

054825

This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured in June 1970 and concerns a notebook, with entries dated 12 May to 1 June 1970 by a member of an unspecified command agency ((possibly VC/NVA Sector B in Cambodia)). The entries pertain to activity plans and weapons and personnel strength reports of elements of 7th NVA Division and 170th and 171st Security Guard Battalions, Combined Base Area Security Command, Headquarters, SVNLA. Document also mentions meetings held to elect a village executive committee of the Vietnamese Residents Association and administrative committees ((possibly of this association)) in various Cambodian villages. The untranslated portion of the document contains US military terminology with French and Vietnamese equivalents.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured in June 1970 in Cambodia (Kompong Cham Province) by FANK. The document was received at CDEC on 20 August 1970, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 37,595, dated 21 August 1970, under CDEC Document Log Number 08-2255-70. Translation was requested by CDEC.

Meeting convened on 12 May 70:

1970
/CAMS

One self-defense unit of 24 men has been activated in Chhlong ((Village)). This unit is equipped with sufficient K-44's ((rifles)). The ((Administrative)) Committee of Khum ((Village)) had 10 members, including one Chinese resident and two Vietnamese residents. Khum Han Chay had seven members ((in the Administrative Committee)), including one 20 year old female.

One meeting has been convened with 500 attending, and one re-education session has been given to key personnel ((of the village administration)). A Vietnamese Residents' Association has been activated.

In the Can Do ((area vic XU150640)), the Executive Committee of the Vietnamese Residents Liberation Association has been elected, and the militia and guerrilla forces have been activated. Three meetings have been conducted for local residents (one for old men, one for youths, and one for all people). 250 persons attended, including 40 single youths and 39 families.

Phum ((Hamlet)) Pray Xa Man ((possibly Prek Samnn, vic XU150570)) has 150 Khmers ((Cambodians)) in 35 families, and 32 guerrillas headed by one platoon leader and one assistant platoon leader. They have not yet been equipped with weapons. The ((Administrative)) Committee of hamlet has been elected and trained on operating procedures.

The Cham ((Village)) has 2,000 inhabitants in 200 families. Two meetings have been conducted for local residents, and another meeting will be conducted today to discuss the activation of militia and guerrilla units and the election of the ((Administrative)) Committee.

Local residents were very receptive. They have recruited civilian laborers to transport material captured from the enemy.

The Cham ((ethnic minority)) has donated 200 kilograms of rice ((to VC/NVA troops)).

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((Local residents)) were afraid of airstrikes, and their routine activities have not yet been stabilized. Local residents in the Can Do area were disappointed when ((the VC/NVA units)) collected ((modern)) weapons and issued them K-44 rifles. Comrade Bông used his weapons to threaten the local residents and stole their property. He also sold clothing items and captured material to the Cham's. Local residents also stole captured material.

((The situation in)) Prasap ((vic XU150640)) was more deplorable than that on this side. There were many teachers in this area. They wanted to continue teaching ((because)) they feared that Lon Nol's ((troops)) would return, and kept worrying about the return of Sihanouk. ((VC/NVA)) cadre have re-educated a Captain's wife and persuaded her to call her husband back.

The police post in Prasap had 13 men, but one has fled. They have brought 12 weapons ((to VC/NVA forces)).

Me Fum ((Chief of an unspecified hamlet)) hesitated to contact us ((VC/NVA)) because he feared that the local residents would learn of it. However, he appeared to change his mind.

The small number of Khmer troops was one of our ((VC/NVA)) difficulties.

The clash between Vietnamese residents and Khmers became rather serious. We were requested ((by Vietnamese)) not to issue weapons to ((the civilian)) Khmers to prevent them from taking revenge. (Me Fum and the Lieutenant had Vietnamese wives).

Comrade Mu³ Do⁴ reported that while motivating the Khmer populace, emphasis should be placed on the infrastructure, because Khum ((Village)) authorities are ready to do what

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we want, but they dared not organize militia and guerrilla units. Therefore we have to start with Sóc ((house groups)) and Phum ((hamlets)) first.

There was duplication of operations between elements of Tam Lai, Tủ Trức, and our unit in the Chhlong area.

Public security in the city was deplorable. Inhabitants were gambling. The Vietnamese residents' concentration stations have to be disorganized. The populace suspected that Sihanouk might return because they realized that our ((VC/NVA)) forces were superior in number to theirs ((Lon Nol forces)).

Phum ((Hamlet)) - Dam Ray Fung

(XAY TRIET
(SAY SA DUC
(NA HUT
(SAI SA NOC

The organization ((of militia and guerrilla forces)) in the areas adjacent to the route from Chhlong ((vic XU090550)) has not yet been completed. Due to a lack of specific guidance, the militia force in Chhlong is losing its initial high fighting spirit. The guerrilla force in Pray Ka Man had 15 men armed with five CKC's, three carbines, and eight K-44's, however these guerrillas did not fully understand ((the use of the weapons)). Apparently, the militiamen were reluctant to receive weapons for fear of Cambodian terrorist actions.

Observation:

We ((VC/NVA)) have just organized ((administrative committees)) in the Phum's ((hamlets)) surrounding Solong and along the river, however they are not stable because they have not yet been instructed on working procedures. The Vietnamese Residents' Association

has been organized, but it is losing its initial stimulus. The K ((Cambodian)) people have not yet been indoctrinated. The command cadre of Khum ((village)) are undecided. There are no ((people's)) organizations in Nasai. The local residents have not yet been motivated ((to support the VC/NVA)). They also fear that Lon Nol ((troops)) would return.

The morale of the Vietnamese resident. They are overconfident. They do not fear a return of the Lon Nol ((troops)), but they fear that the US and the Puppets((RVN)) will expand the war. They are also afraid of airstrikes.

There have been signs of dissension between those having some relationship with the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) and the majority of the populace.

There have been some slightly extremist manifestations ((among the populace)).

Upcoming missions.

Activating people's organizations among friendly ((Cambodian)) people has priority. Develop guerrilla warfare.

Activate a Vietnamese Residents' Liberation Association.

From 12 to 15 May ((70)), Muoi Do[^] will be in charge of the left bank ((possibly of the Mekong River)). CT7 is in charge of the right bank ((possibly of the Mekong River)). Captured material in Prasap-Deydo ((place names)).

Personnel strength and weapons status of element B.

CT7 - D7 ((possibly 7th Battalion)): The Battalion Headquarters has two comrades:

Quang, Party member

One soldier ((sic)) - Youth Group member

C1 ((possibly 1st Company)) has a total personnel strength of 103 (82 are former members and 21 are Vietnamese residents who have been newly recruited. Of these 103 personnel, 25 are Party members and 48 are Youth Group members).

C ((company)) cadre: 4

B ((platoon)) cadre: 8

WEAPONS:

AK : 49

CKC: 7

RPD: 4

B-40: 3

Carbine: 1

Small arms ammunition: 1,075 rounds

Mortar shells : 30

B-40 rounds : 30

82mm mortar: 1

K-54: 4

DH-5 ((directional mine)): 3

DH-10 ((directional mine)): 2

Hand grenades: 80

Sapper ((Unit)) of CT7.

Total personnel strength: 35 (31 are former members and four are new recruits. Of these 35 personnel, 24 are Party members and eight are Youth Group members).

D ((battalion)) cadre: 1 (Comrade Vinh)

C ((company)) cadre: 3

B ((platoon)) cadre: 5

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Weapons:

K-54 : 3

Pistols captured from the enemy: 5

AK: 20

CKC: 1

B-40: 1

Carbine: 3

DH-5 mine: 2

Hand grenades: 91

Bangalore torpedo: 1

~~Đoàn Headquarters Công Trường~~ ((possibly meaning a battalion of 7th NVA Division))

Signal element and Radio Station

Surgical element 12 comrades (including two new recruits)

Rear service element

Reconnaissance element of Công Trường: Seven comrades (four Party members and three Youth Group members); two B cadre.

Seven AK's

Armed propaganda unit: 17 comrades (15 are former members and two are new recruits).

Two D cadre: Quang and Trung

8 AK's
3 CKC's
3 carbines

26 Apr: Attacked Chhlong:

The night ((VC/NVA)) forces seized Solong town: ((They captured)) six magazines - 100 rifles; then seized control of the town, and organized a guerrilla force.

3 May: Twelve comrades of Cl/D7 ((possibly 1st Company, 7th Battalion)) attacked Con Cat Tay, ((and)) Cau Goo; and captured six prisoners, five 82mm mortars (one 81mm), two 12.8mm and one 12.7mm ((antiaircraft machine guns)), two machine guns, three machine guns ((sic)), and one ((unspecified)) radio.

6 May: Launched a penetration attack on Prasap; the enemy ((possibly FANK)) escaped; captured two metric tons of ammunition, 100 rifles, and one VHF radio.

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8 May: Extended ((the operation)) to Sop: Sent one reconnaissance element to conduct a penetration attack t/n ((possibly abbreviation for tây nam or southwest)) of Côn Cồ Tung ((possibly Koh Tung)); seized all the weapons, including one 37mm antiaircraft gun; captured two majors, one captain, and 60 soldiers; and brought 400K ((weapons)) to Căn Dò Depot.

Organizing the people: Three Party Chapters (Chhlong area); (45 individuals) two platoons of militia who had already received training on the technique of using weapons.

Bo Nâu: One self-defense unit of 25 individuals of Chhlong town; one friendly unit of 30 individuals in the Ban Lung area; one VK ((possibly abbreviation for Việt Kiều or Vietnamese residents)) self-defense unit of 15 individuals.

Vietnamese Residents' Liberation Youth Group: 75 comrades Căn Dò - Prasap (being organized)

Prey Xanam: There are four ethnic peoples: Vietnamese, Khmer, Cham, and Chinese.

Hamlet ((Administrative)) Committee: Three individuals who have undergone training on operating procedures; one 30-man platoon of militia who have not yet been issued weapons.

Cham ethnic minority people are electing a hamlet committee; there are 200 families of 1,000 individuals.

One chapter ((committee)) of Vietnamese Residents' Liberation Association consisting of three individuals. The chapter has conducted three propaganda sessions (one session organized for the populace and two sessions organized for ((two words illegible)).

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Chinese residents in Kompong Cham: Six of the 10 volunteered to enlist ((possibly in a VC/NVA unit)) (These Chinese speak Cambodian fluently).

Prasap District: There is one ((possibly FANK)) captain. One 1st lieutenant is hiding.

<u>Muoi-Do</u> : 31 comrades	17 Party members	One Chapter Party Committee member
(C2/170 plus action unit)	8 Youth Group members	Two battalion Party Committee members
2 medics		One D cadre - Four B cadre
		Two C cadre - Five squad leaders

TS/170: Four comrades (including one B cadre)

Weapons: 3 pistols, 29 ((sic)), 2 B-40's, 1 B-41, 23 AK's.

C9/180: 37 comrades (32 are former members and five are new recruits).

Of these 37 personnel, 17 are Party members and 13 are Youth Group members.

C cadre: 2

B cadre: 4

Weapons:

2 K-57's (machine guns) with 1,000 rounds.

1x82mm mortar gun with 25 rounds.

2 B-41's with six rounds.

10 AK's with 150 rounds each.

2 K-54's.

Two medics. No adjutant

Friendly ((possibly Cambodian Communist)) platoon:	24 (including three females)
	Total: 178
	35
	37

(One female cadre speaks Vietnamese)

Radio station ((element)): 8 comrades

250

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Past Activities:

Element of CT7 ((possibly 7th NVA Division)), 25 Apr:

TS/F ((possibly reconnaissance element of the 7th NVA Division)) forced ((the enemy)) to surrender: ((They captured)) 12 policemen, 73 Self-Defense members; seized all the weapons (3 carbines, 27 rifles, and one ((unspecified)) radio).

has turned over ((to us)) 12 rifles. The militiamen and guerrillas are hesitating to receive weapons. They are afraid that the enemy ((FANK)) will return.

Morale situation of the element of "CT7":

Prior to their departure ((for the battlefield)), C1/D7/209 was thoroughly indoctrinated. C1/D7/209 displayed a very high spirit of organization and discipline, properly studied the policy, and performed missions with enthusiasm. Therefore, during the past, everybody satisfactorily accomplished their combat missions. Once they reached a location, they carefully reconnoitered enemy defense positions and defense works. They knew they had to consolidate and expand the liberated areas. They were well prepared for counterattacks against the Americans and Puppet ((RVNAF)).

Some other points:

- The organization ((of the people and restoration of order)) after seizure of a city.

Disciplinary action was taken against one member.

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Concern about food supply, including husked rice:

80,000 Riels ((Cambodian currency; 55R = \$1.00 US)) taken from one ((enemy)) officer was on hand.

Prior to the departure, efforts were made to check the private property of each soldier; and the check was resumed after each attack to see whether the captured material policy was strictly observed.

After evaluation of the enemy, our friends are determined to employ small forces against large ones. The prisoners of war had high esteem for our troops' attitude.

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The Cambodians and the Vietnamese residents deeply admired and respected the attitude of our troops, but they worried about our withdrawal.

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Situation of C9/180: Received the order on 9 May. While constructing installations and transporting rice, the unit was ordered to depart for a combat mission. Everybody moved out in high spirit, though they had a heavy load (weapons and ammunition). They appeared enthusiastic when they arrived at the assembly point, where they were warmly welcomed by the populace and the forward command post.

They secured the key position at a section of a river at Dey Do Hamlet.

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The construction of a model fortification for the population has been undertaken, and the populace have been assisted in digging their fortifications.

The people of K ((possibly Cambodian)) and VK ((possibly Vietnamese residents in Cambodia)) are very enthusiastic, ((so the VC/NVA)) assist them.

The people appeared to be very concerned about the withdrawal of ((VC/NVA)) troops.

((We are)) promoting the troops' morale to make them combat ready.

One Party Chapter consisting of two Party cells has been organized.

((Personnel)) still worry about the delay of their subsistence allowances for Apr 70.

There has been only one uniform ((for each person)). A recommendation for sending personnel back to receive clothing supplies and subsistence allowances was initiated.

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Element of Brother Muoi Do:

C2/170 ((possibly 2nd Company of 170th Battalion)):

Continuously fought for four consecutive nights; personnel have been very enthusiastic and very good in enduring hardships. They have carried out orders in an urgent manner.

The ((Party)) policy has been implemented very well during past combat missions.

There has been a good unity in leadership which has promoted a high determination ((among VC/NVA personnel)).

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Maintaining Party and Youth Group activities in a satisfactory manner.

Have issued one set of clothing (captured from the enemy) to every person.

There are still some attitudes unfavorable for combat readiness requirements.

Election of Liberation Association ((Executive)) Members: Because of inadequate preparation and lack of motivation of the people, the population was still frightened and they still elected "former" ((well known)) individuals.

- In Chhlong District, the comrade in charge of controlling the populace, who is a cadre from the Party Committee of Vietnamese residents, did not made any progress.

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- The recruitment rate is low.
- Beware of rightism.
- The people's organizations have been rather superficial.

List of Battalion Cadre

CT7 ((possibly Công Trường 7, aka 7th NVA Division, HQ, SVNLA)):

- Nông Ngọc Cấn, Battalion Executive Officer, Assistant Chief of the Reconnaissance Section of F ((possibly division)), Party Chapter Secretary.
- Phan Bình, Battalion Executive Officer, Assistant Chief of the Sapper Section of F, a Party Committee member.
- Đàm Vinh, Battalion Executive Officer, Commanding Officer of the Sapper Battalion of F, a Party Committee member.
- Lê Đức Quang, Battalion Executive Officer (Enemy Proselyting ((cadre)), Political Staff of F), a Party Committee member of D ((Battalion)).
- Dũng Trung, Battalion Executive Officer (Civilian Proselyting ((cadre)) of F), Party Chapter Secretary.
- Nông Văn Quang, Company Commander (holding the position of Battalion Executive Officer), a Party Committee member of "D".

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- Nguyễn Công Trục, Company Executive Officer, (Company Political Officer), a Party Committee member.

- Đặng Quang Phê, Platoon Leader, (Assistant Company Political Officer), a Party Chapter Committee member.

- Nông Văn Noong, Platoon Leader, (Company Executive Officer), a Party Chapter Committee member.

- Nguyễn Văn Hải, Platoon Leader, (Company Executive Officer), a Party Committee member.

- Nguyễn Xuân Khắc, Platoon Leader, (Assistant Company Political Officer), a Party Chapter Committee member.

- Nguyễn Văn Thịnh, Company Executive Officer, (Company Executive Officer), DVCT ((possibly Đảng Viên Chính Thức, meaning an official Party member)).

- Trần Văn Vy, Company Executive Officer, (Company Executive Officer), DVCT.

- Comrade Canh, Assistant Company Political Officer, (Security Staff Assistant Officer of F), a Party Chapter Committee member.

C2/170 (- Đỗ Nhữ Kinh, Company Commander, (Company Commander), a Party Committee member
(- Nguyễn Thanh Tùng, Platoon Leader, (Company Executive Officer), a Party Chapter Committee member.

- Mười Độ, Battalion Executive Officer (Inter-Unit Leader), a Party Committee member.

- Hoàng Tùng, Company Executive Officer (Company Commander), a Party Chapter Committee member, concurrently Assistant Secretary.

- Đặng Tuy, Assistant Company Political Officer, (Company Political Officer), a Party Committee member of "D".

The Command Committee of D

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14/5 ((possibly 14 May))

The Armed Propaganda Unit has a strength of 14 comrades.

It will be divided into two units.

It has one translator and
presently needs another translator.

Each unit will consist of seven persons.

Preparation for physical requirements in general was adequate.

AK ((assault rifle)), 250 ((rounds for each rifle)).

Other types of ammunition, one basic load.

Rice, enough for three days. Combat rations, five days.

The entire C ((possibly company)) = 10A's ((possibly squads))
(nine A's of infantry and one A of heavy weapons).

B1 ((possibly 1st Platoon))	19 men
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B2 ((possibly 2nd Platoon))	21 men
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B3 ((possibly 3rd Platoon))	19 men
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59 men

Entire C = 18 Vietnamese resident recruits

Each A = from five to seven men

((Each of the)) mortar elements and heavy weapon element: Five men

C ((company)) headquarters = 11 men

Total = 75

Among three "AT" ((squad leaders)) =

assistant platoon leader,

Each B ((platoon)) had three comrades ((platoon cadre))

Party Chapter: Three Party Chapter Committee members = four Party cells,

Regarding the morale, all cadre and combatants felt encouraged and expressed their firm determination. The Headquarters of "Doan" ((Group)) was being consolidated.

Hammocks: Enough. Tents: Enough; shortage of plastic sheets ((used as raincoats)): It was ready for the troop movement.

15 US shovels

+3 old shovels

Weapons:

Presently ((they)) have one company cadre and three platoon cadre.

A plan has been made to assign Canh and Chinh to take charge of one unit, and Trong and Binh to take charge of the others.

The whole unit has one medic

There will be one cook if ((the Armed Propaganda Unit)) consents.

ĐOÀN ((GROUP)) HEADQUARTERS

The Command Committee: Vu Ba, Mubi Tho, and Nam Tuc

Military

- Ba Tran
- Can
- Thuc

Political

Bay Quang

Rear Service

Khue, platoon cadre

Chinh

Binh in charge of Rear Service

Sai (tailor)

Subordinate ((elements)) of Doan Headquarters

One radio squad: Ngan, Squad Leader; Ban, in charge of crypto

One flash liaison squad: Liem.

One security guard squad (Vo Si A, Vu Ba) ((lined out in O.T.))
Bien, Ty, and Ba and two female personnel.

Squad Leader shortage:

Translator: On

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Security guard A ((squad)), one AT

((Squad Leader)) Van, Mieng

Van, Binh

15 May 70: Study the situation report of d7/B

C1 ((possibly 1st Company)) already solved the problem of troop morale ((by)) converting these men into sappers.

C2: Total strength: 29 - two C ((Company)) cadre, 26 former members and three recruits.

A firm determination existed on the day of departure to perform the mission assigned by higher headquarters. They realized the advantages and disadvantages of their new mission. The Party Chapter thoroughly understood its mission. The Youth Group Chapter and the Military Council had convened meetings. There was enough rice for three days the dry rations consisted only of salt. It ((possibly 2nd Company)) still consisted of three b ((platoons)), but in each b, the majority of the personnel were cadre. There was adequate absorbent cotton and field dressing.

C3 ((possibly 3rd Company)); total strength: 54 men; cadre: three

54 men

C ((Company)) cadre: Three

B ((platoon)) cadre: ((Unstated))

C ((possibly the 3rd Company)) consists of two B's((platoons)).

Each B = 24 men having two B ((platoon)) cadre; one platoon leader and one assistant platoon leader.

One in charge of mail.

One liaison agent and one medic.

Each B ((platoon)) is divided into three A's ((squads)). Each A consists of one squad leader, one assistant squad leader and seven members. It might be organized onto three or four elements.

Total strength: 54

21 Party members (five Vietnamese residents)

(five official Party members)

29 ((Youth)) Group members

4 non-Party/Group members

Weapons: 32 AK's ((assault)) rifles

2 B-40's

2 DH-5 directional mines

6 CKC's ((rifles))

5 pistols (3 Colts and 2 K-54's)

1 pair of scissors

1 saw ((possibly bucksaw))

2 pick mattocks

34 shovels

1 machete

68 Chicom stick-type defensive hand grenades

16 "Pellet" type hand grenades

15 offensive/defensive hand grenades

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Being thoroughly familiar with the mission all personnel felt encouraged.

Difficulties: The personnel are still unfamiliar with the techniques of firing various armaments. Therefore, they worry about their mission.

Rice: Five days - Food: Five days.

C4 ((possibly 4th Company)) realizes its missions.

Two machine guns
with 1,000 rounds.

25 tents

25 raincoat
nylon sheets

One 82mm mortar.

25 rounds. Fifteen men (13 men at squad leader level and lower).

Two B-41's and six rounds of ammunition. Eleven AK's, six CKC's.

Organization: Two Party cells = 37 men (five new))

16 Party members (nine official, seven probationary)

14 ((Youth)) Group members

2 aged personnel

5 new recruits.

There is one probationary Party member who has not yet been recognized as an official member, because the D ((battalion)) did not do so.

Six shovels (one big shovel) one ((buck)) saw.

Physical ((requirements)): Rice for three days. Two medics. Medicine

Battalion A

Party Committee : 7

Trung, acting Secretary

Party
Committee
members: }

Vinh

Khai

Party Committee members
((cont'd)):

Trúc

Tuy

Kinh and Quang

D ((battalion)) Headquarters: Vinh, dt ((possibly a battalion
Commanding Officer))

Trung, dvf ((possibly a battalion Assistant Political Officer))

Quang, df ((possibly a battalion Executive Officer)).

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18 May - The number of new personnel recruited by Mười ^Đ was
21 men. Only eight men went with D7A ((possibly 7A Battalion))

(Four men remain with Comrade Kinh. Is this correct?)

Nine men are still at the D ((possibly battalion)) of Brother Quan[^]
(170).

Gasoline and oil. Did the element of Comrade Canh pick up one
motorboat load (eight cans) of gasoline?

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19 May - 24 men

23 May. The battle on 23 May.

1. Confirmed the number of
personnel killed, 100 ; destroyed one C; and
wore down one C.
2. Evaluate the significance of
our victory, Friendly
force + 3 ((possibly KIA))
3. Task of consolidation
and reorganization. Captured several weapons
and ammunition - 5
((possibly WIA))
4. Appraisal of the battle.

Immediate task for tomorrow, 24 May.

Significance of victory:

- This was a very significant victory.
- High fighting spirit.
- Use of a small force against a larger force. Major victory.

- Proper implementation of orders in launching the attack.
- Increased the influence over the populace in newly liberated areas.
- Raised the prestige of the Liberation Army.

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Unity between the army and the people has been improved and guerrilla warfare has been developed. The class standpoint of Party members and junior cadre has been improved, and they absolutely believed in ((the Revolution)).

- Weak points: The evaluation of enemy capabilities is poor.
- Captured equipment:

23 CKC's ((Red Stock rifles)), one B-40 ((AT grenade launcher)) with six rounds, four cases of machine gun ammunition, four AK's ((assault rifles)), one MAS heavy machine gun, two carbines and three cases of 60mm mortar rounds.

- Personnel strength: 30 men. Three have been KIA and four WIA.

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- The 2nd Company had 50 men ((sic)) including Nhat, Platoon Leader and Tu, Assistant Platoon Leader:

<u>B1 ((1st Platoon))</u>	<u>B2 ((2nd Platoon))</u>	<u>B3 ((3rd Platoon))</u>	<u>Company Headquarters</u>
12 men	12 men	17 men	7 men

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Comrade Chau's element in the Bung Do area: Twenty men including recruits (14 of them are armed); six Khmer ((Cambodians)) and six Vietnamese residents (unarmed).

Comrade Nam Phuc will come to O Pram ((area vic NU590650)) on 27 May 70. If he does not come on 27 May, he will come on 28 May ((70)). 100 men. ((All problems concerning)) Stung Trong ((District, Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia)) will be settled on 29 or 30 May ((70)). If Nam Phuc stays in the ((O Pram area)), Comrade Ba will move to Kompong-Thom ((Province Capital)) to attack it. If the mortar ((element)) arrives, he will attack Kompong Thom.

0800 hours, 26 May: One Sapper Company will be in the Ô Pram ((area)) to be sent later to the Ô Chôt ((area)) to prepare for an attack in coordination with an infantry company.

27 May ((70)): One infantry platoon is to contact the ((cited)) sapper company at a three-way road junction located 1,500 or 2,000 meters from Cầu ((Bridge)) Lôn and in the vicinity of Sot Cha area and Khô Leng Watchtower.

27 May: Passwords and recognition signals:

At night:

Clap one's hands or knock the rifle stock or imitate an owl's cry.

Challenge: Three times

Answer : Two times

In day time:

Challenge: Hold a tree branch in the left hand and move it up and down three times.

Answer : Lift a tree branch in either hand to shoulder height twice.

Pass words:

Challenge: Vu Ba

Answer : Mui Tho

28 May:

Recognition signals:

At night:

Challenge: Two times

Answer : Three times

In daytime:

Challenge: Raise left hand three times.

Answer : Raise left hand to shoulder level three times.

Pass words:

Challenge: Anh

Answer : Dung

On 29 May ((70)), use the passwords of 27 May ((70)).

On 30 May ((70)), use the passwords of 28 May ((70)).

Communication is sent through K63 ((radios)).

The 60mm mortar element ((is commanded by)) 10 Tao.

If an 82mm mortar is available, give it to 10 Tao to conduct blocking fire.

On 1900 hours, 27 May ((70)), the command post ((possibly of the attacking force)) will be on the left bank of the river opposite to Stung Trong ((possibly District of Kompong Cham Province)).

Use sampans to carry ((situation)) reports to the Headquarters. Use motorboats and outboard motorboats - Lao Sang.

The D ((battalion)) that is to go to Kompong Thom must arrive at Ô Pram on 27 May ((70)) or in the morning of 28 May ((70)). It is to carry explosive charges and gasoline.

Elements of Ô Chót:

The command post is west of Ô Pram and will later move to the area of KoKi Thom.

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At 1000 hours, three vehicles will move to Ô Pram.

Two vehicles of Hùng Túu will also ((arrive)) tomorrow, 27 May ((70)).

Give Hùng Túu's the Bertier ((truck)) and a Jeep.

At 1900 hours, Triêt and another person will use the motorcycle to transport gasoline for Hùng Túu's motorboats.

There will be 160 persons taking meals on 27 May ((70)), including Gia, Danh, and members of X Headquarters.

One "a" ((squad)) of guerrillas is familiar with the roads.

Sapper Company:

Lăng, Company Commander.

Kiên, Political Officer.

Thỏ, Company Executive Officer.

Biêu, Assistant Political Officer.

2nd Company:

Tung, Company Commander.

Danh, Political Officer.

Sỏi, Company Executive Officer.

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The main ²Mit ((element)) consists of 11 comrades, commanded by Comrade Luông, Company Commanding Officer. These men are armed with two B-40's, one K-54, a number of AK's, and from 12 to 15 Chicom stick-type shaped-charge hand grenades. The main objectives are the command post and its mortar positions.

²Mit 2 is commanded by Thỏ, Company Executive Officer. It consists of 11 comrades who are equipped with one B-40, one K-54, a number of AK's, and from 12 to 15 Chicom stick-type shaped hand grenades. Its mission is to destroy the objectives in the inner-perimeter.

²Mit 3, commanded by Comrade Danh, consists of eight comrades who are armed with five AK's, one B-40, and one light machine gun.

ZB ((possibly Headquarters of a battalion)) consists of 14 comrades, commanded by Comrades Quang and Sỏi, who are equipped with one B-41, two 60mm mortars, and a number of AK assault rifles.

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CDC ((possibly meaning a sapper company)) has a total of 30 comrades.

ZB Sapper ((possibly Headquarters of a sapper battalion)) - C2 ((possibly 2nd Company)) still has 13 men.

The medical evacuation element: Nine comrades.

The Command Committee has 12 comrades and an assistant company political officer.

At 2400 hours on 27 May ((possibly 1970)): Final preparation at a 10 to 15 minute march from the target.

At 0100 hours on 28 May ((possibly 1970)): Begin to penetrate.

At 0200 hours on 28 May ((70)): All individuals are to penetrate into the inner-perimeter. B2 ((possibly infantry element)) is to be 50 meters from the enemy ((post)). The attack signal shot is to be fired either at the ((enemy)) command post, the radio station, or the mortar positions.

Secrecy will be maintained during penetration and we ((VC/NVA)) only open fire when we approach the ((enemy)) mortar positions.

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Order of march:

Reconnaissance cell (Troop departure should be
(started sooner than scheduled
Element 1 (if it rains.

Element 3

Element 2

Command Post - Z b ((possibly Headquarters'))

1700 hours - Ready to move. 1730 hours - Departure.

Heighten determination to fight by primarily adopting the sapper tactics, but when the unit is discovered, raids against the enemy should be conducted in accordance with infantry procedures.

D78: 80 ((men))

Doan Headquarters including signal
and reconnaissance elements: 50 ((men))

Unit VT3 ((possibly Armed Propaganda)): 28 ((men))

((Total)) 158 ((men))

(Reconnaissance Unit: 9 ((men))

(

(1 platoon leader and

(

(8 privates.

(

(Signal?

Drivers

((possibly meaning truck
element))

KIA: 1 squad leader

WIA: 3 (including the C3 Company Commander)

4,800 kilograms of rice.

150 kilograms of salt.

300 kilograms of dried food.

Medicine: 2 cases and 2 bags.

31 May - Received situation report from Comrade Can:

- The entire D is currently stationed from the area north ((illegible)) Bridge to KpPhonur.

1 Jun - Situation as reported by Comrade Nam ... ((three words illegible)).

Beginning 16 May. Command Committee: Vinh, Battalion Commander.

Quang, Battalion Executive Officer.

Trung, Assistant Battalion Political Officer.

Four combat engagements of large and small-scales. The smallest engagement was the attack against Tang Krassang (on 25 May, at night).

- In the attack of Tangraine, much food, rice, medicine, alcohol, and 13,000 Riels were seized.

- Specific points are that this is the first coordinated action of the entire D.

- D cadre: 3 - ((three words illegible)): 2 comrades.

- Uniformity in combat technique, and tactics - Lack of leadership unity.

- Evaluation of achievements:

- Killed 170 enemy: (... ((7 words illegible))).

- 2 heavy machine guns and ((one)) 12.7mm machine gun ((were captured)).

- Destroyed one 4 x 4 ((truck))

- 53 cases of 82mm mortar ammunition, 24 cases of DK75 ((75mm RR)) ammunition, 4 cases of K-53 ammunition and ((one word illegible)) cases of ammunition ((possibly were used during the military operations)).

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- Have liberated 18 Vietnamese resident youths at Tang Krassang.

- One armed propaganda unit was organized.

- The populace is enthusiastic and confident in S's ((possibly Prince Sihanouk's)) policy.

Anxieties.

1. ((US/RVNAF)) airstrikes.

2. Revenge by the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) when we ((VC/NVA)) withdraw.

- Determination to complete assigned missions:

Boldness in combat, endurance of hardship and overcoming difficulties by

the guerrilla forces will take it as a good example and promote their fighting spirit. Some Vietnamese resident recruits have displayed heroic acts.

Accomplished the mission of seizing the objectives assigned.

Cut off Communication Route 6.

C2 accomplished its mission, when it was detached from D ((Battalion)).

With a high fighting spirit, the unit is ready to carry out any mission, and in any place.

Weakpoint: Inadequate political education and ideological political guidance by cadre. Rightism still prevails.

Inadequate survey of the recruits' attitude. There were two Vietnamese resident recruits (from Chhlong) who deserted from the unit carrying two AK's.

(Inadequate control of recruits).

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Regarding the steering cadre . ((They quite often)) get angry, and raise their voices.

Policy for captured material is not strictly observed.

Combat plans are not carefully prepared. Lack of vigilance and combat readiness.

The non-Party members have not been soundly educated on saving supplies (especially ammunition).

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Conclusion: - Overcome all difficulties. Carry out all missions.

- Evaluation ((of achievement is based)) on the implementation of policy.

Weaknesses: Discipline is not strictly observed. Orders must be thoroughly understood. Activity plans are not specific. Leadership of cadre is inadequate.

((TN: The six pages following this extract translation, which ends on page 31 of the original text, contains US Armed Forces terminology and abbreviations for US agencies translated into Vietnamese and French))

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----