

After this failure, the US imperialists had to plunge a step deeper by sending US troops and South Vietnamese henchmen to directly invade Cambodia. This time, their intention was to search for and destroy friendly agencies and storage facilities.

[They also hoped to] smash the Cambodian Revolution in order to change the situation and save their Vietnamization program from heavier failure.

Since the war was expanded throughout Indochina, the following results have been noted:

1. The enemy could not attain his objective and his plan became fruitless.

The Vietnamization program was still a failure, despite enemy efforts.

After the coup in Cambodia, the situation worsened. The Lon Nol regime, instead of being strengthened, became weaker militarily, politically, and diplomatically.

The US political and diplomatic influence has been adversely affected.

The people of the world, the US people and Congress, the Indochinese people forced the US to withdraw its infantry forces from Cambodia.

The enemy, instead of causing us heavy casualties, have suffered more casualties since the war was expanded.

In SVN during the first six months of 1968, we killed 230,000 enemy soldiers, and destroyed 4,300 aircraft and 1,500 artillery pieces. During the third quarter, we killed 150,000 others.

In Cambodia we killed over 60,000 enemy soldiers, the equivalent of 100 battalions and three brigades, within nine months.

In Laos, in eight months, we killed 15,000 enemy soldiers, and destroyed one Thai battalion.

The enemy failure has the following characteristics:

Although the enemy has changed his military strategy, he still remains on the defensive.

In the past, the enemy organized his defense in depth. He now organizes his defense by conducting limited counter-offensive activities.

He used firepower in the place of troops to reduce casualties and losses of war materiel. However, enemy casualties and losses of facilities have continuously increased.

With the de-escalation of the war, the US had to gradually withdraw troops while the Puppet troops were unable to replace them. As the war was expanded throughout Indochina, the enemy forces became thinly dispersed. The contradictions between the enemy schemes and capabilities created many vulnerabilities.

His plan to organize a military alliance bloc, consisting of his henchmen cliques, to support the Lo Non [Lon-Nol] regime resulted in nothing.

The enemy was divided over the question of sending US and Puppet troops into Cambodia.

The US has bogged down a further step. If it abandons the Lo Non [Lon Nol] regime, the latter would immediately collapse. If it maintained the Lon Nol regime by sending troops to Cambodia, it would suffer heavier losses and lose popular support. Financial aid had been given secretly and parsimoniously (because the US Congress disapproved of any aid for the Lon Nol regime). If South Vietnamese lackey troops were to be sent [into Cambodia], their forces would be thinly dispersed, and the pacification program would therefore be stalled [sic]. Those are the deadlocks and difficulties that the US is facing.

In summary, the Vietnamization program has failed in its first step.

The Nixon doctrine of using the Indochinese people to fight the Indochinese people failed at the beginning.

We are gaining increasingly greater victories.

Although the enemy expanded the war, creating temporary difficulties for us, we always gained the initiative and attacked the enemy forces from all sides on all battlefields.

In South Viet-Nam:

We broke up many strategic hamlets, particularly in the Mekong River Delta and the lowlands of Region 5. We conducted many attacks against the enemy in many military sub-sectors and district seats. We conducted continuous attacks to encircle and destroy enemy forces in the Tri-Thien area. We forced enemy troops to withdraw from Hil 395, and encircled them in the Coc Bay [sic] area.

In Cambodia, The people's [revolutionary] movement has developed strongly. The [people's] armed forces have been quickly organized. Three-fourths of the land, including five provinces in the north and over 100 district seats have been completely liberated. More than two and a half million people are living in liberated areas.

In Laos, two more southern provinces, A-tro-po [Attopeu], and Sa-ra-ven [Saravane] have been liberated. The enemy plan to secure the Xuyen Khoang [Xiang Khoang] area has been smashed.

Through the victories of the three nations of Indochina, the following salient characteristics concerning the friendly and enemy situation are apparent:

Enemy political and diplomatic [situation]

1. The opposition of the US people to their government.

The opposition of the US people to Nixon's aggressive policy has continuously increased in various strong and meaningful forms. They initiated various movements against their government. There are a number of States which used State laws to forbid drafting new soldiers to be sent to fight in South Viet-Nam.

The protest of US students against the aggressive policy of Nixon has been demonstrated through such actions as destroying draft cards or refusing to heed draft orders.

2. The opposition of the US Congress to the US Government.

The Congress issued a resolution to limit the authority of the president and reduce expenditures for the war in Indochina.

Many cabinet members and high officials of the Nixon Administration objected to the policy of aggression in Indochina by resigning their posts (including former Secretary of Defense Bo-lit-phot [possibly Clifford], and Diplomatic Counselor Ha-ri-man [Harriman]).

3. The party in power (the bellicose Republican Party) cast a vote of no confidence against Nixon as the representative of the Republican Party. A number of leaders and groups in the party objected to the Nixon policy.

4. The opposition of the people of the world to the US.

Where there are US flags and embassies, there are popular movements and demonstrations against the US. US flags were destroyed.

[US] diplomatic groups sent to foreign countries have always met with protests, even in imperialist countries like England and Italy, etc... [sic]. Recently, the Italian people demonstrated, smashed the furniture of the [US] Embassy, and burned 13 US vehicles during Nixon's visit to Italy.

5. The imperialistic countries also openly opposed the US.

6. US dependent and satellite countries have also objected to the US plan to form the Indochina Military Alliance [sic]; some of them, such as South Korea and Australia, blackmailed the US with threats to withdraw their troops from South Viet-Nam in order to compel the US to increase their [combat] allowances.

Previously, US foreign policy used US power and threat as leverage, but now it is based on deceitful tricks and lies, such as organizing conferences with prearranged and secret agreements. US prestige has sunken lower than ever before.

The Saigon Puppet are seriously divided. Division even prevails between Thieu and Ky.

A third force (an opposition force against Thieu and Ky) was formed.

The following city struggle movements are seething :

The workers' and laborers' movement.

The students' movement.

The Puppet disabled veterans', orphans', and widows' movement.

The press and journalists' movement.

The struggle movement for women's rights.

These movements are supported by the Buddhist movement.

Friendly situation:

Our political struggle movement is steadily developing step by step.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government's prestige is strongly consolidated and heightened.

When it was founded, this government was recognized by 26 countries with which it has established diplomatic relations.

The Cambodian Revolutionary Government was established and recognized by 24 countries.

An anti-US Indochina Front has been formed.

Our government and revolutionary organizations have been recognized by all international organizations and movements. Therefore, we were invited to attend all conferences held by these international organizations.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh has been invited to visit India and was warmly greeted at the conference held in India by 70 non-aligned countries to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops from all of Indochina, and particularly from SVN. This was a great political and diplomatic victory of our side.

The eight-point [peace solution] presented by Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris peace talks was a diplomatic offensive to:

- Launch a sudden but well prepared diplomatic offensive designed to unmask the US imperialists' scheme to prolong the war in an attempt to implement their Vietnamization plan.

- Divide and isolate to a high degree the clique of puppets and lackeys, especially the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique.

- Strive to win the support of forces advocating neutrality and peace, including those elements who now live abroad or are working for the Puppet Government.

- Create favorable conditions for the American people struggle to demand a withdrawal of US troops according to a fixed schedule etc... [sic]. (Because Nixon deceitfully argued that a withdrawal of US troops according to a fixed schedule would incur the danger of destruction by our forces, we have pointed out in the 8-point proposal that if the US troops withdraw speedily according to our proposed schedule, we will guarantee their safe withdrawal).

It is necessary to reaffirm that the present objective of the Revolution and our present diplomatic aim are to get US troops out of SVN.

Establish a coalition government, organize a general election, and discuss national reunification.

In the present victorious conditions, our objective remains unchanged on the basis of the eight-point [peace solution] which constitutes a new tactic. The decisive victory is still the one won on the battlefield.

Economic aspect: Comparison of US expenditures.

The US spent only 24 billion dollars for the Korean war during 37 months of fighting.

In South Viet-Nam, as of the end of 1969, that is 60 months, 150 billion dollars were spent, while aid for all Latin America was only \$2.5 billion dollars.

The expenditures in SVN caused an economic crisis and monetary inflation in the US.

US gold reserves flow to other countries. (One-third of US paper currency is guaranteed by gold.)

The US prosperity plan was bankrupt.

Taxes increased by 19 percent and the cost of living increased 30 percent in the US.

The war in SVN caused an economic crisis in the US. This worsened the living conditions of the US people. Therefore, 5,000 strikes were conducted by US workers and laborers to resist the capitalists and the Nixon Administration.

The South Vietnamese economy is totally dependent on the US and other capitalistic countries.

Domestic production dwindled due to the removal of the people [into secure areas]. Moreover, the farmlands were mostly in liberated areas.

Higher taxes were imposed on 1,500 kinds of commodities.

The cost of living is multiplied by from five to seven times.

Monetary inflation increased from 70 to 210 billion piasters.

The economic crisis in SVN is the cause of continuous struggles by people from all walks of life.

Due to their defeats the US imperialists were forced to withdraw their troops and pass all military and economic burdens on the shoulders of the Puppet troops. This caused an economic chaos for the Puppets and turned the puppet administration into an oppressive machinery. Therefore, all struggle movements have an increasing chance to develop.

Achievements gained by the sub-region:

A. Good points:

[The forces of the sub-region] destroyed part of the enemy strength.

They are able to hold the area of operations connecting the three areas from the front to the rear and are ready to deploy forces and accomplish missions when the orders are given. They are able to hold the strategic operation areas, and in coordination with other sub-regions, continuously encircle and put pressure on key enemy agencies.

They are able to uphold the offensive stance of the entire South.

Although they have not frustrated the enemy rural pacification plan, they have caused him many losses; slowed the implementation of this plan; and weakened the oppressive control of the population in a number of strategic hamlets.

Development of force is low but we are confident that chances for development are good in the future.

B. Weaknesses:

The requirements for destroying the enemy strength have not been met.

The frustration of enemy rural pacification plan has not been accomplished uniformly. The development of forces has been lax.

The financial collection has not been performed well. Personnel of every level do not have a good sense of thriftiness.

The execution of the civilian proselyting policy has not been properly done.

All shortcomings have not been corrected speedily.

C. Causes:

The main reason [we attained these achievements] was because of the prompt leadership and stable political and ideological level of cadre.

Cadre and soldiers placed their mission above all else. They sustained hardships and overcome every difficulty to accomplish their mission.

However, they still displayed shirking attitude, lacked sense of responsibility, and usually used difficulties as pretexts for not fulfilling their tasks.

The fighting spirit is still low. Therefore, many units and individuals failed to accomplish the tasks assigned by higher echelons.

The ethical conduct of each echelon and individual did not meet the revolutionary requirements; they worked without setting plan; displayed unaggressive and passive attitudes; spent more time on their living, and rest than on performing tasks; they lacked a sense of responsibility.

The situation is evolving in our favor. We have overcome all difficulties caused by the enemy's obdurate efforts. Because of the experiences gained in combat, we have matured therefore we do not feel that the situation is really tough. The enemy is displaying many weaknesses. Therefore, the situation is less difficult than we thought. We should recognize that this is a great development of our forces. The enemy thinks that we are unable to overcome difficulties; in reality, we did overcome the difficulties and develop our strength.

PART TWO

II. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION, AND FUTURE MISSION.

1. Comparison of [enemy and friendly] forces.

To compare our force with that of the enemy, we should consider the following two main problems:

- a. The pacification [problem]
- b. Relation between [the SVN war] and the Indochina war.

Enemy situation: The enemy has three strong points:

- a. His troops are still numerous, his fire power is still strong. His war facilities, although destroyed in great quantity, still have considerable capabilities. He still occupies important areas of operations especially large cities, and prosperous and populated areas in South Viet-Nam, Laos, and parts of Cambodia.
- b. His defensive systems have consolidated and expanded. He is increasing sweep operations to support his rural pacification plan.
- c. In spite of their poor combat capability and morale, the Puppet troops are receiving improved arms and equipment from the Americans.

Although these strong points are unstable, the US imperialists and their henchmen are trying to take advantage of them to carry out their schemes.

In the face of the new situation, we should assess, the fundamental weak points of the enemy and our strong points to make an accurate comparison.

The enemy has the six following fundamental weak points:

a. It is impossible for the Americans not to continue the withdrawal of troops, yet the more they withdraw troops, the more their main force is reduced. This will weaken the enemy both in SVN and the rest of Indochina and demoralize the US, puppet South Vietnamese and puppet Cambodian troops. Because of their defeats, the Americans have to de-escalate the war and withdraw their troops from SVN. However, they still want to expand the war in an attempt to gain a strong position. This is an insurmountable contradiction.

b. While de-escalating the war, the Americans are on a passive position. However, because the Lon Nol regime is too weak, they are forced to disperse part of the South Vietnamese puppet force [to Cambodia]. This confused the enemy strategic deployment on both the South Vietnamese and Indochinese battlefields. The enemy forces are thinly dispersed and are particularly weak in Cambodia. In SVN, the enemy also displays many new vulnerabilities in both military and pacification areas. Thus, the expansion of the war not only failed to help the US troops gain a strong position, but also caused them new shortcomings and vulnerabilities.

c. When escalating the limited war, the Americans used their high quality strategic forces to oppose our forces. Because of their defeats, they are now gradually withdrawing their main forces from SVN to transfer the burden to the Puppet troops who are becoming increasingly demoralized. This is a difficult and dangerous work. On the other hand, the Puppet troops have to play the main role in Cambodia and Laos. This will cause more difficulties for the Puppet troops and bring them new failures.

d. The Americans are attempting to gather their henchmen in Asia to help them on the Indochinese battlefield. However, having observed the US failure, the henchmen showed no enthusiasm

in meeting the US' desire. An inclination for peace and neutrality is developing. The political struggle movement of the US people becomes increasingly decisive. The contradictions between various peoples is increasingly acute. Therefore, the Americans are meeting many difficulties which limited the implementation of the scheme of using Asians to fight Asians.

e. The US are trying to protract the war in order to save the Puppet Government. However, they still fear the struggles conducted by the US people. They now expand the war throughout Indochina while they are forced to withdraw their troops and reduce war expenditures. Therefore, they are increasingly meeting military, political, economic, and financial difficulties in the Indochinese countries, in the world, and even in the US. Nixon's policy of protracting the war is seriously dividing the internal organization of the US ruling class and its henchmen. The crisis and confusion that the US imperialists are suffering throughout Indochina and even in their own country are increasingly developing.

f. The US scheme to protract the war and the foolhardy action of invading Cambodia have given rise to worldwide protests against the Americans and have driven them to a high degree of isolation.

The Americans' capabilities are limited and these capabilities are further limited by the military and economic contradictions now plaguing the US.

We have the following strong points:

Qualitatively the political and ideological level, the strategic and tactical skills of our troops have greatly improved. The people's movement opposing the US Puppets and their pacification plan is increasingly stronger.

Quantitatively our forces are capable of fulfilling their missions.

The people, enlightened by our just cause and led by the Party, have confidence in the Revolution and the Party. Although under the enemy oppressive control, they will rise up to attack the enemy when conditions permit.

Concerning leadership and command, we enjoy such military skills as the use of small forces to attack large enemy forces, the technique to force the enemy to stretch thin his forces in order to inflict him telling blows.

Although we have encountered some difficulties caused by the enemy's expansion of the war, we have many favorable conditions on the battlefields which enable us to deploy our troops according to our plan and force the enemy to fight on our terms.

When concentrated, our troops have superiority over the enemy.

We have a strong rear base which is contiguous to the friendly theaters of operations.

We surmounted many past difficulties. In the coming period we will make efforts to overcome new difficulties and turn them into opportunities.

Through the above comparison, we know that we have many fundamental advantages and also many difficulties, but those are practical difficulties which we can overcome. The enemy strengths are temporary. His fundamental weakness is bringing about many contradictions beyond his capability to solve. Consequently, if we make efforts to exploit the enemy deficiencies, we can limit his performance of future schemes.

2. Enemy schemes and capabilities:

Although defeated and bogged down, the US imperialists are still stubborn. In order to save themselves from defeat, they may resort to the following plots:

General plot: Continue to prolong and gradually de-escalate the war. Conduct limited counterattacks by increasing pacification activities to carry out the Vietnamization of the war.

Strive to concentrate their forces to attack the border area, our bases, corridors, and storage facilities during the dry season, and support the Lon Nol Puppet Government and keep the Lon Nol regime on its feet.

Specific enemy plots:

Continue to carry out the pacification plan in order to destroy our base-level revolutionary organizations, consolidate his oppressive machinery; intensify sweep operations supporting the pacification personnel; drive our troops away and divide the territory into pacified zones and white zones.

Use many cruel, wily, and deceptive schemes to carry out the pacification program, especially to establish oppressive machinery and espionage organizations to neutralize our attacks.

The enemy scheme is very important and he is striving to implement his plan, but he is also encountering many difficulties, such as : Withdrawal of US combat troops; incapability of the Puppet troops to replace the US troops in SVN and at the same time support the Cambodian troops in Cambodia; wide dispersion of the troops; contradiction between the enemy's ambition and capability.

The rate of collapse of the enemy depends on the decisiveness of our military counterblows against the enemy.

Speeding up the Vietnamization plan:

The enemy is trying to pacify populated rural areas and exploit manpower and material resources to strengthen his military armed forces and oppressive forces.

Heighten the function of US troops [sic] [Possibly: Puppet troops] to replace US troops in strategic areas of operations.

Reduce the role of US troops to repatriate a large part of US combat troops.

Intensify propaganda on false victories, and psywar and Open-Arms activities. The enemy will resort to deceptive slogans concerning peace and a cease-fire to create peace illusions among the people and the Revolution. [his personnel].

For that reason, the coming struggle between enemy and friendly forces is :

A very violent struggle between enemy pacification activities and friendly counterpacification activities and between his strengthening of the oppressive control, exploitation [of manpower and material resources], conscription and upgrading of troops, and our

breaking of his oppressive control, destruction of his strength, and development of our revolutionary forces. Our future efforts to attack the enemy throughout the theater of operations will decide the rate of collapse of the US pacification and Vietnamization plans.

If we succeed in defeating the Vietnamization plan, we will achieve victory throughout Indochina because the US-puppet forces are concentrated mainly in South Viet-Nam. The Puppet forces are the key support of the Lon Nol regime. If we defeat them, this regime will collapse.

3. Future advantages and difficulties:

Advantages:

- We are gaining great victories on the battlefield while the enemy is bogged down.

- We have overcome great difficulties, creating a new favorable situation.

- Achievements of city movements and the forming of the Third Front against the Thieu-Ky [clique] are boosting the development of our political movements.

We have gained much experience in destroying the pacification program; in the future, we should make extraordinary efforts to gain greater achievements.

Difficulties:

Our cadre have not kept pace with the evolution of the revolutionary situation. Therefore, training should be conducted for our cadre to strengthen their viewpoint so they can accomplish their coming missions.

Material preparation was not well done in the past. However, we have taken measures to overcome this difficulty. In the future, this matter will be settled satisfactorily.

Our cadre lacked aggressiveness in performing their tasks and had no specific operational plans. They did not make the best use of all opportunities or promptly correct their shortcomings.

In the future they must perform their tasks with specific plans and correct their working attitude in order to better perform their tasks.

4. Immediate missions:

a. Common missions:

In the coming period, all ideological, Party and [Youth] Group tasks must be concentrated on fulfilling our missions, stepping up military and political attacks as well as troops proselyting activities, building up our forces in all aspects and destroying the enemy's pacification program.

1. Destroy an enemy mobile force element and conduct strong attacks against Regional and Popular Forces.

2. Destroy tyrants, breakup the Puppet oppressive machinery, hinder his upgrinding of troops, expand our liberated areas, strongly develop the political struggle movement, and smash his dry season campaign.

3. Implement close coordination with the Cambodia and Laos war theaters, but specifically, fulfill our mission on our own war theater.

4. Launch a diplomatic offensive to demand the withdrawal of US troops from SVN and the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique. Frustrate the Vietnamization plan and the US imperialists' scheme to expand the war throughout Indochina in order to create conditions to gain greater victories as a step toward gaining the decisive victory.

b. Specific mission:

First, we must fully understand and properly assess the enemy pacification program. This program is an important part of the Vietnamization plan. If the enemy fails to carry out this program, he will be defeated not only in Viet-Nam, but throughout all of Indochina.

To gain immediate and future achievements, our primary mission is to destroy the pacification program.

For the destruction of the pacification program, we must know how to coordinate the three-pronged attacks and strengthen our forces. Based on the results obtained in our recruitment of forces, we can assess the enemy pacification program. Particular attention should be given to annihilating enemy Regional and Popular Forces, oppressive personnel, and tyrants. We should strive to disintegrate the People's Self-Defense Force and kill forces supporting the pacification teams. While conducting attacks against the enemy pacification personnel, we must exert every effort to annihilate important elements operating outside.

We should thoroughly understand the purpose and significance of the immediate phase of activity by conducting a short, emergency political reorientation phase.

c. The sub-region's mission

All subordinate agencies and units should study and grasp the resolution concerning their respective missions.

Local troops and attached units should study and grasp specific missions entrusted to them by the district.