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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a notebook, maintained by Nguyen Trong Thanh, a member of ((possibly 3rd Platoon, 6th Company, 5th Battalion, Group 46, aka 52nd Regiment, 320th NVA Division)). The notebook, dated between 1 March 1971 and 23 March 1971, contains Cambodian lessons, information on personnel and weapons status, infiltration of B3 and notes from an unspecified directive about the situation in SVN.

1.09 ✓  
044-71

## FULL TRANSLATION

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## TASK NOTEBOOK

1971

((Signed illegibly, possibly by  
Nguyễn Trọng Thành))

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Nguyễn Trọng Thành

((LBN)) 658080 IAO

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## Weapons on hand

CKC ((carbine)): 2,053 ((Lined out in O.T.)) 280 = 3,724 ((sic))

RPD ((light machinegun)): 151

B-40 ((grenade launcher)): 418

((TN: The remainder of Page 3 and Pages 4 through 10 of Item 4 of O.T.  
contain a glossary of Vietnamese phonetics for Cambodian phrases.))

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Two-hour activity agenda

0600 hours: Breakfast

0630 hours: Go on mission

One comrade was assigned to receive rice ((Lined out in O.T.)).

((Two words illegible)) carrying sufficient first-aid kits.

0800 hours: Go to transport rice

((Category)) B ((cadre)); Comrade <sup>↓</sup>Thăm: Her health ((is poor)) and she  
displayed a pessimistic attitude ((six words illegible)).

((Category)) B ((cadre)) Comrade Mi: Suffered from bad health.

((Category)) B ((cadre)) Comrade Nen: Failed to accomplish his missions  
and feared the enemy.

Category A	Category B	Category C	Poor ideology	Bad health
((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
Total	Party ((members))		Group ((members))	
((Blank))	((Blank))		((Blank))	

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Four party members, 10 group members, eight soldiers, four Category A cadre = T ((possibly total)) 14 members ((sic)) January, February and March ((1970)).

Total ((sic))	IA ((possibly Category A))				IB ((possibly Category B))					IC ((possibly Category C))					Poor ideology	Poor health
	Party members	Group members	Category A cadre	Soldiers	Total ((sic))	Party members	Group members	Category A cadre	Soldiers	Total ((sic))	Party members	Group members	Category A cadre	Soldiers		
15	2	11	4	9	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	2	Comrade Cuu	Comrade Mi
14	4	10	4	8	2	0	4	2	0						Comrade Tuom	
14	4	6	2													
10	4	6	2	6	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	Category C TH (Ky) Du ((sic))	TH ((sic))
															Category B Ng h TH h ((sic))	

1500 hours: B ((possibly platoon)) caucus.

Assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the unit.

Critiques on cadre's combat determination, and their knowledge of combat purposes, and the preservation of unit strength and implementation of prescribed policies.

Assessment of their sense of discipline, solidarity and conduct.

What should we do to strengthen our B ((platoon)) in all fields?

We should draft new ((activity)) plans, heighten our combat determination, carry out the three-excellence policy, and be more combat ready.

Specific requirements: Use exemplary events to indoctrinate our troops and increase discipline.

Provide proper leadership for rear service tasks. What causes our weaknesses? Can we overcome them?

1 Mar 70

Critiques on activities of Category A and B cadre. Comrade Thanh failed to observe the prescribed regulations ((some words missing)), displayed a shirking attitude,

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lacked a firm determination, and did not work in a democratic manner.

Comrade Mãi also did not perform the assigned mission nor provide specific guidance for his detachment members. He did not have a high sense of responsibility (and could not motivate his troops to carry out the civilian proselyting tasks).

During the movement and bivouac, he failed to remind his detachment members to observe ((prescribed regulations)) and did not set up appropriate plans of action.

Comrade Nghi was still-quick-tempered and often quarreled with ((Category)) A cadre (Comrade Khôi) and failed to encourage his troops to perform movement and bivouacking tasks.

Comrade Báo did not have a high sense of responsibility and failed to perform the rear service tasks. He neither conducted timely inspections nor did he formulate specific plans for rear service tasks.

Comrade Long did not regularly remind his detachment members to perform their tasks. The three-day supply of rice was consumed by 4 Mar 71.

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Departed for A10 on 2 Mar 70. We organized a Party caucus at 0145 hours, had a meal at 0300 hours, and departed at 0400 hours.

Later, we reconnoitered the terrain feature of the bivouac site.

From 0700 to 0800 hours, we moved on forest paths and crossed a stream. All our troops were camouflaged.

Departed for All on 5 Mar 70.

We arose at 0220 hours and departed at 0300 hours. Our 10-hour itinerary was divided into two parts.

During the first part: We moved from 0300 hours to 0900 hours and then prepared our meal. The second part: We moved out at 1600 hours and reached our destination at 2100 hours. During the march, we received direct leadership from the assistant platoon leader.

((TN: three lines illegible.))

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7 Mar 71

1830 hours, departed. Moved from 0800 to 1000 hours ((sic)) and arrived at Road 4 at 1430 hours.

Characteristics: The route ((of movement)) was not obstructed. We arrived at Route 4, our commo-liaison site. The people moved about freely.

During the movement, it was forbidden to use flashlights or lighters, to pick leaves or to talk.

We passed an abandoned hamlet and a stream. There were many small paths. We were ordered to be cautious so as not to break formation and get lost.

Friendly ((VC/NVA)) elements of C7 ((possibly 7th Company)) and a reconnaissance ((force)) were deployed along both sides of the road.

During the movement, we passed a hamlet where local inhabitants lived under a legal status and were allowed to move freely. Enemy troops sometimes stay there over night.

We passed two more abandoned hamlets. We crossed a road, 2.5 kilometers from a post where vehicular activity was noted.

Flares were dropped 1.5 kilometers from ((us, so we)) did not continue to move until the flares were about 2.5 kilometers ((from us)).

It was required that close control be maintained to ensure that no one would be left behind.

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Arrived at ((possibly Way Station)) TL3. The station ((was located in an)) open ((area)) where water was scarce. We picked up some rice there.

One comrade of each B ((platoon)) was assigned to collect ((weapons)).

Before departure, we packed our equipment to avoid noise and for rapid movement.

((Meeting)) held by B ((sic)) on 9 Mar 71.

Ideology and determination to fight:

They fully understood their assigned missions and had a high determination to fight. (They made long marches, but strived to overcome difficulties despite exhaustion.) They did not fear enemy bombs which were delivered close to their movement formation. Their ideology remained unchanged and they showed no fear ((of the rigors of war)).

**They retained their sense of discipline and organization.**

They strictly observed all regulations.

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They properly constructed combat trenches and air shelters.

They improved messing and billeting conditions, dug latrines constructed kitchens. During the movement, smoke and light discipline was observed, whispering and crossing roads stealthily was practiced to avoid air observation and to maintain secrecy. ((Troops)) must observe the orders of C Bo ((cadre)) when on TDY or when performing assigned missions (trench digging, rice carrying).

#### Solidarity:

((Quarrels occurred among members of unit A8 who had to carry heavy loads.)) The unit accomplished the troop movement safely with full strength weapons and equipment. Personnel cleaned their weapons regularly. Periodic checks were made.

#### Rear service:

The rear service played its role well and improved cooking methods to ensure better living conditions for the entire unit.

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#### Weaknesses:

((Cadre and personnel)) lacked a strong determination. They still feared bombing and shelling and did not have a high sense of organization and discipline. Trenches were not built satisfactorily. Smoke, noise, and light discipline were not observed. Furthermore, they did not strictly observe the orders of C Bo ((cadre)).

During the troop movement, many persons failed to maintain the unit formation and were often left behind (especially Comrade Tham).

Cadre neglected to exercise close control. Therefore, items were frequently left behind.

They did not provide good leadership in maintenance. Therefore, many persons let materials rust (Comrades KhSi, Tam and Sinh).

10 Mar 71

((The unit)) departed at 0600 hours and moved until 0700 hours.

((The unit)) stopped to eat from 0500 hours to 0545 hours.

The unit moved on the clear routes through several abandoned hamlets.

The unit moved secretly on Route 3 which was sandy.

Members strictly observed noise and light discipline.

All traces of the movement were obliterated ((two words illegible)). (Comrade Lang) ((sic)).

11 Mar 70

The unit ate at 0500 hours and departed at 0630 hours. After moving on Route 3 for two hours, the unit met personnel from a friendly unit who led them to the assembly area.

12 Mar 71

The unit arrived at the assembly area.

The second assembly area was a one-day trip from the first area. The unit would indoctrinate its members and prepare for other activities ((at the second area)).

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The unit completed preparations for the training course from 12 to 14 ((Mar 71)). Personnel were indoctrinated ((on politics)) and prepared for tasks from 15 to 18 ((Mar 71)).

On the morning of 12 ((Mar 71)), the unit made arrangements for messing and billeting.

Personnel started building trenches in the afternoon and finished by night. Each trench was 20 to 30 meters long, seven to eight meters wide, one to two meters deep, and 60-70 centimeters thick ((sic)), and covered with wood.

Elements finished with their task were allowed to bathe from 1600 hours. Secrecy must be maintained at all times.

On 13 ((Mar 71)), the unit had to finish building the messing and billeting facilities and begin constructing the conference hall. Several tunnels were to be built around the hall. Some members went to transport rice for the unit in the afternoon of 14 Mar 71.

14 Mar 71

The unit continued the above activities in the morning and inspected personal military equipment in the afternoon.

Political indoctrination was given on 15, 16, 17 and 18 ((Mar 71)).

The assistant leader of the 3rd Platoon departed to procure rice in the afternoon of 14 Mar 71, and returned seven days later.

Gather a supply of firewood for cooking.

Be combat ready.

Quickly make ((preparations)).

Implement a combat plan.

Personnel must carefully camouflage themselves while on duty. No one may leave the unit without permission.

Each man is to carry one kilogram of roasted rice. When going into battle, each man should carry one pair of pants, two pair of undershorts, one long-sleeve shirt, one undershirt, one hammock, one mosquito net, one tent, and weapons and grenades, including B-40 ((grenade launcher)). He should leave behind everything else. In addition, he is issued one AK ((assault rifle)), and a new pair of sandals.

Each assistant squad leader must carry AT ((sic)). 0600 to 0630 hours: Breakfast, 0700 to 1130 hours: Work, 1230 hours: Training.

On the morning of 15 ((Mar 71)): Party Chapter meeting, in the afternoon ((of the same a day)): Group ((meeting)), at night: meeting of military personnel's council.

On 16 and 17 ((Mar 71)): Indoctrination on new mission.

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On 18 ((Mar 71)): Study policies.

Activities of the three-man cell:

Review of daily activities.

Indoctrination on sense of organization and discipline (combat orders and internal regulations of the unit).

The unit must maintain secrecy while on bivouac or on duty.

Platoon leaders and Party cell leaders should review the above activities.

A7 ((7th Squad)).

1. Sqd Ldr, Tuan, AK ((assault rifle))
2. Dđ, automatic rifle
3. Toán, B-40 ((grenade launcher))
4. Tham, AK



A8 ((8th Squad)).

1. Nghia, AK ((assault rifle))
2. Viet, automatic rifle
3. Phon, AK
4. Hanh, grenadier

A9 ((9th Squad)):

1. Khoi, AK ((assault rifle))
2. Phong, AK
3. Long, grenadier

B ((possibly platoon))

T ((sic)) AK ((assault rifle))

B ((sic)) AK

C mess personnel

T ((sic)) one AK, 2 x lc ((sic))

Three B-40 shells

120 K-56 rounds

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B ((platoon)) caucus:

((Questions)) concerning determination:

Do personnel assume difficult tasks?

Do they fear combat assaults?

Do they have a high fighting spirit?

Have they executed regulations and orders?

Maintenance of secrecy:

Clothes must be kept from enemy discovery when hung up to dry. Be combat ready.

What do personnel do for security when alerted? Tunnels must be adequate with 70-centimeter covers.

The unit has been prepared to assume new missions.

The missions are very urgent.

Three countries in Indochina have been achieving great victories.

Assessment by the Central Headquarters:

We have defeated enemy attacks in Khe Sanh and Southern Laos, and have frustrated his Vietnamization plan. Thus, in 1971, the situation in Indochina will be subject to a significant change.

Each platoon is equipped with one RPD ((light machine gun)), one grenade thrower, one B40 ((grenade launcher)), and AK's ((assault rifle)).

Weapons issued:

	<u>A8</u>	<u>A9</u>	<u>A7</u>	<u>B</u>		<u>Total</u>
AK	2	1	2	2	=	7
Automatic rifle	1	1	0		=	2
Rifle grenade adapter	1	1	1		=	3
B-40	1	1	0		=	2
B-56 round	55	35	5	20	=	115
B-40 round	3	0	0		=	3
DT ((sic)) and rifle grenade rounds	4	4	3+1		=	12
Shovel, pickaxe	2+1	1+4	2+1		=	((Illegible))

PARTY CHAPTER MEETING, 15 MAR 71, TO PROMOTE  
HIGH COMBAT DETERMINATION

Platoon and company cadre did not have good leadership capabilities. They fulfilled their duties superficially. They did not inspect or motivate their personnel to accomplish their tasks correctly. They displayed rightism and failed to implement missions and failed to observe the regulations of higher echelons.

All politico-military commanders displayed a high sense of organization and discipline and provided proper leadership.

All members ((of the Party Chapter)) effectively implemented resolutions concerning strengthening the Party Chapter.

Close coordination was not maintained among cadre.

All Party members set good examples for others.

**Weaknesses:**

The Chapter Party Committee failed to guide Party Committee members in overrunning enemy positions.

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Four unit commanders and cadre had good ideology but failed to promote their determination to win.

**Future activity plans:**

According to the assignment of E ((possibly the 52nd Regiment, 320th NVA Division)), our C ((possibly the 6th Company)) must fiercely attack the Saigon Puppet troops.

We must completely annihilate the enemy and gain great achievements early in the attack in accordance with the requirements of D ((possibly the 5th Battalion, 52nd Regiment)).

All unit members must effectively observe the policies concerning the wounded and war dead soldiers and PW's and ralliers.

They must maintain their weapons and equipment and seize enemy weapons to arm ((VC)) forces.

They must observe absolute security maintenance during bivouac or movement.

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**Specific measures for proper leadership in the coming period:**

Political training courses must be conducted for all cadre, soldiers, Party and Group members, and youths to improve their revolutionary awareness. Particularly, the sense of organization and discipline of cadre must be promoted. Revolutionary organizations must enthusiastically participate in an emulation movement (to strengthen their determination).

Can we conduct continuous attacks against the enemy or defeat him in the first battle?

Seven soldiers, four cadre, and one Party member. Losses: 9.8% ((sic)).

The political training courses should be conducted for personnel to study enemy warfare and his serious failures in southern Laos and Cambodia and the Sanh and Quang Tri ((SVN)).

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Everyone should clearly understand the significance of our coordinated operations and achievements attained on the Cambodian battlefield.

Specific mission of B52 ((52nd Regiment)).

The unit personnel must correctly evaluate the enemy and friendly situations and clearly understand the urgency and significance of their tasks.

All of Indochina is our battlefield.

We must clearly realize our present specific missions.

Specific characteristics of the situation:

We must correctly grasp new enemy schemes.

We must discover enemy agencies and their operating procedures.

We must frustrate the enemy pacification and Vietnamization plans and continually defeat him on the battlefields.

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The enemy planned to destroy our rear areas (and the Ho Chi Minh Trail) to prevent supply and reinforcements from the rear ((NVN)) reaching the front line. ((In addition, the enemy intended to)):

Prevent friendly attacks during 1971.

Use Puppet ((RVNAF)) forces as a main force to step up the Vietnamization plan.

Purposes of the enemy incursion into lower Laos were:

To extend the rear to lower Laos (and later to NVN).

To insure the Vietnamization of the war.

(The enemy failed to properly estimate the situation.)

The enemy was embarrassed and frustrated in that operation.

Our achievements on the battlefield:

Friendly forces achieved significant victories on the three battlefields. (In lower Laos, we defeated the enemy with his tactics of using helicopters, tanks, and posts to defend high points.)

Friendly forces destroyed over 200 tanks, shot down 100 aircraft, and killed 2,000 enemy troops including the entire 39th ((RVNAF Ranger)) Battalion.

In northeast Cambodia, friendly forces conducted 20 attacks in 25 days and destroyed 10 enemy battalions, captured

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500 assorted weapons, destroyed 500 ((possibly vehicles)), and shot down 50 aircraft. They also destroyed the POL dump in Sihanoukville, and attacked the Nam Vang Airport, thus defeating the enemy dry season campaign. In Trung Bo ((central Vietnam)), a friendly unit conducted two attacks in one day and killed 300 enemy troops.

Significance of our victories:

The victories gained by friendly forces throughout Indochina exerted favorable influences on the people. It was strategically significant that we defeated the enemy in the first phase of his Vietnamization of the war.

Confronted by our violent attacks, the US imperialists lost their confidence in the capabilities of the Puppet forces.

The violent friendly counterattacks created several difficulties to the Vietnamization program.

The victories also strengthened the solidarity of the three nations in Indochina and created several opportunities for us to defeat the enemy.

Progress and victories on the Cambodian battlefield.

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The eight-province battlefield.

Achievements gained in Apr 70:

Friendly forces conducted 271 attacks; killed 22,367 enemy troops; captured 6,276 others, including more than 100 company officers; destroyed hundreds of enemy companies and battalions; destroyed 838 vehicles, including 125 tanks; seized many weapons and military equipment; and liberated several areas.

Progress on the Cambodian battlefield:

Although friendly forces fought on an unfamiliar battlefield and lacked installations and facilities, they strove to overcome these difficulties and built powerful units and promoted solidarity.

On the other hand, many friendly soldiers were combat experienced and consequently were able to cope with the battlefield conditions.

1. Strong and weak points of E52 ((possibly 52nd Regiment, aka Group 46, 320th NVA Division)):

Strong points:

Since the anti-French war, the regiment has been highly reputed for its combat capabilities. Most of the regiment's companies and battalions have been decorated. During the following period of peace, the regiment strived to serve the nation and train cadre and soldiers to prepare for war. During the anti-US war, the regiment fought independently. In combat, all members of the regiment had a high combat determination.

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Weak points:

The regiment failed to conduct large-scale operations, promptly attack enemy forces, and completely destroy enemy units. It captured a few PW's, but lost many weapons. In addition, it could not settle WIA and KIA problems satisfactorily.

Several members of the regiment were overly objective, and lost their sense of discipline.

Missions:

General missions:

Frustrate the new US and Puppet Government schemes.

Build strong units, promote high combat determination, and prepare carefully for all activities.

Comments of Trung Ương ((NVN Politburo)):

This is the decisive battlefield for the anti-US struggle.

On this battlefield, we will strive to destroy all US forces and their war facilities.

(Comments of Mát Trán ((possibly NLF)) ):

We must deal heavy blows to the new enemy schemes.

We must both continue to fight and strengthen our unit. In order to conduct continuous fighting, we should do the following:

Assess the situation, mission and resolution of the Region Party Committee.

All cadre and soldiers must strengthen their combat spirit.

Heighten discipline in the unit.

Ensure internal solidarity within the unit and help others to overcome difficulties.

Objective and mission of our regiment.

Our regiment is of the main force. It is well equipped and has the following advantages:

It has a good tradition and is respected by the people.

It has gained the confidence of the great rear (NVN).

It has gained the confidence of the Party Committee and was assigned an important mission.

It performs its mission while friendly forces (VC) are winning on the three battlefields (SVN, Cambodia and Laos).

It has been assigned an important mission to be initiated upon arrival in the area.

Therefore, our mission is to win a resounding victory from the first battle to enhance the confidence of friendly units and higher echelons and to demoralize the enemy.

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Requirements: Make all preparations so we can start the attack phase on time. Launch repeated, large-scale attacks against enemy fortifications and positions. We must become stronger during combat.

Principles: Our main mission consists of attacking the enemy when he is away from his posts. When attacking a post, we must be confident of winning.

We must strive to completely destroy enemy units completely, and capture as many PW's and weapons as possible.

SPECIFIC MISSION:

1. Urgently reorganize and strengthen our unit in accordance with mission requirements.

2. Ensure high effectiveness in the shortest time possible. We must fight the enemy upon engagement and win the first battle.

3. Make careful preparations to ensure effective replacements. Study all tactics carefully.

4. Urgently improve the health of unit members.

5. Urgently conduct a study of the directive. Try to overcome all difficulties rapidly. (Adhere to the Five Do's and Four Don'ts.)

Difficulties and advantages (Do's and Don't)

((Five)) Do's:

((1)) Heighten the combat spirit and the determination to overcome difficulties and hardships and

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to win by all means. Be determined to launch repeated attacks until we attain the final victory.

((2)) Develop solidarity and coordination to conduct simultaneous attacks. Pursue the enemy to fight him.

((3)) Cadre and Party members must be exemplary in their acts.

((4)) Develop organizational methods and discipline.

((5)) Develop the people's viewpoint for the unit members.

((Four)) Don'ts:

1. Combat the fear of hardships and difficulties.

2. Combat liberalism.

3. Combat individualism.

4. Combat the habit of submitting false reports.

#### Questions:

1. In 1970, the US and Puppet Governments were unsuccessful in their endeavor to expand the war to Cambodia. In 1971, their troops marched against southern Laos, Route 9 and northeast Cambodia. What was their purpose? The enemy scheme was very cunning and adventurous, but was he strong?

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At present, what difficulties or advantages does the enemy have?

What success did our army and people make since the enemy initiated these new schemes? Will we be able to gain great victories in the future?

The enemy was trying to frustrate our attack plans. In 1971, he also tried to destroy our combat potential.

He conducted deep thrusts against our rear bases.

What are his current main difficulties?

He is still unable to Vietnamize the war.

Three hours for the study of these subjects.



2. Our unit has a military tradition. Upon arrival at the battlefield, it was immediately designated to fight the Saigon and Lon-Nol Puppet troops.

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Discuss advantages and disadvantages we have encountered in our ambushes and raids.

(Two hours)

3. What specific problems and difficulties need to be solved to ensure success in the first attack against the enemy?

(One hour)

4. How can we defeat the enemy in the first attack and deploy all our troops to launch simultaneous attacks against the enemy? How can we conduct continuous and fierce attacks against the enemy and develop our forces?

(Two hours)

((Of the above four points to be discussed)), we should place more emphasis on questions one and four.

Three personnel of B3 ((possibly 3rd Platoon)) departed to transport ammunition:

A8 ((possibly 8th Squad))	A9 ((possibly 9th Squad))	A7 ((possibly 7th Squad))
Nghi T ((sic))	Việt T ((sic))	Bao -T ((sic))
Hanh -T ((sic))	Khôi <sup>9</sup> = ((sic))	Tuan = ((sic)) He is sick.
Con <sup>~</sup> O ((sic))	Phong = ((sic))	Du <sup>~</sup>
	Gay = ((sic))	Toan T ((sic))
		Tham <sup>c/</sup>

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Activity plan drafted on 16 Mar 70:

Comrade Phong reported that the rice supply was only enough to last until 26 ((possibly Mar 70)).

Rear service task:

8-2 ((possibly there were eight members, but two were absent)), consisting of (soldiers and squad leaders) used three ru<sup>2</sup>'s ((possibly a unit of measure)) of rice and some (B's and C's ((possibly platoon and company cadre)) ) use three to five ru<sup>2</sup>'s per day. From Mar ((70)), ((each person)) should be issued 700 grams of rice and from 70 to 90 grams of meat (per day).

All personnel must settle rear service problems with their supervisors before going into combat..

They are not allowed to divide or use extra funds.

Necessary preparation to be made before participating in combat:

All unit members must prepare to participate in a seven-day military operation.

They must have a one and a half or two day supply of dry food rations, fresh food for two days, and salted and dried beef for two and half days.

Clothings and weapons:

Each of them must bring two pairs of trousers, two pairs of undershorts, one long shirt, one undershirt, one pack, one tent, one blanket, one pair of socks, one pair of sandals, one hat, and one canteen.

Each platoon must have members assigned to one RPD light machine gun, one B-40 grenade launcher, and one flamethrower. The remaining personnel will be equipped with AK assault rifles. Each unit member must have one pick or one shovel.

Two of them must have protective masks.

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((Unit))	AK assault rifles	RPD ((light machine gun))	FL ((rifle grenade launcher))	B-40 grenade launcher	B-40 rounds	DK-56 ((recoilless rifle))	DFL ((rifle grenade))	Grenade	60mm mortar round	Shovel	Pick	Total ((sic))
A7	3	DO ((sic))	1 0 ((sic))	1	3		4	7	3	1	3	4
A8	3	1	1 0 ((sic))	1 0 ((sic))	0		4	7	4	2	1	4
A9	2	0	1	0	0		4	5	4	2	2	3
B	2	0	0	0	0		0	3	1	3	0	3
	10	1	1	1	3		12	22	12	8	6	14
		1	2	1								
	10 +	2 + RPD	3 + FL	2 B-40	= 17 Surplus 4 ((sic))							

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Automatic rifle rounds: 300

AK rounds: 150

CKC carbine rounds and  
rifle grenades: 100

B-40 rounds: 5

Rounds to be used for three grenade  
launchers, and three AT ((sic)).

All machetes, bayonets, and saws were to be brought.

Medical instruments: Two rolls of bandages one bottle of halazone, and mosquito repellent. Each squad should have a pack of DDT and each platoon, one liter. Individual belongings and personnel papers should not be carried.

Packing should be finished by noon on 18 ((month and year unspecified)). A roster of the soldiers of the squad ((participating in the attack)) should be submitted to the battalion.

Each comrade should bring two meters of rope to bind enemy PW's.

All weapons should be clean and ready.

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#### Tasks.

Seven comrades are assigned to the battalion to construct warehouses.

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#### Political ((Task))

Six regulations should be taken into account.

1. If captured in combat, observe the three nothings: Hear nothing, see nothing, and know nothing.

2. Overwhelm the enemy early in the engagement and assault him simultaneously.

3. When attacking the enemy, attempt to completely obliterate him. Take the initiative on the battlefield and capture as many PW's, weapons, and war materiel as possible.

4. Every operation should be a victory.

5. Every movement should arrive at its destination; all firing should be accurate; and each task should be successful.

6. In combat, unite and provide mutual support. Observe directive and orders for the battlefield, and regulations concerning WIA, KIA, PW's, and captured war materiel. Conduct civilian proselyting. Save and preserve weapons and ammunition and capture enemy weapons to arm our units.

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#### MILITARY PROSELYTING TASK BY COMBAT UNITS IN CAMBODIA.

##### I. PURPOSE AND REQUIREMENTS:

We should understand the morale of the Lon Nol ((Cambodian)) troops. On that basis, we should increase the knowledge of our cadre and soldiers for the military proselyting task.

We should minimize losses and strive to win enemy troops to our side.

##### I. ORGANIZATION OF THE LON NOL ARMY:

((The people and army)) lived in peace for over 15 years. Now they have risen up against the Revolution. Therefore, their thoughts and combat spirit have not caught up with the new war situation.

Organization was loose. ((Two words illegible.)) Enemy soldiers were demoralized. The enemy conscripted children, youths and old men from 13 to 57 years of age. Enemy tanks were used to herd farmers and schoolboys.

The majority of enemy soldiers received no military training. New recruits composed 50 to 90 percent of the enemy ranks.

Some old soldiers have defected. They joined Sihanouk ((troops)) in ((Cambodian Communist)) liberated areas.

## II. LON NOL TROOPS.

Seventy percent ((of Lon Nol troops)) followed Sihanouk.

Many of them listened to revolutionary radio broadcasts regularly and wanted to join the ((Cambodian)) Revolution and Sihanouk.

((Cambodian)) officers are inclined toward the Revolution.

Following the Kiriram battle, enemy soldiers, including a colonel, surrendered.

Different methods should be used to proselyte enemy soldiers with low morale. They surrendered without fighting. Both they and Saigon Puppet troops were demoralized.

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## III. SIGNIFICANCE OF PW'S AND EXECUTION OF POLICIES:

1,500 enemy soldiers, including colonels and lower ranking men, were captured; 3,000 were WIA; and 2,500 were KIA.

Three-pronged attack tactics (military, political, and military and enemy proselyting activities) were conducted.

Advantages we can gain from capturing enemy soldiers: Exploiting the enemy military situation, keeping abreast of his thoughts and organization, lowering his prestige and strengthening our determination.

After indoctrinating them on our policies, we can employ them in enemy proselyting activities. We must reeducate them to understand our right cause and counter enemy propaganda activities.

Significance and effects of the execution of our policies:

Enemy soldiers judge us by our attitude toward them. By properly executing prescribed policies, we will be able to gain their esteem.

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Prisoners should be brought to liberated areas upon capture.

The people in liberated areas believe in and understand our humane policies.

IV. HOW DID OUR ARMY PERFORM THE ENEMY ((FWAMF)) AND MILITARY ((RVNAF)) PROSELYTING TASK?

Before combat, make preparations for conducting enemy and military proselyting.

During combat, thoroughly assess the situation. Each element and each cell must verbally call enemy troops to surrender. (Do not use loudspeakers only.)

Make positive efforts to seize prisoners but be cautious of enemy troops who are anxious to rally or feign death ((on the battlefield)). Carefully detain and bind prisoners and exploit documents seized from them. It is forbidden to deprive them of their property (money, gold, or jewelry) or to dishonor them.

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After combat, apprehend and arrest tyrants ((GVN officials)). Officers should seize documents. Detain prisoners under strict regulations.

Search of prisoners:

Everything seized ((from prisoners)) must be sent to higher levels and corruption must be avoided.

Appeal through propaganda for assistance from the people in our areas of operations ((in proselyting activities)).

TEN REGULATIONS ON PRISONERS AND DEFECTORS

1. Avoid killing prisoners enroute ((to rear areas)) except when they resist or attempt to escape.
2. Search them and seize their weapons, equipment, and documents. Make receipts for money, gold, jewelry, etc ... ((sic)), and confiscate and forward them with the prisoners ((to higher levels)).
3. Separate tyrants, officers, and soldiers. Keep them in secure areas and do not crowd them into one place.

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4. PW's must be bound tightly. Explain our policy to them.

The evacuation of PW's and ralliers must be in accordance with the prescribed policy. Blindfold them when passing our bivouac sites, depots, agencies, villages, and large roads. Do not stay overnight in places close to these areas. Do not evacuate PW's and criminals with ralliers.

5. Do not take or purchase from or exchange anything with PW's nor receive anything they offer.

6. Do not offend the beliefs, customs, or habits of PW's and ralliers. When evacuating criminals who have taken advantage of religious parties to conduct their activities, make them change their religious garments.

7. Treat all PW's and ralliers indifferently, regardless of their rank or creed. Food rations for ralliers is the same as evacuator's, but PW's receive only two-thirds of this amount.

8. Dress the wounds of PW's if conditions permit, and explain to them the lenient policy of the Front ((NFLSVN)).

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Slightly wounded enemy officers should be taken back to the ((VC)) unit.

9. Do not talk with PW's and ralliers while guarding or evacuating them. Discussion might reveal information on our forces and the missions of our units.

10. Behave honorably; do not use profanity. Be vigilant and combat ready. Be confident in taking actions to prevent the loss of PW's and ralliers.

#### QUESTIONS

1. What is the present organization and ideology of Lon Nol ((Cambodian)) troops? (One hour.)

2. ((What is)) the significance of PW's and how is the policy ((concerning PW's)) to be implemented?

3. What should our troops keep in mind while conducting military proselyting activities?

((These questions must be explained to troops)) before, during and after combat.)

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A7 ((possibly the  
7th Squad))

((Comrade))

TUÂN: AK ((assault  
rifle))

ĐU: AK

TOAN: B-40 ((grenade  
launcher))

NHUÂN: AK

4 ((personnel))

A8 ((possibly the  
8th Squad))

NGHI: AK

VIỆT: TL ((possibly  
submachine gun)).

TÔN: AK

KHUYẾN: AK

4 ((personnel))

A9 ((possibly the 9th  
Squad))

LONG: AK

THANH: FL ((rifle  
grenade))

THAM: AK

3 ((personnel))

NHUAN, Assistant Squad Leader ((lined out in O.T.)), B ((possibly platoon)): CUU, a cook, and BAO were issued AK ((assault rifles)).

18 Mar 71

What shall we do to win a battle or conduct a coordinated assault? What is the mission of each comrade?

Purpose of the emulation phase: To attain achievements to honor Uncle ((Ho Chi Minh)).

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1. All cadre and soldiers must display a high determination and a good fighting spirit, be ready to ((successfully)) achieve any mission assigned. Especially when confronted with the fierceness of the war, they must overcome all difficulties and hardships and fight the enemy courageously. They must follow orders strictly to conduct coordinated assaults, and strive to defeat the enemy in the first battle. They must try diligently to capture as many prisoners and weapons as possible, and maintain the initiative to attack the enemy continually to the last man.

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In any battle, they must defeat the enemy completely.

2. The unit must be strongly organized and strictly follow ((prescribed)) regulations. All Party members must meet the seven requirements for Party Chapters and all Group members must attain the Four Good Qualities. All Group Chapters must be determined to win and have no unqualified members or combatants. All Party Chapters must have a good sense of responsibility and an average combat level and avoid arrogant or complacent actions.

3. Internal solidarity must be heightened in the unit and all personnel must provide mutual assistance. They must take the initiative in coordinating activities to attack the enemy and have a good sense of organizational methods and discipline. They must be eager to serve, and never violate combat discipline even under critical circumstances or in the face of battle.

4. They must adhere to combat plans. In strengthening the unit, they must properly maintain their weapons and never allow them to become unserviceable, lost, or captured by the enemy. They must counter corruption and waste and replace or arm their personnel with captured enemy weapons.

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None of them should violate the above cited policy by losing even the smallest ((minor)) equipment.

5. The unit must be urgently consolidated and stabilized in all aspects in accordance with the ((prescribed)) CT ((possibly directive)). All members of the unit must be fit for combat. Pay due attention to preventive medicine.



From 26 Mar ((71)), ((to commemorate)) the 40th Anniversary of the founding of the ((Labor Youth)) Group.

From 26 Mar to 24 Apr ((71)), ((submit)) a preliminary report ((to commemorate)) the 101st birthday of Lenin.

From 24 Apr to 19 May ((71)), ((submit)) a recapitulative report ((to commemorate)) Uncle Hồ ((Chi Minh's)) birthday.

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A8 ((the 8th Squad))	A9 ((the 9th Squad))	A7 ((the 7th Squad))
VIỆT ((was)) present	LONG ((was)) present	TUÂN ((Blank))
NGHI " "	THANH " "	ĐU " "
FON " "	THAM " "	TOAN " "
		NHUAN " "

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Of 13 comrades, Thanh and Toan attained the criteria.

Two comrades escorted Comrade Tham to the hospital. Surplus weapons and clothes were turned in at C.17 ((possibly the 17th Company)) by two other comrades.

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#### FOOD PROVISIONS ((sic))

((All personnel)) should complete messing at 1630 hours and assemble at 1745 hours.

At 1800 hours, mount elephants and depart.

Personnel of the last squad should destroy all traces of the movements. At 0400 hours, depart, using the same route and go to the same destination as the previous day.

There would be no collecting section ((for stragglers or wounded)). The movement formation would be a ((single)) column. Stragglers must strive to keep up with advancing elements.

Noise and light discipline should be strictly followed. During halts, do not pick leaves to sit on while resting.

When passing civilian houses, no one will stop to rest or purchase merchandise.

Upon arrival at the designated area, all squads should swiftly secure their positions and send out guides to lead ((incoming units)).

No one uses a flashlight except ((personnel of)) the company headquarters. When cadre move forward ((lined out in O.T.))

At each halt, security guards should be deployed.

Set up combat fortifications upon arrival at area.

Every two comrades will construct one covered fortification. From 20 to 21 ((possibly Mar 71)), ((stayed)) at Ky 2 ((sic)). At night, every three comrades dug one trench at Ky 2 at 50 meter intervals.

Upon arrival at the area, B ((platoon)) cadre should deploy troops and assign personnel as guards.

Doan ((Group)) 46, ((aka E52)), Battalion H5, 6th Company, ((320th NVA Division)).

Medical Company C23

Straggler Recovery Company ((C)) 24.

Recognition signals for night or day guard duty:

Sleeves must be rolled up to the elbows.

((Date))	Challenge	Reply
20 ((Mar 71))	Slap weapon stock four times	Slap weapon stock one time
21 Mar 71	" three times	" five times
22 Mar 71	" six times	" three times
23 Mar 71	" one time	" one time
24 Mar 71	" nine times	" six times
25 Mar ((71))	" two times	" four times
26 ((Mar 71))	" five times	" two times
27 ((Mar 71))	" six times	" eight times
28 ((Mar 71))	" none	" none
29 ((Mar 71))	" four times	" six times

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30 Mar 71	" six times	" five times
31 Mar 71	" seven times	" nine times

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21 Mar 71

At 1830 hours, organize troop formation.

At 1845 hours, start moving.

From 0900 to 1000 hours, follow K4.

Move along Route 3, then turn on the trail. Each comrade should carry one canteen of water and one pressed rice ball.

Our location must be kept in absolute secrecy. Every three comrades should dig one trench.

Set up a Hoang Cam ((VC/NVA regulation)) field kitchen for the entire C ((company)) in a well camouflaged area. Upon arrival at the area, formulate a combat plan.

The following morning, get up at 0600 hours, eat breakfast, then dig trenches.

Trees will be sawed instead of chopped.

((The unit)) was equipped with flares and flashlights.

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Plan for movement on 22 Mar 71:

((One word missing))

At 0500 hours, breakfast.

At 0545 hours, prepare for departure.

At 0600 hours, depart.

It will take us two hours to reach Montagnard village Cay Dua where we will be received by personnel of the station. During movement to the designated area, we must keep closed ranks, maintain absolute secrecy, and observe light and noise discipline.

((On the following day)), at 0500 hours, we will prepare our meals and dig trenches. The routes and trenches are to be camouflaged. The unit was issued five CMC carbine magazines and one 82mm mortar round.

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23 Mar 71

We departed at 1600 hours on N-day.

We must arrive at the bivouac site in 24 hours.

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At 0300 hours on N-day + 1 ((sic))

Preparations for combat must be completed at 1200 hours on N-day + 1 ((sic)).

At 1600 hours on N-day + 1 ((sic)), start moving.

By 1200 hours on 24 ((Mar 71)), preparations for combat should be completed.

At 0600 hours on 25 ((Mar 71)), depart.

At 1800 hours ((25 Mar 71)), arrive at the troop concealment position.

By 2400 hours on 26 ((Mar 71)), construction of combat trenches should be completed.

At 0430 hours on 26 ((Mar 71)), breakfast.

Initiation of combat is set for 0500 hours on 26 ((Mar 71)). During movement, everyone should carry one hammock, one ((nylon)) tent, one change of clothes, one mosquito net, and a rope to bind PW's.

Rice and food provisions must be enough for 10 days.

#### Ammunition:

AK ((assault rifle)): 150 rounds

CKC ((carbine)): 100 rounds

Carry all FL's + AT's ((possibly rifle grenade launcher and antitank grenades))

RPD ((light machine gun)): 300 ((rounds))

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B-40: 5 rounds, but use only two rounds.

After two recent battles, we had 20 CKC rounds left. Out of 150 AK ((assault rifle)) rounds, we had eight rounds left. During the first battle, we used 150 automatic rifle rounds and two B-40 rounds.

Medical ((element)) should carry two rolls of bandages, one bottle of insecticide, one bottle of Nhan Dan ((sic)) oil, and one bottle of balm.

Each platoon should have one ((wooden)) litter and one ((canvas)) litter.

The litters should have arm and leg straps.

War booty should be collected and submitted to higher echelons.

The troops should proceed toward the foot of Sihanouk Pass.

Upon arrival, dig trenches and ((air and artillery)) shelters to prepare for battles near the road ((sic)).

During the movement, the troops will be allowed to have one full meal.

Each soldier should carry his own rations.

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Requirements:

Perform security maintenance.

Rules of engagement:

Signal withdrawal from the battleground by shooting two red flares.  
Shout during assaults.

Regroup into two elements and advance up the hill after the battle.

Use automatic rifles to shoot down enemy aircraft, if possible.

Conserve ammunition. During the assault, we should deploy troops on both flanks when meeting no enemy resistance.

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Signal and code

One B-40 round is used to signal the order to open fire.

103 is the cover designation of A1 ((1st Squad))

104 " A2 ((2nd Squad))

105 " A3 ((3rd Squad))

106 " A4 ((4th Squad))

107 " A5 ((5th Squad))

108 " A6 ((6th Squad))

C " Unit ((possibly company))

H " Battalion

Individual recognition signal:

Each person had ((two words illegible)).

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((One line illegible))

At night, the recognition signals are as follows:

Challenge: Our Đoàn ((Group)) is Doan 16.

Anh Thu's Battalion.

Reply: Hiêu's Battalion.

Hoc's Battalion.

Name	Serial number	Type of weapons	K-56 round	B-40 round	AP ((Antitank)) round and grenade launcher round	Grenade	60mm mortar round	Shovel	Pick-axe	Magazine for AK assault rifle and RPD light machine gun	Aiming device for AK rifle	Signature
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))	((6))	((7))	((8))	((9))	((10))	((11))	((12))	((13))
A7 ((7th Squad))												
Tuan		AK assault rifle	150					1				
Toan		B-40 rocket launcher	5				3	1				
Nhuon		Grenade launcher	100		5 + 5		1x 82mm mortar round		1			1
A8 ((8th Squad))												
Nghi		AK assault rifle	150					1	1			
Phon		AK assault rifle	150				4					
Viet		Automatic rifle	300					1				
Khuyen		AK assault rifle	150									

	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))	((6))	((7))	((8))	((9))	((10))	((10))	((12))	((13))	
A9 ((9th Squad))													
Long		AK assault rifle	156				4						
Thanh		AK assault rifle	150										
B ((Platoon Command Committee))													
Thanh		AK assault rifle	150										
Bao		AK assault rifle	150				4						
Tri		AK assault rifle	150										
Cuu			1750				15						
A7	AK assault rifle	Grenade launcher	Auto-matic rifle	B-40 round	K-56 round	Antitank round and grenade launcher round	Grenade	60mm mortar round.	Shovel	Pickaxe	Magazine	Anti-tank round	Signature
A8	1	1	0	5		5 + 5	4	3	2	1	0	1	
A9	3	0	1	0		0	7	4	3	1	3	0	
B	2	0	0	0		0	4	4	1	1	0	0	
	3	0	0	0	750	0		4	4	1	0	0	

A7: 72 ((possibly rounds))  
 A8: 72 "  
 A9: 54 "  
 Total: 198 "  
 A7: Two B-40 grenade launchers  
 A8: Two "  
 A9: One "

	B-40 grenade launcher	Grenade	Antitank round	Grenade launcher round	Mortar round
Fire power of A7: 2		4	2	2	4
" A8: 2		2	1	1	4
" A9: 1		2	1	1	3
" B : 0		2			

Grenade launcher rounds: 10

B-40 rounds : 5

A7 : 3 ((possibly rounds))

A8 : 4 "

A9 : 3 "

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----