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Overview

Roots of the Problem. The single most influential socio-political fact of life on the Indochina peninsula today is the cultural heritage of ill-will and distrust among the various ethno-linguistic and nationalist groupings. It is rooted in ancient long-abiding rivalries and counts for far more in shaping history as it unrolls than do the more modern political and diplomatic influences. Khmer and Vietnamese perceptions of each other represent one of the world's great antipathies, and like those others is just as well entrenched, as edged with irrationality and just as resistant to the advice of well meaning outsiders. As would be expected, national behavior on both sides is largely conditioned by these deeply ingrained perceptions, with the Vietnamese a

disdain born of the sense of innate superiority, for the Khmer the view that what is at stake is their survival as a race. Therefore the problem of bringing peace and order to Cambodia is intricately bound up with an ethnic conflict whose roots can be measured in centuries.

Historians looking back at the long record of war and peace in Cambodia note that conflict generally results from one of three conditions. First, conflict is precipitated when outsiders see a threat to Cambodian sovereignty that endangers their own interests -- Thailand (earlier Siam) if the threat comes from the Vietnamese, and Vietnam if the perceived threat is by the Thais. A second common cause of conflict is disintegration of the ruling Khmer leadership and its elite system. This usually involves bitter factional struggle in which contending factions seek the support of outside armies. The third common cause is Khmer leadership abandonment of equidistance in foreign relations in favor of alignment/alliance with outsiders. Cambodia's historical experience has been that foreign relations devices which work well elsewhere, such as balance of power politics and military alliances, do not work well at all for Cambodia. The lesson of history then is that peace and stability in Cambodia requires (a) an absence of the foreign military presence which can polarize Khmer geo-politics; (b) a high level of elite and leadership unity; and (c) careful maintenance of equidistance (or non-alignment) in foreign relations.

These historical truths were obscured during this century rampant nationalism and by various modern political ideologies. The anti-colonial war of the 1940's and 1950's followed by the "liberation" wars of the 1960's and 1970's seemed to supplant these earlier influences. But, as has been observed, most of the behavioral change was only apparent. The colonial and post-colonial influences proved to be like an ocean which at floodtide obscures the rocks near the shore; when the tide ebbs the rocks appear; they are not new, were always there, but simply have become visible again.

Emergence of latent antipathy was particularly the case with the so-called regional "red brotherhood". We now know there always was a high degree of antipathy between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese just as we now know that the bonds between North Vietnamese and Chinese were always more tenuous, more suspect, than outsiders believed at the time. Although the Khmer Rouge under its initial primary leader, Pol Pot (known at the time as Saloth Sar) was trained, armed and developed by the North Vietnamese -- it never enjoyed the confidence of Hanoi leaders. From the earliest days, circa 1970, Hanoi officials acknowledged serious difficulties in dealing with the Khmer Rouge, the press frequently making notes of "the Pol Pot problem."

The essence of this problem was the intransigent unremitting hostility of the Khmer Rouge which Pol Pot regarded as survival strategy, a defense against Khmer

extermination; the Vietnamese considered this irrational.

It had long been the Hanoi leadership's expectation -- more assumption than worked-out plan -- that the eventual political configuration of the Indochina peninsula (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) would be some form of integrated association. This began, in the mind of Ho Chi Minh, as simply French Indochina "without the French," later moving through various proffered forms -- special relationship, alliance, confederation, federation. Of necessity Hanoi leaders acknowledged integration would require the acquiescence of the Khmer and Lao, could not be done with bayonets, and quite probably would require decades to accomplish. They were in no hurry -- the next century would be soon enough -- the important thing was that history continue to nudge the three countries in the direction of integration.

Pol Pot stood against this -- in fact threatened to be a reverser of history -- and was indoctrinating an entire generation of Khmer to hate the Vietnamese and regard integration a disguised formula for extinction of the Khmer. That was Vietnam's "Pol Pot problem." It was not his gross violation of human rights, nor his strange vision of the perfect society, nor even his pro-Chinese gestures. It was that he was permanently dividing something that the Vietnamese believed should be unified.

In mid-1975 Hanoi officials launched the first of a series of efforts to solve the "Pol Pot problem." They sent Party

Secretary Le Duan to Phnom Penh to make strong representations (even, it is said, to pound on the table in a half hour tirade). They launched two PAVN military operations (one involving 90,000 troops) into the Parrot's Beak section of Cambodia, to "teach the Khmer a lesson." They tried to bribe Pol Pot's bodyguards to assassinate him (if Pol Pot is to be believed). Under General Vo Nguyen Giap's tutelage they laid plans for full scale revolutionary guerrilla war in Cambodia: they recruited Khmer in Vietnam and dispatched them as armed-propaganda teams to organize and mobilize Cambodian villagers; a Khmer Liberation Radio went on the air; a provisional government to seek foreign support was formed. Finally, they resorted to full scale invasion. None of this worked in the sense that it solved the Pol Pot problem.

This is not to say that Pol Pot's fanning of hatred for the Vietnamese was the lone issue for Hanoi leaders. There were Khmer Rouge territorial seizures of poorly demarcated border regions and offshore islands in the Gulf of Thailand from 1975 onward (seizures also by the Vietnamese for that matter). There was growing intimacy between the Khmer Rouge and Beijing although exactly how extensive this was (in the 1975-79 period) cannot yet be fully determined. And, particularly after 1979, the struggle in Cambodia broadened into something of a proxy war -- the SRV/USSR vs. ASEAN/China.

Thus the fuller historical meaning of Hanoi's effort to solve the "Pol Pot problem" lies not in him as a person or in

his strange brand of Marxism-Leninism. Hanoi's misbegotten invasion of Cambodia was the result of the Vietnamese leaders' perception that Cambodian behavior endangered Vietnam's long range national security. Hanoi generals study the map and see they are obliged to defend an extraordinarily long, narrow country (Vietnam is only 95 miles wide at the Vinh waist), which could quite easily be cut in half by overland invasion or from the sea. It is therefore, they insist, a genuine and legitimate Vietnam imperative that a regime hostile to Vietnam never comes into power in Phnom Penh (or Vientiane for that matter). Acting on this counsel, Hanoi officials seek, as best guarantee, some form of regional integration that binds Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos together in mutual interest. This is the issue which the Cambodian peace process must address if it hopes to arrive at a realistic solution.

Course of the Struggle. Having tried various ways to solve the "Pol Pot problem," and having failed, the Hanoi leadership was persuaded (apparently by a group of "young Turk" PAVN colonels and, by all evidence, against the advice of General Vo Nguyen Giap and older PAVN officers) to embrace the ultimate solution: application of full military force. The Politburo's initial calculation was that it would require, at most, six months to achieve its twin objectives: elimination or dispersal of the Democratic Kampuchea forces and creating in Phnom Penh a truly viable governing structure, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (under Heng Samrin). However, the

DK forces under Pol Pot took to the jungle and launched a protracted conflict using armed and political struggle tactics (as some PAVN officers had predicted). Six months passed and it became clear that the "quick fix" solution had failed. Pacification work began as did the effort to recruit and train a PRK Armed Force (army building is always a slow task, full of set-backs). In the next few years PAVN pressed counter-insurgency intensively, at the cost of high casualties and in the face of growing restiveness within the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. Many of the professional PAVN generals saw the limitations imposed (especially permitting guerrilla sanctuary in Thailand) as a "no win" strategy. They adopted less costly pacification tactics: more PAVN road patrols, fewer operations in the mountains; greater use of heavy artillery and airpower. This reduced the counter-insurgency tempo with the net effect of permitting the resistance to survive. At the same time, the newly formed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was garnering increased support from abroad, both military and diplomatic. By 1984 the struggle had become stalemated in the sense that the Vietnamese were unwilling to take those measures necessary to destroy the resistance while the resistance, not strong enough to drive out the Vietnamese, became firmly entrenched. The Cambodian scene took on what has become its dominant characteristic -- one that continues to this day -- its intractableness.

It is important to bear in mind that current Hanoi

Politburo policy making on Cambodia is conditioned by the fact that not only did the initial effort to secure a quick solution fail, it worsened the problem by creating an impasse from which the leadership has yet to extricate itself.

Nature of the Problem. The war in Cambodia during the past decade, to the extent it can be termed a war, is complex and singular. It is also multi-faceted:

-- A war for national independence between Khmer and Vietnamese having all the intransigence of a cause, fueled by the fires of nationalism.

-- A civil war, among contending Khmer factions.

-- A surrogate war between contending Khmer factions each with its outside backers.

As was the Vietnam War, it is a war new not just in degree but in kind. It is "struggle", broad amorphous armed/political struggle. What we see in Cambodia is the face of future warfare, manifesting itself there in the same manner as in the Mideast, Central America, Ireland, and in Afghanistan.

More to the point is the fact that the essence of the struggle in Cambodia is anarchy, in the ordinary dictionary definition: absence of government. Pol Pot destroyed modern government in Cambodia. The invading Vietnamese found virtually no institutions of administration over which to assume control. In subsequent years, the only governmental administration in Cambodia was PAVN military government. At the lower levels -- province and district -- government

amounted to little more than a PAVN battalion, commanded by a major, assisted by a few PRK officials who chiefly served as interpreters, whose primary mission was maintaining order. While the PAVN major might be amenable to local government services -- schools, hospitals, roads, etc. -- he had neither the personnel nor the resources to provide them. Efforts by the PRK to extend local government -- village elections for village chief for instance -- were opposed by the resistance, often in the form of assassinating the newly elected official. While it is extraordinarily difficult to end anarchy and create local government, it is quite easy to sabotage such an effort.

Recently, there is evidence that local government is developing in Cambodia. However we have virtually no reliable evidence of what the governing situation actually is in the country's 11,600 villages.

Reliable assessment is made even more difficult because the DK apparently has changed its mobilizational strategy from sabotage to infiltration, and is quietly infiltrating villages of the country. This is a second major unknown: exactly how much power does the DK (and the CGDK) have in the countryside?

The nature of the Cambodian struggle in external terms, is nearly as complex as its internal dimension. Just as the nature of the problem is complicated so of necessity must be a solution requiring:

-- Multilateral settlement (among contending Khmer), that

is a "national" settlement.

-- A bilateral settlement (between the Khmer elements and their respective sets of backers).

-- An international settlement (among the outside powers).

Chief actors in this are ASEAN (with Thailand as frontline state) and China. Cambodia is symptomatic of the Southeast Asia region, that is, a reflection of regional alignments and the current balance of power.

Over the years outsiders have demonstrated general reluctance to get deeply involved. Clearly all are fearful of being trapped by events in Cambodia. In part this is a reflection that at root they see the problem as primarily a Khmer problem.

The scene has long been characterized by its intractable or unchanging nature. This is now less true in its external dimension. While the SRV (and the USSR) long argued that the situation was "irreversible" and China and ASEAN/Thailand spoke of the possibility of a "fifty year war," the fact is considerable fluidity of position developed. What prevented this from influencing policy was the almost paradoxical perception of the outside actors. Each saw advantage in having the struggle continue; each also saw benefits to accrue if it ended. This "balance" of national interest now clearly is changing. We are, or should be shortly, at the point where every actor will regard a settlement as in its interest (depending of course on the kind of settlement reached).

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Over the years observers have conjured up various scenarios for Cambodia. In more or less descending order of probability, the major ones are:

-- The "No-Solution" Scenario. This envisions a future marked by a continuing indeterminant condition, often termed "more of the same." It involves festering armed-political struggle; a rise and fall in Khmer social pathology; and continued but unsuccessful efforts by outsiders to resolve the problem. A variant of this, labeled the "partial solution" scenario, envisions a semi or pseudo-solution such as an international conference which produces the semblance of a settlement, buys some time, but actually accomplishes little.

-- The "PRK/Hanoi Victory" Scenario. As originally conceived this would have seen destruction of the resistance and creation of a fully viable government and army in Phnom Penh. PAVN would withdraw; the PRK would become a Vietnamese client state. Now this has metamorphosed into the "fading war" scenario. It envisions the steady diminution of the CGDK in military terms; eventual denial of resistance sanctuary by Thailand; loss of interest in the whole affair by China (presumably the result of a Sino-Soviet "deal"). The PRK would become more centrist (less Leninist), take on the trappings of Khmer nationalism, and distance itself somewhat from the Vietnamese who would reluctantly accept diminished influence. This has also been labeled, somewhat cynically, the "define it

away" scenario, that outsiders agree the struggle is over and go home.

-- The "Khmer Only Solution" Scenario. This envisions the contending Khmer factions taking their fate into their own hands and (possibly assisted by outsiders) establishing a new governing structure in Phnom Penh. Outsiders might not particularly like what emerged but would accept it. Settlement would be made possible because the Khmer are either moved by a spirit of reconciliation or are galvanized by a common fear of the Vietnamese.

-- The "Deux Ex Machina" (God Out of a Machine) Scenario. This envisions things put right by outsiders, imposed by them if necessary. The contending Khmer factions are motivated/pressured into a settlement in the name of peace, order and justice which is largely arranged, implemented and enforced by outsiders. The question of who will be the peace bringers and how exactly they will accomplish their mission is, to say the least, formidable.

-- The "Defacto Partition" Scenario, There are a number of inadvertent or accidental scenarios in that they are unintended. The most likely of these is the fragmentation of Cambodia into two, three or four separate semi-sovereign political entities, each with a territorial enclave, its own private army and outside backers. This would amount to the "Balkanization" of Cambodia, or would resemble the "warlordism" of north China during the 1920's and 1930's.

CURRENT PEACE PROCESS

As this is being written (late May 1989) the Cambodia peace process, which for nearly a year had been marked by constant, sometimes frantic, diplomatic activity suddenly subsided. There is no logical explanation for this hiatus, nor does it seem intentional on the part of any of the actors. Quite probably it is but a temporary lull.

After years of only glacial progress, the peace process in early 1988 began picking up speed -- marked by a great deal of shuttle (and secret) diplomacy with a general purpose of arranging negotiations among the contending Khmer and among outsiders with direct interest. The major venues were various "working groups", the most important perhaps being ASEAN with Indonesia acting as interlocutor. It sponsored two Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) sessions. There were separate sessions among the contending Khmer -- in Bangkok, Jakarta and outside Paris -- including important meetings between Prince Sihanouk and the PRK's Hun Sen. Other "working groups" included Sino-Soviet (following the Sino-Soviet "summit") and Indonesian-Vietnamese. Endorsement, gestures and offers of good offices came from Japan, India, France and the Non-Aligned Movement.

What resulted from all this activity (as of May 1989) chiefly was a defining of the issues involved. This delination of existing differences/agreements had to do chiefly with these issues:

1. Fixing a timetable for the withdrawal of PAVN troops

from Cambodia.

2. Arranging a ceasefire among the Khmer and ending resistance military activity.

3. Determining the nature of (and the personnel for) the future governmental structure in Phnom Penh.

4. Sequestering and eventually disarming the contending Khmer troops with a view to the eventual establishment of a single united armed force in Cambodia.

5. Recruiting and installing an external monitoring and peacekeeping force in Cambodia.

6. Staging free, fair and supervised elections either to choose a new national assembly or to elect delegates to a constituent assembly which would write a new Constitution.

7. Holding an international conference to legitimize and guarantee the settlement arranged.

One of the few clear results to date in these efforts has been the decision by Hanoi to remove the last of its troops from Cambodia by September 30 of this year. This was not an easy decision. It will remove one major impediment to peace.

One clear negative result has been a demonstration as to just how deep and abiding is the divisiveness among the contending Khmer. The Vietnamese charge, with some validity, there has been deliberate ambiguity by China. The Chinese make charge, with some validity, of insincerity on the part of Hanoi. What is most important here however, is the fact that the peace process continues. It indicates at least nominal

interest by all parties in reaching a settlement.

THE CHALLENGE

Viewed in terms of strict formal logic it can be said that the conflict in Cambodia will continue indefinitely because it cannot logically be explained how it can end. However, there is a higher law of logic of history, which says that all wars end, although that fact does little to assist our analysis or help us see through the thicket into the future. In the final resolve we must proceed to a certain extent by accepting as articles of faith certain fundamental assumptions:

-- That the struggle in Cambodia is given to settlement through negotiations involving political compromises.

-- That outsiders do have it within their power, if willing, to make a major contribution to this peace process.

-- That there is something termed "national reconciliation" among contending Khmers that can become the primary influence in bringing peace and stability to the country.

If all three of these assumptions are not correct there is little possibility the problem can be resolved in the foreseeable future.

Two additional cautionary notes:

-- In thinking through this challenge of bringing peace to Cambodia we must accept the reality that as of the moment there is no solution on the horizon in the full and accurate meaning of that term. A plethora of partial solutions, semi-solutions and pseudo-solutions have been proffered, but no one

has yet produced a comprehensive formula that satisfies all basic requirements. Accepting this fact is the beginning of wisdom since it helps separate reality from hope, thus avoiding the trap of wishful thinking.

-- Most outsiders thinking about the peace process in Cambodia see it as a goal, a point of arrival; it is something to be accomplished and that will be the end of it. The contending Khmer, more correctly, see it as an ongoing, never ending political/social process. As with other unfolding historical events it will be marked by ups and downs, failures and successes, but never by an arrival point at which it can be said the matter is finished. It is important therefore continually to ask, what will happen next, and what will follow from what has just been done?

Fundamental Questions. The Cambodian peace process as it currently stands is characterized by a number of basic questions on fundamental issues that are largely imponderable and not given to full and certain answer. Further, the process is in a highly dynamic state of flux, change, and it is hoped, development. Difficult as these questions are to address, they represent the essence of the Cambodia peace process problem:

1. To what extent is the current optimism justified that changed conditions have greatly enhanced peace prospects? For the past six months most observers have professed to believe that the pace has quickened, that there is now greater interest in national reconciliation by contending Khmer, more

willingness to be flexible and to devise some new political power sharing arrangement; also that outsiders' national interests and policy positions have changed and are changing with the net effect of removing external impediments to a resolution. Is this a realistic view?

2. What is the relationship, or what might be called the emerging balance of influencing factors, between internal Khmer political developments and outsider behavior/influence? What ability do outsiders have to affect the actions of their surrogates, assuming a willingness? To put it crudely, can Hanoi "deliver" the PRK; China the DK; and ASEAN/Thailand/U.S. Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann? Even if outsiders do agree on a course of action, can it be implemented in Cambodia?

3. How much consensus, or at least tacit agreement, actually exists among the major outside actors on a settlement in Cambodia? More importantly, what is the trend (primary reference here is to Soviet and Chinese policies).

4. What institutional structure is to be created in Phnom Penh to govern Cambodia in terms of philosophic orientation and bureaucratic organization? How much governing authority can be installed and how much anarchy will remain? This is part of a broader question, equally ambiguous, what is the actual state of governance now inside Cambodia? How much control does the PRK (and the CGDK factions) actually exert in the countryside? (And what are their strategies for extending their respective controls?)

5. What precisely is required for true political "national reconciliation" in Cambodia? Is one necessary, or could a power-sharing arrangement be devised without it? How far apart are the factions on policy matters? What is the exact degree of trust and mistrust among them? Within this, what exactly is meant by the oft repeated admonition against the "return of Pol Pot?" How genuine is the threat/possibility of the DK assuming dominant power in Phnom Penh?

These five questions are set down with a view to offering a framework for discussion of the Cambodian peace process, and of the possible contributions outsiders may make.

The general challenge then is furthering the Cambodia peace process. Within it are specific challenges that need to be singled out for special examination, always bearing in mind that each of these is a facet of the broader comprehensive challenge.

Establishing the Settlement. Resolution of the Cambodia problem can either be the result of an internal resolution (the "Khmer only" solution); the result of external actor activity; or some combination of these two. Quite probably the third route will be followed.

Considerable ambiguity exists at the moment among the various actors over an exact policy position on the matter of external peacekeepers, now commonly termed the International Control Mechanism (ICM). The second Jakarta Informal Meeting (Feb. 1989) reached a more or less general agreement on the

ICM nature and role: that it monitor and supervise PAVN withdrawal from Cambodia; that it maintain physical security in areas vacated by PAVN troops; that it sequester the contending Khmer military forces; that it ensure order and minimal civil administration during the establishment of the new four-power governmental authority; and that it supervise the reduction of outside military assistance (within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement). The CGDK, particularly Prince Ranariddh, have been the most forthcoming in envisioning this external peacekeeping mission, claiming U.N. support for a 7,000-person peacekeeping force funded by the U.N. at a cost of US\$700 million (AFP interview with Ranariddh, Jan. 12, 1989). Hun Sen has mentioned 600 as a peacekeeping force, which he sees as having the delimited mission of monitoring PAVN withdrawal and supervising subsequent elections. He has said the PRK advocates a reconstituted International Control Commission (ICC) with India as chairman and Canada, Indonesia and Poland as members and operating under U.N. authority (April press conference in Jakarta). The SRV has said for the record it endorses this PRK position of a temporary, delimited role by outsiders to monitor PAVN withdrawal and supervise Cambodian elections. Chinese, ASEAN and Soviet spokesmen discussing the matter tend to use the deliberately vague, semi-official term "international control mechanism", leaving unanswered their respective positions on to whom this applies and what

precisely would be its duties.

Governance of Cambodia. The tendency of outsiders interested in the Cambodia peace process has long been to focus on what actually are secondary issues: withdrawal of PAVN troops; preventing the return of Pol Pot; lack of Chinese cooperation; lack of Soviet "pressure" on Hanoi. These are contributive influences it is true, but the central factor is and always has been the governance of Cambodia, and, within this the danger of incipient anarchy that could follow the end of the existing PAVN military government if the system left behind is too weak to govern. Worse than the current condition would be an anarchical scene with the danger not only of a Pol Pot return but the rise of new Pol Pots, to say nothing of ubiquitous bloodletting by the victims of Pol Pot seeking their revenge. We have no way of knowing how viable the new governing system, as it finally emerges, will prove to be. But it is imperative that a political vacuum does not develop, that nothing has been substituted for something.

While the impediments to creating a new governing arrangement in Phnom Penh remain formidable, and while it still must be said that there is as yet no agreed-on formula for the eventual future political configuration of Cambodia, there has been a sorting out during the past year. Areas of agreement have been established that had not existed before: that the government eventually created be sovereign, independent, "democratic" and pursue a neutral or nonaligned

foreign policy; that safeguards be installed to ensure that the Democratic Kampuchea faction be denied a predominant political position (and that Pol Pot and certain others yet undetermined DK leaders be excluded entirely, perhaps exiled); that the new arrangement involve "national reconciliation" among all of the major contending Khmer political factions (within this, general but less certain, agreement that the Chief of State be Prince Sihanouk).

Still not settled is the composition of the interim government to rule while the permanent institution is being devised and installed. And also remaining unresolved, although perhaps agreement in principle has now been reached, is the sequestering and disarming of the existing armies of Cambodia and their subsequent reconstitution into a single new Cambodian army.

At the more abstract level there remains unresolved issues having to do with the institutionalization of political power. How is power to be divided, and how are the divisions to be maintained? How will disputes be adjudicated? Should the PRK assume a "leading role" or, as Sihanouk has demanded of Hun Sen, should the role of each faction be determined through the establishment of a multiparty electoral system? Should the existing PRK constitution be amended/adjusted (the Hun Sen position) or should an entirely new Constitution be written (Sihanouk position)?

It seems self-evident that what is required in Phnom Penh

is some form of power sharing by all of the contending Khmer factions, most probably a coalition government. The single criterion for its organization of necessity would be that no faction is excluded if, in that exclusion, it has the ability to subvert the coalition government. Hence potential "spoilers" such as the DK faction would be included, with the calculation that eventually they could be co-opted. Since coalition governments, as tried throughout the world, have never proved particularly successful, there is all the more reason why the Cambodian arrangement would require the support of all the Khmer factions. Representation would be with respect to sociopolitical grouping, that is by constituency, not by individual figure or leader (some of whom of necessity would have to be excluded if the arrangement were to succeed).

To prove truly viable the new governing structure would need at least the tacit cooperation, and more likely the full support, of those outsiders with important vested interests in Cambodian affairs. This would not only require delimiting foreign presence and influence, but also a careful balancing of such influence as was present. Specifically it would mean authentic equidistant posture and truly nonaligned foreign policies. The government would be obliged to conduct its affairs under an operational code of deference to its neighbor's interests, particularly to the respective national security interests of Vietnam, China and Thailand. This would be no easy task, especially with respect to the conflicting

to return home.

Finally to address the Cambodia peace process in long range terms, brief note must be taken of the challenge of establishing some integrated institution for the three Indochinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia which is acceptable to them and also to their neighbors. Is it to be a "special relationship", a mutual alliance, a loose confederation, a tight-knit federation, or some other arrangement?

It can be argued that regionalism is a coming force worldwide, that history is pressing groups of nations toward larger integrated regional units. This process is underway in Southeast Asia, with ASEAN and with the Indochinese states, however to a considerable extent the full meaning of regionalism has yet to be addressed by the countries of the region. Eventually each must decide what its policy on regional integration is to be, and whether it is willing to support the process or, if opposed, to what length it is willing to go to prevent it.

Berkeley, June 6, 1989