

Document No 6

Unsigned report of April 19,
1970 Base Area Meeting.

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FILE SUBJ.
DATE SUB-CAT.
4/19/70

Base Area Meeting

055015

19 April after Directive 06 of C69 [possibly COSVN] had been implemented there have been new developments in the situation.

Our units and agencies located along the border areas had helped step up the friendly [revolutionary] movement; the Lon Nol Government has become weaker and more isolated. Most people are supporting the five-point statement of S [possibly Sihanouk]. Between 1 and 20 April, an area from 20 to 30 to 60 kilometers was enlarged from the border not to speak of many other areas where the Lon Nol administration has been paralyzed. In the West governmental authority has expanded as have guerrilla activities and those of the People's Revolutionary Party of C. The liberated area has approximately 1 million people of a total of 6 million, including 100,000 Vietnamese residents of a total of 600,000. In this situation, with the cooperation of our friends' forces, we had seized a few thousands weapons: more than 1,000 of them were seized on Highway 1, 300 from Krek, 500 from An Giang province, 500 from Tay Ninh province, and over 500 from T2. With the cooperation of our friends' force, we had successfully attacked one military post and 4 police posts and persuaded a number of panic-stricken people and monks to follow us. Since the Lon Nol Government had been isolated, the present situation favored our activities, and we acquired strong support in the eastern area of Cambodia. The situation developed quickly. The Current Affairs Committee estimated that the situation will develop even faster, because the Lon Nol Government is very weak, the people are in the full-blown movement, and the Queen expressed the hope that Viet-Nam would help her and showed confidence in Viet-Nam because VN is resolute to oppose the Americans.

The Lon Nol clique proved its stupidity and barbarity through its policy of massacring both the Cambodia people and the Vietnamese residents. Several news agencies including western press agencies had criticized Lon Nol for terrorist activities.

This situation obviously substantiates the correctness of Directive 06, which states that our difficulties are temporary and favorable opportunities will bring the Cambodian and Indochinese People's Revolutionary movements to the next higher steps, rally a great number of the royalist people [?] to a large front, and definitely bring the S [possibly Sihanouk] Party to the side of the Revolution. This will create a situation in which the Cambodian people of all strata must join the Revolution, establish the Revolutionary administration, and organize the liberation armed forces. Though we do not see all the possibilities yet, the recent coup d'etat appears to have given the Revolution a great leap forward, created a revolutionary government and laid the ground for an anti-American front of the Indochinese peoples in conjunction with activities on the three battlefields while the imperialists are de-escalating the war and continuing to withdraw troops from SVN. The Revolutionary movement is progressing quickly along with the conduct of a [military] campaign in SVN. The enemy pacification and Vietnamization strategy has experienced failures, chiefly in the Mekong River Delta. Meanwhile, the Laos war experiences fast developments in the Plain of Jars... and yet the Americans dared not bring their troops into Laos. They will no doubt experience a defeat on the battlefield. The L Government had requested weapons, but no one dared give it weapons. The press commented that giving weapons to the weak Lon Nol Government is a sure way to supply weapons to the VC.

The U.S. has no capability to wage a war in [Cambodia] but has the capability to give [the Lon Nol Government] financial aid, weapons and advisors, and use the South Vietnamese lackeys to attack us; the U.S.'s principal means of attack are intelligence, artillery and aircraft.

The Cambodian situation proves that the situation assessment and policy of our Party were correct.

The American imperialists are very stubborn, and we should beware of their activities. For instance, the Americans had wanted to overthrow S in order to strike VN and implement the Vietnamization plan. They wanted to cut our transportation routes, destroy our storage facilities and base areas in order to cause difficulties to us, weaken our forces, force us to make concessions at the peace talks, and check the expansion of the Revolutionary movement in C. But after the fall of S the present

Government was so weak that as we began to act, it was falling by large chunks. The press said that the VC had expanded many base areas and they would rather expand their controlled areas than conduct attacks on the Phnom-Penh. This is a very delicate situation.

Confronted with this situation, our Party planned to focus efforts to "Resolve the SVN battlefield" [win militarily]* while striving to give maximum assistance to the People's Revolutionary Party of C and bring the Cambodian Revolutionary movement to the next higher stage. In the recent past, we had correctly executed this policy. So far, we had not done anything which badly hurts the SVN situation because our forces had been rationally employed in C and regardless how large are our forces to be committed, we will not get ourselves in trouble in C. Previously, the enemy thought we might be in trouble in C. But, unexpectedly, this Campaign had brought bitter defeats to the enemy, who was obliged to review his pacification program.

Being strategically defeated, the enemy will make new efforts which require our precautionary measures. His efforts in Z would be the intensification of intelligence activities, Biet Kich operations, bombings, and artillery shelling, in conjunction with the employment of concentrated infantry units. At present, he focusses on the destruction of our storage facilities by means of artillery fire and bombings. Specifically, in Ba Thu he concentrated eight Puppet battalions and one armored, moving five to six kilometers deep into [the Cambodian territory], in some areas the armored vehicles went as far as 10 Km [inside Cambodia]. He clung to a number of areas located along the route leading to Hong Ngu Highway 1, and Road 22 leading to Krek; he also planned to establish a number of white zones along the border area. Tactically, he would pull out his troops from a vulnerable position, deliver heavy bombings and artillery fire, then concentrate troops to reoccupy it. This is merely his planning, whether he can do it or not depends on the balance of friendly and enemy forces. At present, we are striving to expand our [base] area and establish our mastership over it.

* Note: This is a literal, translation of "giai quyet chien truong" which is a military slang for winning on a battlefield.

We now control an area stretching from Road 7 to the vicinity of the Mekong River, and from Mimot to an area adjacent to the Mekong River. This is an important base area. We had to establish a base area of 60 kilometers in every direction in order to hold 60,000 to 70,000 people who are completely on the side of S. Here, jungles are large and interspersed with a number of spacious rubber plantations, villages, hamlets, ricefields and farm lands which yield good productions if we know how to exploit them. In addition, tens of thousands of Vietnamese residents are now living along the bank of the Mekong River. This area may fit the transportation, postal-communication, and signal communication strategy, and insure communication with T2 and T3.

The Standing Committee, reminds us of its strategic intention, which dictates that we ought to establish base areas to ensure the performance of combat and production activities for a long period of time. Its policy is as follows:

1. Efforts should be made to develop the Revolutionary movement in a short period of time; strengthen and develop this movement into a steadfast combat and production movement, stressing the rallying of revolutionary people in lieu of occupying jungle areas. In this regard, we activated the Liberation Committees in 10 phum's and held meetings with representatives of 21 other phum's on 19. [Probably means on the 19th of April]. The coming month will be a decisive month in the performance of farm work and preparations for countering the enemy offensive activities. The responsible agencies should therefore select personnel for this mission.

2. We should ensure the establishment of relationship between the new and old base areas, and employ the latter as "springboards" to obtain access to other areas and provide mutual support. The reason is that if the enemy occupies our old base areas, he will no doubt strike us. In other words, we must safeguard our old base area.

3. Organization of messing and billeting in the present base area.

We should observe movement and bivouacing regulations, watch for the enemy presence, safeguard the base area, because the enemy has the capability to strike us with artillery, aircraft

and commando troops. He has tried to reoccupy the Krek post. The U.S. and puppet troop are still holding on Route 22 and the enemy has not given up Route 7. Traffic on this route is not safe because of the danger of being detected and attacked by the enemy.

The Standing Committee, was disturbed about the indiscriminate firing by a number of our cadre and members.

4. Concerning the people:

In the establishment of a relationship with the people, cadre and members should display a correct attitude, respect their habits and traditions, and absolutely not touch their property, because they treated us as their liberators. We should tactfully refuse what they offer us.

5. Everybody should work to help both the SVN and Cambodian revolutionary movements develop, properly fulfill our responsibility, and do production work in accordance with the prescribed criteria. First, we ought to produce ammunition because resupply is difficult.

Situation of the base area

The Ca-Ngot situation adversely hurts the friendly Revolution.

The Cabot Post had 500 men and the Cam Xe had 300 men.

Money donated by rubber plantations to the Revolution:
The Frenchmen in Krek City donated rice, fish sauce, and cassava to our forces.

The people in Krek said that when living in their areas, we should not leave any trace which might disclose our presence, as the enemy would kill them.

There are enemy agents still operating in the Cambodian revolutionary ranks.

Some of our men, during their movement rushed into the people's houses after being spotted by the enemy aircraft.

For the Cambodian people, firing had become a political matter. In Ca Mong, the Cambodian asked our men why we did not give them weapons.

While living in the friendly territory, to safeguard our lives and carry out combat missions we ought to respect friendly sovereignty and should not chase the Cambodian people.

In doing farm work, do not clear new jungle areas, but strive to plant cassava. Do not transport farm products along communication routes.

The base area requested the following:

More old hammocks, mosquito-nets, and rifles (MAS, German, and Red-Stock).

The coup d'etat was engineered because the Americans had been defeated in SVN. It was designed to stop the SVN Revolutionary force from coming into Cambodia, and to turn Cambodia into a new colony of the Americans.

Did the Lon Nol Government plan to sell Cambodia to the Americans?

The Americans wanted to expand the war but they were obliged to de-escalate the war.

The Cambodian Army does not have a just cause. Its personnel usually harass the people and are corrupt.

The people of 18 out of 20 provinces in Cambodia participated in demonstrations.

To urge the people to oppose press-ganging.

The Cambodians were asked to either fight or lose their country.

The compliments of S were addressed to the demonstrations.

Declaration of S concerning the activation of the Front.

Message sent from S.

Our statement.

The appeal made by the Communist Party: Counter foreign invasion.

Missions: Stand against the Lon Nol Government and strengthen forces to safeguard the Khmer Kingdom.

According to S, the Cambodians should take up weapons, kill tyrants, break loose the enemy's grip, disband Lon Nol's organizations, refuse to pay taxes, and strive to establish a new life.

Each village will have seven Committee members and each hamlet will have three Committee members. Twenty or 30 representatives of a hamlet and 30 representative of a village should hold a meeting.

On 19 and 20 [probably means on the 19th and 20th April] village Front Committees were activated and district Front Committees will be organized in early May.