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<div style="position: relative; height: 150px;"> <span style="position: absolute; left: -40px; top: 50%; transform: translateY(-50%); font-size: 2em;">30</span> <p>(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 7 May 1970, and concerns a notebook, entries dated August to September 1969, maintained by a cadre of J12 Section ((possibly Border Area Office, Political Staff Department, Headquarters, SVNLA)), which pertains to notes taken during an indoctrination session on the missions of the border defense units. The notes cover the importance of the border area, enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) intelligence activities, political tendencies of various Cambodian factions, <u>Cambodian diplomacy</u>, and methods used by border defense units to insure the safety of friendly agencies and units stationed on the frontier. The document also predicted US attacks deep in Cambodian territory.</p> </div>		O N	

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1. Importance of border areas: The border between Cambodia and Vietnam is 930 kilometers long. The areas along it constitute a rear area which directly influences the SVN battlefield. Supplies and weapons from rear area ((NVN)) bound for the frontlines have to be brought through this area.

2. Characteristics: Through these areas we could establish contact with the world ((sic)) and the large rear area ((NVN)) ((sic)). For this reason, the US and Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops attempted to cut us completely off from the Cambodian people.

I.- SCHEMES.

1. The US and Puppet troops are trying to isolate the SVN Revolution. The US has poured in money and facilities to bribe the ((new)) Cambodian Government in order to control the border areas and drive us out.

To achieve their purpose, they have assigned spies from SVN and Cambodia to the border areas. These spies, Special Forces, commandos, and reconnaissance agents are disguised as cadre and liberation troops, wear the same uniforms, and have the same equipment.

The spies who came from Cambodia mingled with the people under the pretense of visiting their relatives who were either merchants (or enlisted in our ranks). They inquired about our bases and storage facilities and then sent either Special Forces to attack us or B-52's dropped bombs to destroy us.

In short, what the reactionary Cambodians knew, they reported to the US and Puppet troops who in turn used air and artillery attacks upon us in the border areas. (The US troops launched the following attacks in the border areas):

Attacked our base areas in Mar 69.

Attacked Areas 50 and 71 in May 69.

Attacked Area 91 in Aug 69.

Recently, they attacked Sau Ro's area, eight kilometers inside the Cambodian border.

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2. They tried to capture our personnel to exploit information, and then either eliminated or released them. Some of our personnel sold information to the US, thus enabling them to drop their troops from helicopters to attack our border areas.

The ultra-rightists constantly criticized the Cambodian ((Government)).

They said that the B-52's attacked Cambodian territory because there were "Việt Cộng" in it.

The enemy tried to sympathize with Cambodia in order to control the border areas.

He ((enemy)) attempted to attack and destroy our support areas and create dissensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodian people.

He ((enemy)) criticized the Cambodian Government and the people who sympathized with our cadre and troops.

In conclusion, the border area is very important. We are presently fighting over it with the enemy and are protecting our agencies and forces which are located there to support the battlefield.

## II.- THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT CONSISTS OF THREE TYPES OF MEMBERS.

1. The rightist faction: This faction consists of people who have little nationalism. They have always found a way to create dissension between the Vietnamese and Cambodian people and have cut off all relations between us and the Cambodian people who have supported and traded with us.

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### 2. Ultra-Rightists:

This faction consists of pro-American individuals.

### 3. Neutral Faction:

This faction consists of those who have a progressive political tendency. They want to support us and maintain Cambodia's independence and neutrality.

Due to the variety of political tendencies in Cambodia, we have met many difficulties in our diplomatic relations from the central down to the local levels.

## K ((possibly Khmer)) Government's policy.

1. The Cambodian Government still maintains its diplomatic relations with us, because it knows that we have achieved great victories. They also know that we are strong and have a righteous cause, and for this reason, the world supports us. Cambodia will always be our neighbor. Therefore, it cannot break off relations with us.

Cambodia needs our support to resist the US and Puppet aggression.

2. ((On the other hand)), Cambodia intends to resume diplomatic relations with the US in order to receive economic aid.

Cambodia's Economic Difficulties: Cambodia has lost crops in all areas of the country. The national budget is short of four billion Riels ((Cambodian currency, 55R = \$1.00 US)).

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In addition, the Cambodian ((Government)) appears to be confused.

1. She is afraid that if we gain a complete victory, our Revolution will have an influence on the ((Cambodian)) Revolutionary movement and cause the Cambodian people to uprising.

What is the reason for the Cambodian passive attitude? It is because this country has adopted a feudalist and capitalist regime since. The bourgeois class rules Cambodia it fears any type of Revolution and has to take precautions.

However, Cambodia still needs to rely on our forces.

1. The Cambodians still rely on our forces because they fear that the US will exert pressure on them. By relying on our forces, not only can they maintain their independence, but also have an opportunity to exert pressure on the US.

2. We are strong. We have a firm political standpoint and a good cause. We also have the support of Sihanouk which increases our prestige.

3. After we gain our victory, Cambodia will live side by side with our country, a peaceful country with a serious political policy. For this reason, Cambodia will not fail to support us.

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Results obtained:

Cambodia failed to receive financial aid from the U.S and to strengthen her weak economy. She finally realized that the Vietnamese ((NVN and VC)) and the socialist bloc, were her true friends. For instance, Cambodia has received a donation of four million metric tons ((sic)) from NVN, and 10 million metric tons ((sic)) from ((Red)) China. While we assisted her, we did not intervene in her internal affairs. As for the Americans, they would provide aid to Cambodia only if she met the following conditions:

1. Not allow the Viet Cong to locate their units on the Cambodian border.
2. Re-establish diplomatic relations with the US.
3. Allow the US to establish an airline from Saigon to Bangkok, via Phnom Penh. It is obvious that the US assistance is conditional and a threat to Cambodia. Cambodia did not dare accept it.

III.- RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US ((NVN AND VC)) AND CAMBODIA.

Due to foreign policy, the Cambodian Government immediately recognized the ((Provisional Revolutionary)) Government, Republic of South Vietnam, and invited our government to visit Cambodia and received us warmly. The Cambodian Chief of State and ((representatives of his)) Government attended the funeral and mourning of our Uncle ((Ho Chi Minh)). He also invited our ((NVN)) Prime Minister to visit Cambodia.

These are the good aspects of Cambodia.

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Our position:

1. Our friendly position is strong and our political policy is sound. This is clearly realized by the Cambodian Government.

2. We gained the sympathy of the Cambodian labor class. Therefore, we are required to maintain the following points:

When encountering difficulties caused by the Khmer people, we should not be confused, but calm and believe in the Front. If we are captured by the Khmer troops, we should display a firm political attitude, and be aware of our position. We should not reveal secrets.

On the contrary, if we have favorable operating conditions, we should not lose our vigilance.

Our shortcomings:

1. We did not respect the Cambodian territorial integrity.
2. The messing, billeting, and movement regulations of our troops were not strictly observed. We fired carelessly and killed people and cattle. This created a bad influence upon the Khmer people.
3. Our soldiers were not courteous and did not display equality toward the Cambodian people in dealing with them.

They failed to live up to the code of the People's Army. In some areas, they either lowered the prestige of the revolutionary forces or revealed military secrets. They failed to understand the Cambodian people. They did not discriminate between friend and foe.

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((Possibly notes from a reorientation course))

V. ((Sic)) ANTICIPATION OF THE FUTURE SITUATION AND OUR MISSIONS:

Characteristics: The US will sustain more failures on the SVN battlefield and will fail in its attempt of gaining the support of K ((abbreviation of Kampuchia, which means Cambodia)). This is why they will react more strongly, and will attack deep in the border areas to pressure K. They will try to sow dissent among K ranks and undermine the solidarity of K and our country. As for K, insurmountable difficulties will arise if she demands aid from the US.

Therefore, the border area situation will be more complicated in the near future.

Our mission:

Our chief mission is to continue to win K to our side for the benefit of our frontlines, our messing, and our billeting at the border.

Our required attitude:

1. We should firmly maintain the attitude of a man who is fighting for a just cause, and who is winning.
2. We should treat the Cambodians as our equals, we should be friendly but constantly vigilant.

3. In trying to gain Cambodia for our side, we should consider the Cambodian population as our main objective and try to win their support.

All participants have displayed a correct attitude during the indoctrination course. (They were all serious and satisfied). Everyone joined in the discussion.

Results obtained: They all realized the importance of the border area which is our direct rear area and also our base area. Before the indoctrination, they failed to understand this important point. They only thought that the Cambodians were hospitable people ((sic)).

The US and Cambodia's schemes:

Our personnel have realized that Cambodia cooperated with the US, and provided them with

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intelligence information. Concerning the espionage activities, they had thought that the enemy Special Forces personnel only existed in SVN, while in Cambodia only Cambodian officers and soldiers could do them harm. They failed to notice those persons who were disguised as commercial travelers or people visiting their relatives. Due to the lack of vigilance, they did not keep an eye on the merchants or people who frequently went into the woods. They thought that the latter were woodsmen or smugglers, (but did not consider the possibility that they might be enemy spies coming from inside Cambodia).

Evaluation of the good and bad aspects of K:

The participants understood the nature and composition of the K Government, which displayed a passive attitude by maintaining diplomatic relations with us while re-establishing relations with the US.

Review of our past attitude:

We did not respect the territorial integrity of K and looked down on the K people. For instance, our messing, billeting, and movement have had adverse effects on the Cambodian people's standard of living.

Our personnel were afraid of only Cambodian officers who rode motorcycles, but they disregarded the people ((sic)).

They paid little attention to what the Cambodian people thought of them.

They were inclined to impress the Cambodian people with their weapons and thought they could bribe them with money.

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They have not tried to help our ((Cambodian)) friends and maintain a good relationship with them.

Our attitude toward the Cambodian authorities:

In the forthcoming missions we may meet K ((meaning: Cambodian authorities)).

We should maintain a friendly attitude with them, but we must also observe the traditions and regulations of our army. It will be possible for some of us to be arrested, and any discussions we have should conform to our policies.

We must also know that when the enemy does arrest us that we must call upon our revolutionary pride, and remain faithful to the Party and loyal to the people.

We will lose the reputation of the Revolutionary Army if we disclose any secrets.

We would rather die than reveal secrets. To persuade them of our good intentions, we should talk only about the friendship between the two nations. (If they try to bribe us or buy us off, we must firmly maintain our revolutionary pride to make them admire us).

The best measure is to heighten our vigilance under all circumstances.

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Border ((unit)):

Presently, each unit has one set of kitchen utensils. It is Requested that the utensils be increased by 50% so that they can entertain transient personnel, if any. The rear service needs the following items:

One cauldron for each unit (six units).

Seven cauldrons for the inter-unit.

Each cauldron should be large enough to cook rice for 12 people.

One machete for each unit.

One saw for each inter-unit.

Clothing for ((Unit)) 89. Since the beginning of this year, we have only received eight suits and 95 meters of nylon.

Allowance for administrative office and for reception of transient personnel (Aug 69) ((sic)).

Allowance for repair of bicycles not issued (Sep 69) ((sic)).

SVN LIBERATION ARMY

J12

ENUMERATION OF ITEMS RECEIVED AND  
PRODUCED BY THE ENTIRE SECTION.

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Order No.	Units	Name of different items	Quantity	Classification			Self-sufficiency	Quantity	Remarks
				A	B	C			
1	Inter-Unit 85	Bicycle	9	1	8				
		Radio set	4	4					
		Thermos bottle	4	4					
		Glass and bowl	80						
		Large bowl and plate	14						
		Knife	4						
		Hair clippers	4						
2	Inter-Unit 50	Bicycle	6		3	3			
		Radio set	5						
		Thermos bottle	5	5	13				
		Teapot	3						
		Glasses	32						
		Bowls	51						
		Hair clippers	4						
3	Inter-Unit 89	Bicycle	12		12		Bicycle	14	There were no scissors
		Thermos bottle	7		7				
		Radio set	6		4	2			



Order No.	Inter-Unit	Name of different items	Quantity	Classifi- cation			Self-sufficiency	Quantity	Remarks
				A	B	C			
4	Inter-Unit 50	Radio set	6	1	2	3	Bicycle	1	
		Bicycle	8		6	2			
		Thermos bottle	6	5	1				
		Teapot	9	8	1				
		Glass	47						
		Among them there were five big glasses.							
		Hair clippers	5 sets	3	2				
		Guest-shoes	14 pairs of shoes	10	4				
		Guest clothes	8		4	4			
		Guest hat	6		3	3			Two glasses were broken

## REPORT ON MATERIALS RECEIVED AND PRODUCED

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Order No.	Units	Cast-iron frying pan			Aluminium pan			Rice basin	Soup basin	Large spoon	Plate	Chopping knife	Broad blade knife	Wood chopper (sic)	Axe	Saw ((large))	Saw ((small))	Hoe	Shovel	Drill	Soup spoon
		((possibly size))			((possibly size))																
		0.30 meters	0.40 meters	0.50 meters	0.25 meters	0.30 meters	0.40 meters														
Inter-Unit 50		1	2		10	6		7	16	6	41	2	5	4				2	2		
	Self-sufficiency				6				3	1	3	2	2	1		1	1	3	1	1	
Inter-Unit 89				1	4	13	3	7	18	15		4	3	3		4		4	3		14
Inter-Unit 85		1			3	7			12	spoon 16			1				2	4	9	1	

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----