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9/70

1. COUNTRY: <b>SOUTH VIETNAM / CAMBODIA</b>	8. REPORT NUMBER: <b>6 028 1399 70</b>
2. SUBJECT: Directives on the Situation in Cambodia, 9th VC Division, Headquarters, SVNLA (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: <b>16 January 1971</b>
3. ISC NUMBER: A135.565 G ARMED           A163.000 A163.050 G ARMED           A744.165 G PROSEL	10. NO. OF PAGES: <b>1</b> 11. REFERENCES: <b>DIRM 1C2b4. 1S2f</b>
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: <b>March and April 1970</b>	12. ORIGINATOR: <b>COMUSMACV (CDEC)</b> <i>Michael H. Crutcher</i> <b>MICHAEL H. CRUTCHER, CPT, MI</b> <b>CHIEF, PROD DIV. US ELM, CDEC</b>
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: <b>CB; 26 June 1970</b>	13. PREPARED BY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> <b>GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA</b> <b>DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC</b>
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:
7. SOURCE: <b>CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT</b>	

15. SUMMARY:
 

(C) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns a directive signed by Nguyen Van Trong, Chief ((of Political Staff)), Doan 54 ((possibly Headquarters, 9th VC Division)) and a report signed illegibly for the Current Affairs Committee of Doan 54 Party Committee ((9th VC Division)). The directive, dated 28 March 1970 and numbered 83/CT, prescribes a series of measures to be taken by subordinate units and agencies to cope with new developments in Cambodia caused by the "coup d'etat" which overthrew Prince Sihanouk. The report, dated 3 April 1970 and numbered 242/NQ, discusses the morale of cadre and soldiers after the coup d'etat in Phnom Penh on 19 March 1970 and states that additional ideological training should be given to all personnel to make them aware of the international proletariat task that friendly forces were to fulfill in Cambodia and Laos.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: These documents were captured on 26 June 1970 in Cambodia (Kompong Cham Province; WU883055) by 318th Task Force, RVNAF III CTZ. The documents were received at CDEC on 7 July 1970, and were summarized in Bulletin Number 36,072, dated 9 July 1970, under Items 1-2 of CDEC Document Log Number 07-1618-70. Translation was requested by JUSPAO, Vietnam.

07-1618-70

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PARTY COMMITTEE OF DOAN 54 ((possibly Headquarters, 9th VC Division, SVNLA))  
CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Number 242 NQ

/Absolute Secret/ ((VC Classification))

# M I N U T E S

Of a meeting held by the Current Affairs Committee, Doan 54, for implementing the directive issued by C69 ((possibly COSVN)) Current Affairs Committee and that by the Party Committee, Headquarters, SVNLA, concerning the situation of K ((Cambodia)).

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Present at the meeting: Comrades Thoi, Tung and Trong.

Absent: Phong and Liem.

After studying the directives of C69 Current Affairs Committee and the Party Committee, SVNLA Headquarters since 19 Mar 70 to date, the Current Affairs Committee of Doan 54 totally agreed with higher echelons on the assessment ((of the Cambodian event)). It has reviewed the implementation of these directives and drawn up a plan for the immediate future.

## I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVES:

Immediately after the Cambodian coup d'etat (which took place on 18 Mar 70), the Current Affairs Committee of Doan's Party Committee evaluated the situation and provided guidance for appeasing ((inquisitive)) personnel, then step by step implemented the directives of C96 ((sic)) and the Party Committee, SVNLA Headquarters. Specific instructions and guidance for implementation were provided for all units on the frontline as well as those in rear areas. Generally speaking, the Current Affairs Committee succeeded in making cadre and soldiers accurately assess the situation. They realized that the US staged the coup d'etat which overthrew S ((Sihanouk)) to minimize their failures in SVN, counter his policy of independence and neutrality, and foil the revolution of K ((Cambodia)).

Our personnel, at first, worried that we would be confronted with difficulties. After the **situation developed further**, they realized that we would meet with new difficulties. However, the K Revolution will have a great opportunity to develop and will provide us with great advantages, so, we should strengthen our faith ((in the revolution)), increase our enthusiasm, and strive to satisfactorily fulfill our missions during X ((Campaign)). Nonetheless, some erroneous concepts still prevail. We are striving to correct them.

1. Our personnel do not have a deep sense of responsibility toward the Cambodian Revolution. They **have** a wait-and-see attitude and do not actively participate in the development of the K Revolution.

2. Our personnel are too overconfident and they underestimate the

enemy. They disregard the Cambodian reactionary forces and they are unable to see through the perfidious nature of the US and Puppets. Therefore, they are not very active in countering them.

3. They also display passiveness in their implementation of specific countermeasures:

Each unit does not thoroughly understand its specific missions. Those stationed in rear areas pay close attention to their assignments, but those on the frontline still disregard theirs.

Instead of positively staging a new front, they only took the defensive.

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They did not actively enlarge their areas of operations. They only consolidated them in an overly cautious and slow manner.

4. They did not activate a leading committee for implementing countermeasures. A system for coordinating the activities of different units in each area has been set up, but it is inefficient and ineffective.

5. Economization, self-help and self-support are carried out, but not as required. The stockpiling of rice, ammunition and medicine etc... ((sic)) was unsatisfactory.

To strictly implement the directives of higher headquarters, the Current Affairs Committee of the Doan's Party Committee decided to carry out the following:

A. General line:

We are to continue indoctrinating cadre and soldiers to enable them to understand the mission of our armed forces and particularly that of our Doan toward our national Revolution, the international proletariat and friendly countries, especially Laos and Cambodia which are our closest friends. We must make them see through the immediate and long-range schemes of the US concerning the Cambodian Revolution. On this basis, we must make every member realize that the prime mission of our Doan is to fulfill our AB ((sic)) missions, and at the same time, actively, positively and totally assist the K Revolution along the border where our Doan is operating.

We should make everyone understand the policy of the friendly Party ((referring to the Cambodian Communist Party)) and those of the Sihanouk (Front) and to act accordingly. We should pay attention to developing the sense of self-help and self-assurance of our friends, and we should avoid doing all their work for them.

We should indoctrinate our cadre and soldiers on the situation and missions of our friends' Party so that they can correctly comply with their policies and avoid any action detrimental to the K Revolution.

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-----FULL TRANSLATION-----

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We should make our cadre and soldiers thoroughly understand the concept of violence of a proletarian party and apply it to the current situation of Cambodia, and we should counter rightism and pessimism.

B. Specific requirements:

1. We are to determine the boundary of our quartering and operating areas and draw up a plan for their gradual enlargement. We must constantly keep track of the development of the local situation and enemy activities. We should map out specific plans of action for our whole unit and for each area.

2. We are to activate a special staff for assisting Party Committee and Command Committee of the Doan to keep abreast of the Cambodian situation and carry out the countermeasures prescribed. We should activate two or three armed propaganda units which are to coordinate with local forces to perform specific assignments.

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3. We should cooperate with our friend's Party and Sihanouk's faction in local areas to enlarge their liberated rural areas.

We should wipe out the enemy's local forces and militia, gain the support of those who oppose the extreme rightists ((in Cambodia)) and side with Sihanouk, and ostracize or eliminate tyrants who oppress the people.

4. We should intensify our motivation of Buddhist monks and our proselyting of enemy servicemen, eliminate the racial discrimination among the Cambodian people and that between Cambodians and Vietnamese, persuade the people to hold their ground and lands, and protect their lives and property.

5. We should reorganize our forces in rear areas, coordinate with local forces in counterattacks against the US, RVNAF and also Cambodian troops.

6. We should regularly remind our personnel of **border** security regulations and strictly implement them in order to avert any losses. Our personnel must seriously comply with ordnance decreed by local authorities and respect the population's customs and habits.

7. We should focus our leadership on motivating our personnel to energetically carry out the AB plan and prevent them from **losing interest**.

8. We should actively assist the local rear service in its requisition, purchasing, storing, concealment, and protection of food supplies, weapons and medicines.

9. A specialized conference should be held for recapitulating and promoting the implementation of economization, farming, and for planting the coming crop in time.

10. We are to instil in our personnel a spirit to capture enemy

weapons to equip ourselves and to save our own weapons for lasting use or for difficult moments.

3 Apr 70

For the Current Affairs Committee

/S/

((Possibly Nguyen Van Trong))

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SVN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY  
DOAN 54 ((possibly Headquarters, 9th VC Division))  
Number 83/CT  
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Absolute Secret ((VC Classification))

BE UNITED AND HUMBLE.  
EACH OPERATION SHOULD BE A VICTORY, EACH BATTLE  
SHOULD BE A COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY.  
LIVE AS A HERO, DIE IN HONOR.  
\*\*\*

#### D I R E C T I V E

#### COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CAMBODIAN COUP D'ETAT.

On 18 Mar 70, the US instigated the pro-American, extreme rightist, Cambodian faction to mount a coup d'etat and overthrow Sihanouk. The enemy schemed to attack us from our rear in order to ~~ease~~ ease their difficulties in SVN and Laos, and at the same time, undermine the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and suppress and eliminate the Cambodian revolution.

On 21 Mar 70, Sihanouk, the legal Chief of State of Cambodia, proclaimed his determination to counter the coup and safeguard the neutrality of his country. His policy was unanimously supported by our government, the socialist bloc and the progressive people in the world.

Since 18 Mar 70 to date, the US and the Cambodian rebels were confronted with a considerable number of difficulties:

The extreme rightist Cambodian Government resorted to all means to purge Sihanouk's faction, consolidate its powers, slander Sihanouk, and oppose us. They were condemned **by public** opinion, even by Cambodian high ranking officials and officers. Actually, they had to declare martial law to keep the situation in hand in Phnom Penh and a number of province capitals. The US imperialists have laid bare their being the **mastermind** of the Cambodian coup d'etat, and have brazenly conducted **airstrikes** on Cambodian territory. The SVN Puppets are trying to gain the cooperation of Cambodian reactionaries and attack our forces along the border. In some areas, the Cambodian reactionaries have demanded

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that we evacuate Cambodian territory. Some of them have initiated hostile acts, such as the destruction of our property ((referring to the violent riot against the DRV Trade Office in Phnom Penh)) and searching ((for our personnel)). They cooperated with the US and SVN Puppets to isolate and attack our forces. A number of fire fights have taken place. However, considering the actual difficulty and confusion of the new Cambodian Government, foreign powers only took a wait-and-see attitude and did not dare recognize it.

Sihanouk's prestige is still considerable in several areas of Cambodia. In fact, many Cambodian monks and civilians have stage protest demonstrations against the pro-American extreme rightist faction. They wished Sihanouk would come back home. ((Sihanouk was in France at that time.))

Many Cambodian soldiers and officers became confused. They waited for Sihanouk's return. They feared that they would be forced to fight us. A large number of them deserted. We should, on one hand, heighten our vigilance against a coalition of the Cambodian extreme rightist faction with the US and SVN Puppets. On the other hand, we should realize that this provides us with a great opportunity to gain the confidence of the Cambodian people, promote the friendship between two nations which have a common goal of fighting the US

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and create favorable conditions for a rapid and strong growth of the Cambodian Revolution.

On our side, after the Cambodian coup d'etat, a number of our cadre and soldiers were anxious about the new difficulties we would have to face. Others, due to a lack of vigilance during their movements along the border, were disarmed and had their belongings appropriated by evil Cambodians. To consolidate our personnel's faith in the leadership of the Party and make them realize the capability of our armed forces and people to overcome difficulties, the Current Affairs Committee and Command Committee of Doan provided all subordinate units a specific directive and guidance for ideological indoctrination which would be effective. Positive countermeasures were also practised. However, our personnel did not entirely comprehend the character of the ((Cambodian)) event. They failed to see through the cunning intentions of the US, SVN Puppet and Cambodian reactionaries. As a result, they were not as alert as desired. Their implementation of security regulations pertaining to the movement, messing and lodging was unsatisfactory. Their shelters and trenches were carelessly maintained, their guard and patrolling inefficient. Their readiness for combat left much to be desired and much more should be done to improve it.

In compliance with higher headquarters' directives, Current Affairs Committee and Command Committee of Doan instruct all subordinate units to carry out the following:

1. Concerning our personnel: Continue to point out to our cadre and soldiers that the purpose of the US in plotting the Cambodian coup d'etat was to minimize their failures in SVN and create difficulties for us.

However, they will not succeed in this design, but get more confused and embarrassed. They will be certainly and miserably defeated. Of course, our army and people are going to meet with some difficulties. But under the leadership of our Party, we have the capability to overcome them. We are determined to do it and gain greater successes. We should avoid demoralization, pessimism and confusion.

We must motivate everyone to resolutely carry out the X mission prescribed by higher headquarters. We should not let the Cambodian event alter our determination. We should realize that the better our X mission is fulfilled, the more advantages we will have, and the less difficulties we will encounter. The fulfilment of our mission also has the effect of motivating and encouraging our friend's army and people to rush forward and defeat the Cambodian reactionary faction.

We should be constantly ready for combat to avert any losses in personnel or equipment caused by eventual attacks from the Cambodian reactionaries alone or in joint action with the US and SVN Puppets. Regulations on movement along the border should be strictly observed. Any displacements of personnel should be done at night and by armed groups. The concealment of equipment must be planned in advance. A defense system must be prepared in detail. Spike pits, booby traps, and fences must be set up, but precautionary measures should be enforced to avoid accidental casualties to the local population. Warning posts and intercepting elements should be organized to stop the enemy **from a great distance.**

## 2. Concerning our ((Cambodian)) friends:

Subordinate agencies and units which are in daily contact with local

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people should motivate them as follows:

Try to gain the confidence of indigenous people, including village and hamlet administrative personnel. Point out to them the true significance of the current situation (propaganda themes on this subject will be provided by C2). Gain their allegiance and make them side with us in countering the US. Persuade them not to create difficulties for us. Persuade them to champion Sihanouk's cause and ostracize and isolate the pro-American faction. When the order is given, activate armed propaganda units and have them strictly adhere to these prescriptions and carry out their assignment well.

With regard to members of our friends' Party who operate in our quartering areas, we should not contact them without specific instructions from Doan. This is to avoid giving away their identify which adversely affects their operations.

3. Concerning the enemy: We should be prepared to defeat any enemy in any circumstance. We should absolutely not underestimated the Cambodian reactionaries. In the event an element of the reactionary Cambodian Government comes to our place, we should stop them at a distance and definitely not let them enter our quarters. Nevertheless, we can contact them and talk them out of their hostile intentions with persuasive arguments.

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We can tell them that we side with Sihanouk and advise them to do the same, to maintain friendship between the two nations which share a common ideal of countering the US. We should try to win the sympathy of ((Cambodian)) soldiers and low ranking officers, and avert any clash or gunfight. However, if they shoot at us, we ~~must~~ defend ourselves by destroying them or capturing them and confiscating their weapons.

Attention: If an element of the Cambodia Army turns against it and asks for our assistance, we should help them find a suitable area for quartering, then help them set up a defense system and build guerrilla bases, and instruct them how to attack the pro-American and reactionary Cambodian clique. Subordinate units should not allow them to quarter in their own bases and immediately report to Doan.

This directive must be urgently implemented. Party Committees at all levels should disseminate its contents to basic echelons. At the same time, they should instruct cadre and soldiers to keep absolute secrecy about the directive, and absolutely not to reveal it to irresponsible people. Reports on the implementation of this directive and any events ~~occurring~~ in our quartering area should be promptly submitted to Doan.

28 Mar 70

For the Command Committee of Doan  
Chief of Section ((possibly  
Political Section))

/S/ <sup>12</sup> Nguyen Van Trong

((Footnote))

Reproduction of this directive is forbidden. It should be destroyed after dissemination to battalion Party Committees.

-----END OF TRANSLATION -----