

056672

*camb*  
FILE SUBJ  
9/15 SUB-CAT

*9/10/75*

SUMMARY: IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1975, THE KHMER COMMUNIST (KC) PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE RECEIVED GUIDANCE FROM THE UNITED FRONT IN PHNOM PENH INSTRUCTING THAT THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE MEMBERS BE BRIEFED ON RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT A 12 SEPTEMBER MEETING IN PHNOM PENH. THE PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCE KULEN DISTRICT COMMITTEE ESTIMATED THAT THE DISTRICT'S 1975 FARM PRODUCTION WOULD SURPASS THAT OF 1974 AND THE DISTRICT WOULD ALSO SATISFY 90 PERCENT OF ITS FABRIC REQUIREMENTS. THE DISTRICT COMMITTEE HAS COMPLETED THREE DIKE PROJECTS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE IRRIGATION CAPACITY. IN MID-SEPTEMBER THE KC BEGAN TO CHANGE THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM IN PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCE, INCORPORATING ENTIRE VILLAGES INTO A UNIFIED COMMUNAL SYSTEM. END SUMMARY.

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1975, THE KHMER COMMUNIST (KC) PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE RECEIVED A WRITTEN COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED FRONT IN PHNOM PENH CONCERNING RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT A 12 SEPTEMBER MEETING IN PHNOM PENH ATTENDED BY P E N N NOUTH, K H I E U SAMPHAN, S O N SEN AND S O M SAMNANG. THE REPORT CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING FOUR RESOLUTIONS APPROVED AT THE MEETING AND INSTRUCTED

THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF DISTRICT COMMITTEES ON THE RESOLUTIONS:

"A. THE CAPITALISTS, BOURGEOISIE, SCHOLARS AND FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE AND THE REVOLUTION. THE PARTY MUST CLOSELY OBSERVE THEM AND ELIMINATE THEM SECRETLY IF THEY DO NOT BECOME MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTION. TO AVOID CONFUSION THIS PROBLEM MUST BE HANDLED WITH CARE AND IN A SECRET MANNER.

"B. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR LARGE QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WERE LEFT BEHIND. WE MUST MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THESE WEAPONS FOR FUTURE USE IN THE LIBERATION OF OUR BROTHER CAMBODIANS IN THAILAND AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

"C. CAMBODIA MUST BE NEUTRAL AND MUST NOT ALIGN ITSELF WITH ANY SIDE. WE WILL ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY ON THE BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHERS' INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE COUNTRY TO HAVE OUTSIDE RELATIONSHIPS BECAUSE OF THE POOR ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE NEED TO IMPORT SUCH ITEMS AS PETROLEUM WHICH CANNOT BE PRODUCED IN CAMBODIA AT THE PRESENT TIME.

"D. FOREIGN AID WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED UNLESS IT COMES

2

WITHOUT STRINGS."

2. THE KULEN DISTRICT COMMITTEE IN PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCE ESTIMATED IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1975 THAT THE DISTRICT'S 1975 FARM PRODUCTION WOULD SURPASS THAT OF 1974. IN 1974 ABOUT 55 PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE LAND WAS CULTIVATED; HOWEVER, THE COMMITTEE ESTIMATED THAT IN 1975 95 PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE LAND WAS UNDER CULTIVATION. DURING THE 1975 PLANTING SEASON THE COMMITTEE WAS ABLE TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL 40 RAI OF NEW LAND. TOTAL LAND UNDER CULTIVATION IN 1975 IS BELIEVED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 8,400 RAI. (FIELD COMMENT: ONE RAI EQUALS .4 ACRE.) THE MAIN CROP IS RICE AND THE COMMITTEE HAS REPORTED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS THAT 34,900 CASSAVA PLANTS AND 25,620 BANANA TREES WILL BE HARVESTED. A GOOD HARVEST IS EXPECTED BECAUSE OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF RAIN WHICH HAS FALLEN IN 1975.

3. TO IMPROVE THE IRRIGATION CAPACITY, THE KULEN DISTRICT COMMITTEE HAS COMPLETED THREE DIKE PROJECTS IN THE SPEAR HAL, OKDUL AND ORAMEAS AREAS. THE DIKES AVERAGE 750 METERS LONG, THREE AND ONE-HALF METERS HIGH AND FOUR METERS WIDE AT THE BASE. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE, 3

REPORTING FROM THE NEIGHBORING AREA OF ANLONG VENG (VA0273) SAID THAT ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1975 A 250-MAN KC MILITARY GROUP WAS DEPLOYED FROM ANLONG VENG TO PHUM PAAV (VA1881) TO CONSTRUCT A DAM. THE DAM WAS CONSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WATER TO ALLOW FOR THE PLANTING OF A DRY SEASON RICE CROP. THE DAM IS TO BE ONE KILOMETER LONG, ONE AND ONE-HALF METERS HIGH, AND TWO AND ONE-HALF METERS WIDE. TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANLONG VENG THE MILITARY UNIT IS UTILIZING AN UNIDENTIFIED TYPE OF RADIO. CALL SIGNS CURRENTLY IN USE ARE 13 FOR THE PHUM PAAV ELEMENT AND 30 FOR THE ANLONG VENG HEADQUARTERS.)

4. THE KULEN DISTRICT COMMITTEE ESTIMATED THAT IN 1974 THE AREA WAS ABLE TO PRODUCE ABOUT 35 PERCENT OF THE FABRIC REQUIRED BY THE DISTRICT FOR CLOTHING. CURRENT COMMITTEE ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT 90 PERCENT OF 1975 FABRIC REQUIREMENTS CAN BE SATISFIED FROM FABRIC PRODUCED IN THE AREA. COTTON AND SILK PRODUCTION IN THE AREA HAS BEEN IMPROVED AND THE PEOPLE ARE STRIVING TO IMPLEMENT THE SELF-HELP PRINCIPLE.

5. THE KULEN COOPERATIVE STORE, UNDER THE MANAGERSHIP OF T O C H MENGHAU, RECEIVES MERCHANDISE FROM TBENG MEANCHEY Y

AND PHNOM PENH EVERY 15-20 DAYS. COOPERATIVE MERCHANDISE IS DELIVERED BY TRUCK, WHEN BUYING OR SELLING MERCHANDISE THE COOPERATIVE IN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO DEAL ONLY WITH GROUP LEADERS FROM ADJACENT VILLAGES. AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER THE COOPERATIVE HAD A SET LIST OF PRICES FOR MERCHANDISE IT WAS SELLING AND BUYING FOR EXPORT OUTSIDE THE AREA. MERCHANDISE ON-HAND AND AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE INCLUDED: 149 FARM UTENSILS, SUCH AS HOES, SICKLES AND PLOWSHARES, WHICH CARRIED PRICES RANGING FROM 12 TO 18 RIELS EACH;

96 METERS OF PLASTIC CLOTH, PRICED AT 14 RIELS PER METER,  
680 KILOGRAMS OF SALT, PRICED AT THREE RIELS PER KILOGRAM  
AND 336 DOSES OF MEDICINE WHICH INCLUDED AURIOMYCINE,  
STREPTOMYCIN, AND CLOROQUINE WHICH WERE PRICED AT TWO TO FIVE  
RIELS PER DOSE. (FIELD COMMENT: THE EXCHANGE RATE FOR THE  
RIEL IS UNDETERMINED. THE SIZE OF THE MEDICINE DOSES  
WAS NOT SPECIFIED.)

6. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1975, THE KC BEGAN TO CHANGE  
THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM IN PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCE. PRIOR TO THE  
CHANGES EACH VILLAGE WAS BROKEN INTO GROUPS OF 10-15 HOUSES  
WITH ABOUT 80 INDIVIDUALS IN EACH GROUP. IN THE PAST A  
LARGE VILLAGE IN THE AREA MAY HAVE HAD FROM FIVE TO 10  
COMMUNAL GROUPS WITH EACH GROUP HAVING A LEADER WHO REPORTED  
TO THE VILLAGE COMMITTEE. UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM THE ENTIRE  
VILLAGE WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A UNIFIED COMMUNAL SYSTEM.  
(FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO K O C K KIEN, IN EARLY OCTOBER  
THE KULEN DISTRICT COMMITTEE RECEIVED WRITTEN GUIDANCE  
FROM PHNOM PENH DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1975 EXPLAINING THE NEED  
FOR THE NEWLY INSTITUTED CHANGES IN THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM.  
THE ORDER CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: "HOW USEFUL IS

THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM? FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE OLD SOCIETY THE 30 FAMILIES OF 30 HOUSES HAD 30 RICE POTS AND 30 COOKS. IN A ONE-DAY PERIOD IT WASTED ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THE AVAILABLE PRODUCTIVE TIME. IF WE PUT IN THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM ONLY FOUR INDIVIDUALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO PREPARE THE COMMUNE'S FOOD AND THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS CAN DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO OTHER PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES. THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM IS THE PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION WANTS US TO WORK UNDER A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM. COMRADES K A E O YIL AND A C H A R SOPHONKAMBOR SACRAFICED THEIR LIVES FOR THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM. ALL OF US HAVE TO GIVE PROPERTY TO THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM AND OUR POOR BROTHERS. THIS ORDER IF FOR THE DISTRICT COMMITTEES TO ASSIST THEM IN CONVINCING OUR BROTHERS TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT HESITATION.")

CAMB  
FILE SUBJ  
4175 SUB-CAT

APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1975

THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN CAMBODIA)  
VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH  
INFLUENCE

SUMMARY: THE SPEED WITH WHICH KHMER ROUGE FORCES  
OCCUPIED PHNOM PENH FOUND THE RGNU SOMEWHAT UNPREPARED TO  
ASSUME AUTHORITY, BECAUSE OF MANEUVERING AMONG KHMER ROUGE  
OFFICIALS DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF INSTABILITY, THE RGNU  
WAS UNABLE TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF A  
NEW GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT WAS OFTEN UNAWARE OF STANDINGS  
WITH RIVAL FACTIONS. BY THE END OF THE SECOND MONTH AFTER  
THE KHMER ROUGE TAKEOVER, TWO POLITICAL FACTIONS HAD



EMERGED: ONE LED BY IENG SARY WHICH FAVORED A HARD-LINE COMMUNIST POLICY, AND ONE LED BY THE MORE MODERATE AND POPULAR KHIEU SAMPHAN. WITHIN THE FIRST DAYS AFTER THE FALL OF PHNOM PENH, A PRC DELEGATION ARRIVED TO ARRANGE FOR THE RETURN OF CHINESE ADVISORS TO CAMBODIA, AND BY SEPTEMBER THERE WERE 500-800 CHINESE ADVISORS. AS OF THAT TIME, HOWEVER, THERE WERE STILL FEW, IF ANY, VIETNAMESE ADVISORS IN CAMBODIA. PRINCE SIHANOUK WAS SUPPORTED BY THE CHINESE AS A BALANCE TO THE PRO-VIETNAMESE POSITION OF IENG SARY. SIHANOUK'S SUPPORT SEEMED TO COME ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FROM CHOU EN-LAI. END SUMMARY.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE ATTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN CAMBODIA TO PRINCE NORODOM S I H A N O U K ON THE BASIS OF NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THEM DURING THE PERIOD FROM THE FALL OF PHNOM PENH IN APRIL 1975 TO SIHANOUK'S RETURN TO CAMBODIA IN SEPTEMBER. SOURCE, HOWEVER, WAS UNABLE TO SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHICH STATEMENTS WERE ACTUALLY MADE BY SIHANOUK, BUT CONSIDERED THE CONTEXT A GENERALLY ACCURATE PRESENTATION OF SIHANOUK'S VIEWS.)

2. THE SPEED AND RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH KHMER ROUGE FORCES WERE ABLE TO OCCUPY PHNOM PENH IN APRIL FOUND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION (RGNU) SOMEWHAT UNPREPARED TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS IN CAMBODIA. WHEREAS INSURGENT MILITARY COMMANDERS WERE ABLE QUICKLY TO ESTABLISH MILITARY/POLICE AUTHORITY IN THE CAPITAL CITY, THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT ORGANIZED MILITARY FORCES TO CONTROL ALL OF THE PRINCIPAL PROVINCIAL CENTERS. DURING THE FIRST MONTH OR SO POLITICAL AUTHORITY WAS ILL-DEFINED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THERE WAS EXTENSIVE MANEUVERING FOR POWER AMONG KHMER ROUGE OFFICIALS. THE RGNU WAS UNABLE, DURING THIS PERIOD, TO ISSUE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS REGARDING COMPOSITION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT, IN PART DUE TO THE LACK OF FUNCTIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY BECAUSE IT WAS OFTEN NOT AWARE OF THE RELATIVE STANDINGS WITHIN THE RIVAL FACTIONS. DURING THE FIRST FEW MONTHS THIS STRUGGLE WAS NOT LIMITED TO ONE FOR PERSONAL POWER, BUT ALSO CONCERNED SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES ON POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES.

### 3. HOSTILITY AMONG FACTIONS WITHIN THE INSURGENCY

--LOOSELY DIVIDED INTO ROYALIST, NATIONALIST, AND COMMUNIST-- HAD REMAINED COMPARATIVELY DORMANT DURING THE WAR, BUT BECAME SIGNIFICANT FOLLOWING THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT'S SURRENDER. THE UNSTABLE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED BY CONTRADICTORY PRESSURES FROM HANOI AND PEKING. BY THE SECOND MONTH AFTER THE KHMER ROUGE TAKEOVER, MILITARY CONTROL OF THE PROVINCES HAD BEEN FAIRLY WELL ESTABLISHED, AND TWO VIABLE POLITICAL FACTIONS HAD EMERGED IN PHNOM PENH. THE DOMINANT ONE APPEARED TO BE THE GROUP LED BY I E N G SARY (WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN NAMED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER), WHICH FAVORED A HARD-LINE COMMUNIST POLICY. THIS GROUP WAS OPPOSED BY A LOOSELY ORGANIZED FACTION, ALMOST AS INFLUENTIAL, LED BY THE MORE MODERATE AND MORE POPULAR K H I E U SAMPHAN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE KHIEU SAMPHAN GROUP WAS GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED AS NATIONALIST, BUT WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE RETURN OF PRINCE SIHANOUK, AS WAS IENG SARY.)

4. DURING THIS EARLY PERIOD, THE ROLE PLAYED BY FOREIGN POWERS, SPECIFICALLY NORTH VIETNAM AND THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC), WAS SIGNIFICANT AND COMPLICATED THE SOLUTION OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT WAS SPECULATED THAT BOTH VIETNAM AND THE PRC WERE THEMSELVES SOMEWHAT UNPREPARED FOR THE KHMER ROUGE VICTORY AND PREFERRED TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN PHNOM PENH CONFUSED UNTIL THEY COULD FORMULATE THEIR OWN POLICIES TOWARD THE NEW REGIME.)

5. WITHIN THE FIRST THREE OR FOUR DAYS AFTER THE FALL OF CAMBODIA, PRC AIRCRAFT FLEW A LIMITED NUMBER OF TRIPS BETWEEN PEKING AND PHNOM PENH. THE INITIAL FLIGHTS CARRIED A SMALL DELEGATION--WITHIN WHICH WERE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER PRC EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA--TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE RETURN OF PRC TECHNICAL ADVISORS TO CAMBODIA TO ASSIST IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OR REOPENING OF TEXTILE, CEMENT AND PAPER FACTORIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. (SOURCE COMMENT: NO DETAILS IDENTIFYING THE FACTORIES OR THEIR LOCATIONS WERE ANNOUNCED, BUT THE MAJORITY WERE THOUGHT TO BE IN PHNOM PENH, KOMPONG SOM AND BATTAMBANG PROVINCE.) ANTICIPATING POSSIBLE ADVERSE REACTIONS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, THE PRC WAS CAREFUL TO RESTRICT ITS ADVISORS

TO ONLY THOSE FACTORIES WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, WITH  
PRC ASSISTANCE, PRIOR TO THE L O N N O L C O U P D'ETAT.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THESE MOVES BY PEKING, THE NORTH  
VIETNAMESE, THROUGH COMMUNIST PARTY FIRST SECRETARY LE  
D U A N , BEGAN EXERTING DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON VARIOUS  
KHMER ROUGE LEADERS WHOM THEY CONSIDERED PRO-VIETNAMESE.  
THE VIETNAMESE WISHED TO ASSURE THAT IENG SARY, A KNOWN  
VIETNAMESE SYMPATHIZER, RECEIVED A SIGNIFICANT APPOINTMENT  
IN ORDER TO SERVE AS A BALANCE AGAINST PRO-PEKING FACTIONS  
WITHIN THE KHMER ROUGE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE EXACT  
VIETNAMESE MOVES INVOLVED ARE NOT KNOWN. IT WAS RUMORED  
THAT IENG SARY VISITED HANOI SHORTLY AFTER THE FALL OF

PHNOM PENH TO CONFER WITH LE DUAN AND THAT LE DUAN HAD VISITED CAMBODIA SHORTLY THEREAFTER.) ULTIMATELY, IENG SARY, WHO HAD NOT FIGURED AS PROMINENTLY AS A NUMBER OF OTHER KHMER ROUGE LEADERS DURING THE WAR, SOON EMERGED AS A LEADING, IF NOT THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. (SOURCE COMMENT: AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 1975, HOWEVER, AUTHORITY IN PHNOM PENH WAS TENUOUSLY BALANCED BETWEEN AT LEAST THE TWO MAIN FACTIONS AND POWER APPARENTLY EXERCISED ON A CONSENSUS BASIS. THE ULTIMATE ROLES OF BOTH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND PRIME MINISTER PENN N O U T H REMAINED UNDECIDED AT THAT TIME, AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT RELATIVE POWER WILL CONTINUE TO SHIFT BETWEEN VARIOUS COMPETING OFFICIALS FOR SOME TIME TO COME.)

7. IT WAS SPECULATED, BUT UNSUBSTANTIATED, THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ALSO WISHED TO SEND ADVISORS TO CAMBODIA TO OFFSET THE INFLUENCE CREATED BY CHINESE PRESENCE, BUT ELECTED TO WAIT UNTIL THEY HAD GAINED A COMPLETE MILITARY VICTORY IN THE SOUTH. AS OF SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, THERE WERE FEW, IF ANY, VIETNAMESE ADVISORS, OTHER THAN REMNANTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO HAD BEEN WITH KHMER

ROUGE FORCES DURING THE WAR IN CAMBODIA. IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT IENG SARY, AT THE INSTIGATION OF LE DUAN, WOULD SOON ATTEMPT TO REQUEST VIETNAMESE ADVISORS BE SENT TO CAMBODIA. IN CONTRAST THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 500-800 CHINESE WORKING IN CAMBODIA AS OF SEPTEMBER. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT WAS RUMORED THAT THE MAJORITY OF KHMER STUDENTS WHO HAD BEEN STUDYING IN THE PRC, ESTIMATED AT CLOSE TO ONE THOUSAND, HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO CAMBODIA AT THE REQUEST OF THE KHMER ROUGE. ALSO, ALL VIETNAMESE REFUGEES WHO HAD SETTLED IN CAMBODIA DURING THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY REPATRIATED SINCE THE FALL OF PHNOM PENH.)

8. THE CHANCES FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK'S RETURN TO CAMBODIA IN A SIGNIFICANT ROLE HAVE BEEN DIMINISHED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS, ALTHOUGH SIHANOUK WAS THOUGHT TO HAVE RETAINED HIS POPULARITY WITH THE KHMER PEOPLE AND WAS, AT LEAST SENTIMENTALLY, SUPPORTED BY SOME OF THE FACTIONS REPRESENTED IN THE NEW CAMBODIA POWER STRUCTURE. ALSO, THE PRC WOULD PREFER THAT THE PRINCE CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS, AT LEAST AS A FIGUREHEAD, SO THAT HIS PRO-PRC FEELINGS WOULD COUNTERBALANCE THE PRO-

VIETNAMESE FACTIONS WHICH, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, SEEMED TO BE GAINING A DOMINANT ROLE IN INTERNAL CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS. CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCE PERSONALLY SEEMED TO COME ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FROM PRIME MINISTER C H O U EN-LAI. (SOURCE COMMENT: WHEN PRINCE SIHANOUK ARRIVED IN PEKING FOLLOWING THE LON NOL COUP, IT WAS CHOU EN-LAI, ON A PERSONAL RATHER THAN OFFICIAL BASIS, WHO WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR EXPRESSING "CHINESE" SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK. FREQUENTLY SUCH ENCOURAGEMENT WAS PASSED INDIRECTLY TO SIHANOUK; IT WAS OFTEN THE WIFE OF CHOU EN-LAI WHO WOULD BRING REPORTS FROM THE PREMIER TO PRINCESS M O N I Q U E, WHO WOULD IN TURN RELATE SUCH MESSAGES TO SIHANOUK. IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT THIS SUPPORT HAD AN IMPORTANT AFFECT ON THE PRINCE'S DECISION TO MAINTAIN A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE AND ALSO THAT CHOU EN-LAI'S STANCE WAS UNPOPULAR WITH -- IF NOT ACTUALLY OPPOSED BY -- A LARGE NUMBER OF PRC OFFICIALS.)

9. ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERSHIP WAS THE EXPLANATION BY PRC AUTHORITIES TO SIHANOUK ABOUT THEIR TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR



IENG SARY DURING THE FIRST FEW WEEKS AFTER THE FALL OF PHNOM PENH, DURING SIHANOUK'S VISIT TO PEKING IN SEPTEMBER 1975, WHICH PRECEDED HIS FIRST RETURN TO PHNOM PENH, AN UNIDENTIFIED CHINESE OFFICIAL APOLOGIZED FOR IENG SARY'S HAVING BEEN FLOWN TO PHNOM PENH ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION IN APRIL OR MAY, IN A BOEING 707. THE CHINESE EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD BEEN FORCED TO USE AN AIRPLANE WHICH COULD MAKE THE ROUNDTRIP WITHOUT REFUELING. THE CHINESE WERE CAREFUL TO POINT OUT THAT USING A 707, NORMALLY RESERVED FOR THE PRINCE, WAS NOT AN INDICATION THAT THE PRC CONSIDERED IENG SARY TO BE OF EQUAL RANK WITH SIHANOUK, (SOURCE COMMENT: AS A GENERAL RULE THE CHINESE OFFERED SIHANOUK THE USE OF EITHER A 707 OR AN ILYUSHIN 62 FOR TRAVEL, EVEN WITHIN CHINA. FOR OTHER KHMER DELEGATIONS, WHEN THE PRINCE WAS ABSENT, THE ILYUSHIN 18 WAS THE DESIGNATED AIRCRAFT.)