

054540

FILE	SUBJ.
DATE	SUB-CAT.
1965-1973	

Statements By

Prince Norodom SIHANOUK

1965 - 1973

1. Statements on the Cambodian Communist Movement
1965-1970
2. Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders
(Hu Nim, Hou Youn & Khieu Samphan)-- 1970-1973
3. Statements on Who Controls the Cambodian
Insurgency-- 1970-1971
4. Statements on His Future Role -- 1970-1973
5. Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance -- 1970-1973
6. Statements on Effect of Bombing -- 1973
7. Statements on Negotiations -- 1972-1973

LAST month I wrote . . . I have never had the slightest illusion about the fate that awaits me at the hands of the communists, as well as that which is reserved for "my" government, after having removed from our region the influence, and especially the presence, of the "free world" and the US in particular . . . I concede again that after the disappearance of the US from our region and the victory of the communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene.

NY TIMES JUNE 1965

As for such socialist countries as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we support them politically and diplomatically without reservation. But we cannot support certain among them in their efforts to neocolonialise Cambodia and turn it into a satellite by using Khmer Reds as their trojan horse.

MAY 1967

If the Khmer people find that Sihanouk and the Sangkum are good for nothing or are traitors or have done something bad, and if the Khmer people therefore want to expel Sihanouk and the Sangkum from the country, we will have nothing to say about it because it is the will of the Khmer people. But we cannot let the Khmer Reds say that Sihanouk and the Sangkum must be replaced by China. We cannot accept this because China has no right to come and rule over Cambodia.

SEPTEMBER 1967

I will step down and turn the country over to General Lon Nol . . . Out of indignation with the Khmer Reds who do nothing but call others US lackeys, I am inclined to say that I want to side truly with the Americans. Out of indignation I want to submit really to the Americans because these people never stop speaking of my submission to the Americans. As to them, they who are lackeys of the Chinese and the Vietnamese, they have not said anything about that.

MARCH 1968

I am planning to ask the Russian and Chinese leaders to urge the Vietcong to leave us alone. I will always defend the neutrality of my country. I do not want it aligned to the West or the East. Neutrality is the condition for the survival of the Cambodian people . . . the rightists do not need to stage a coup d'etat against me. I am not really attached to power. If the people and the army wanted to go to the right, I would certainly let them go to the right. [In Paris, just before leaving for Moscow]

MARCH 12 1970

"They launched these attacks because they want to create civil war. . . .

"If we fail in our operations against them and if the Khmer [Cambodian] Viet Minh emerge victorious, they can transform the nation into a Communist country. If not they must continue to accept independence and neutrality. . . .

"The masters of the Khmer Viet Minh are the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong."

May 9, 1967:

"Concerning the Communists, dear companions, we say that we trust the Chinese and Vietnamese. But when the moment comes what will happen between us and the Vietnamese?

"I must tell you that the Vietnamese Communists and the Viet Cong negotiated with us three or four times but that absolutely nothing comes out of the negotiations. They did not sign a pledge of respect for our present frontiers. That is the first problem. The second problem is the fact that the pro-Viet Minh Khmer [Cambodians] have had the habit of permitting the Viet Minh to come into our country. Formerly, after I had expelled the French and after the French troops left Cambodia, the Viet Minh remained in our country in order to conquer it. How can we have confidence in the Viet Minh? Will we be able to escape falling into their hands once we turn Communist?

" . . . If we side with the Viet Minh, we will lose our independence. . . ."

May 9, 1967

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
APRIL 16, 1970

SIHANOUK - Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders
Hu Nim, Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan - 1968-1969

"Today there are about 10 persons being tried by the military court, and some of the Khmer Reds who found this out have taken flight into the forest, such as Hu Youn, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, who have sold their country to foreigners -- the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong and the People's China. And now these guys who are plotting with the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong must leave the country at once for Vietnam."

[February 1, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

* * * * *

"Then the Prince discussed the disappearance of Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan [Khmer Red leaders] who fled to a foreign country. He said: 'Their master had sent them here to stay.'"

[February 5, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk read a letter from a Khmer intellectual who had just returned to Cambodia from the United States, in which he praised the Sangkum's development. Sihanouk then commented on past events, recalling the time when Cambodia was infiltrated by the Viet Minh, the masters of Hu Nim."

[October 14, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk said he will again offer his sympathy and paternal and brotherly feelings to the Khmer Red leaders -- such as Hou Youn, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim -- whenever the latter change their attitude and again become nationalist, royalist, Buddhist, or socialist Buddhist. He said that as long as they remain enemies of the nation, he is obliged to counterattack them."

[September 24, 1969 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk then called on the families of Hu Nim and Hu Youn, Khmer Red leaders, to try to convince the two men to stop creating trouble and insecurity. Sihanouk said: It's just like they [Khmer Reds] have opened the door for the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh to enter and stay in the country. There are so many of them now. When I asked our Royal Armed Forces, how many Viet Cong and Viet Minh were in the country, I was told 40,000."

[October 13, 1969 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Who Controls the Insurgency (b)

"Sihanouk stressed that the 'last word' on this matter (GRUNK reevaluation of war policy) belonged to Khieu Samphan."
[Sihanouk Press Luncheon Speech - AFP - January 31, 1973]

* * * * *

Sihanouk cabled the New York Times: "If they (Interior Resistance leaders) refuse to let me return to Cambodia within 2 months at the latest, I will offer to them my resignation from my present position and will retire to France."
[January 31, 1973 - New York Times]

* * * * *

"It is only by inviting the RGNUC with Samdech Penn Nouth as prime minister and Mr. Khieu Samphan as deputy prime minister to establish itself in Phnom Penh that the independence, peace, unity and reunion of the Khmers can be realized."
[Sihanouk Message to Khmer Nation - Peking NCNA-June 19, 1972]

* * * * *

"What we oppose is what they call a third-force operation which would seek to turn the government over to a handful of neutralists balanced halfway between the pro-American extremists and the 'Reds' as they call us. 'Reds' or not, we represent legitimacy. It is upon that legitimacy and around it that Cambodia must be rebuilt."
[Peking - Interview with Jean Lacouture - July 1971]

* * * * *

"With regard to the managing of the country (education of the people, organization and defense of national territory, administration of the liberated townships, districts, provinces and cities, etc. ...), I have entrusted it entirely to the patriotic persons who are now leading the national resistance in the country, particularly comrades Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. Thus, all of you who participate in the struggle are fighting for the motherland, for yourselves and for your families."
[May 12, 1970 - Sihanouk Message to Armed Forces - Peking NCNA]

* * * * *

"Prince Norodom Sihanouk said today that the majority of the Royal Cambodian National Union Government is now Red Khmer, and the power already belongs to the Cambodian Communist Party.

"I am giving everything to the Red Khmers. They are pure. They will do what is necessary for the people. They are patriots. They will keep Cambodia independent."
[September 26, 1970 - Interview with Sihanouk in Peking]

SIHANOUK - Statements on His Future Role (a)

"The Cambodian Communists say they want him to stay at the head of the state of Cambodia, 'to be a link -- a cement among all Cambodians,' the Prince noted. 'But I told them I am leaving them in power, because I do not want, as before, to accept the responsibility which power entails.'

* *

"Sentimentally the Cambodian Communists too are attached to the idea that we shall remain a kingdom. In fact, it will be a republic, a people's democracy, which means a socialist state in which the people has taken over power and the Communists play the most important part. This is Cambodia of tomorrow,' Sihanouk said."

[Sihanouk Interview on Belgrade TV - July 5, 1973]

* * * * *

"The interior part is in charge of armed resistance and the administration of the liberated zone,' he continued. 'There I am a symbol. When I visited the liberated zone, the Khmer Rouge swore to me that our entente would last forever. I don't know what will happen after the total liberation of Cambodia. It is perhaps not a marriage of love but a marriage of reason.'"

* *

"They [the Khmer Rouge] told me that I would be chief of state until the end of my life. In the interior, as Ieng Sary said: You're the cement, the guarantee of the union of the Cambodians."

[Interview with Henry Kamm - Bucharest, Rumania - published in New York Times - July 1, 1973]

* * * * *

"But if I go on as chief of state after victory, I run the risk of being pushed out the window by the Communists, like Masaryk, or I might be imprisoned for revisionism or deviationism... It isn't that I lack physical or moral courage, but what I have to do is to rehabilitate myself and retire in beauty, in an exit that it is, if not triumphant, at least honorable. Obviously, it is possible that I might go on for a few years after liberation as chief of state. Even the Communists have asked me to. During the reconstruction period, Cambodia may still need me to represent the nation, to accept credentials from ambassadors, to do public relations. But I shall have nothing to do with domestic politics. That has cost me too much already."

"I am struggling for the liberation of my country. I have the strength to do that. But to fight to keep myself in power? No, I won't fight."

[Interview with Tribune De Geneva, December 10, 1971]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Future Role (b)

"In an interview given in Peking to M. Alexandre Casella, an interview broadcast by the French Swiss radio station, Prince Norodom Sihanouk reaffirmed his intention of retiring from the political scene once General Lon Nol's Phnom Penh Government is overthrown. 'I shall hand over power to the young,' he said, 'and settle in France' Will Prince Sihanouk's departure mean the end of Cambodian monarchy? 'Undoubtedly,' the Prince replied, 'but, you see, we can do nothing about it. Assuming that Cambodia turns Red, it will be a Yugoslavia or a Romania at the most, but I believe that I will be rather pink than red.'"

[Paris LE MONDE, December 5, 1970]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk reaffirmed that he would resign as head of state after the liberation of Cambodia, and retire to Moujins, in southern France. He said: After the liberation, there will be problem of the Communists and non-Communists now assembled in the United National Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Will the front then hold together? I do not know, but I do not want to have to deal with the Communists after the liberation. 'That will be a problem for the young generation.'"

[Paris AFP, July 3, 1970]

* * * * *

"I only wait for the day of complete victory of our people to tender them my resignation as the legal head of state and transfer them the legitimate power of the state given to me by the people in 1960. Moreover, I shall be able very soon to entrust all the responsibility of state affairs to the qualified representatives of our progressive people and youth who make up the new government of national union.

[Sihanouk's Third Message, Peking NCNA, April 21, 1970]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Future Role - (c)

"Last month I wrote in the monthly review Kambuja, published in Pnompenh: 'I have never had the slightest illusion on the fate that awaits me at the hands of the Communists, as well as that which is reserved for my government, after having removed from our region the influence, and especially the presence, of the 'free world,' and the U. S. A. in particular.'"

In an editorial which will appear shortly in this same review, I concede again that after the disappearance of the U. S. A. from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene.

I know the Chinese well enough to understand that they cannot be 'bought' and that it is perfectly useless to bend before them, or to play their game occasionally in the hope of extracting some ulterior advantage. If I acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly so, by the Chinese people, who would not alter their plans one iota so far as my country is concerned."

[From a letter to the New York Times dated May 16, 1965, published June 4, 1965]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (a)

"... Sihanouk said he allowed the port of Sihanoukville--now known as Kompong Som--to be used by Chinese ships to deliver military equipment, arms and ammunition to the Vietnamese Communist troops based on both sides of the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.

"There was two-thirds for the Viet Cong and one third for my army, 'the prince said. 'That way I didn't have to provide in my budget for military equipment arms and ammunition.'

"Sihanouk--admitting accusations made by the United States while he was in power and always denied by him and ridiculed by the anti-war movement throughout the world--said that the Cambodian army provided the transport on a road built by the United States AID program, from the port to the Communist sanctuaries.

"We wanted to get rid of American aid, and as a result we not only had to open a casino but to transport, to become the Viet Cong's coolies,' the prince said. 'Two-thirds for the Viet Cong, one-third for yourself--at that rate one sells oneself. So that was my end. There is the truth.'"

[Interview with Henry Kamm - Predeal, Romania - Washington Star- July 5, 1973]

* * * * *

"Prince Sihanouk termed the consequences for Cambodia of the peace agreement on Vietnam 'rather unfortunate.' 'There is no one left to help us. I assure you that there is not a single Vietnamese combat unit -- either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese -- fighting with us. The North Vietnamese who are still in Cambodia belong to logistic support or quartermaster units and not to combat units. I don't hide from you that we grant them right of passage toward South Vietnam, but when the Americans talk of 2,000 or 3,000 North Vietnamese in Cambodia, that is untrue.' The peace agreement was a handicap, Prince Sihanouk said, 'because the North Vietnamese no longer transport arms and munitions to us from China.'"

[Sihanouk Statement in Paris - Hong Kong AFP - July 6, 1973]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (b)

"I can assure you, ' Prince Sihanouk said here in Bucharest, 'that neither Hanoi nor Peking would dare put pressure on us for a political solution. They would not even suggest that we negotiate,' he added, emphasizing 'suggest.'

"All Peking and Hanoi could do to please Washington is to refuse us ammunition, ' Prince Sihanouk said. "

* *

"At another point speaking of the common pledges of the Vietnamese Communists, the Pathet Lao and himself 'to fight against American imperialism to the end,' the Prince said, laughing at himself: 'Who could foresee that afterward they would stop before us? And suddenly you see Kissinger smile and Le Duc Tho smile at Kissinger, they shake hands, they go arm in arm and leave us alone. "

* *

"According to them [Khmer Rouge], one must never admit that the Vietnamese helped us,' he said. 'We must say how it really was. In 1970 and '71 we had the help of the Vietnamese. There were two things that were given us at my request. First, there was help to our young resistance. They helped us to structure our people's army. And second,' he said, 'there were naturally some North Vietnamese units that helped us to face the great storm of May 1970,' referring to the American and South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia. 'But since the second half of 1972 we are autonomous,' the Prince said. "

[Interview with Henry Kamm - Bucharest, Rumania - published in New York Times - July, 1973]

* * * *

"He said the only North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the ranks of his forces were there on liaison missions. He said these North Vietnamese and Viet Cong dealt with such questions as getting supplies in the 'liberated' zones of Cambodia. He said his forces occasionally authorized the passage of Vietnamese units through Cambodian territory in the region near the border with South Vietnam but that these transit units did not take part in the fighting in Cambodia. "

[April 28, 1973 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (c)

"This great victory is also yours, that is of all the glorious Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, in a very fraternal manner, has taken upon herself the very heavy responsibilities of organizing and realizing my historic trip, a realization of the most heroic of all peoples, the Vietnamese people, through the travel was a very perilous one in view of the ill intentions of U. S. imperialism and the constant, incessant and impudent violations of the Paris agreements of January 27, 1973 by the Nixon government."

* *

"Your new, historic and decisive aid adds to the innumerable aids you have accorded to our people and our national resistance. It confirms in a most convincing manner in the eyes of the whole world that your support of the NUFC, the RGNUC, the CNPLAF and Norodom Sihanouk is total and indefectible. . . . Nothing and nobody in the world can ever separate us from one another. We have always intimately shared weal and woe."

* *

"Respected and beloved Mr. Prime Minister, of the DRV, you are one of the greatest heroes of our Indochina, one of the most noble supporters of Kampuchea and one of the most admired, most affectionate friends of the Khmer people and myself. Each of your words toward us and each of your gestures bear the highest significance."

* *

"With regard to weapons and munitions, I can affirm that on the one hand our great and indefectible friends -- the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- had helped us, prior to January 27, 1973, to build up a very important stock that enables us to carry on our armed struggle all by ourselves until 1975."

[Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi, VNA Hanoi, April 10, 1973]

* * * * *

"... We have just concluded a new military aid agreement with China and shipments are already on route." (Two agreements for military and economic aid were in fact signed in Peking on January 13, 1973)

[January 21, 1973 - Interview with AFP in Peking]

"I must admit that it is true that I shut my eyes to the activities of the Viet Cong who found refuge in our country, because of the solidarity which has always united us whenever we were faced by foreign invaders.... Now they [the Americans] have pushed us into the arms of the North Vietnamese; we have been forced to ally ourselves with the Vietnam resistance fighters. In the past, we were neutral--although I allowed the Viet Cong to use a few small sanctuaries--but now they are able to go deeper into Cambodia and have their arms dumps everywhere. In any case, we belong to a single common front."
[Lome, Togo - 'Togo-Press Denyigba' Interview - November 11, 1972]

* * * * *

"Our troops sometimes launch combined operations with our friends -- the North Vietnamese and national liberation forces -- along the Cambodia-Vietnam borders. But our armed forces assume sole responsibility for all military operations within Cambodia. We grant to the troops of our North Vietnamese and national liberation forces friends the right of passage across our national territory, but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not have any permanent base within our country. The question of their evacuation from Cambodia is not posed and will not be."
[October 29, 1972 - Sihanouk cable to Indespress Correspondent-Answers his Questions - Broadcast by AKI]

* * * * *

"Prince Sihanouk on October 4 told an AFP correspondent that he had recently received assurances from Chou En-lai and Le Duc Tho that even if a separate cease-fire took place in Vietnam or Laos, Peking and Hanoi would continue to furnish arms and logistical support to the Cambodian combattants. Sihanouk said that Le Duc Tho told me that...if you fear that we will achieve peace before you, please be assured that we will always continue to give you our support..."
[October 4, 1972 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]

* * * * *

"On September 4, Sihanouk told an AFP correspondent that "the March offensive in Vietnam did away with dependence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the transport of material for South Vietnam and Cambodia...weapons and material now come directly from the North to the South through Quang Tri Province."
[AFP, September 4, 1972]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (e)

"I admit that I have really helped the Vietnamese communists not because they are communists, for I am not a communist and never will be, but because being Indochinese I support the Vietnamese people who are struggling to liberate their country....

'We Indochinese people should help one another to be able to resist a common enemy, as for example the Arab countries are doing--kingdoms, republics, progressive or not--in the face of Zionism that which endagers them all....

"Despite the (U. S.) bombardments...we are succeeding in producing sufficient cereals to feed the populations and the fighting units, sufficient textiles to clothe them, and we are even succeeding to the point of feeding the Vietnamese and Lao units which are cooperating with us on the frontiers."
[Dakar, Mauritania - 'Le Soleil' Interview - 13-14 July, 1972]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk stated on July 3, 1972 that China and North Korea gave equipment and medical supplies but that the Vietnamese supplied the instructors and that 'our instructor-in-chief is General Giap...'
'It is true,' he said, 'that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia.'
[July 3, 1972 - AFP Interview]

* * * * *

"China is giving us all kinds of aid, which enables us to exist as a state.

"Before, there were a great many Vietnamese units helping us, but now our units are overwhelmingly Cambodian, and we don't even have any more Vietnamese advisers or instructors.
[December 10, 1971 - Sihanouk Interview with Tribune De Geneva]

* * * * *

"He added that heavy artillery had been supplied to Cambodian 'reactionary forces,' while his own side had no heavy guns, only rockets and mortars. It is difficult for us to transport heavy artillery from China through North Vietnam and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, said the prince, who once spent two years as a student officer at the French tank and cavalry school."
[October 19, 1971 - Phnom Penh Domestic Service]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (f)

"Our regular troops are entirely equipped by China, including heavy equipment, and our militia are equipped by (North) Korea."
[September 26, 1970 - AFP Sihanouk Interview]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk said: It is true that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia. But why should anyone be astonished that the Indochinese unite? In Vietnam, the Americans erased the line of demarcation and they have turned the Vietnam war into an Indochinese war. Henceforth, Indochina must be considered as a single battlefield, and the Indochinese will remain united until final victory."
[July 3, 1970 - Paris AFP in English]

* * * * *

"We renew to the DRV, to its respected President, its respected leaders ... the assurance of our ... gratitude for their... backing, their total support and precious assistance to our government. Our people's struggle is inseparable from the struggle of the Vietnamese people... together we are fighting, together we shall win. Together our peoples will fight until all their countries are liberated... after our common victory we will always remain inseparable brothers... and... our three countries will cooperate closely in conformity with the resolutions of the Indochinese peoples summit conference."
[May 27, 1970 - Sihanouk Speech - VNA]

* * * * *

Sihanouk also told Norman Webster of the Toronto Globe and Mail in July 1970 that he had been tempted to call in North Korean troops to help liberate Cambodia and that Kim Il Sung has urged him to accept 'volunteers' but that a 'majority of the members of his 'government' in exile felt that the job could be done by Cambodia 'resistance fighters from the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao.' These statements of Sihanouk earned a rapid rebuttal from NCNA which on July 13 quoted a GRUNK statement 'refuting the distorted report ... of Norman Webster.' The GRUNK statement nevertheless did not exclude all mention of the VC/NVA, but referred to 'Khmer forces and the United Front of the Indochinese peoples' as being sufficient for the fighting.

SIHANOUK - Statements on Effect of Bombing

"I am surprised that in spite of the U. S. wanton bombings and the drought of last year, the liberated zone is very prosperous economically."

[Sihanouk Press Conference, April 13, 1973, Peking NCNA]

* * * * *

"The towns in our hands are not being bombed but only the bridges and airports giving access to them are being bombed."

[Sihanouk Press Conference, April 13, 1973, Peking (AFPC printed Washington Post, April 14)]

* * * * *

"He added that the B-52 bombings are not causing many casualties in the liberated areas."

[Sihanouk Press Conference, AFP from Peking, April 17, 1973]

* * * * *

"Asked about his own forces rocket attack on Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport earlier this week, in which a number of civilians living in makeshift homes were killed or injured, Prince Sihanouk said: 'That's war.'"

"The Prince cited two main reasons for the decision not to launch a final assault on Phnom Penh at this stage. One was the possible massive response to such an attack by the United States Air Force."

[Interview with Reuters in Peking, April 28, 1973]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations (a)

He added, I can assure you solemnly that neither Peking nor Hanoi will ever lead us toward negotiations, they are wary of it and on our side. We have told them, and they well know, that we will not budge one inch.

"We will never negotiate with Lon Nol and his band. Their fate is the gallows."

[April 28, 1973 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]

* * * * *

"I have four times expressed willingness to speak with either Nixon or Kissinger during their visits here. But it was rebuffed, he said.

"If they attempt to contact me, I will consult Khieu Samphan (the Khmer Rouge guerrilla leader in Cambodia) and let him make a decision.

"But such an approach would mean the Americans knew they were beaten and there would be no purpose in talking with them."

[April 28, 1973 - Reuters]

* * * * *

"He said that there was no question of his resistance movement negotiating or reconciling itself with 'the traitors' in Phnom Penh. 'All we expect them to do is to resign,' he said....

"Sihanouk said: 'I tell you solemnly that the leaders of the interior will never accept any compromise with the Phnom Penh clique. It is completely illusory for countries like the United States, France or the Soviet Union to count on a compromise solution.' "

[April 20, 1973 - Peking - AFP]

"We have proposed reconciliation with the USA but maintain that the USA must put an end to this military involvement in Cambodia, end aid to Lon Nol and cease interference in our affairs....

"We will never accept cease-fire or compromise.

"When we speak of negotiations with the USA, we mean to negotiate the question of ending U. S. interference, not the question of cease-fire. They are different questions. Cease-fire means splitting our country, means recognition of the Lon Nol-controlled zone."

[April 13, 1973 - NCNA]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations (b)

"In this connection, I have just had a direct contact with the CNP-LAF and the RGNUC back home. They asked me to let the whole world know that they will never accept, in any case or any circumstance, any compromise whatsoever with the regime of the traitors, any cease-fire whatsoever, any 'peace conference' whatsoever. They are not bellicose, but they will only accept a peace with the installation of the RGNUC in Phnom Penh and with the rehabilitation of the independent and non-aligned Kingdom of Cambodia, that elimination of U. S. neo-colonialism from Khmer territory."

[April 19, 1973 - Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi]

* * * * *

"Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced in Hanoi yesterday that the policy of the United National Front of Kampuchea had been revised following the conclusion of the Vietnam cease-fire Agreement.

"The head of the RGNUC said that this new policy included an overture to the United States, a decrease of the military activities of the Cambodian resistance fighters, and provision for a general amnesty in Cambodia.

"He said: If the United States is willing to play the game of friendship with an independent and non-aligned Cambodia, we will be able to arrive at a quick reconciliation with the Washington Government. Prince Sihanouk added that he envisaged the resumption of a dialogue with the United States in two stages. He said: 'First, a meeting without any condition to see what each has up its sleeve, and the negotiations.' Prince Sihanouk added that the Cambodian problem could not be settled without the definitive retirement from political life of Lon Nol and his clique of traitors. He said: 'We do not want to capture them. They have sufficiently well-stocked bank accounts in Switzerland. They must leave.'"

[February 1, 1973 - Press Interview - AFP]

* * * * *

"... We must adapt to the changes. We are doing as the Vietnamese do. That is the reason for our 'new look' in our policy. But we will also maintain our principles Sihanouk emphasized that the purpose of the new policy was to avoid inconveniencing Cambodia's neighbors who must observe the cease-fire. He said: This is why on the military level we are going deliberately to temporize, lowering the tone of air operations and not launching offensive actions."

[February 1, 1973 - Hanoi - AFP]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations (c)

"Sihanouk said that the American Government had not made any more offers to him since he rejected its offer for the establishment of a government of reconciliation in Phnom Penh of which he himself would have been head. The U. S. had suggested this solution to him last year through the Chinese Government. He had rejected the offer because for one thing it prescribed the winding up of the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union and the Phnom Penh Government in favor of a Government of National Reconciliation that would have existed until general elections were held in Cambodia."

[January 21, 1973 - Interview with AFP Correspondent - Peking]

* * * * *

"On October 4, Sihanouk told an AFP Correspondent that Senator Mansfield's suggestions for a peace settlement in Cambodia was unacceptable to him (e. g. Sihanouk's return to Cambodia as the head of a Vietnam Government of National Union with the participation of Lon Nol's Government representatives).

[October 4, 1972 - Interview with AFP Correspondent - Pelon]

* * * * *

"Sihanouk said his forces were opposed to such an arrangement (e. g. cease-fire/partition) and would fight until the Lon Nol regime is completely eliminated. He said: We refuse the Nixon solution -- a cease-fire with international control. We do not accept either a cease-fire or partition or international control."

[September 4, 1972 - AFP]

* * * * *

"They (and Britain and others) are proposing to us the formation of a government of national reconciliation or of national coalition. To sum up the matter, these governments would have three heads: one left, which would be we resisters; one right, which would be the pro-Americans; and one center, which would be the people who were not engaged in this war and whom I will call the cowards.

"Now a government with three components is necessarily a weak government, for there is no monolithic bloc. What will happen is clear: one will find on one side the patriots who form one-third of the government, and the other two-thirds will be formed by traitors and cowards. The result is that the minority third will be forced back into the bush, as is the case in Laos with the Pathet Lao."

[July 25, 1972 - Interview with Le Soleil]