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FILE SUBJ.  
DATE SUB-CAT.  
5/70

Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Hearing Transcript, 12 May 1970  
Page 44, following line 14

Question: Whether, if you were a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese commander, and your forces were attacked, what you would like to be doing by way of counter attack elsewhere in this whole Southeast Asian situation?

Answer: The North Vietnamese likely will react to allied attacks. First, they could press further to the west in Cambodia, increasing pressure on the Lon Nol Government; however, they may be constrained from doing this by allied pressure on their rear. Second, they could step up activity in Laos, in either the Plain of Jarres area or in South Laos. They have stepped up operations in South Laos already. Finally, they could increase activity in I or Northern II Corps of South Vietnam. These possibilities were considered and weighed in the President's decision to move against Cambodian sanctuaries.

Question: What new factors or developments between February and the date of the Cambodian invasion appeared to indicate that the Viet Cong would be a greater threat to our forces?

Answer: Sometime after the Lon Nol Government deposed Sihanouk in mid-March; the North Vietnamese decided to pressure this Government. During the latter part of April, despite the President's admonition, they consolidated their position inside Cambodia, connected their base areas and expanded their influence deeper into Cambodian territory. This posed the threat of unlimited Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia both as a sanctuary and a source and route of supplies. Sihanouk had imposed some restraint on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities; this restraint was now gone. Unlimited enemy use of Cambodia would pose a serious danger to Vietnamization, particularly as we continued to withdraw US forces.

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FILE SUBJ.  
DATE SUB-CAT.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Hearing Transcript, 12 May 1970  
Page 44, following line 4

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Question: Is one of the reasons for the invasion of Cambodia the relief of Viet Cong pressure on Phnom Penh?

Answer: The principal reasons for the limited Allied military actions against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia are to protect US lives in South Vietnam and the momentum of Vietnamization. An ancillary effect of these operations is the relief of pressure on the Cambodian Government.

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FILE SUBJ.  
DATE SUB-CAT.  
5/80

Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Hearing Transcript, 12 May 1970  
Page 43, following line 25

Question: How long after our forces leave Cambodia before the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese can again harass the US and South Vietnamese forces from across the border?

Answer: Vietnamese Communist forces can reenter base areas in Cambodia very quickly after Allied forces leave, but the capability and flexibility to conduct operations in South Vietnam will be limited. For example, the ammunition alone captured to date would enable the Vietnamese Communists to conduct almost 4,000 attacks by fire of intensity comparable to recent actions. The "drying up" of the supplies in Cambodian base areas forces the North Vietnamese to bring more supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and this takes time, particularly with the forthcoming rainy season. All in all it should be about 6-8 months before the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong can conduct major and continued incursions into South Vietnam.