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4/70

CAPTURED DOCUMENT ON COSVN MEETING ON CAMBODIA (c. 4/70)

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19 Apr ((70))

Meeting held by representatives of the Base Area Security ((Committee, COSVN)) in Carum Chat ((possibly Phkan Rumchet Province, Cambodia)):

After Directive 06 of C69 ((COSVN)) had been implemented by our units and agencies, there had been new developments in the ((Cambodian)) situation.

Our units and agencies located along the ((Cambodia-Vietnam)) border areas had helped the friendly ((possibly Red Khmer and Sihanouk's forces)) make new progress and consequently made the Lon Nol Government weaker and more isolated. The ((Cambodian)) people mostly talked of the five-point program of S ((Prince Sihanouk)). Between 1 and 20 Apr ((possibly 70)), an area 30 to 60 kilometers long was controlled, and approximately 600,000 people, including 100,000 Vietnamese residents were living in the friendly ((possibly Red Khmer and Sihanouk forces)) liberated areas. This does not include the neutralization of a number of administrative organizations of L ((possibly Lon Nol)) Government and the expansion of the guerrilla's areas of activities and those of the People's Revolutionary Party of C ((Cambodia, meaning Red Khmer)). In this situation, with the cooperation of the friendly forces, we had seized some thousands of weapons: 1,000 of them were seized from ((posts and towers)) located along Highway 1, 300 from Krek ((City, Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia)), 500 from An Giang Province, 500 from Tây Ninh Province, and over 500 from T2 ((possibly Military Region 2)). With the cooperation of the friendly units, we had successfully attacked four posts and persuaded a number of panic-stricken ((Cambodian)) people and ((Buddhist)) monks to follow us. Since the Lon Nol Government had been isolated, the present situation favored our activities, and we acquired strong support in the eastern area of Cambodia. The situation developed quickly. The Current Affairs Committee ((possibly of COSVN)), in its assessment of the situation, states that we still have to make further progress faster, because the Lon Nol Government is very weak, the ((Cambodian)) people are in the full-blown ((Revolutionary)) movement, and her Majesty, the mother ((of Prince Sihanouk)) really appreciated aid from Vietnamese ((possibly meaning VC/NVA)) who were resolute to stand against the Americans.

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The Lon Nol clique proved its stupidity and barbarism through its policy of massacring both the Cambodia people and the Vietnamese residents. Several western press agencies had blamed Lon Nol for terrorist activities. This situation obviously substantiates the correctness of Directive 06, which states that difficulties experienced by friendly units are merely temporary ones, and favorable opportunities will bring the Cambodian and Indochinese People's Revolutionary movements.

to the next higher steps, rally a great number of the ((Cambodian)) royalist people to a large front, and urge the S ((Sihanouk's)) Party to completely side with the Revolution ((VC/NVA and Red Khmer)). This will create a situation in which every social stratum of ((Cambodia)) will assume revolutionary work, establish the Revolutionary administration, and organize the liberation armed forces. Though we do not see it yet, the recent coup d'etat appears to have created a great leap forward in the revolutionary movement. It has established the ground for an anti-American front of the Indochinese people's in conjunction with ((combat)) activities on the three battlefields ((SVN, Laos, and Cambodia)), while the enemy is de-escalating the war and continuing to withdraw troops from SVN. The Revolutionary movement is progressing quickly along with the conduct of a military campaign ((possibly meaning Campaign X)) in SVN. The enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) pacification and Vietnamization strategy began to experience failures, chiefly in the Mekong River Delta. Meanwhile, the Laos battlefield experiences fast developments in the Plain of Jars ... Since the Americans dared not bring their troops into Laos, they will no doubt experience a defeat in the C ((Cambodian)) battlefield. The L ((Lon Nol)) Government had requested weapons, and no one dared give it weapons. The press corps contended that if weapons are issued to the Lon Nol Government which is still very weak, they will certainly fall into the VC hands. The C ((Cambodian)) Government is not capable of fighting a war, but might receive financial aid, weapons, and advisors ((from America)) and help the SVN troops and their henchmen conduct attacks on us by means of aircraft, artillery fire, and intelligence activities.

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The Cambodian situation proves that the assessment of the situation and policy of our Party were correct.

The American imperialists are very stubborn, and we should beware of their activities. For instance, the Americans had overthrown S ((Sihanouk)), stricken VN ((meaning VC/NVA forces)), implemented the Vietnamization plan, cut our transportation routes, and destroyed our warehouse facilities and base areas in order to cause difficulties to us, weaken our forces, force us to make concessions in the ((Paris)) peace talks, and check the expansion of the Revolutionary movement in C ((Cambodia)). But after the fall of S ((Sihanouk)), this Government ((meaning the Lon Nol Government)) was so weak that it was nearly shattered. The press said that the VC had expanded many base areas and they would rather expand their controlled areas than to conduct attacks on the Phnom-Penh ((Capital)) which would create very complicated incidents.

Confronted with this situation, our Party planned to focus efforts to settle the SVN battlefield ((meaning to win the war)) and strive to give maximum assistance to the People's Revolutionary Party of C ((Cambodia)), and bring the Cambodian Revolutionary movement to the next higher stage. In the recent past, we had correctly executed this policy. So far, we had not done anything which badly hurts the SVN ((Revolutionary)) situation because our forces had been reasonably employed in C ((Cambodia)) and regardless how large are our forces to be committed ((in C)), we will not get ourselves in trouble in C. Previously, the enemy thought we might be in trouble in C. But, unexpectedly, this ((possibly 1970 Spring)) Campaign had brought bitter defeats to the enemy, who was obliged to review his pacification program.

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Being strategically defeated, the enemy will make new efforts which require our precautionary measures. His efforts in Z ((possibly Vietnam-Cambodia border area)) would be the conduct to intense intelligence activities, Biệt Kích ((Special Forces)) operations, bombings, and artillery shelling, in conjunction with the employment of concentrated infantry units. At present, he stresses the destruction of warehouse facilities by means of artillery fire and bombings. Specifically, he concentrated eight Puppets ((RVNAF)) D ((battalions)) in Ba Thu ((Parrot's Beak)) and moved one armored E ((regiment)) six to 10 kilometers deep into the ((Vietnam-Cambodian)) border area, and clung to a number of areas located along the route leading to Hồng Ngự ((District, Kiến Phong Province)), Highway 1, and Road 22 leading to Kred ((City, Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia)). He also planned to establish a number of white ((free fire)) zones along the border area. Tactically, in a battle, he would pull out his troops from a vulnerable position, then deliver heavy bombings and artillery fire, to reoccupy it. This is merely his planning, because its success depends on the balance of friendly ((VC/NVA)) and enemy ((FVNAF/RVNAF)) forces. At present, we are striving to expand our areas of activities and exercise control in them. We now control an area stretching from Road 7 to the vicinity of the Mekong River, and from Mimot ((rubber plantation area)) to an area adjacent to the Mekong River. This was said to be an important base area. We had to establish a base area of 60 kilometers in every direction in order to hold 60,000 to 70,000 people who have completely sided with S ((Sihanouk)). Here, jungles are large and interspersed with a number of spacious rubber plantations, villages, hamlets, and ricefields, which yield good productions if we know how to exploit them. In addition, some thousands of Vietnamese residents are now living along the bank of the Mekong River. This area may fit the transportation, postal-communication, and signal communication strategy, and insure communication with T2 and T3 ((Military Regions 2 and 3)).

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The Current Affairs Committee, ((possibly of COSVN)) reminds us of its strategic intention, which dictates that we ought to establish base areas to ensure the performance of combat and production activities for a long period of time. Its policy is as follows:

1. Efforts should be made to develop the ((Cambodian)) Revolutionary movement in a short period of time; strengthen and develop this movement into a steadfast combat and ((farm)) production movement, stressing the rallying of revolutionary people in lieu of occupying jungle areas. In this regard, we activated the ((People's)) Liberation Committees in 10 phum's ((hamlets)) and held meetings with representatives of 19 other phum's on 19 ((possibly Apr 70)). The coming month ((possibly May 70)) will be a decisive month in the performance of farm work and preparations for countering the enemy offensive activities. The responsible agencies should therefore select personnel for this mission.

2. Cadre and members should ensure the establishment of relationship between new and old base areas, and employ the latter as "springboards" to obtain access to other areas and provide mutual support. The reason is that if the enemy occupies our old areas of activities, he will no doubt strike us. In other words, we must safeguard our previous areas of activities.

3. Personnel of units and agencies should observe movement and bivouacking regulations, watch for the enemy presence, safeguard their base areas, and avoid enemy bombings and artillery fire. The reason is that the enemy might reoccupy the Krek Post, seize control of Route 22, and strike Route 7. Therefore, if movements and bivouacking regulations are not observed, thus compromising our locations, the enemy will certainly attack us.

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The Current Affairs Committee, ((COSVN)) was disturbed about the indiscriminate firing by a number of our cadre and members.

4. In the establishment of a relationship with the ((Cambodian)) people, cadre and members should display a correct attitude, respect their habits and traditions, and absolutely not touch their property, because they treated us as their liberators who never covet their property.

5. Everybody should work to help both the SVN and Cambodian revolutionary movements develop, properly fulfill our responsibility, and do production work in accordance with the prescribed criteria. First, we ought to produce ammunition because resupply is difficult.

((The report is ended by-fragmentary footnotes which reveal the following information:))

Situation of the base area.

- The Ca-Mgot situation adversely hurts the friendly Revolution.
- The Cabot Post had 500 men and the Cam Xe ((Post)) had 300 men.
- Money donated by rubber plantations to the Revolution: The Frenchmen in Krek City ((Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia)) donated rice, fish sauce, and cassava to our forces.
- The people in Krek said that when living in their areas, we should not leave any trace which might disclose our presence, as the enemy would kill them.
- There may be enemy agents in the Cambodian revolutionary ranks.
- Some of our men, during their movement rushed into the people's houses after being spotted by the enemy aircraft.
- For the Cambodian people, firing had become a political matter. In Ca Mong, the Cambodians asked our men why we did not give them weapons.
- While living in the friendly territory, to safeguard our lives and carry out combat missions we ought to respect friendly sovereignty and should not chase the Cambodian people.
- In doing farm work, do not clear new jungle areas, but strive to plant cassava. Do not transport farm products along communication routes.

More old hammocks, mosquito-nets, and rifles (MAS, German, and Red-Stock) to be issued.

The coup d'etat was engineered because the Americans had been defeated in SVN. It was designed to stop the Revolutionary force from coming into Cambodia, and to turn this country into the new colony of the Americans.

Did the Lon Nol Government plan to sell Cambodia to the Americans?

The Americans wanted to expand the war but they were obliged to de-escalate the war.

The Cambodian Army does not have a just cause. Its personnel usually harass the people and are corrupt.

The people of 18 out of 20 provinces in Cambodia participated in demonstrations to protest conscription.

The Cambodians were asked to either fight or lose their country.

The compliments of S ((Sihanouk)) were addressed to the demonstrations.

Declaration of S concerning the activation of the ((National Reunification)) Front.

Messages sent from S.

Our statements concerned.

The appeal made by the Communist Party: Counter foreign invasion.

Missions: Stand against the Lon Nol Government and strengthen forces to safeguard the Khmer Kingdom.

According to S, the Cambodians should take up weapons, kill tyrants, break loose the enemy's grip, disband Lon Nol's organizations, refuse to pay taxes, and strive to establish a new life.

Each village will have seven Committee members and each hamlet will have three Committee members. Twenty or 30 representatives of a hamlet and 30 representative of a village should hold a meeting.

On 19 and 20 ((possibly Apr 70)) village Front Committees were activated and district Front Committees will be organized in early May ((possibly 70)).

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