: Silent footage of aircraft approaching, bombs falling, bombs exploding on the ground.

Audio: **Anncr. (VO):** We bomb the villages and destroy them. We bomb the crops and destroy them. We, you and I, drop bombs brilliantly designed to kill and wound farming people, because we have a strategy. The strategy is to terrorize the rural population, causing them to flee into the cities, and thus cause great unrest, and thus keep our pressure on Indochina. And we've been doing it all along, long before we hit Hanoi and Haiphong.

And isn't it interesting that we can do this now with little risk to ourselves, without ground troops, and merely destroy people, their farms and homes, through automation, without even having to see what we destroy? There are some of us who call this immoral, and some who call it genocide. But still it goes on.

What can you do about it? Well, this is still a democracy, isn't it?



12. SOMEDAY :30

Video: Stock footage of airplanes, bombs, and devastated countryside.

Audio: **Anncr. (VO):** Someday you're going to learn the truth about the American bombing of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Someday you're going to learn the truth about how many men, women and children our bombs have killed and wounded. Someday you're going to learn the truth about how many men, women and children our bombs have made homeless. Someday you're going to learn the truth about what's going on right now.

And you know what you're going to say? What could I do about it?

Radio Commercials to Help Unsell the War

- R-40 "Citizen."** Henry Fonda talks about how the endless bombing war makes him feel about his country.
- R-41 "Our Government's Peace Plan."** A reminder that, although the ground war is ending for Americans, the bombing goes on and on.
- R-42 "Thank God."** American troops are coming home. Thank God for that. We are still dropping 1,500 tons of bombs on Indochina every day. God help us.
- R-43 "Mother Bomb."** A woman describes the effects of the American anti-personnel weapons known as Mother Bombs.
- R-44 "I Am War."** A personification of war asks the audience to help him kill by doing nothing to stop him.
- R-45 "We Bomb."** Talks about the continuing American bombing strategy in Southeast Asia. Announcer asks: "What can you do about it? Well, this is still a democracy, isn't it?"
- R-46 "Anti-War Readings."** Readings from powerful anti-war passages in literature by leading actors.
- R-47 "Nobody Left."** Sounds of children playing. Announcer asks us to realize that before they became casualty figures they were human beings.
- R-48 "American Wasteland."** Sound of buzzing fly becomes the hum of aircraft. "What began as a nuisance has become an overwhelming disaster."
- R-49 "Stop Counting."** A child complains that she is tired of counting. Announcer points out that many Americans are also tired of counting deaths and bomb tonnage.
- R-50 "Someday."** The narrator tells the audience that someday they will learn the truth about what American bombs are doing to Vietnam right now.

Commercials are Sent Free to Media Outlets.

Thank you for your interest in Unsell. Please cut out coupon below and mail to Help Unsell the War; A Project of Clergy and Laymen Concerned, 637 West 125th Street, New York, N. Y. 10027 (212) 749-8518, or (for states west of the Mississippi River) P.O. Box 4453, San Francisco, CA 94101 (415) 824-3885.

I'd like to donate time on my station to the Unsell campaign. Please send me the commercials checked — free of charge.									
Name _____									
TV or Radio Station _____									
Address _____									
City _____		State _____			Zip _____				
Radio Commercials One 5-inch reel containing all spots. 7½ ips.				Television Commercials (16 mm. on individual reels).					
				TV-1	TV-2	TV-3	TV-4	TV-5	TV-6
				TV-7	TV-8	TV-9	TV-10	TV-11	TV-12

Help Unsell the War

What It Is:

Help Unsell the War is a nationwide public service advertising campaign designed to educate and motivate the American people to act to end the war in Indochina. The Unsell ads were produced by professional creative and production people from the advertising industry, who donated their time and talent to this effort. Television and radio stations, newspapers and magazines are urged to run the Unsell material as a public service to their audiences and communities.

How It All Began:

Unsell was originally organized by Yale student Ira Nerken and David McCall, president of LaRoche, McCaffrey, McCall advertising agency in New York. In March, 1971, they gathered together more than 300 men and women in the advertising field who donated a million dollars worth of advertisements for all types of media — the largest contribution ever made for a single peace effort.

The creation of the advertising completed the first step of the campaign. Nerken and his associates then sought the help of a national organization with a grass-roots constituency to coordinate the campaign, to increase the visibility of Unsell, and to bring the campaign to local communities around the country. Clergy and Laymen Concerned, a nationwide ecumenical peace group, took on the Unsell project in September, 1971.

Since then, there has been gratifying success in getting the Unsell material run as a public service on television and radio stations in every state in the country.

The Air War Campaign • Help Unsell the War Phase II

While local organizers and community peace groups were busy distributing this material to their local stations, a new Unsell office was set up in San Francisco to facilitate the campaign in the western regions of the country. Unsell-West was also in charge of working with west coast advertising people on a new series of ads to update the campaign. The new material, now offered here, concentrates on the continuing air war in Indochina, which belies the common belief that American involvement in the war is "winding down." Although ground troops are being withdrawn, their strength has been replaced by massive air and sea support, and the death and destruction in Indochina continues unabated. We feel that it is important to balance the record on this issue of vital concern to the American people — their nation and its resources are still inextricably involved in a war halfway around the world which has gone on far too long. These new commercials present the facts about this air war, and ask, "Isn't there something we can do about it?" "Yes. This is still a democracy, isn't it?"

Prominent Ad Executives Support Unsell.

From its beginnings in 1971, the Help Unsell the War campaign's main support and creative base has come from the dedicated people in the advertising industry who have donated their time and resources to the cause of peace. Below are some of those who agreed to serve on the Unsell Advertising Committee (partial list).

Carl Ally, <i>Chairman</i> Carl Ally Inc.	Lewis I. Haber <i>Vice President-Media Dir.</i> The Shaller-Rubin Company, Inc.	Jim Nelson, <i>Exec. Vice President</i> Hoefler, Dieterich & Brown
Arnold Arlow, <i>Exec. Vice President</i> Martin Landey, Arlow Advertising, Inc.	Bill Honig, <i>Chairman</i> Honig-Cooper & Harrington	Edward N. Ney, <i>President</i> Young & Rubicam, Inc.
Bud Arnold The Maxwell Arnold Agency	John T. Hughes <i>Vice President-Media Dir.</i> Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc.	Robert M. Okener <i>Co-Creative Director</i> David, Oksner & Miltchneck, Inc.
Peter A. Berla, <i>Sen. Vice President</i> Carl Ally Inc.	Leo Kelmenson, <i>President</i> Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc.	Kenneth S. Olshan <i>Sen. Vice President</i> John Rockwell & Associates, Inc.
Paul J. Caravatt, <i>Sen. Vice President</i> Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.	Lee King, <i>Pres. & Creative Director</i> Edward H. Weiss & Company	Charles A. Richardson, <i>Vice President</i> Tinker-Pritchard Wood Associates, Inc.
Ralph Carson, <i>Chairman</i> Carson & Roberts, Inc.	Donald B. Kraft, <i>President</i> Kraft, Smith & Lowe, Inc.	Martin L. Smith, <i>Secretary</i> Smith/Greenland Company, Inc.
Maxwell Dane <i>Chm. Executive Committee</i> Doyle Dane Bernbach Inc.	Alex S. Kroll <i>Executive Vice President,</i> <i>Creative Director</i> Young & Rubicam, Inc.	Martin Solow, <i>President</i> Solow/Wexton, Inc.
Guy Day Chiat/Day, Inc.	Shepard Kurnit, <i>Chairman</i> DKG, Inc.	Walter E. Stabb, <i>Chairman</i> SFM Media Service Corp.
John De Garmo, <i>President</i> de Garmo, Inc.	Donald Kurtz, <i>President</i> Kurtz Kambanis Symon Inc.	Walter Terry, <i>Exec. Vice President</i> D'Arcy, MacManus, Intermarco, Inc.
Bruce M. Dodge, <i>Chairman</i> Dodge & Delano Inc.	Lester Leber, <i>Chairman</i> Leber Katz Partners Inc.	James J. Tommaney, <i>Sen. V. P.-Media,</i> <i>Broadcasting, Research</i> LaRoche, McCaffrey and McCall, Inc.
Laurence D. Dunst, <i>President</i> Daniel & Charles, Inc.	Richard S. Lessler, <i>Chairman</i> Grey Advertising, Inc.	Alan R. Tripp, <i>Chairman</i> The BTHB Group
Ted H. Factor, <i>Senior Vice President</i> Doyle, Dane, Bernbach, Inc.	George Lols, <i>President</i> Lols Holland Callaway Inc.	Sam B. Vitt, <i>President</i> Vitt Media International, Inc.
Peter Geer, <i>President</i> Geer, Du Bois & Co., Inc.	James J. McCaffrey, <i>Chairman</i> LaRoche, McCaffrey and McCall, Inc.	Douglas Warren, <i>Chairman</i> Warren, Muller & Dolobowsky, Inc.
Richard Gershon, <i>President</i> Independent Media Services, Inc.	Richard K. Manoff, <i>Chairman</i> Richard K. Manoff, Inc.	Cliff Wilton, <i>President</i> Wilton-Coombs & Colnett, Inc.
Richard L. Gilbert, <i>President</i> Gilbert Advertising Agency, Inc.	Robert S. Marker, <i>Chairman</i> McCann-Erickson, Inc.	Fred Wittner, <i>President</i> Fred Wittner Company, Inc.
Leo Greenland, <i>President</i> Smith/Greenland Company, Inc.		

A Few Words About Clergy and Laymen Concerned.

CLERGY AND LAYMEN CONCERNED (CALC) was organized in December, 1965 as a national emergency committee against the Vietnam war. Since then, it has grown to be a recognized ecumenical peace group supported by over 41,000 persons. CALC strives to give continued and visible evidence of its opposition to the war in a number of ways apart from its Help Unsell the War project:

CALC helps support 20 locally staffed groups around the country.

CALC publishes AMERICAN REPORT, a unique weekly newspaper that covers the war in Southeast Asia, the movement at home, Third World politics, and the political implications of our individual moral and religious commitments.


CALC publishes and distributes a wide variety of books and literature, including a new book titled: *Military Chaplains: From a Religious Military to a Military Religion*, edited by Dr. Harvey G. Cox.

In addition, CALC sponsors a nationwide daily radio program, also called AMERICAN REPORT. It is a four minute digest of facts in perspective, presented by experts, in the form of personal commentary.

CO-CHAIRMEN OF CLERGY AND LAYMEN CONCERNED

Dr. John C. Bennett
President Emeritus
Union Theological Seminary
Bishop John J. Dougherty
Auxiliary Bishop of Newark
Mrs. Coretta Scott King
Atlanta, Georgia

Sister Mary Luke Tobin
Superior General
Loretto Mother House
Nerinx, Kentucky
Rabbi Abraham J. Heschel
Professor, Jewish Theological
Seminary of America



WHAT
CAN I DO
ABOUT



WHAT IS GOING VIET TO HAPPEN IN NAM?

Will the United States become a permanent police force in Asia? Will continued escalation lead to war with China and Russia with the threat of the use of nuclear weapons? Will de-escalation threaten our security? Is it possible to achieve peace militarily when economic and political turmoil remains? Are negotiations possible at the present time?

Can we accept or even comprehend the casualties of this war—the destruction of family and village life of a people who for the last 25 years have known only war. A war in which American soldiers die in mounting numbers and which has such a high proportion of civilian casualties, especially children.

How are we responding to this crisis—searching in anguish for a responsible end to this war; refusing to get involved because we don't know what to do?

The United States involvement in the Vietnam crisis does demand much of its citizens. Our responsibility in a democracy is always great, but at this time of conflict it becomes vital. As our country becomes more and more involved in the war in Vietnam, the level of confusion, emotion and subjectivity is intensified. Are we able, in the midst of such controversy and frustration, to examine our own presuppositions about how policy is to be made, what is patriotic and what is not, how dissent is to be handled and what our next steps should be?

This war has been the object of more uneasiness and criticism about our policies than any other war in which we have been involved. Yet, even though we hear daily about the war, most of us do not feel we really understand what brought about the present situation, how we got there and what is behind the differing policies and disagreements that are constantly expressed.

How then can we act responsibly today? It is with this question utmost in mind that the Board of Missions and Board of Christian Social Concerns of The Methodist Church have initiated and placed high priority on a Joint Vietnam Emphasis. The Boards are hoping that every church will begin or continue to study the complexities and moral issues raised by the war and, out of this study, act on their concerns.

ARE THERE TWO SIDES?

One thing that prevents real debate on the Vietnam war is the tendency of people to want to follow the more usual procedure and reduce all the examinations of this problem to "two sides." It may well be that we have only one side—many people, all wanting the United States to follow the policy they believe will

insure the peace and security of the United States and the rest of the world, but differing about what will achieve this end. The government has this objective. All those who discuss Vietnam responsibly, no matter how radically they disagree with the government view are also trying to achieve these same ends.

It is very important to understand this because if we classify positions as "sides" we tend to make debate virtually impossible. What needs doing is the examination of the presuppositions on which various thinking is based.

WHAT ARE SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS?

What are the presuppositions of United States foreign policy? How valid are the presuppositions? What arguments support them and where do they lead us?

Can the United States police the world unilaterally especially since Great Britain has announced its intention of withdrawing from her last important overseas posts during the next ten years?

Is competition with communism the main determinant of our foreign policy?

What are our presuppositions concerning the often conflicting goals of stability and an economic and social revolution?

PROBLEMS

Dissent to present policy is not limited to extreme views, but includes many alternatives which do not favor either escalation or complete withdrawal. Are people aware of these views?

How do we judge priorities: military expenditures, cost of human suffering, economic and social destruction of Vietnam, security?

What are the effects of propaganda on the United States public? What is war-mentality and how does it affect the way people react to a war which is taking place many miles away?

Is there an increasing questioning of the right of the individual to speak his convictions? Does this have dangers? Is it necessary?

INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AND THERE ARE MANY WAYS TO BECOME INVOLVED. HOWEVER, EVERYTHING DEPENDS UPON PEOPLE ACTUALLY COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE TASK.

SUGGESTED PROJECTS

LOCAL CHURCH

BEGIN a study project. Use the Vietnam Emphasis Primer, a basic information pamphlet (see bibliography) as study guide and assign readings on Vietnam using the bibliography of this pamphlet. Discuss the statements of the

Boards of The Methodist Church on Vietnam and compose your own statement as you study. The group might then present its statement to a general meeting of the church and explain their conclusions based on that study.

FOCUS on the problem of dissent in time of war. Use as case studies recent events such as General Westmoreland's speech in Congress, the trial of Captain Levy who refused on moral grounds to teach certain medical practices to army personnel, extremist group statements, the move to repeal the First Amendment. Read the leaflet, "The Right to Dissent" by Dean Kelley. Express your views through letters to local papers or take an ad in the newspaper.

FORM a committee whose function is to keep church members informed of events, insert material in the weekly bulletin, set up a Vietnam library, prepare bulletin boards with information on groups helping the victims of the war, have a free literature table and prepare a list of local speakers on Vietnam.

EMPHASIZE Southeast Asia in church school. This might include such topics as the religion, culture, traditions of Southeast Asia. Study such concepts as what justifies war, Christians' citizenship role in time of war, problems of dealing with moral and political considerations.

CONDUCT a three evening discussion series. Commission on Social Concerns could set up Vietnam programs in the local church or community. Political leaders, teachers, ministers may be asked to speak. Provide opportunity for discussion. Vietnam Emphasis has a record on which Dr. Arthur Fleming, formerly in the Eisenhower Cabinet and now President of the National Council of Churches and President of the University of Oregon, encourages such discussion.

USE U Thant tape on Vietnam. At any meeting on Vietnam it would be educational to hear the voice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations whose home is in Southeast Asia. The tape contains the remarks which U Thant made before a citizens' group at the United Nations about Vietnam. It may be obtained for \$4 from Vietnam Emphasis. We recommend the use of mimeographed texts of the message (25 for \$1) so that people hearing the tape will have a record of his comments.

ORGANIZE an ecumenical worship service for reconciliation in Vietnam. Vietnam Emphasis has liturgies, prayers and scripture prepared especially for Vietnam concerns. Use the collection for relief of war victims. Committees to which the money could go: Methodist Committee for Overseas Relief, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 406, New York, New York 10027; The American Friends Service Committee, 160 N. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 (relief for the needy, caring for wounded, sending volunteers to Vietnam).

HOLD a day of inquiry. Invite congressmen and knowledgeable speakers on Vietnam to discuss issues. The State Department is often willing to provide speakers. Purpose of day would be to present differing viewpoints and be the start of further study on questions raised. Could be community wide, publicize on radio, interview programs and local TV. Use films and tapes and advertise follow-up study programs.

YOUTH of the church hold local, sub-district, district meetings on the draft. Raising the issues of conscientious objection, and selective conscientious objection as they relate to the present situation. Include a study of draft classifications and draft resistance in the United States and its implications.

HAVE a discussion in the Official Board. The Commission on Social Concerns might take the responsibility for planning a discussion for a meeting of the Official Board. Mimeographed or printed material from Vietnam Emphasis could be used. If there is a consensus among the members of the Board, the secretary might be directed to send a resolution to the proper persons in Washington, D.C.

ARRANGE a district one-day workshop. The conflict is so important that local church members of Commissions on Social Concerns and Woman's Society Social Relations Secretaries should be called together by the District Committee to hear speeches by political leaders, college teachers, or concerned ministers to discuss the moral and political aspects of the war.

TAKE the pamphlet, "The United States and Vietnam: Two Viewpoints," (see bibliography) tear it in half, give the two halves to a panel of two people. Have them go before Sunday school classes and other appropriate organizations in the church to present the pro and con sides of the Vietnam issue.

REMEMBER to think through whether each Vietnam project you undertake might not be more effectively done by as many churches as can be involved.

MINISTERS

PREACH about Vietnam. Any Sunday is an appropriate time to treat such an important national and international issue as this war. A service on this subject may be planned by the Commission on Christian Social Concerns, which will help the minister decide who will assist in the service, help prepare the bulletin, and offer books for sale afterward. Statements by the Methodist Bishops and other bodies of the church on Vietnam should be used. A discussion period in a nearby room after the service is recommended.

ENCOURAGE times of congregational concern, prayers and meditations. Vietnam Emphasis has liturgies, prayers and meditations to be used in the churches and you may use these on special days of concern.

ARRANGE a service of compassion with other ministers in the community for all involved in the Vietnam conflict.

PROVIDE counsel and aid to conscientious objectors and to those men who are facing questions of participating in this particular war. For information and materials write the National Service Board for Religious Objectors, 550 Washington Building, 15th and New York Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. The Methodist Church is one of 44 consulting agencies for this organization.

ASK that the Vietnam issue be raised at all forthcoming conferences and meetings you will attend.

INDIVIDUALS

READ some material on Vietnam each week as a matter of personal discipline. Besides articles, read detailed histories such as THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM by Kahin and Lewis (see bibliography at end of this pamphlet).

SEND a letter to your congressman, asking his position on Vietnam policy and asking him questions you have about the present situation. You might circulate his reply. Write letters to the editor of the local paper expressing your position.

BE ALERT to dissent issues and questions of loyalty raised in your community. Respond through letters, conversations and personal contact where you feel discussion and helpful dialogue is being threatened.

SUPPORT your minister, District Superintendent and Bishop as they seek to raise issues concerning the war and our national policy.

START a home study group. Use the bibliography in this pamphlet. The group may then want to follow up the study by becoming resource people and speakers to other groups, publicize their concerns, get information for people, place an ad in the newspaper and answer responses to the ad.

VOLUNTEER to work for organizations concerned about Vietnam. Such committees are The Methodist Committee for Overseas Relief, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 406, New York, New York 10027; "Negotiation Now," 156 5th Ave., New York, New York 10010 (circulation of a negotiation proposal petition); Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, 5th floor, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027; The American Friends Service Committee, 160 N. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 (relief for needy, caring for wounded, sending volunteers to Vietnam).

CONTRIBUTE time and money to candidates whose views you support and who are running for office this year. Support the "National Committee for an Effective Congress," 10 East 39th Street, 6th Floor, New York, New York 10016, or the "Council for a Liveable World," Suite 535, 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (nonpartisan groups which provide financial aid to men in Congress who are assuming moral as well as political leadership).

ARRANGE a special Vietnam seminar in New York and Washington, D.C. for a group of ministers and lay people. In New York at the Church Center for the United Nations the international perspective can be seen; in Washington related national issues can be explored with the Board of Christian Social Concerns. You will also be able to express your point of view to your congressman. Write to Methodist Office for the United Nations, 11th Floor, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017 for information.

VIETNAM EMPHASIS

Joint program of Board of Christian Social Concerns and Board of Missions of The Methodist Church

777 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
Room 1100—(212) MU 2-3633

SELECTED SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON VIETNAM

THREE SPECIAL LEAFLETS ON VIETNAM, produced by Vietnam Emphasis:

What Can I Do About Vietnam?

Vietnam, Your War

Vietnam Primer—Political Background of the War in Vietnam

Available free for postage and handling from Service Center, Board of Missions, 7820 Reading Road, Cincinnati, Ohio 45237.

OTHER VITAL BACKGROUND—HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS

VIETNAM, AN APPEAL FOR DEBATE AND ACTION, National Council of Churches, Council Press, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y. 10027, 20¢.

THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM, George McTurna Kahin and John W. Lewis. Delacorte Press, New York, N. Y., 1967, 445 pp., \$2.95, paperback. One of the best and most recent accounts of the United States involvement in Vietnam. Contains an important appendix which includes documents not easily available on the National Liberation Front.

THE BITTER HERITAGE, VIETNAM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1941-1966, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1966, 128 pp., 75¢, paperback. A good short history and analysis of the war in Vietnam. Critical of current policy; provides some well-reasoned answers to the question of what we have done and where we now are.

VIET-NAM, Marvin E. Gettleman. Fawcett Publications, Inc., Greenwich, Conn., 1965, 448 pp., 95¢, paperback. A collection of basic documents expressing differing opinions and positions on the war. Includes government statements, international agreements, position papers and analytic reports.

THE DEBATE—VIETNAM POLICY POSITIONS

VIETNAM VIEWPOINTS, Center for War/Peace Studies, 144A Mount Auburn St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138, approximately \$1. A kit containing 24 reprints of important articles of diverse opinions and analyses.

THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM: TWO VIEWPOINTS, Wesley R. Fishel and T. A. Bisson. Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 391, 381 Park Ave., New York, N. Y. 10017, 32 pp., 25¢. A defense and critique of United States actions and policies in Vietnam. Includes a short factual introduction and epilogue delineating the major differences in interpretation.

THE CHURCHES' CONCERN

VIETNAM SUMMONS, TO HEAL AND TO BUILD, I. V. Moomaw. Brethren Service Commission, Church of the Brethren, Elgin, Ill., 1967, 48 pp., 75¢, paperback. A summons to clearer understanding, to compassion and to an early and honorable solution to the conflict in Vietnam. Important contribution to an understanding of the effects of the war on the people in Vietnam.

PEACE IN VIETNAM, Report for American Friends Service Committee. Hill and Wang, Inc., New York, N. 1967, 132 pp., \$1.25, paperback. A proposal for settlement which places high priority on the welfare of the Vietnamese.

FOREIGN POLICY IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE, John Bennett. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, N. 1966, 160 pp., \$1.25, paperback. Important for understanding Vietnam in the context of United States foreign policy and in the context of the Christian faith. Contains a chapter on the Vietnam conflict.

"Resolution on Viet-Nam," Adopted by the General Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, September 15, 1967. 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y., pamphlet, 20¢.

"Right of Dissent," Dean M. Kelley. Board of Missions of The Methodist Church, Editorial and Literature Department, Joint Commission on Education and Culture.

"Vietnam," Resolution adopted by the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of The Methodist Church April 13, 1967 and "An Appeal to the Churches Concerning Vietnam," Board of Missions of The Methodist Church, Annual Meeting, January, 1967.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What activities has your church and/or individuals undertaken?
2. What has been most helpful in encouraging study and action of people?
3. What has been the reaction to discussion, to opinions expressed, to projects promoted?
4. What is the reaction to the statements on Vietnam made by the National Council of Churches and the Boards of The Methodist Church?
5. Have you found this pamphlet useful? Please comment on your reactions to it.

I am filling this out as (1) an individual,
(2) for the local church, (3) as a minister of a church

Send to: Viet Emphasis

777 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
Room 1100


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An aerial photograph of a city, likely Hiroshima, showing a grid-like street pattern and a large, dark, diagonal shadow cast across the right side of the image. The shadow appears to be from a large structure, possibly a bridge or a building, and it creates a strong visual contrast with the lighter-colored city below.

by **ROBERT McAFEE BROWN**,
Professor, Stanford University

WAR CRIMES

"Violations of the laws or customs of war which include but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian populations of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the high seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity."

—Nuremberg Principle VI, Clause 1

At the time of the Nuremberg trials, Justice Robert Jackson stated that "we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would be unwilling to have invoked against us." The time has now come to test our national policies in Southeast Asia against this principle, for it is a matter of increasingly widespread public record that American soldiers have been committing "war crimes" in Southeast Asia for years. The massacre at My Lai, and the actions of men like Lt. Cally, can no longer be described as mere "exceptions" to an otherwise acceptable mode of conduct; the evidence shows that the kinds of acts defined as "war crimes" at Nuremberg, in the Geneva and Hague conventions, and in the U.S. Army Field Manual, have been repeatedly committed by American troops.

Although no nation in the past has ever engaged in such a critical act of self-judgment, we must set the moral precedent of judging ourselves today by standards at least as rigorous as those we employed against our enemies a quarter of a century ago. Unless we do so, we will compound the consequences of our guilt by failing to acknowledge it.

We must therefore insist that the facts be made available to the American people, even though they are facts we are reluctant to acknowledge. This will include a recognition that in the name of America:

- **Asian civilians have been brutally and needlessly slaughtered**
(Senator Kennedy estimates that between 25,000 and 35,000 civilians were killed in the war in **South** Vietnam last year—a 50% reduction "as a result of the diversion of American bombing raids from South Vietnam into Cambodia and Laos.")
- **Villages have been totally destroyed**
(According to Pentagon figures, bombing tonnage from January, 1965 through March, 1971 amounts to 5,795,160 tons. By comparison, the American air force in World War II dropped about one-third that number of tons of bombs in the European, Mediterranean and Pacific theatres combined.)
- **Crops have been burned and animals slaughtered**
(The Congressional Research Service statistics admit that 5,205,354 acres of forest and 562,166 acres of cropland were sprayed through 1970 in South Vietnam. Our B-52 raids made more than three and one-half million craters 45 feet in diameter and 30 feet in depth by April, 1969 alone, while wildfires in herbicide-treated vegetation, bulldozers and soil erosion contributed to the starvation and toxic after effects that are part of our legacy to the "preservation of the Vietnamese people.")

- **Populations have been deported**

("Pacification" under the various policies, "agrohamlets," "agrovilles," and "new life hamlets," has "re-grouped" the population into crowded, unsanitary, "relocation" communities with barbed wire fences. Orville and Jonathan Schell described one instance when, ". . . the 'pacification' camps became so full that Army units were ordered not to 'generate' any more refugees." **The New York Times**, March 15, 1971 reported evidence indicating that "The conduct of the war in the last two years has resulted in an additional half-million civilian casualties and generated three million refugees.")

As we look at the widening web of American involvement in war crimes we must ask ourselves, "Where does the blame lie?" It is too easy to dismiss the question by saying that we are all guilty, for if this is so then blame can be so widely distributed that all are exonerated. **WE AFFIRM THAT, WHILE SOME ARE GUILTY, ALL ARE RESPONSIBLE**, and that the blame goes beyond the individual who himself commits a specific act. Not only those on the scene, but those responsible for the policies leading to specific immoral acts, must also be held accountable. A policy that puts a high premium on "body counts" so that it is advantageous

to kill rather than to take prisoners, a policy that **creates** "free fire zones," a policy that looks upon the entire people as the enemy and orders crop defoliation and mass deportations, a policy that entails indiscriminate destruction of civilians, whether at a distance of 5 feet with a gun or fifty thousand feet in a B-52 bomber—such a policy inevitably leads to the committing of war crimes. So if there is to be any assigning of responsibility, it must go up the line from individual soldiers, through the echelon of officers, to the civilian policy makers who formulated the political stance that made such military actions necessary. This is precisely the position we adopted in trying German "war criminals" after World War II.

This is a hard reality for Americans to acknowledge, but we will pave the way for further war crimes in the future if we do not make it clear that public officials are finally to be held accountable. Indeed, as we press the matter, it is clear that the ultimate atrocity in Southeast Asia is not this or that specific act; the ultimate atrocity is the war itself and the way we have waged it.

In addition to concern about the destructiveness of war crimes upon their victims, we are also concerned about

the impact of such crimes upon those who commit them; they indicate an increasing brutalization of our own soldiers making it possible for them to accept as routine, actions they once would have considered reprehensible. Even while affirming that men can say "no" in combat situations to orders that are a clear violation of minimal moral standards, we must show concern for individual soldiers who have committed crimes which, either at the time or later, struck them as morally abhorrent. It will be an ongoing task to help such men come to terms with their responsibility and guilt.

When the uncomfortable truth of America's "war crimes" has been accepted by our people, we must call for penitence for the crimes that have been committed. But that is not enough. Our emphasis must not be merely on penitence for past misdeeds, but on using the lessons learned—and paid for at such great cost to innocent Asian lives—as a way of insuring that such misdeeds are never again repeated. This will mean the reestablishment of moral constraints, along with a newly-intensified recognition that the breaching of such restraints will entail the sternest kind of accountability. Only then can the message of forgiveness be other than an easy escape from ongoing responsibility.

Clergy and Laymen Concerned was organized as a national emergency committee in December 1965. **CALC** is supported by over 41,000 persons.

CALC strives to give continued and visible evidence of its opposition to the war in a number of ways:

- **CALC** funds more than twenty full and part time staff persons across the country.
- **CALC** national office publishes and distributes literature on the war. There are approximately 125 titles on **CALC**'s literature list.
- **CALC** publishes **IN THE NAME OF AMERICA**, a book on war crimes and will publish a new book with an introduction by Harvey G. Cox titled **MILITARY CHAPLAINS: From Religious Military to a Military Religion**, in Spring 1972. **COMMAND AND CONSCIENCE**, a Random House publication, was initiated and edited by James Finn of **CALC**'s Steering Committee.
- **CALC** publishes **AMERICAN REPORT**, a unique weekly tabloid that covers the war in Southeast Asia, the movement at home, Third World politics and the political implications of our individual moral and religious commitments.
- **CALC** played an important role in helping to initiate the Set The Date campaign, an interdenominational move to end the war.
- **CALC** organized a 6-day conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan in August 1971 to bring together representatives of the religious community committed to peace from communities all over the country.
- **CALC** just integrated **Unsell**—a campaign initiated by major New York advertising agencies to "Help Unsell the War"—into its program. Through **Unsell**, radio, television and print advertising will be distributed to media all through the country.
- **CALC** participated in the New Mobilization demonstrations in Washington, D.C. and participates in the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice.
- **CALC** publishes and distributes posters and billboards that graphically demonstrate against the war.
- **CALC** has devised a series of demonstrations and actions coordinated with Thanksgiving, Christmas and Chanukah which involve people in the witness of our concern about the war and its victims.
- **CALC** helped to initiate a week-long Citizen's Conference on Ending the War in Indochina, in February 1971, sending 170 Americans from 40 states to Paris for discussion with representatives to the Paris peace talks.