

12/69

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| 2. SUBJECT: Elements of 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN (U) | 9. DATE OF REPORT: 26 August 1970 |
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| 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1969 | 12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC) |
| 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 30 May 1970 | 13. PREPARED BY: ANGEE R. DEL VALLE, 1LT, MIC, PROPOV, US EIM, CDEC |
| 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u> | 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: ALVIN W. LOTZ, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US EIM, CDEC |
| 7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT | |

15. SUMMARY:
(C) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents captured on 30 May 1970 and concerns two reports from the Command Committee of Doan 180 ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN)). The first report, dated 17 December 1969, concerns ((VC/NVA)) troop discipline and border security violations along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. The second report, dated 20 December 1969 pertains to ((VC/NVA)) food purchasing and medical treatment of Cambodian civilians.

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SVN People's Armed Security ((Section)) COSVN

Đoàn 180/B4 ((possibly 180th Armed Security
Regiment, Security Section, COSVN))

No. 13/BC

REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN AREA Z
((possibly Vietnam-Cambodia border))
(From 1 to 15 Dec 69).

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I. THE ENEMY SITUATION:

1. Bombing activities.

During the first 15 days of Dec 69, the enemy increased his air activities along Area Z ((possibly Vietnam-Cambodia border)) on a 24-hour basis, especially from Z1 to Z5.

On 29 and 30 Nov 69 and 1 and 2 Dec 69 the enemy attacked the Suối Can area (or Trã Not clear area) along both sides of the jungle. He attacked twice daily, in the morning and afternoon.

During the night of 12/13 Dec 69, ((US)) jet fighters bombed a portion of the road leading to the ferry landing, but caused no damage.

On 10 Dec 69, L-19's ((possibly reconnaissance planes)) used 12.7mm machine guns to strafe a portion of the Bô' Dung forest (close to the former base area of ZA), but caused no damage.

On 13 and 14 Dec 69, L-19's and L-21's (double-fuselage) frequently flew low over the Che Mon Market area in the direction of Z1, and rocketed the Đất Đỏ area.

The targets of the increased reconnaissance missions and air attacks during the past 15 days were our transportation and troop communication lines and stations..

2. Infantry activities.

We have had no confirmed reports, but it is unlikely that there have been reconnaissance agents and Biệt Kích ((Special Forces)) in AREA Z

II. THE SITUATION IN A ((POSSIBLY CAMBODIA))

1. People's activities.

During the first 15 days of Dec 69, the rice was ready to be harvested. The people gathered it and transported it to entry and exit points to sell to us at the same price as was paid in Nov 69. The harvest of early rice has nearly been completed. Relations between the people on both sides in Area Z have been normal.

2. As of the beginning of Dec 69, Cambodian military forces had not conducted any operations which affected the security of Area Z. Only a few

movements had taken place. On 1 Dec 69, 21 vehicles carried the Commander of Military Region 1 from Krabao to Ampin, An Long Kress, Tã Äm, and Krët; on 4 Dec 69, 11 vehicles carried one ((Cambodian)) major from Krabao to Krët; on 3 Dec 69, policemen in the Tã Ky and Tã Xua post withdrew to Cãy Dâu, leaving only military troops (the reason for the withdrawal is unknown); and on 10 Dec 69, the ((Cambodian)) Government organized a ceremony to present relief funds to several families living in Thlock Trach whose water buffalo and oxen had been killed by US and Puppet planes. They received 2,000 Riels ((55 Riel = \$1.00 US)) for each animal killed and 500 Riel for each animal injured. These funds were presented by ((Cambodia)) Major Krabao, who said, "The people do not believe those who oppose the Crown Prince and say that he sides with the US against the people. The Crown Prince is always concerned with the welfare of the people, and does his best to improve it."

3. Local diplomatic activities.

On the afternoon of 5 Dec 69, Comrade Năm Lũc (Z6) and Comrade Tam Đang (finance and economy personnel) went to Hãm Pin, Trã Sang Post. While spending the night there, they met a first lieutenant. They discussed various activities, and relations between the two sides. The lieutenant said, "I hate policemen, but we must help each other. If I were a district chief, I could provide you any assistance you needed, and you could go anywhere whenever you wanted."

((Page 2 of Item 1 of O.T.))

Subsequently, Comrade Nam Luc invited the lieutenant to attend a ceremony on 20 Dec 69 at 76, where he would spend the night and see a movie. He accepted. On the morning of 6 Dec 69, Comrade Năm Lũc and Tam Đang returned home. While travelling, they visited the Ta Sua Post and talked with Văn Xin (the Post Chief). Comrade Năm Lũc said "If Văn Xin needed my help, I would come and live near Tã Xua Post." Văn Xin smiled and thanked him.

The attitude of the 1st Lieutenant was friendly. He probably wanted to gain our confidence for his own interests.

On 8 Dec 68, 1st LT Krasăng came to Z5 to discuss messing and billeting of the elements of C.71 ((sic)) and the Són Entry and Exit Point. They ((the Cambodians)) did not agree to allow our agencies to locate on the other side of the oxcart trail and from Són Entry and Exit Point to Bridge 5. (This problem was continuously discussed by Z5, in the hope that our agencies could remain at their locations instead of moving to the river bank).

At 0800 hours on 9 Dec 69, two jeeps and four motorcycles with license plates "Taphong Rum Sel" and "Tãphong Scol" were carrying Province Chief Major Sol-Đầy, and a retired major (Kret District Chief) to Lien Cỏ Dispensary. They met some personnel of Lien Cỏ Dispensary, who were collecting buffalo dung ((for fertilizer)). Their soldiers arrested four of them and took them to the dispensary to see Trần Y ((possibly a VC cadre)).

Upon meeting Trần Y, they made four recommendations, of which Hai Sang was later informed:

- 1) Since the area in Tapeng Tumsel is still secure, our units and agencies should not cooperate with the Red Khmer forces(?);
- (2) if the Liberation troops want to purchase rice, people will sell rice to them in the area west of Route 22, but our troops should not come to the rice fields or help the Cambodian farmers harvest their crops;
- (3) many farmers planted

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rice in the area west of Route 22, such as in Phum Sam Re, Bô Chet, and An Long Kret; therefore, friendly troops should not interfere with harvesting of these ricefields; and Mr. Hai Sang would be displeased if the harmony between the two sides was threatened (?); and (4) beginning immediately, our cadre should not purchase rice directly from the people, but should deal exclusively with the Cambodian province and district authorities, no matter how large their demand.

In addition to these four recommendations, Sol-Đay added that the dispensary would be permitted to remain at its location for one more month, then it must be moved closer to the Cambodian border. (This statement was probably an attempt to extort money from us).

The first lieutenant who accompanied the Major asked our comrades in the dispensary, "Are there any Cambodians living with you at this dispensary?" We said no. He also questioned each K ((possibly Cambodian patient)) in the dispensary, looking at them carefully.

We had properly established contact and had a useful discussion with Major Sol-Đay. Captain In Chin, who accompanied him, asked to be examined because he was feeling ill.

They left the dispensary at 0900 and stopped at Peng Plong Post to meet the post chief. Mè Công Phước, Mê Khum, etc ... ((sic)) also wished to inform Mr. Hai Sang of the four recommendations.

On 13 Dec 69, 2nd LT Kret and Ngọc Dung and his two aides came to Unit Z3. They met Comrade Hai Sang and gave him five reels of recording tape. They said they had found them and thought they might belong to the liberation forces. They did not specify exactly where the reels were found. They tried to help us in many ways ... ((sic)). They wanted us to give them an AR-15 ((possibly M-16)).

The second lieutenant said he would return to Unit Z1 on 20 Dec 69. The atmosphere of the meeting on that day was quite friendly.

On 10 Dec 69, Mè Công Phước informed us that on 24 and 25 Dec 69 the Royal Cambodian Army would conduct a military operation in the Sam Re, Bô Chet, Trach Khol, and Tápeng Plong areas to protect the farmers who would be harvesting their rice. The Royal Cambodian Army is taking this precaution because the Cambodian authorities were told that some other people had harvested rice in these ricefields (We suspect A2). We are following this matter and trying to learn the truth, and will report to you later.

((Marginal notes)):

We should investigate whether such incidents really occurred, and resolve such matters with A ((Cambodia)) satisfactorily. We must not allow the bad elements to create dissension or distort the truth. Otherwise many events may occur and create difficulties for us.

This is an important matter. However, it has been reported too late.

/S/ N.

((End of marginal notes))

III. MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE AND SECURITY IN Z ((POSSIBLY VIETNAM-CAMBODIA BORDER AREA))

Indiscriminate firing continued to occur during the first 15 days of Dec 69. Most of the violators have been cadre and troops on movements.

On 11 Nov 69, Thanh, a member of C23 ((possibly 23rd Company)), Group 82, attempted to rape a nine-year old girl named Chó (a daughter of Bay Rũm, who lives in Hamlet 4, Hoã Hiếp Village). Thanh choked her and tore her clothes off, but he was discovered by the people. When this was reported, cadre of C23 came to Bay Rũm's house and investigated this crime.

During the last 10 days of Nov 69, members of C23, Group 82, killed a dog belonging to some ((unspecified)) Cambodians, and a dog belonging to Mr. Ba Quanh of Hamlet 4, Hoã Hiếp Village. These soldiers were brought before the Command Committee of C23 for disciplinary action. They were ordered to pay damages of 800 Riels in the first case, and 200 Riels in the second case.

On 12 Dec 69, Hoã and Chi, deserters from Công Trường 1 ((1st NVA Division)), were arrested.

They had stolen unhusked rice and furniture belonging to people in Ta Tum and Tâm Phô Villages. They were turned over for military discipline (on 14 Dec 69).

On 15 Dec 69, Be, a Vietnamese national in B17C ((sic)), Cambodia, deserted to A ((sic)), taking an AK assault rifle and 30 rounds.

Several persons have violated the regulations of Area Z and engaged in activities detrimental to the security and order of this area.

On 10 Dec 69, a member of G1/D2, Đoàn 180 ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN)) used hand grenades to fish in Đập Đá. ((The higher echelon)) has ordered the Command Committee of D2 to take disciplinary measures.

On 7 Dec 69, Unit 25 captured Phạm Văn Ut, 23 years old, and Đặng Thị Hoa, 18 years old, of C14, Group 80C (Vietnamese Nationals in Cambodia). They had deserted and fled to Cambodia. They said they were homesick, and had fled to Cambodia. They were returned to their unit.

On the same day, Comrades Tâm Châu and Sáu Môn (C.23, Đoàn 83) rode two motorcycles carrying five persons (unidentified) to Tả Păng Pring and Khai Đẩu Key. Then they proceeded on Route 22, where they were checked by troops of Unit A ((VC)).

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((End of marginal notes))

Members of a transportation element of Group 82 camped near Comrade Hai Ngô's base. They stole manioc and sweet potatoes.

After investigation it was decided that this unit must relocate immediately, however it has not done so.

C21, Group 82, transported goods with pack bicycles from the Z2 to Z1 areas. The unit met to review the results, and its mission was considered ended.

Members of C.26, Group 82, who transported goods with carts owned by the A people ((Cambodians)) from Tân Phô to Chang Riêc and Phum Thmey (near Road 22), were arrested by the Cambodian authorities. We settled the difficulties and our personnel were released. This matter has been discussed in a critique session.

IV. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION DURING THE FIRST 15 DAYS OF DEC 69.

The enemy increased his aerial attacks and reconnaissance activities in Area Z. The enemy concentrated his forces to repeatedly attack the area from Trang Bô Dung, Tân Nôt, to Bêh, attempting to intercept our transportation and troop movements.

There has been a lack of order and security. All movement and commercial transactions still violate the regulations concerning the border areas.

No large-scale sweep operations were conducted by Cambodian troops near Area Z during the first 15 days of Dec 69.

There were only some patrol operations by district and province authorities. These operations did not seem to create difficulties for us.

17 December 69

Command Headquarters of Unit 180

/S/ Tam Lai

((Page 1 of Item 2 of O.T.))

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF BORDER UNITS
OPERATING ALONG
THE ((VIETNAM-CAMBODIA)) BORDER IN 1969.

((Page 2 of Item 2 of O.T.))

ARMED SECURITY FORCES OF SVN PEOPLE'S

LIBERATION ARMY

Doan 180 ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN)), Z3 ((possibly Unit 3)).

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES IN THE BORDER AREA DURING 1969.

Part I: THE GENERAL SITUATION.

1. Characteristics of the situation of Z3.
2. Activities of the US and Puppet troops.
3. Activities of A ((Cambodian)) officials.
4. Activities of the people of A.

1. Characteristic of the situation of Z3.

Our area of responsibility along the corridor is 12 kilometers long. Some Cambodians sell goods along the corridor daily. Agencies in this area are organized in three areas along the corridor. Some isolated agencies are situated about two kilometers into Cambodian territory.

Located opposite the Border Unit is a post of A ((Cambodian authorities)). It has 12 personnel, including one officer and two NCO's. They are armed with one automatic rifle, one light machine, two AK rifles, and several CKC's. This post is located close to Route 22 on the western side.

In addition, two detachments are also stationed close to Route 22. The Cambodians enter our base areas daily to cut wood, cultivate crops, clear land, fish, gather bamboo sprouts, and graze their buffalo and cattle. Approximately 90 percent of these Cambodians are poor and lack sufficient food.

The enemy has intensified sweep operations and air and artillery strikes in Vietnamese border areas along the corridor. The size of our base areas has decreased because the people cleared the forests to expand their rice fields. For this reason, our personnel have become more crowded in the agencies because of the reduced living space. According to military regulations, entry and exit points are to buy goods from merchants and the people. The corridor is situated entirely in Cambodian territory. The traffic on this corridor has increased continually.

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THE ((VIETNAM-CAMBODIA)) BORDER IN 1969.

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Command Headquarters of Unit 180

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Enemy aircraft could easily discover this corridor because of its width.

2. Activities of US and Puppet Troops.

Concerning the activities of enemy spies and Special Forces personnel in Z during 1969, we twice noted the presence of strange people. Another time, some people from M² Cong came to our area to gather snails and shellfish.

((Page 3 of Item 2 of O.T.))

At that time we remarked that Chin Phach ((possibly a suspect)) and his plot appeared to be active. Therefore, we suspected that the US and Puppets must have planted spies in our areas, although there was no specific evidence of their activities. However, the enemy's air activities were intense. Reconnaissance planes usually operated both during the day and night. Their main areas of operation were Route 22, the Bay Bao, Lo Ui, and other areas in the vicinity, and along the border. The enemy often fires artillery from SVN into the Lo Ui, Xo Mat, and Lung Tung areas. Prior to launching sweep operations, he shelled these areas heavily and his aircraft twice took aerial photos of the areas along Route 22.

In addition, the enemy carried out psywar activities. Leaflets were dropped nine times in the Z3 ((possibly Unit 3, 180th Armed Security Section, COSVN)) area. He appealed to friendly members to surrender twice from planes, and spread poisonous chemicals deep in A ((Cambodian territory)) three times. After investigating the enemy situation, we concluded that enemy spies and Biet Kich ((GVN Special Forces)) have cooperated with A.

3. Activities of A Officials.

Because of the change in their political situation, and also because they feared our Revolutionary influence upon their people, in May 69, the Cambodian authorities replaced all soldiers and offices with new personnel and increased their strength. While watching the situation, we noted the following three salient points concerning their attitudes:

If the friendly units and agencies continue to move deeper in to Cambodian territory, the settlement of the border area problem will become more difficult.

Friendly elements have more or less assisted A's ((possibly Red Khmers)) in their activities.

Friendly propaganda activities among the Cambodian people have influenced them greatly.

In addition, friendly rice and provision purchases have badly affected the Cambodian economy.

Reasons for fear are evident in all areas. They do not want our personnel ((medics)) to come to phums ((villages)) to treat their people. When we tried to contact their people by ourselves, they flatly forbade us to do so. They also restricted their people from contacting us. Later, when we succeeded in improving our relations with them, they tried to prevent us from going to the phums by pretending that there were spies, journalists,

and high ranking officers there who would recognize us. They also feared that we were too deep in their territory. Every time they met us they said the area was one kilometer or more within Cambodian territory. Sometimes, they even told us to return to Vietnamese territory. They said that we disturbed the movement and living conditions of their people who would send complaints to their superiors and create difficulties for them.

((Page 4 of Item 2 of O.T.))

They suspected us of giving assistance to the Red Khmer and spread the false rumor that we provided their leadership. They sowed suspicion among the Cambodians and assigned agents to keep us under surveillance.

They often disguised themselves as Communists to contact us, and took advantage of such visits to spy on our activities, looking for indications of our support of the Red Khmer Cambodians.

Consequently, we realized that the Cambodian Officials were still unsure that we supported the Red Khmer Cambodians. For that reason, when we moved deeper into Cambodian territory, their concern over contact with their people increased greatly.

However, the Party has provided sound guidance to allow us to allay their fears. From events and conversations with them, we knew that the people in Z3 believed us, however the majority of the Cambodian people did not believe that we have never helped the Red Khmer. Therefore, they often spy upon us, even in our areas and posts. The Cambodian officials merely thought that our cadre did not understand Cambodians, consequently our worries about them decreased. Since then, we have intensified our activities, especially those of winning over the people and Cambodian officials. We have gradually increased satisfactory relations between Cambodians and friendly forces.

4. Activities of the Cambodian people.

After one year of operating among the people we knew that approximately 330 families, totalling 2000 persons, lived in Ta Phu, Taly, and Thu My Hamlets. Most of them are farmers; and about 15 families are merchants. Each year, just before the harvest, 90 percent of the families are out of food, and have to borrow money or work as servants. Not only were their living conditions very poor but they also possessed certain bad social habits, such as wedding parties and ceremonies, particularly religious ceremonies. Every year, four ceremonies are held to collect money for monks. This money is spent to buy food for the monks, who eat daily.

When they were sick they had no medicine. As a result, when we contacted them or provided them with medicine they were appreciative. On the whole, all Cambodian officials paid no attention to the social welfare of the people.

When Uncle Ho^A died, the people showed sorrow and expressed regret. They told us that Uncle Ho^A had always served

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Enemy aircraft could easily discover this corridor because of its width.

2. Activities of US and Puppet Troops.

Concerning the activities of enemy spies and Special Forces personnel in Z during 1969, we twice noted the presence of strange people. Another time, some people from M² Cong came to our area to gather snails and shellfish.

((Page 3 of Item 2 of O.T.))

At that time we remarked that Chin Phach ((possibly a suspect)) and his plot appeared to be active. Therefore, we suspected that the US and Puppets must have planted spies in our areas, although there was no specific evidence of their activities. However, the enemy's air activities were intense. Reconnaissance planes usually operated both during the day and night. Their main areas of operation were Route 22, the Bay Bao, L² Ui, and other areas in the vicinity, and along the border. The enemy often fires artillery from SVN into the L² Ui, X² Mat, and Lung Tung areas. Prior to launching sweep operations, he shelled these areas heavily and his aircraft twice took aerial photos of the areas along Route 22.

In addition, the enemy carried out psywar activities. Leaflets were dropped nine times in the Z3 ((possibly Unit 3, 180th Armed Security Section, COSVN)) area. He appealed to friendly members to surrender twice from planes, and spread poisonous chemicals deep in A ((Cambodian territory)) three times. After investigating the enemy situation, we concluded that enemy spies and Biet Kich ((GVN Special Forces)) have cooperated with A.

3. Activities of A Officials.

Because of the change in their political situation, and also because they feared our Revolutionary influence upon their people, in May 69, the Cambodian authorities replaced all soldiers and offices with new personnel and increased their strength. While watching the situation, we noted the following three salient points concerning their attitudes:

If the friendly units and agencies continue to move deeper in to Cambodian territory, the settlement of the border area problem will become more difficult.

Friendly elements have more or less assisted A's ((possibly Red Khmers)) in their activities.

Friendly propaganda activities among the Cambodian people have influenced them greatly.

In addition, friendly rice and provision purchases have badly affected the Cambodian economy.

Reasons for fear are evident in all areas. They do not want our personnel ((medics)) to come to phums ((villages)) to treat their people. When we tried to contact their people by ourselves, they flatly forbade us to do so. They also restricted their people from contacting us. Later, when we succeeded in improving our relations with them, they tried to prevent us from going to the phums by pretending that there were spies, journalists,

the country and people and therefore had waged the war for liberation successfully. But Sihanouk spent money on and took care only of his wife and children, and did not pay attention to the people's living conditions. For that reason, we have almost completely gained the people's affection. In summary then, through our contacts with the Cambodian people, we realized that most of them had a great affection for us, but some (about 10 people) sometimes did not believe us and spoke ill of us because they had a bad temperament. When we left for one or two days they looked for us and asked for news of us, or they took advantage of the New Year holidays and other holidays to visit us. After the harvest they brought us rice if we could not come to get it. Although the people sympathized with us, they were also afraid of the government officials, because these officials often threatened them, assuming that they were in sympathy with us and were providing assistance to the Cambodian Communists. The people enthusiastically helped us when the officials were not around, but when Cambodian soldiers or officers appeared, they left us gradually, and even pretended to avoid us. But they helped us gain the release of our cadre who had been captured, evacuate wounded soldiers, etc... ((sic)).

PART II: THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE IN AREA 2.

1. Friendly situation: During the past year we have been faced with a number of difficulties, including the deactivation of C7. There are 14 principal agencies in Area 2, with approximately 600 men living entirely in Cambodian territory. Most of them are assigned to security, finance-economy, and rear service elements.

During the past year these agencies successfully performed their missions. All agencies and border units had good relations with each other. When the bases made plans, the border units made similar plans. The agencies coordinated with the border units in defending the base areas, lines of communication, and entry and exit points. Significant information was immediately relayed to the border units, as in the cases of theft, strangers cutting wood, activities of the Cambodian people, etc... ((sic)).

Even with such advantages, we still have shortcomings. Specifically, units do not supervise their troops when purchasing ((Cambodian)) goods.

Therefore, relations between us and the Cambodian people have been complicated by such activities as developing film, buying on credit, selling government property, etc... ((sic)). Desertions are occurring

regularly, mainly among members of D2 ((possibly 2nd Battalion)), most of whom are Vietnamese nationals. Regulations on the use of weapons have not been followed. In some places they are still violated and weapons are fired indiscriminately at all hours, at persons, and at livestock. While moving on the corridor, a number of personnel still use explosives to kill fish and shoot at birds. Although we have arrested violators and filed reports, after a time violations reoccur, especially during the rainy season. During the past year, our units were under the leadership of the Party Committee, the Base Command Committee, and the border elements, so our cadre successfully accomplished their missions of defending base

areas, border areas, and corridors. They did not let any thing harm our common missions.

2. Past performance of missions.

When Unit 3 was activated in Sep 68, it had eight members. It increased to 12, then to its present strength of 19. Most of them are Vietnamese nationals. The unit has two members from SVN, and five from NVN. The rest are Vietnamese nationals. Commanding cadre have good ideology, but they were not familiar with the border tasks and did not perform them willingly. Some cadre left to go to a work site, and others asked to be assigned other tasks. The level of professional skill varied. Cadre were assigned various tasks, so they had difficulties in providing leadership.

As for our comrades, when they first joined the Revolution, their ideology was encouragingly enthusiastic. But after one to two months, they had to accept discipline, and they were trained and assigned to perform duties. As a result some of them became homesick. Because their life was different than before, and they faced some difficulties, they wanted to desert and disturb internal organizations (one comrade). They had not yet fully understood the policy and plans of the Party and Government. They applied what they had learned mechanically, without fully understanding the reasons behind their actions. Therefore, they had many difficulties, and were often inexperienced at performing their missions. Border defense soldiers were insubordinate to cadre, not realizing why patrol missions lasted so long. Instead of checking strangers, they merely directed them along the corridor, and did not determine why the strangers had to go to A ((sic)). They performed their tasks regularly, but did not understand their purpose.

((Page 7 of Item 2 of O.T.))

To eliminate these difficulties, the Party Committee, Base Command Committee, and border elements promptly provided sound leadership on strengthening organization and training, especially political indoctrination, to heighten the degree of revolutionary awareness and improve the working class viewpoint of cadre.

Thanks to this, our cadre gained knowledge and understanding in all fields. The unit has made progress so far. After one year the unit is well organized and stronger. Our cadre have increasingly

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understood the nature and missions of the border tasks. They are not as confused as they had been.

3. Winning over the Cambodian people.

Under the leadership of the Party Committee, the Base Command Committee directly contacted the units when we encountered difficulties in carrying out the task of winning over the Cambodian people. Initially these difficulties were caused by Cambodian officials who threatened the people. As a result, it was difficult for the people to associate with us.

In the beginning we could go to the hamlets every day. We could do anything but go to ricefields to ask the people for information. Gradually we gained their sympathy, and went to hamlets to win them over. We visited poor people and helped them when they were sick. Last year we provided medical care for 67 Cambodians, including three monks, three who were seriously ill, and one who needed first-aid. We issued medicine to them 102 times.

In addition, we provided clothing, blankets, and sandals for five poor Cambodians. Due to this assistance, the Cambodian people were more and more sympathetic toward us, in contrast to their officials. Some said that the liberation troops were not Cambodian Communists, and that Cambodian officials did not sincerely care for the Cambodian people.

For these reasons the Cambodian people actively helped us and opposed their officials. They informed us of strangers and of the capture of our cadre. They also conducted a memorial service for President Ho Chi Minh. When friendly elements met with accidents, they informed us and helped us evacuate the wounded. When we met difficulties in buying rice, they tried to help us. Last year when we trampled their ricefields, the families detained us and demanded damages. This year when we did the same thing, they complained, but did not claim damages (as in the case of Brother Ngoc). When American and Puppet troops conducted sweep operations, they invited us to hide in their hamlets, etc.... ((sic)).

4. Winning over the Cambodian monks.

During the past year, we were active in trying to win over the Cambodian monks. We organized the people to go to pagodas for every ceremony.

We provided medical care and medicine to sick monks. Therefore, their sympathies were with us. When talking with us, they told us that they were furious with the US and Puppet troops for destroying pagodas and killing monks in SVN, and that they always prayed for our victory over the US and Puppet forces, and for independence and freedom. Thirteen monks conducted a memorial ceremony for President HỒ Chí Minh. Our flags and the President's pictures were displayed on the wall. When we left, they asked for more pictures of President HỒ. In short, almost every monk supported us. They willingly helped us whenever we needed it.

5. Winning the support of ((soldiers in)) Cambodian military posts and ((Cambodian)) authorities:

During the past year, personnel of Cambodian military posts were changed once, however we have won the replacements over.

These personnel have not completely supported us; however, through our efforts, we settled such matters as messing and billeting, movement along the corridors, and the purchase of rice. Due to our successful efforts, when troops moving along the corridor were recently attacked by the enemy, we were permitted to take refuge in these posts. It is very difficult to buy rice at the end of the harvest, but with their help we were able to fulfill our need; therefore, we gave them two guns.

We have also gained the support of local authorities. Especially in M^ê Phum and M^ê Công they initially thought that if we lived on their land, we would trouble them.

But through our efforts, monks, the people, soldiers in posts, and Cambodian local authorities have accepted us.

Previously, they called us to them when they had difficulties, or if we wanted to settle a problem, we had to go to them. But now when we have a problem, we invite them to see us. And they show their respect for us.

During the past year, we have ensured the security of our messing and billeting sites, as well as movement along the corridors. Even in difficult situations we have maintained security.

Between Sep 69 and 20 Dec 69, we purchased 160 tons of rice, 20 tons of corn, recovered seven cadre and members ((who had been arrested by the Cambodian authorities)), including one agent who was assigned to Cambodia and one agent who surrendered to the enemy, and we have captured one CKC and 1 AK assault rifle.

Our efforts have ensured the success of the policy of the Party and the Government ((of Cambodia)). Specifically, we have respected their

sovereignty, ensured equality for the Montagnards, and have done nothing that would cause complaints. Therefore, they have helped us willingly.

6. Results of the political struggles.

A. Since the later part of the year, the Party Committee has

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provided suitable and specific guidance to the Base Command Committee and base elements, enabling them to efficiently solve various problems.

B. By strictly executing the Party's policy line, resolutions, and directives, our units have established a strong position in every struggle.

C. Due to careful supervision of the Party Chapter and the overall efforts of cadre, Party members, Group members, and soldiers in the units, work has been done properly and successfully.

D. These struggles have had a definite and specific purpose. We have gained the support of ((Cambodian)) authorities and personnel in military posts, and have been permitted to enter Cambodian territory to trade.

However, we also have imposed certain conditions upon local ((Cambodian)) authorities or other officials, as in Mê Công and Mê Phum.

Although we have many strong points in these struggles, we still have some weak points. Specifically, we have failed to win the support of the people and the soldiers in posts.

PART III: THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER.

In executing the directives of the Party Committee, the Command Committee, and the section in charge of border affairs, last year our units carried out all missions involving the maintenance of order in our bases, corridors, and the border areas. Specifically, daily patrol teams on the corridors, at entry points, and in heavily populated areas were organized. In addition, border cells in agencies were reorganized for one or two months, according to the specific situation. In accordance with a recommendation from higher echelons, a meeting of the agencies was held, at which they were reminded to implement internal regulations for the border and maintain order in their areas of responsibility.

We suggested that higher echelons further assist them by issuing them written authorization empowering them to maintain order. In addition, we also reminded all comrades to maintain order on the corridors.

Corridor units also had to organize daily patrol cells to apprehend violators of the border area internal regulations, expedite disciplinary action, and make reports to higher echelons. Specific measures were taken to prevent indiscriminate movement and firing. Seven violators were reported, and

((Page 10 of Item 2 of O.T.))

the weapons of four undisciplined soldiers were confiscated.

During the past year, order on the corridor has been successfully maintained. The corridor has been protected and no acts harmful to the Revolution have been committed.

There are several reasons for the successful maintenance of order along the border corridor. Higher echelons have provided close supervision.

The border units intensified indoctrination to help all comrades thoroughly understand the responsibility and capability of the unit and realize the importance of protecting the border corridor. The border units have always been supported by the people (specifically, the agencies in the base). During the past year, under the direct leadership of the Party Committee, the Base Command Committee and the sections in charge of border affairs, with cooperation and support from various agencies, have successfully maintained order.

However, weak points still exist. Several agencies have failed to properly execute the internal regulations of the border. They have hunted at night and independently established contact with Cambodia (specifically in financial and trading matters) without informing the border unit; and have transacted business, fired weapons indiscriminately, and left documents at markets. They have also failed to follow the civilian proselyting policy towards the Cambodian people, especially C3 ((possibly 3rd Company)). The border unit has few personnel, a large border area, and many agencies; therefore, its achievements have been further reduced. In addition, personnel have been weak, both in number and competence. They have failed to clearly understand their responsibility, especially concerning the internal regulations of the border. The settlement of problems has been very difficult. A number of members of the Công Truong ((possibly Division)) on the corridor have not observed orders. They have shot birds, fished with grenades, etc ... ((sic)).

PART IV: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

During the year, the unit has exerted great effort, properly implemented the regulations, and has quickly discovered the activities of the US, Puppet, and Cambodian Officials.

Through contact with the Cambodian people we have discovered

((Page 11 of Item 2 of O.T.))

two cases of desertion to ((Cambodian)) posts, where the deserters surrendered their weapons.

We requested that the personnel of the post return the weapons to us, but they refused.

We have also been warned of two sweep operations by (Royal) Cambodian soldiers. In addition, we have been informed of nearly all events and have been able to settle all problems satisfactorily. For instance, we persuaded the Cambodian authorities to release two of our personnel whom they had arrested. Another time, one Cambodian soldier was provoked by our personnel, and wanted to shoot them. As we knew his intention, we promptly settled the matter successfully.

Though we have made progress in solving problems and properly providing guidance, weaknesses remain. We did not have the situation well in hand, and this caused leadership difficulties.

We also failed to solve some problems.

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However, we also have imposed certain conditions upon local ((Cambodian)) authorities or other officials, as in Mê Công and Mê Phum.

Although we have many strong points in these struggles, we still have some weak points. Specifically, we have failed to win the support of the people and the soldiers in posts.

PART III: THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER.

In executing the directives of the Party Committee, the Command Committee, and the section in charge of border affairs, last year our units carried out all missions involving the maintenance of order in our bases, corridors, and the border areas. Specifically, daily patrol teams on the corridors, at entry points, and in heavily populated areas were organized. In addition, border cells in agencies were reorganized for one or two months, according to the specific situation. In accordance with a recommendation from higher echelons, a meeting of the agencies was held, at which they were reminded to implement internal regulations for the border and maintain order in their areas of responsibility.

We suggested that higher echelons further assist them by issuing them written authorization empowering them to maintain order. In addition, we also reminded all comrades to maintain order on the corridors.

Corridor units also had to organize daily patrol cells to apprehend violators of the border area internal regulations, expedite disciplinary action, and make reports to higher echelons. Specific measures were taken to prevent indiscriminate movement and firing. Seven violators were reported, and

((Page 10 of Item 2 of O.T.))

the weapons of four undisciplined soldiers were confiscated.

During the past year, order on the corridor has been successfully maintained. The corridor has been protected and no acts harmful to the Revolution have been committed.

There are several reasons for the successful maintenance of order along the border corridor. Higher echelons have provided close supervision.

PART V: THE MANAGEMENT OF ACTIVITIES AT THE ENTRY POINT.

There are one entry and exit point and two markets within the operational area of the unit. We have managed the daily activities of the entry and exit point and controlled the merchants, and the quality and quantity of food and other goods.

We have assigned two Cambodian-speaking comrades to the entry and exit point daily to observe the merchants. In that way we always knew who did business at the entry and exit point. Whenever there was a stranger, he was discovered immediately. As a result, several strangers and personnel going through the entry and exit point without a valid reason were arrested. 160 tons of rice and 20 tons of corn were purchased in 1969.

The majority of the merchants are laborers and soldiers. Since the crops were not yet harvested, they went to Karet Chin Non to purchase goods. Five wealthy merchants, Tén Ênh, Mè Công, Phước Tén Phum, Tén Yáũ, and Tén Hốt, are local residents. Sa Rénh, a Chinese born in Karet, is a business associate of Suốt Xếp Bôt and Phước. Through our control of the entry point last year we solved two cases of theft. One was the case of a Cambodian who stole 190 kilograms of rice from our rear storage area. The other was a Cambodian who stole hens from other Cambodians and sold them.

Our way of solving problems is to always properly follow the Party policy-line and the Government's policy in the border area.

((Page 12 of Item 2 of O.T.))

The persons who committed these thefts were poor and had numerous children, so we only advised them to earn a living honestly. We solved these two cases satisfactorily. The tasks at entry and exit points have presented the following specific problems: In doing business with people, cadre have had to adopt a correct attitude toward them and pay for goods promptly. By so doing, we have been able to carry out our political task and gain their confidence. Our cadre have not fully understood the tasks to be carried out at entry and exit points, so they have been confused when performing missions. In addition, the control of entry and exit points has been weak.

PART VI: STRENGTHENING FORCES.

The unit has 19 members, including company cadre, three platoon cadre, one squad leader, and six assistant squad leaders. Seven are Party members and eight are Youth Group members. The remaining four members of the unit are non-Party members. Two of these personnel were from SVN, five from NVN, and the rest were Vietnamese nationals from Cambodia. The unit has four cells:

1. A patrol cell with seven men.
2. A cell operating in A ((possibly Cambodia)) with four men.
3. An entry-exit point cell with three men.

4. A rear service cell of two men, and a Command Committee with four men.

The total strength should be 20 comrades.

Presently, we need one person to complete the above composition. However, personnel already in the cells will probably be assigned to other areas. In addition, we are encountering still more difficulties in the deployment of troops.

If our troops are deployed for both patrols and entry-exit point duties, we will be unable to solve the problems caused by surprise enemy attacks or personnel shortages when cadre are sick or being treated at a dispensary.

While performing their duties, cadre of the Command Committee of Z have strictly observed all directives and orders from higher echelons. In addition, they have reported all their activities. They have not executed directives or orders on their own initiative. Even in cases of emergency they have first sought the advice of higher echelons. Our cadre have behaved in such a manner that the soldiers of our unit have always executed directives properly. They have been indoctrinated to realize their duty to properly execute directives and orders from higher echelons.

Unit members and cadre have always sought advice from higher echelons concerning expenditures. All expenditures have been clearly explained. Expenditures of more than 10 Riels ((55 Riels = \$1.00 US)) have always been witnessed by at least two persons. Economy in the use of public funds has always been practiced. When spending for political purposes, only the Economy Section was consulted.

((Page 13 of Item 2 of O.T.))

For example, 250 Riels was spent to assign five personnel to ((some words illegible in O.T.)). 370 Riels was spent to obtain Comrade Da's release from a Cambodian ((police station)). 50 Riels was spent for Sihanouk's birthday. In addition, when C3 ((possibly 3rd Company)) arrested one civilian ((possibly Cambodian)) and later released him, 100 Riels was spent to purchase clothes, sandals, and blankets for him; 77 Riels was spent in cooperation with the Finance and Economy Section ((without seeking higher echelons' advice)); and 30 Riels was spent on medicine for the month. Total expenses were only 877 Riels, so we had economized.

The spirit of solidarity between unit members, and critique and self-critique sessions.

During the past year, the spirit of solidarity between unit members has been high, and critique and self-critique sessions were conducted successfully. The Command Committee performed its duties with a spirit of democracy and mutual support engendered by the unit's revolutionary zeal. At present, the Party Chapter, the Group Chapter, and the unit do not display erroneous thoughts or confusion harmful to the solidarity of the unit.

Weak points: In the sessions, our cadre did not fully express their opinions. They did not openly criticize higher echelons. These weaknesses must be eliminated.

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1. A patrol cell with seven men.
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Strong points: Our unit has been placed under the close leadership of the Party, and under the direct leadership of the 180th Party Committee ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN)) and the Security Command Committee.

Our unit has also been placed under the direct leadership and guidance of the Border Committee. On that basis, our unit has made plans for implementing its missions and gradually strengthening its organizations. In addition, the unit has been supported by the agencies in the base areas. Consequently, all cadre and soldiers of the unit have exerted great efforts to accomplish their missions.

Weaknesses:

Agencies in the base area, and cadre and soldiers of the unit have not yet fully realized the significance and importance of the border tasks.

This is due to the fact that we are living in A ((Cambodian)) territory, therefore our cadre and soldiers are partly limited as to indoctrination to understand their missions.

The border task is really the political task of the Party and government. However, cadre and soldiers in some places have not yet fully understood this, so they meet many difficulties when performing this task.

The fact that the enemy will clear the forests constitutes a difficulty for us. The enemy tries to influence the people's psychology and aspirations in a very cunning manner ((sic)), and the people are unable to detect the enemy's cunning schemes.

((Page 14 of Item 2 of O.T.))

PART VII: REQUIREMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS.

1. The activity plan of the unit should be closely controlled by the Border Area Section in the next year. The unit should be helped to prepare adequate documents concerning its activity plan.

2. A committee meeting concerning border activity should be held quarterly. By doing so, our cadre and unit members will gain experience and improve their skills in border control operations.

3. We should request higher echelons to issue four bicycles to facilitate border operations. Recently, our unit asked various agencies to lend it bicycles for a surprise attack, but we could not keep them. In addition, we should request the issue of three K-54 pistols, two AK assault rifles, and one CKC for the cell operating in A ((Cambodia)).

20 Dec 69

Command Committee of Z3

/S/ Nguyễn Văn Sơn

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