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5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:	VB; 12 May 1970	12. ORIGINATOR:	COMUSMACV (CDEC) <i>George A. Fisher</i> GEORGE A. FISHER, MAJ, MI JNS OFF US ELM, CDEC
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>		13. PREPARED BY:	<i>Harry E. Evans</i> HARRY E. EVANS, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE:	CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	

15. SUMMARY:	(Leave Blank)
<p>(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 12 May 1970, and concerns a directive, dated 27 March 1970, originated by Chin Vinh ((possibly aka General Tran Do of the Military Affairs Party Committee, HQ, SVNLA)), which outlines some specific points in establishing relations between K ((possibly Cambodian)) officers. The author claims that after hearing the declaration of S ((possibly Sihanouk)), K officers in several places would like to contact us ((VC/NVA)). All areas are required to look for all possible means to contact these officers and make various recommendations to them if they support Prince S.</p>	

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D I R E C T I V E

Outlining some specific points in establishing relations between
K ((possibly Cambodian)) officers and us.

After hearing the declaration of S ((possibly Sihanouk)), K officers in several places wanted to contact us. All areas are to use all possible means to contact these officers immediately, if they have not yet come to contact us. We should assign personnel who know them to establish contact with them or assign cadre who know them to infiltrate these areas to meet these officers and find out their intentions. They must follow the following instructions:

1. For all K ((Cambodian)) officers in general, without distinction of rank, if they support Prince S, we should advise them to:

- a. Thoroughly maintain secrecy.
- b. Firmly control trustworthy personnel.
- c. Urgently stock food provisions and ammunition.
- d. Secretly maintain regular contacts with us.
- e. Prepare an ((alternate)) base area for emergencies.

2. In regard to those officers who do not have any troops or who have very few (less than one C) ((possibly company)), in addition to the above recommendations, we should also advise them to contact their superiors and friends and motivate them to get in touch with us secretly and to recruit additional forces.

3. As for those officers who control a large force (D) ((possibly a battalion)) or larger, we should advise them to:

a. Keep firm control of their subordinate force, pay attention to making their subordinate officers and soldiers understand the situation, and persuade them to support the five-point declaration of S. Unite to fight the Americans and their lackeys for independence and neutrality. Officers should take care of their soldiers.

b. Extend their influence over other friendly units, win the confidence of their superiors and that of administrative personnel of all echelons, and propagandize and instigate the people to participate in demonstrations against Lon Nol, as was done in Kompong Cham ((Province)) and Mimot.

c. Remain in their positions, do not transfer the command of their unit to anybody else, nor let higher headquarters reassign them elsewhere, and be determined to suppress the US lackeys who have infiltrated their unit and the local area. If under heavy pressure, initiate a coup d'etat in the local area, proclaim themselves as a dissident element, and prepare for combat.

d. Encourage and assure them that we stand back of them and support their action.

4. With regard to other influential officers who control troops and have influence in their own area of operations, such as officers in charge of a province or a military region, if they dare rise up and declare their opposition to the US lackeys, we should encourage and wholeheartedly support them in this action. We should look for means of coordinating our activities with theirs.

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5. During the conversation, we should pay attention to upholding and promoting the spirit of self-help for self-improvement ((sic)) of these officers. We should point out to them that their duty is to save their country out of friendship for the two peoples and out of friendship for S. We are ready to provide them with every assistance, including cadre and armed forces. During the conversation, we should also find out what their attitude is toward the Red K ((possibly Cambodian Communists)).

27 Mar 70

CHIN VINH

((Possibly aka General Tran Do of the Military Affairs Party Committee, HQ, SVNLA)).

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----