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# REPORT ON INDOCHINA

## REPORT

OF

SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

ON A STUDY MISSION

TO

VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, LAOS

INDOCHINA ARCHIVE

Douglas Pike, Ed  
Washington, D.C.



OCTOBER 15, 1954

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## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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OCTOBER 15, 1954.

HON. ALEXANDER WILEY,  
*Committee on Foreign Relations,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is my report on a study mission to Vietnam and the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. I visited these countries during August and September en route and returning from the Republic of the Philippines. In the latter country, as you know, I served as a delegate of the United States to the international conference on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, at the request of the President and the Secretary of State.

I should like to take this occasion to call to your attention the contribution being made by officers of the Department of State and other United States officials in the Philippines and Indochina. These men and women are working faithfully to carry out the policies of the Nation, sometimes under conditions of considerable personal hardship, with a high sense of the responsibilities of public service. They were uniformly helpful to me during the course of my mission.

I also want to commend Mr. Francis R. Valeo whom you assigned from the staff to accompany me on the mission. His assistance and cooperation were of inestimable value and they mark a continuation of his outstanding service from last year on the same project.


Sincerely yours,

MIKE MANSFIELD.

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# REPORT ON INDOCHINA

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the United States has suffered a serious reversal in Indochina. More than a year ago, we embarked on a major effort to assist in the preservation of the three nations in the Indochinese area. These nations, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, lay in the path of the southward sweep of totalitarian communism in Asia and were threatened with engulfment in a new type of colonialism even before they had achieved full independence from the old.

The objective of our policy—to assist in the preservation of these states—was a worthy one. It accorded with our fundamental belief in the right of peoples to freedom. If achieved, it promised to enhance the security of the United States by setting up along the southern borders of an expansive and aggressive China a bloc of three independent and durable nations.

On my previous visit to Indochina, a year ago, it appeared to me that there was a reasonable expectation of accomplishing our objective. Experienced observers there expressed an almost unanimous view that the united effort of the three Indochinese countries, France, and the United States could serve to check the Communist drive and might even eventually dissipate it.

Involved in this effort was the political and military mobilization of the indigenous peoples (particularly of Vietnam) against the Communists, a continuance of the military operations of the French Union forces in Indochina until the Vietminh Communists were brought under control, and military aid from the United States. The extent of the American contribution to the effort is suggested by the allocation of assistance for Indochina. For the 3 fiscal years 1950-52 aid programs amounted to about \$800 million. For 1953 and 1954, however, they were almost \$1.8 billion.

On my recent visit to Indochina, I found that the optimism concerning the prospects of success for the united effort had all but disappeared and with good reason. Instead of being checked or overwhelmed the Vietminh have now obtained firm control of the northern half of Vietnam. While Laos still remains outside the Communist engulfment, internal conditions in that country are such as to make its future highly speculative. Only in Cambodia is there some tangible expectation of the achievement of the objectives of a year ago.

The gravest situation exists in Vietnam. In this, the most populous and strategically the most important of the three states, events have now reached a stage of acute crisis. The Vietminh are consolidating their hold on Vietnam north of the 17th parallel, the area allotted to them by the Geneva accord. The non-Communist Vietnamese leaders have spent much time and energy which should have gone into a

similar consolidation in the south in what amounts to quasi-suicidal political maneuvering and strife.

This divisiveness in all probability has served to facilitate a growth in Vietminh strength throughout Vietnam. Although the Geneva accord is being ostensibly observed in the entire country and the fighting has come to an end, the cease fire does not preclude a subsurface continuation of the Communist advance in south Vietnam. Vietminh sympathizers are to be found throughout that region and it is likely that their number is growing. It must also be presumed that Vietminh activists are being left behind as the Vietminh withdraw their regular forces from south Vietnam in accordance with the terms of the cease fire. One observer described the situation to me in these terms: "Bring a brush down on the map of south Vietnam. Wherever the bristles touch you will find Vietminh."

Beyond this subsurface infiltration, the possibilities of a sudden revival of an overt advance of the Vietminh cannot be discounted. There is reason to believe that they accepted the Geneva agreement with some misgiving and only because it was necessary to some larger purpose of communism. By the same token, they could conceivably be led to abandon the agreement should the requirements of international communism change.

Regardless of this possibility, the state of affairs throughout Vietnam offers scant hope for an outcome in accord with the objectives of our policy. Unless there is a reversal of present trends, all of Vietnam is open in one way or another to absorption by the Vietminh. Even now there is little to stand in their way.

The morale of the French Union forces was shaken by the defeat at Dien Bien Phu and, in any event, massive French military detachments in Indochina may well have outlived their usefulness. Internal political dissension among non-Communist Vietnamese factions and even blatant chicanery on the part of some tends to weaken the nationalist government and discourage popular acceptance of it. The national army of Vietnam is disorganized in the aftermath of the loss of the north. Recent developments, moreover, suggest that it is on the way to being converted into the private army of its commander and his advisers to be used not for the legitimate purposes of the government but as a tool in the maneuvering for political power in Saigon.

In these circumstances, American material aid regardless of amount is hardly a panacea and it may not even be a major factor in the achievement of the objectives of our policy in Indochina. In some instances it has even served inadvertently to work at cross-purposes with our objectives. According to best available estimates, for example, some 25 percent of American economic aid went into areas which are now held by the Communists, an unwitting gift of the United States to the Communists. To cite another case, our assistance made possible major improvement in the airport in the northern city of Hanoi. The airport has now passed intact to the Communists. Its new American-aid-built runway can handle heavy bombers capable of striking at our bases in the Philippines.

The situation in Vietnam, and in a larger sense in Indochina, is grim and discouraging. It would be misleading and futile to report it to the Senate and to the people of the Nation in any other fashion.

The need, it seems to me, is not to bury the realities of this situation but to face them, however grim and discouraging they may be. If we do so, it is possible that aspects of our policy in Indochina may be salvageable. It is also possible that the reversal which has been sustained in Indochina may yield experience which has application elsewhere in Asia. This experience could be useful in avoiding still other setbacks and the damaging waste of untold millions of dollars of the resources of the citizens of the United States.

## 2. BACKGROUND TO THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

A year ago, at the time of my previous visit to Indochina, the French authorities had recently put into effect a new plan of campaign against the Vietminh. The plan was essentially military in concept. It envisioned a three-pronged effort which would combine the striking power of the French Union forces in Indochina, vastly expanded nationalist armies of the three states and large amounts of American material aid. The latter was all that was asked of us. There was no suggestion from any responsible source that American forces should become engaged in the fighting in Indochina. On the contrary, there was general agreement that their engagement would simply complicate the problem. In my report last year I emphasized that—

American aid does not and should not involve the commitment of combat forces. Sacrifices for the defense of freedom must be equitably shared and we have borne our full burden in blood in Korea.

The objective of this three-prong plan was to break the stalemate in the war against the forces under the Communist government of Ho Chi Minh, a war which had gone on for 7 years. At that time, the combined military strength of the French Union forces and the Nationalist governments of the three states already outweighed their opponents in manpower in a ratio of 5 to 3. As a result largely of American assistance, moreover, the non-Communist forces possessed great superiority—estimated as high as 10 to 1—in armaments, and the flow of American aid was constant and increasingly heavy. As one French military observer expressed it: "Never before in our history have we had a force that was so well equipped and supplied."

In a military sense, therefore, the plan seemed to offer reasonable prospects of success and I so reported to the committee and to the Senate last year. It appeared to me then, however, that the fulfillment of two political conditions was essential to the accomplishment of the plan. There was, first, the need for a rapid and clear-cut transfer of full sovereignty from France to the three states; and second, an equally urgent need for the development of a capacity among the non-Communist Indochinese (particularly of Vietnam) to put aside factional strife and excessive self-seeking and to unite under a nationalist leadership firmly based in the populace.

The two conditions were of the greatest importance for these reasons. In the first place, the transfer of full sovereignty was essential in order to mobilize the latent power of nationalist sentiment against the Vietminh. In this respect, I reported last year that—

The current of nationalism runs strong throughout Indochina. It is not, perhaps, of equal fervor in each of the three states but in all of them it is the basic political reality. It gives rise to a desire for independence from foreign control that is deep seated and widespread.



For 7 years, the Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, had capitalized on this force, especially in Vietnam. He had done so with effectiveness by concealing his Communist purposes in a cloak of nationalism. To have won the initiative from the Vietminh in this matter would have required, on the part of the non-Communists, a major political offensive built on genuine nationalist concepts, an offensive that was at once sincere, bold, imaginative, and immediate.

The second political condition was equally important to the success of the plan. It involved, in effect, the development of a capacity among the non-Communists to submerge personal, factional and sectarian interests in the larger interests of their country. The need to fulfill this latter condition was urgent because in 7 years the Vietminh had acquired numerous fanatic adherents and had obtained the support, willing and unwilling, of additional millions. A year ago, however, a large part of the Vietnamese population, probably a substantial majority, still remained uncommitted to either side in the struggle. To rally this uncommitted segment and to win away supporters of the Vietminh, it was essential that the non-Communists establish national governments of an integrity and character that would command the respect of the people and enlist their active support. In my report last year, I stated:

The basic problem which confronts all three governments and particularly that of Vietnam is to put down firm roots in their respective populations. They will be able to do so only if they evolve in accord with popular sentiment and if they deal competently with such basic problems as illiteracy, public health, excessive population in the deltas, inequities in labor and in land tenure, and village and agricultural improvement. Finally, it is essential that there be a constant raising of the ethical standards of government and a determination to use the armies now in the process of formation strictly for national rather than private purposes.

A year ago the non-Communists appeared to be making progress under the three-prong plan. American military aid in quantity was reaching the ports of Saigon and Haiphong and was being used to enlarge the offensive capacity of the French forces as well as to equip the developing nationalist armies. The conscription and training of men for these armies was well advanced, particularly in Vietnam. Tryouts of a new "offensive strategy" in some minor engagements seemed to promise an end to the stalemated war in the near future.

Progress in fulfilling the two political conditions for success, however, did not match that in the military field. With respect to the transfer of sovereignty, an excellent beginning had been made with the French pledge of full sovereignty in the declaration of July 3, 1953. When it came to giving effect to the pledge, however, numerous delays were encountered, sometimes of a most petty and exasperating nature. Norodom Palace in Saigon, for example, symbol of French rule in Indochina was not turned over to the Vietnamese until September 1954.

In Cambodia these delays led to serious tensions between the Nationalists and the French. Only in the case of Laos, whose government was most intimately associated with France and at that time least affected by the nationalist wave running through southeast Asia, did the negotiations go smoothly from the outset.

With respect to Vietnam, the key state in Indochina, the delays were the most conspicuous and damaging. Actual negotiations between France and Vietnam did not even begin until some 8 months after the

July 3 declaration. It was not until June 4, 1954, almost a year later that the basic treaties were finally initialed by the representatives of the two countries. By that time, the event seemed of little moment and almost passed unnoticed. What might have been an occasion 6 months earlier for a rallying of nationalist sentiment in Vietnam was all but submerged in the loss of Dien Bien Phu and the negotiations which were then in progress at Geneva.

Failure to make an effective transfer of full sovereignty was matched by the inability of the Vietnamese to develop a convincing nationalist leadership. The months following the July 3 declaration, months which should have been used for this purpose, were spent instead in an internal jockeying for power. The chief of state, former Emperor Bao Dai, passed most of this critical period in Paris and at Cannes rather than with the people of Vietnam. His Prime Minister, Prince Buu Loc, and the leading members of his cabinet likewise were out of the country for long periods.

It was during this interlude that the military situation moved toward its catastrophic climax at Dien Bien Phu. In December 1953, the Vietminh had launched an attack on central and southern Laos, the weakest and least defensible of the three states. They unleashed a second offensive against the northeastern part of the country early in February. These offensives apparently were not taken seriously at first, some in Saigon and Washington even labeling them mere "real-estate advances."

By the end of February, however, it was evident that they were serious. The reaction of the French Union command was to build a strong defensive point at Dien Bien Phu and, in effect, to invite attack on it in the hope of inflicting crippling losses on the enemy.

On March 12, the Viet Minh launched an assault on the fortress, as anticipated. Their tactics and firepower showed clearly from the outset the influence of increased aid from Communist China. They also displayed far greater offensive strength than the inadequate intelligence services of the non-Communist command had estimated when they began simultaneous attacks in north and central Vietnam. The effect of these diversionary drives was to prevent a concentration of defense at Dien Bien Phu. On May 7, the fortress surrendered. The Geneva agreement, signed some weeks later was almost an anticlimax.

It would do little good at this late date to indulge in recriminations over the tragic chain of events that led to Dien Bien Phu. In a sense each of the participants shares the responsibility; the French for miscalculating the magnitude of the military and political task they had set for themselves and then abandoning it at Geneva; the non-Communist Vietnamese for failing to provide responsible nationalist leadership to their people; and the administration here at home for overpromoting to itself and to the American people the capacity of material military aid alone to influence the situation in Vietnam as well as for the wave of irresponsible statements concerning direct American participation in the conflict at the time of Dien Bien Phu which served only to demoralize and to confuse the anti-Communist resistance in Indochina. Throughout these developments, moreover, there was a general tendency to make the wish father to the thought and consistently and seriously underestimate the strength of the Vietminh.

If there was one overriding cause of the failure, however, it is to be found in the distorted emphasis given to the capacity of military measures alone to bring about an end to the Communist advance in Indochina. It was not because of an inadequacy of allied military manpower or of military equipment and supplies in Indochina that American policy suffered a reversal. It is difficult to see what more could have been added, short of some foolhardy commitment of American troops on the Asian mainland against an outpost of international communism—literally its third line of defense in Asia. What was lacking in the situation was not military power but a sound political substructure for this power which could only have been built by fulfilling the two conditions previously discussed.

### 3. THE GENEVA AGREEMENT

The Geneva agreement brought 8 years of war in Indochina at least to a temporary halt. It provided for a cease-fire which came into effect at various dates during July and August 1954 in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The operation of the agreement has now become a major factor in the present situation in Indochina.

Under the terms of the agreement, the conferees promise to respect the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the three Indochinese States and to refrain from interference in their internal affairs. France, in a unilateral declaration, expresses a willingness to withdraw its forces from Indochina, except that special arrangements for their temporary retention may be made, at the request of the Indochinese Governments.

All sides agree to what amounts to a general amnesty, with provision for an exchange of prisoners and free movement of refugees. Laos and Cambodia and both sides in Vietnam pledge nondiscriminatory treatment to former dissidents remaining under their jurisdiction.

In connection with the international relations of the Indochinese States, the intent of the agreement appears to be to maintain the status quo. Thus, except if threatened, neither Laos nor Cambodia are expected to join in military alliances or to permit their territories to be used for foreign military bases and both sides in Vietnam are flatly prohibited from doing so. Restrictions of various kinds are applied to the introduction of additional foreign military personnel and materiel, the object being to permit limited rotation of men and piece-for-piece replacement of equipment but no increases.

The cease-fire provided for by the Geneva agreement is preliminary to an anticipated political settlement in Indochina. With respect to Cambodia this arrangement presents no special difficulties since only the National Government is recognized. The situation in Laos is more obscure and uncertain. Under the terms of the agreement, Vietminh invaders are to be withdrawn but Laotian dissidents are to concentrate in two northern provinces of Laos, contiguous to Communist China and north Vietnam. Although the authority of the Laotian Government presumably extends over the area of dissident-occupation, the agreement is sufficiently unclear on this point to lay the groundwork for future difficulties.

The most serious problem created by the Geneva agreement is the splitting of the State of Vietnam, roughly at the 17th parallel into a Communist-controlled north and a non-Communist-controlled south.

This arrangement is intended to be temporary and provision is made for a permanent political solution through the instrumentality of free general elections in Vietnam to be held in 1956. An international commission, composed of representatives of Canada, Poland, and India, is to supervise these elections.

The international commissions, one for each state, are also charged with general supervision of the observance of the cease-fire, although initial responsibility in this respect rests with joint commissions of the opposing forces. The international commissions make their recommendations on the basis of a majority vote, except in certain key decisions such as those pertaining to violations or threats of violations of the cease-fire, where unanimity is required. In the event of disagreement on the latter issues, the questions are referred to the signatory governments.

#### 4. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

##### *Effect of the division at the 17th parallel*

All of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel, with the exception of a small area around the city of Haiduong and the neighboring port of Haiphong has already been turned over to the Viet Minh. By May 19, 1955, the non-Communist forces will have withdrawn in progressive stages from these two places as well. In a similar fashion the Vietminh are committed to pull back their forces from south of the 17th parallel, with the completion of their withdrawal also scheduled for May 19, 1955.

At the time of my visit to Hanoi in early September, the withdrawal of the French Union and Vietnamese nationalist forces from the north was proceeding without incident. Equipment was being evacuated by rail and truck from Hanoi to Haiphong. Military authorities in the area gave assurances that all movable equipment would be removed before the Vietminh take over.

Only small forces remained in Hanoi to guard civilian and military installations. Government bureaus likewise were being maintained by skeleton forces. The Vietminh encircled the outskirts of the city, awaiting the arrival of October 10, the official occupation date for Hanoi. In early September, however, Hanoi had already taken on the aspects of a ghost town. A few French civilians, mostly businessmen and technicians, were remaining in the north for an attempt "to ride out the storm." So, too, were most of the Indian and Pakistani merchants and a number of Chinese. Thousands of persons, however, had already left the city for the south or for Haiphong and countless others had faded into the surrounding villages.

The British consulate was remaining open. A decision has also been made to leave Americans at our consulate in Hanoi. When the French military withdrawal is completed, a French liaison mission under Jean Sainteny will remain. Sainteny, who conducted negotiations with the Vietminh in 1946 on behalf of the French Government, is well acquainted with the Communist leaders.

With respect to the Vietminh withdrawal from the south, it was generally reported to me in Saigon that the operation is proceeding, on the surface, in accord with the cease-fire agreement. Much of the Vietminh military strength in the south, however, has lain under the surface. It is composed of irregulars; that is, peaceful civilians by

day and marauders by night. It is impossible to determine how much of this strength is being left behind in the withdrawal.

The irregulars could blend with relative ease into the regular life of their communities where they would constitute a reservoir of Vietminh leadership in the area under nominal non-Communist control. When this reservoir of activists is combined with Vietminh sympathizers in the south, the total strength of the anti-Government elements is probably very considerable.

According to reports reaching me in Saigon, the Vietminh nuclei in the south are already making their weight felt. They do not generally interfere with the installation of nationalist officials in towns and villages, but by a subtle noncooperation and intimidation render them relatively powerless and in some cases virtual prisoners in their offices. Power in many localities, according to these reports, continues to reside in "shadow governments" responsive to the Vietminh.

#### *Exchange of prisoners*

This aspect of the agreement as it affects the return of French Union nationals appeared to be progressing fairly satisfactorily at the time of my visit to Vietnam. Several Americans held by the Vietminh had also been released. The fate of many Vietnamese nationalists and French Union soldiers, however, who disappeared in the north is still unknown.

The total number of prisoners returned to the Vietminh far outnumbered those received from them. It is difficult to determine what part of this disparity is due to a deliberate Vietminh policy of withholding and what part to desertions, conversions, and defections. It is a question which should be expected to command the attention of the International Commission.

Among the prisoners released while I was in Saigon was Gen. Christian de Castries, French commander at Dien Bien Phu. Because of the statements he made at the time of his release and other factors there has been a noticeable cooling off of attitude toward the general on the part of many French and American officials who just a few months ago were lavish in their praise of him. I cite the incident only because it illustrates the dangers of policymaking by personalities, a tendency which appears to afflict many of our officials charged with responsibilities in foreign relations both here and abroad. It is also noteworthy because it suggests the desirability of avoiding impetuous judgments of situations based upon reports filtering through press censorship from a distance of some 10,000 miles.

#### *The refugee problem*

Vietminh propaganda promising amnesty and nondiscriminatory treatment to persons who formerly opposed them has failed to convince a substantial segment of the population in the north. Many thousands have chosen the difficult life of the refugee rather than to put faith in Communist promises. Reports in Hanoi indicated that while ostensibly abiding by the provisions of the cease-fire dealing with the free flow of refugees, the Vietminh were placing obstacles in the way of some who desired to go south.

Nevertheless, as shown in the following table, by the middle of September, France and the United States had evacuated almost 300,000 persons by sea and air. Most of these evacuees are Vietnamese civilians and some 80 percent are Catholics.

*Evacuations from North Vietnam*

	French		United States, sea	Total
	Air	Sea		
French Union troops.....	12, 937	11, 845	-----	24, 382
Vietnam troops and dependents.....	3, 703	19, 644	5, 702	29, 079
French civilians.....	9, 071	3, 323	-----	12, 394
Vietnam civilians.....	90, 681	49, 424	80, 176	220, 281
Other civilians (includes Chinese and Nungs).....	196	4, 048	2, 372	6, 616
Total.....	116, 418	88, 284	88, 250	292, 952

It is entirely possible that the total number of evacuees may reach 400,000 to 450,000 before the northern area is completely abandoned to the Vietminh. The movement of the refugees represents a humanitarian undertaking in which south Vietnam, France, and the United States are participating. Their efforts, moreover, have been supplemented by such organizations as the Red Cross, the United Nations International Children's Fund, CARE, religious welfare units, and the American Women's Club of Saigon. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group in Indochina, and Mr. P. E. Everett, acting chief of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Indochina are handling the operation for the United States. It includes the use of our naval vessels under the command of Rear Adm. Lorenzo S. Sabin, Jr. At Saigon, I went aboard the U. S. S. *Montrail* under the command of Capt. Scott K. Gibson which had just arrived from Haiphong with several thousand refugees. I also inspected Camp Phutho, a transient establishment for refugees several miles outside Saigon. Both visits indicated to me that Americans are making an outstanding contribution in this humanitarian endeavor.

The problem of permanently resettling upward of 300,000 persons, mostly utterly destitute, is a major one, particularly in view of present conditions in south Vietnam. Reports reaching me after I had left Indochina, however, indicate that the Vietnamese government which has primary responsibility for this aspect of the refugee problem is making a determined and effective effort to cope with it.

*The political situation in south Vietnam*

The most explosive single problem in Vietnam revolves about the current political crisis in south Vietnam. On its outcome may well hinge the fate of present American policy in Vietnam.

As previously pointed out, the Geneva agreement provides for general elections throughout Vietnam in 1956. Unless the political difficulties of south Vietnam are overcome quickly the area now remaining outside Communist hands may pass to the Vietminh at that time. Even before 1956, south Vietnam could give way to complete internal chaos.

The political crisis in south Vietnam stems from the same causes that were evident at the time of my previous visit, except that these causes have now become more acute. There is still the same shortsighted struggle for immediate gain among the various political groups, sects and factions. Each of these elements possesses some aspects of power in its organization, armaments or heritage of authority. None, however, is broadly based in the people. The urgent need to develop

such a base through the formation of a national government by popular participation continues to be ignored. In their anxiety to preserve and enhance their individual positions the petty-power groups in south Vietnam appear completely oblivious to the overhanging shadow of the Vietminh which before long may envelop them all unless they put aside their factionalism.

Saigon is the hub of the political crisis. Since the Geneva agreement that capital city has seethed with intrigue and counterintrigue, with rumors and counter rumors. The political plotting goes on in army circles, government circles, foreign circles, in party headquarters, in police headquarters, and even in the demimonde of ill-disguised gangsters, pirates, and extortionists.

The pattern of conflicting interest and political rivalry in Saigon is complex and devious, so much so that it is virtually impossible to fix clear-cut responsibility for the crisis of inertia that grips the political life of the country.

Certain factors in the situation, however, are evident and tangible. In office at the present time is a government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of Ministers. He has a theoretical mandate of full powers from the Chief of State, Bao Dai, who in turn derives his authority from a combination of a French grant and the persistence of the symbolic power of his former rule as Emperor.

In reality, however, Diem does not control the Vietnamese Nationalist Army; nor does he have power over the sureté or the police in the Saigon-Cholon area. By special arrangements with Bao Dai, the latter two are operated by the Binh Xuyen, a demimonde organization which also controls gambling, and other questionable concessions in Saigon-Cholon. Diem's strength rests on the recently arrived refugees and on a tenuous alinement with two quasi-religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, each of which has a military force of some thousands of men responsive to its command.

Diem has a reputation throughout Vietnam for intense nationalism and equally intense incorruptibility, traits which have been sorely needed in the government of Vietnam. Those who criticize him point to his inexperience (he spent many years in exile during the period 1933-54), the fact that he is not a native of south Vietnam and his political rigidity which makes it difficult for him to compromise.

Whatever his shortcomings, the fact remains that Diem assumed the presidency on July 7, under the most difficult of circumstances, after half of the country had been lost to the Communists, while it was being governed by some of his most vehement critics. At that time, the Vietminh were riding a crest of popularity in the aftermath of their victory at Dien Bien Phu. The national government was seriously disorganized. Thousands of refugees were moving into the south without adequate preparations having been made for their reception.

It might have been expected that in such a situation, those who professed to be anxious to see an independent, non-Communist government survive in Vietnam—French officials, the Vietnamese factions and the United States—would support the Diem government fully. The policy of the United States has been to give strong backing to that government. Our State Department officials have assisted it in every practicable way. Beyond this, however, the Diem government

has had little else in the way of tangible support. On the contrary an incredible campaign of subversion by intrigue has gone on in the city of Saigon. Occasionally echoes of this campaign have reached the surface, as in the recent instance of the insubordination of the Vietnamese Army command.

While this campaign has gone on, Diem has been a virtual prisoner in his residence. His constructive program which consists of the elimination of some of the most brazen aspects of corruption and social inequity, remains largely a paper program. It is kept that way by a kind of conspiracy of noncooperation and sabotage by those who oppose him.

The political issue in south Vietnam is not Diem as an individual but rather the program for which he stands. It is unlikely that any independent non-Communist government can survive in Vietnam, let alone recover the Vietminh-held areas unless it represents genuine nationalism, unless it is prepared to deal effectively with corruption, and unless it demonstrates a concern in advancing the welfare of the Vietnamese people.

If the effort to found a government based on those principles is now abandoned just a few months after its inception in an overthrow of Diem, it would raise, in my opinion, serious doubts about the salvagability of any of our present policy with respect to Vietnam. The visible alternatives to the Diem government are not promising. They are a Vietminh absorption of the south or a government or succession of governments at Saigon in the pre-Diem pattern. Such governments made little effort to root themselves in the people in the past and it is unlikely that they will do so in the future. It is probable, instead that they will continue to lean heavily and indefinitely on the prop of foreign support. Barring some drastic change in the total situation in Vietnam, such a government will stand only so long as the prop remains and Vietminh acquiescence can be obtained in its survival.

##### 5. THE SITUATION IN LAOS

The Kingdom of Laos has been invaded on several occasions by the Vietminh, operating under the euphemism of "the Vietnamese People's Volunteers." In addition, there has long been active inside the country a native dissident movement known as the Pathet Lao.

Under the terms of the armistice, the Vietminh invaders are to be withdrawn gradually from Laos to Vietnam and the Laotian dissidents are to concentrate in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. The French Government is permitted to retain in Laos for the present some 5,000 men as a training mission and to maintain 2 military bases.

The Government of Laos, in a separate declaration at Geneva committed itself to integrate all citizens without discrimination into the national community and to guarantee to them constitutional rights and freedoms. Pending the holding of general elections, the government agreed to provide special representation for the Laotian dissidents of the two northern provinces.

In a second separate declaration, the Government of Laos, pledged that unless threatened, it will isolate the country in a military sense from other foreign nations except for the continuing ties with the French.



Considerable difficulty has been encountered in Laos in carrying out the terms reached at Geneva insofar as they involve the withdrawal and concentration, respectively, of the Vietminh and the Laotian dissidents. The impression given me in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, was that the withdrawal of the Vietminh was not proceeding either smoothly or rapidly. There is, moreover, every likelihood that in the process of withdrawal many Communist agents are being left behind. Such agents can readily be absorbed into the permanent community of Vietnamese nationals in Laos whose sympathies, I was advised, are heavily with Ho Chi Minh.

The Laotian dissidents in the northern provinces give rise to additional problems. They are interpreting the Geneva accord to mean that they may exercise full powers in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, at least pending the holding of a general election. Compulsory political indoctrination is being enforced in the villages which they control. Young men from all over Laos are being brought to the provinces for training and some are being sent to north Vietnam for the same purpose.

The basic propaganda theme of the dissident Laotians is that the true king of the country is Prince Souphamouvong, rather than the incumbent, King Sisavong Vong. Souphamouvong is a half brother of the present prime minister of the regular Laotian Government, Prince Souvana Phouma.

That severe tensions have developed in Laos over the last year is evident from the arrest of several hundred plotters some months ago and the assassination of the Laotian Defense Minister Kou Voravong on September 19. There is a possibility that these tensions may be dissipated by a sudden realignment of loyalties among the various leaders, Government and dissident alike, many of whom are personally acquainted.

A development of this kind, if it occurred, might express itself in a sudden nationalist surge against the French, who still retain considerable influence in Laos, and who have heretofore had less difficulty in dealing with the Laotian Government than with any other in Indochina. In present circumstances in southeast Asia, however, it is unlikely that Laos can stand without strong foreign ties. As it is now, the Laotians are heavily dependent on French technical and military assistance and American aid. If the French go, it would appear inevitable that Laos would move or be moved into the orbit of one or more of its stronger neighbors.

#### 6. THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

At the time of my previous visit the fever of militant nationalism was at its height in Cambodia. Thousands of young men were engaged in military training in the streets of the capital, Pnom Penh. The Cambodian Government under the young and energetic King Norodom Sihanouk Varman was both leading and being led by the powerful nationalist surge. That this Government was influenced by the ideas and experiences of Indian nationalism and policy was evident then and even clearer on the occasion of my recent visit.

Last year the Cambodians obtained full control over their armed forces from the French and subsequently full independence. There are details still to be worked out to give final form to the transfer of

sovereignty. For all practical purposes, however, Cambodia is independent. Perhaps even more significant, the people of the country know and believe that they are independent.

This development appears to have produced a salutary situation in Cambodia. Relations with the French, now on the basis of equality, have improved, and French technicians are being retained to assist in the training of the army. Dissident nationalist elements among the Cambodians, according to reports which I received, have been weakened, and the shadowy Communist-sponsored "Khmer government" apparently has lost what little support it formerly enjoyed.

The Geneva agreement served to strengthen the stability of the country by providing for the rapid removal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and the demobilization on the spot of the "Khmer resistance forces."

Assuming that aggression is not resumed, the principal problems confronting Cambodia are essentially those of modernization. In this respect the country is fortunate for it is rich in resources and relatively underpopulated. There is an eagerness for progress on the part of the King and his immediate advisers. It is an eagerness, however, that is tempered by an appreciation of the value of their rich and vital traditional culture.

To fuse those technical elements of western civilization which are needed and desired in Cambodia with the existing culture without destroying the latter will not prove easy. To the extent that United States assistance plays a part in this process, it should be extended with a full awareness of this difficulty. The presence of the recently appointed American Ambassador at Pnom Penh should help to insure caution in this matter.

#### 7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

A year ago, the principal requirements for the success of our policy with respect to Indochina were political. These requirements, full independence and effective internal government, notably in Vietnam, have not been effectively fulfilled. The failure in this respect appears also to have been accompanied by a consistent underestimating of both the political and military strength of the Vietminh, on the part of practically all concerned. In consequence, the situation has seriously deteriorated.

The United States shares responsibility for the reversal in Indochina. We should not make the mistake, however, of assuming all the blame. We gave material aid unstintingly, but its value was dissipated by inadequacies elsewhere. I report this, not so much in criticism—I am fully aware of the great contributions to the common cause made by sincere French officials and sincere Vietnamese nationalists—but rather to make clear that this country has discharged the commitments which it was asked to make last year and which it agreed to make. At that time it was not asked to commit and was even discouraged from committing manpower in Indochina. Not until the crisis of Dien Bien Phu did the question even arise. Then the pressures of American opinion operating largely through Congress discouraged a hasty, ill-conceived involvement. Our share in the defense of Indochina was clearly understood at the outset to be the supply of material aid only and we quite properly insisted that his understand-

ing be maintained. The situation in Indochina is only one of the many crises that confront us and the burden of sustaining freedom in the world must be equitably borne.

At present, there appears to be, at best, scant hope of achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The present Government of Vietnam which is based on the sound principles of national independence, an end to corruption and internal amelioration, is immobilized largely by a squabbling plotting opposition. Its critics complain of the personality of the leader of that Government. In view of the numerous and varied personalities who have occupied the Presidency in Saigon during the past 2 or 3 years without tangible results, it seems more likely that the real question is one of dissatisfaction with the principles of the Diem government rather than the inadequacies of his personality.

Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it is doubtful that under the pressure of time a more satisfactory substitute, subscribing to the same principles to which he does, will be found. Yet these principles must prevail in south Vietnam, if an alternative to the Communist Vietminh that is likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam is to exist. Any replacement of Diem at this time, if it occurs, will probably take the form of a military dictatorship based upon a coalition of the special interests, parties, and groups which now oppose the present Government. It is improbable that the substitute will be the kind of government which will be generally supported by the Vietnamese people any more than the pre-Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a government capable of sustaining a free and independent Vietnam eventually without foreign support. It was to develop that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available hundreds of millions of dollars of aid. In my view, only that kind of Vietnam can achieve the purpose of our policy in Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the consequent enhancement of our own security.

In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore, I believe that the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free Vietnam. Unless there is reasonable expectation of fulfilling our objectives the continued expenditure of the resources of the citizens of the United States is unwarranted and inexcusable.

I further recommend that the appropriate committees of the Senate study the extent of the losses of United States military and other aid in Indochina through defeat, defections, and the operation of the Geneva accord. The purposes of such a study might well be not merely to establish the monetary value of the losses already sustained but to determine their adverse effect on our own security by their inadvertent contribution to international communism in Asia. Such an investigation might also yield more satisfactory criteria than apparently exist at present for determining to what countries, in what amounts, and under what conditions military and other aid can be effectively extended.

In suggesting such a study, I do not intend to imply that such aid has no place in our policies with respect to Asia. It seems to me essential, however, that the limitations and dangers as well as the potentialities of assistance programs must be clearly understood. We must guard against extending aid by force of habit.

In the light of my recent observations in southeast Asia, it seems to me that these commonsense precautions have not always prevailed in the conduct of our policy in that region. Unless they do, we are likely to find the door shut against our legitimate security, and our cultural and commercial interests in Asia. We will have arrived at this point despite the expenditure of billions of dollars, in good faith, for what we believed were decent, worthy, and mutually beneficial purposes.

# APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX I

### AGREEMENTS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA

#### AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

[IC/42/Rev. 2, 20 July 1954]

#### CHAPTER I—PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

##### *Article 1*

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (see Map No. 1).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

##### *Article 2*

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

##### *Article 3*

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

##### *Article 4*

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

##### *Article 5*

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

##### *Article 6*

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

**Article 7**

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

**Article 8**

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

**Article 9**

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

**CHAPTER II—PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT****Article 10**

The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

**Article 11**

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a. m. (local time) on 27 July 1954

Central Viet-Nam at 8.00 a. m. (local time) on 1 August 1954

Southern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a. m. (local time) on 11 August 1954

It is agreed that Peking mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

**Article 12**

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and

neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

#### **Article 13**

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

#### **Article 14**

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notice shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

#### **Article 15**

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a). The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:

- meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island
- northern coast of Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines
- meridian of Campha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement):

#### *Forces of the French Union*

Hanoi perimeter-----	80 days
Haiduong perimeter-----	100 days
Haiphong perimeter-----	300 days

#### *Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam*

Ham Tan and Xuyenmoc provisional assembly area-----	80 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—first instalment--	80 days
Plaine des Joncs provisional assembly area-----	100 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—second instalment-----	100 days
Point Camau provisional assembly area-----	200 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—last instalment--	300 days

### CHAPTER III—BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MUNITIONS. MILITARY BASES

#### *Article 16*

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.



It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same échelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion—or the corresponding échelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below;

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

#### Article 17

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited;

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

#### *Article 18*

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

#### *Article 19*

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

#### *Article 20*

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

- Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;
- Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

### CHAPTER IV—PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

#### *Article 21*

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.

### CHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

#### *Article 22*

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

#### *Article 23*

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies

of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

#### *Article 24*

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

#### *Article 25*

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

#### *Article 26*

The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

#### *Article 27*

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

### CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . .). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of

the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfil the tasks provided for in article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Nameese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the  
People's Army of Viet-Nam

TA-QUANG-BUU,

*Vice-Minister of National Defence of the  
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.*

For the Commander-in-Chief of the  
French Union Forces in Indo-China

Brigadier-General DELTEIL

#### ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

##### I. DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

(Article 1 of the Agreement; Reference Map: Indo-China 1/100,000)

(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows, reading from east to west:

the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cua Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.

(b) The demilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

## II. GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY AREAS

(Article 15 of the Agreement; Reference Maps: Indo-China 1/400,000)

## (a) NORTH VIET-NAM

*Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces*

1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the north-east.

In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.

2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Song-Van-Uc three kilometres north-east of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khé. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.

3. A corridor contained between:

*In the south*, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (South-west of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;

*In the north*, a line running along the Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.

*Note:* Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi, the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of the Song-Van-Uc.

*Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Haiduong*

A straight line running from the Rapids Canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat).

## (b) CENTRAL VIET-NAM

*Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel*

The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Nagi and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.

## (c) SOUTH VIET-NAM

Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

The boundaries of these areas are as follows:

1. *Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan Area*

*Western boundary:* The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.

*Northern boundary:* Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.

2. *Plaine des Joncs Area*

*Northern boundary:* The Viet-Nam-Cambodia frontier.

*Western boundary:* A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.

*Southern boundary:* Course of the Fleuve Antérieur (Mekong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometres east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.

*Eastern boundary:* A straight line from Hung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier south of Doi-Bao-Voi.