

Document No 6

Circular, April 16, 1970,
of Command Committee
of Doan 180 .

Command Committee of Doan [Group] 180

C I R C U L A R

on Guidance for Tasks in K [Cambodia]

Through reports from the Command Committees of Cum's [sub-divisions of Group] and Doi's [sub-divisions of Cum], as well as reports submitted by inspectors after their return from inspection, the Command Committee of Doan [Group 180] found that a number of matters must be corrected and standardized immediately to meet the requirements of the present situation.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL TASKS

1. Organization of our forces: After the dissemination of Directive 06 of the Standing Committee, the Doi's rapidly organized and developed their forces in accordance with the prescribed plan, and the organization and development of forces was successful in several areas. In addition to using their own forces, the Doi's also arranged to use forces of the friendly agencies to share in the task of organizing the Phum [hamlets] and Khum [villages] and setting up the armed propaganda units.

However, generally speaking, we did not make full use of the agencies in the base, nor did we boldly entrust these agencies with full responsibility over the nearest Phum [hamlets] so as to free the armed propaganda units for operations in deeper areas where they would carry out propaganda campaigns, motivate the people and set up administrations and political organizations. To overcome the above deficiencies, all Command Committees at all levels must rapidly deploy their forces deep in their areas of responsibility. They must conduct propaganda and motivation tasks in conjunction with the development [of forces] and production in their assigned area. As for the nearby

Phum [hamlets], they should be turned over to the agencies (under our leadership or that of the Cum's and Doi's Command Committees).

2. Establishment of K [Cambodian] administrative agencies and political organizations: The basic problem of the revolution is that of political power. Once an area is liberated, we must immediately overthrow the enemy administration there and set up a new revolutionary [Cambodian] administration, then use this administration to carry out the mission of resistance and nation building. In some areas, recently the dissolution of the enemy government to establish a revolutionary government was made slowly. Therefore, some local areas are still without administrative control and the people do not know what government they must rely on. In some areas, the administrative machineries were not established in accordance with the disseminated directives: For instance, a "Phum" [hamlet] was administratively considered as a village therefore, a village committee was set up [the case of Doi 1]. The selection of members for the Committee was not carried out in a correct manner. Further guidance is needed for this matter.

With regard to the liberated areas located within the areas of responsibility of Doi's or agencies, we must urgently form the village [Khum] and hamlet [Phum] governmental committees. The hamlet governmental committees must be established prior to that of the village. Administratively, the size of the villages and hamlets must not be reduced or enlarged. (A Phum [hamlet] governmental committee consists of three members, a Khum [village] governmental committee consists of seven members, plus three members in charge of Party Committee Affairs, the militia, and security, this organization is in accordance with the directives which were disseminated to all units). Concerning the selection of members for the governmental committees, the aforementioned members must be true patriots who love the people (Cambodians). They must profoundly hate the US imperialists and their henchmen, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, and be determined to overthrow them. We must make sure that the majority of the members in the governmental committees belongs to the worker-peasant class. It is possible to include one or two members of Sihanouk's former government or monks, provided that they enjoy the confidence of the people and enthusiastically

resist the US and its henchmen. However, they must not be given important positions such as the chairmanship of [the Committee] or the direction of military and security affairs.

3. Establishment of [political] organization: In areas where the Front Committees are already established, we must rapidly organize old people's, youths', women's, and farmers' association in order to facilitate our activities of spreading propaganda and indoctrinating and motivating the people to engage in struggle and production to serve the Revolution. The groups will be called liberation associations, for example, liberation youths' associations, liberation women's associations, liberation farmers' association, etc... In accordance with the criteria, association members must be patriotic workers who follow Siha-nouk and the Cambodian Reunification Front and who actively resist the US and its reactionary henchmen. Each association will have an executive committee consisting of three to five members, depending on the population in "Phum" and "Khum". An association with less than 10 members can appoint one trusted and qualified member to take charge [of the association].

The composition of the executive committee includes a secretary and a deputy secretary (if necessary). The regulations and program of activities will be forwarded later.

(In district towns and workers' quarters of rubber plantations, a study will be made and guidance will be provided. For the immediate future each town section or worker quarter can temporarily select three persons to take charge; these include one [committee] chief, a deputy [committee] chief, and a [committee] member. The selected members must meet the same criteria set forth for the selection of members for the hamlet committee.)

When the government and associations are set up, we must improve their capability, so that they can do their jobs themselves.

We must avoid the impression that such organizations are initiated by the South Vietnam Liberation Army or the "Viet Cong". We must make them [members of the above organization] realize that they are masters [of their country].

Moreover, we must make them (especially Buddhist monks and intellectuals) understand that the leaders of the present Cambodian Revolution are Sihanouk and the Front [possibly National Reunification Front of Cambodia] and that the revolutionary force belongs to the Cambodian patriots. (It is advisable to tell the working class people that the Cambodian Revolution is led by the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia). We must also tell them that we are their friends, opposing the same common enemy, and that we will always wholeheartedly support them. We must explain to them that their cooperation with us does not mean that they serve us. (The explanations must be made in a careful and tactful manner in order to avoid misunderstanding).

II. REPORT PROCEDURES AND CONTENTS

In order to have a thorough knowledge of the situation which enables us to make timely reports to our superiors and to provide close leadership for the lower echelons, from now on, all Command Committees of Cum's, Doi's and units operating in K [Cambodia] must regularly submit reports to their higher echelons with the following contents:

1. The contents of the report must be composed of the following parts:

a. Friendly activities:

In the military field: Report all combat activities conducted for the liberation of enemy posts, the activation of armed guerrilla and militia units, military training, patrols, the construction of fortifications and trenches, the recruitment of [Cambodia and Vietnamese] soldiers, all armed propaganda activities, and the armed propaganda units' strengths and achievements.

In the political field: [Report all activities concerning the motivation for organizing demonstrations and propaganda activities. State their purpose, results, and the people's enthusiasm (point out specific examples.)

The report must include all details concerning the establishment of association and governmental committees at the

hamlet and village levels and the total number of governmental committees established. (The list of the governmental committee members, the names of areas where governmental committees have not been established, and a schedule for the establishment of these committees must be attached to the report). The number of governmental committees established by our units, those established by [the Cambodian] friendly units and agencies, the attitude and sense of responsibility of the governmental committee members, and activities of the people's organizations must also be reported. Social and farm production activities: The list of areas where our activities are conducted in coordination with our friends (A2) [sic] must also be reported.

b. Enemy activities:

Militarily: mention all enemy activities concerning his intelligence, espionage, and sabotage activities, etc.

In the political field: Mention all details of activities regarding his political factions, distorted propaganda, inducements to rally or surrender (efforts to buy off our personnel, etc.)

c. Strong and weak points, experiences, and suggestions.

2. Time prescribed for submission of reports:

Regular reports must be submitted twice a week. A summary report must be submitted every 15 days, and a general report every month. All reports are to be submitted through B2.

The Command Committees at all levels must study, fully understand, and implement the above guidance which is necessary for settling our urgent problems. Should they encounter difficulties in the implementation of the above instructions, they must send urgent reports and submit these to [Doan 180] Command Committee for timely guidance.

16 April 70

For the Command Committee of
[Doan] 180

/S/ SAU HUAN

Document No. 7

Twelve pages of handwritten notes, in Vietnamese, of a VC/NVA plan of action in Cambodia. Undated, Contents indicate notes written between 15 and 29 April, 1970. Underlining as in original.

PLANNED ASSISTANCE FOR THE FRIENDLY MOVEMENT

In compliance with a directive of TWC [COSVN] and one of the Standing Committee, Party Committee of Th[sic], and considering our capability and specific [current] situation, the [Rear Base] Party Committee is going to activate a Group to help our friends. This Group, composed of a number of our cadre, personnel, and soldiers, will be placed under the direct command of our Party Committee. In its operations, the Group is to contact local organizations and friendly units for military help (weapons) or for VTT [possibly armed propaganda] when necessary.

Following are the missions of this Group, its methods of working, and its organizational principles, as specified by the Party Committee:

I. Missions:

1. To strive to motivate and assemble the population of Khum [Cambodian village] waterfront areas [not very legible] and towns into the Cambodian MTTNDT [National United Front of Kampuchea]. Activate an armed force (guerrilla) and sapper units which should be able to hold their ground in waterfront [not very legible] areas and towns under any circumstances.

2. To strive to form and train cadre for the MTTNDT specially at Phum [hamlet] and Khum [village] levels and also to train Khum and Phum guerrillas. Activate sapper units for VK [possibly Vietnamese residents] in Svay Rieng Province.

3. Make the Cambodians realize that the purpose of the assistance provided them by our government is to promote solidarity between the two peoples.

To fulfill the stated missions, the personnel of the Group should bear in mind the following points:

a. They must realize that fulfilling their missions is fulfilling one of our international obligations. At the same time, their task directly helps the SVN Revolution in particular and Vietnam as a whole. In this sense, they must strive to overcome all hardships and difficulties and even to accept the sacrifice of their lives.

b. They should absolutely avoid manifesting pride of being from a larger country. They should not be too enterprising and do everything by themselves instead of giving advice and letting the Cambodian revolutionaries do their job. They should not infringe on the Cambodians' customs, disturb their way of living, or violate their property. They should strictly practice the Party's principle of wholehearted devotion to the cause of the masses, the principle of equality, and the maintenance of mutual respect between the two brotherly peoples. They should maintain a high sense of unity among the personnel of the Group.

c. They should make an accurate assessment of the current development of the war and prepare for any eventuality, whether it be fierce or protracted.

II. Organization Principles and Working Procedures.

The Group will be placed under the command of a steering committee of three members which in turn is placed under the direct leadership of the Party Committee. A special Party Chapter will be set up for Party members of the Group. This chapter will be held responsible to the Party as long as it retains its assigned mission.

Guidelines for action: The Group should boldly motivate the population to build political and military forces in accordance with the specific situation and characteristics of the Cambodian Revolution. In the development of revolutionary forces the Group should be daring but cautious, and should strictly comply with the viewpoint of the masses and with recruitment procedures. It should master the use of revolutionary violence and be determined in the suppression of

antirevolutionaries. It should not do the work of our friends, however, it should not lack firmness on the questions of principles. Rather, it should strive to win over our friends through persuasion in order to carry out the project at all costs.

The Group should operate in close coordination with local friendly units in order to unify actions and get mutual support; to be more specific, it should coordinate with the following:

Tay Ninh [Province], Sub-Region 2, Kien Tuong [Province], the Operations Committee for Vietnamese residents in Svay Rieng [Cambodian province] Party Chapters of Vietnamese residents and the Party network of our friends [Red Cambodians].

The Group can be attached to one of our friends' local revolutionary organizations, and it will be responsible for providing funds and weapons to our friends.

The Group is not authorized to change the resolutions passed by the Party Committee, but it can report to the latter the specific situation it faces while implementing the resolutions. The Party Committee will study the report, for the purpose of amending the resolutions. Once a week, the Group must submit to the Party Committee a situation report with comments on its actual opportunities, difficulties, and its prospects. The Group will hold a meeting every month and frequent briefings for an exchange of views between the personnel on their current performance and experiences drawn from operations in the friendly locality to which the Group is attached,

Subsistence allowances for the Group will be provided by the Party Committee. The Group will have to depend on the local people for other expenditures.

The Group will organize gatherings of Cambodian civilians, hold meetings, conduct armed propaganda sessions to motivate them, sort out the good elements among the population, those from the working class and basic class for enrollment in the revolutionary organizations.

Through the intermediary of good (MHV) [Cambodians, Chinese, and Vietnamese residents] people the Group will identify the wicked enemy administrative personnel and spies, then divide or punish them (the punishment is to be carried out by our friends and the Group should avoid showing up during their performance). Intimidation of village administrative personnel and militiamen is an absolute necessity. A public and impressive inauguration ceremony for presenting the National United Front of Kampuchea will be held for the purpose of enhancing the prestige of the Revolution. At this ceremony, the Front will announce the dissolution of the Lon Nol Government system and its military, economic, cultural, and social organizations and the confiscation of the reactionaries' property, and will proclaim the people's rights to freedom and democracy.

III. Specific Activities of the Group.

1. Foundation of the National United Front of Kampuchea

Motivate the population to activate the Front Committees at the Khum, waterfront [not very legible] and town echelons. Start from the Khum as a base to progress toward the Srok level. At the first step, all people will be grouped into the Front without being organized into separate groups according to their social classes. Under the Khum level, sub-groups or cells can be organized.

Special efforts should be devoted to the formation and training of cadre for the Front, in particular cell leaders and sub-group leaders. In the meantime, members of the executive committees should be improved and trained in leadership, working procedures, and methods of conducting Front activities.

Determine the function and responsibility of the executive committees. This should proceed step by step; unwarranted haste is to be avoided.

Where there are Vietnamese and Chinese residents, the Front Executive Committee at each echelon can include Vietnamese and Chinese residents, but not more than one representative for each group of residents. Each executive committee will be composed of a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary, and a number of members, which is large or small depending on the number of local sympathizers. Members of an executive committee will share among themselves the following jobs: Front affairs, military affairs, security, rear service, social welfare, and public health service.

After activation, each executive committee must make careful preparations for organizing a public inauguration ceremony to nullify the enemy local officials' authority, abrogate their administrative, military, economic, cultural, and social mechanisms, and enhance the revolutionary spirit of the masses. Afterward, the committee should seek to gradually improve its skills and consolidate its organization while doing its routine work.

2. Organization of armed forces

Every Phum, Khum, waterfront [not very legible] area, or town is to activate a guerrilla unit. Next, concentrated units are to be formed at the Srok level. Each Khum should have at least two squads, and each Srok two platoons.

In areas where there are Chinese and Vietnamese residents, mixed guerrilla units must be formed. In addition, it is necessary to form concentrated units of mixed Vietnamese — Chinese composition (with the Vietnamese playing an essential role) placed under our direct control.

In every province, a well trained Vietnamese resident sapper unit is to be organized.

The armed forces should be well trained in cell combat techniques and in armed propaganda. Once the training is completed, they (guerrilla units and sapper units) must immediately conduct armed propaganda operations to build and develop the Front and create a cohesiveness between them and the masses.

The Standing Committee will provide weapons for the guerrilla and sapper units. In the meantime, the Group should try to equip them with the help of our local friends.

3. Security Maintenance

Resolutely eliminate the reactionaries (administrative personnel, policemen, and intelligence agents). Intimidate the ring-leaders who owe blood debts [to the revolution]. Collect information about the other targets, sort them out, and prepare their records in advance, so that we can deal with them when necessary (counterattacks, reoccupation).

The proceedings should be backed by a complete documentation, the indictment must be made in public and every case must be brought to the judgement of the masses. Let our friends conduct the prosecution. When it is absolutely necessary for us to take action, we must do it in a most discreet way.

Set up a security network. This job must be done with the cooperation of our friends' local agencies.

Establish checkpoints, sentry posts, and patrols to control the coming and going of the population.

4. The economic [rear service] problem and the way to deal with civilians' property

The Front Committee will assign a member to take charge of food supplies for the armed forces. Provisions include both confiscated property (husked and unhusked rice) and that contributed by the population.

The Group should induce the population in waterfront areas, towns, and areas along Route 1 to move their husked and unhusked rice to deep rural areas.

Concentrate all transportation means for moving to the deep rural area the husked and unhusked rice confiscated and borrowed from Vietnamese, Chinese residents, and other private individuals. The borrowing should be made formally and vouchers be given to the owners. [note on margin] Borrowed 300 K of husked rice.

Restrict the exportation of husked and unhusked rice and meat to SVN Puppet controlled areas. Coordinate with local economy sections to work out a plan to completely end it.

5. Public health

Activate a mobile medical team composed of a physician and three medics. The mission of this team is to instruct the population on basic sanitation and prophylactic measures, treat emergency cases, provide the population with medical examination and treatment of common diseases, and set up a drugstore to sell at a low price home-made and imported medicine for the benefit of the local population. The said activities are to be centered in the town of Chi Fu as a pilot area, then gradually spread out.

6. Training and indoctrination

Indoctrination themes should be focused on the fast growth of the Revolution in order to promote the trainees' faith in its certain success. The trainees should also be indoctrinated on the role and mission of the Front and the five-point declaration of Sihanouk. Besides their military training, they should learn armed propaganda techniques.

The Front cadre will be trained in the methods of proselyting, motivating, and organizing the masses. They will be taught the working methods and the ways to fulfill the functions of an executive committee.

Training and indoctrination forms.

Organize mass meetings, inter-household meetings, and family gatherings.

Conduct a short-term training course for Front personnel and a separate one for combatants (guerrillas and sapper members).

The course should be short and concise. Trainees are to be improved later while on the job.

Prasaut -- Chifou [Cambodian localities]

Planned personnel and equipment:

A steering committee of three members (from political and military cadre; it would be better if one from the security service is available) will take charge of the Group which will be divided into three elements:

A political element staffed by four basic level cadre and elementary cadre and four assistants.

A military element composed of eight company and platoon cadre, not including those in charge of the training courses for guerrilla and sapper units (two cadre for each course).

A public health element composed of one physician and four medics.

Security? [sic]

Means: A reinforced platoon and four interpreters.

Requested Weapons: Twenty AK's [assault rifles], 50 CKC's [carbines], two B-40's [grenade launchers], 20 kilograms of C4 explosives, and detonators.

Direction of operations

The Group will be split up into two units. One will operate in Prasaut, the other in Chifou.

The Prasaut unit will include two political cadre and one military cadre of company level, two armed squads, two platoon cadre, two assistants, one medic, and one interpreter.

The Chifou unit will be composed of two political cadre, one company cadre, one armed squad, two platoon leaders, one physician, two medics, and two assistants.

(Hoc Sai?) [sic]

Cadre:

Duc

1. Kieu

Bo [sic]

2. Xuan or Nguyet

Xuan

3. Ba Duc (basic level cadre) [sic]

4. Hai Boi (basic level cadre) [sic]

5. Ut Ai

[sic]

Assistant 6. Phat

7. Muoi

Ut Ai

Tam Truong

Interpreters: Ty, Muoi Tra Vinh (at Chifou), Minh (Mong's brother), and TN [sic] (his children and his wife have been confined in a concentration camp).

Public Health: The public health cell is composed of physician Tam, Ly, and Hanh (Tuyet's sister).

Duyen (assigned to the Armed Propaganda Unit operating in Prasaut).

Public Health Unit: Physician Tam, Hanh, Ly, Duyen, Ba Nho, and Phuong.

Document No 8

Unsigned report of April 19,
1970 Base Area Meeting.

Base Area Meeting

19 April after Directive 06 of C69 [possibly COSVN] had been implemented there have been new developments in the situation.

Our units and agencies located along the border areas had helped step up the friendly [revolutionary] movement; the Lon Nol Government has become weaker and more isolated. Most people are supporting the five-point statement of S [possibly Sihanouk]. Between 1 and 20 April, an area from 20 to 30 to 60 kilometers was enlarged from the border not to speak of many other areas where the Lon Nol administration has been paralyzed. In the West governmental authority has expanded as have guerrilla activities and those of the People's Revolutionary Party of C. The liberated area has approximately 1 million people of a total of 6 million, including 100,000 Vietnamese residents of a total of 600,000. In this situation, with the cooperation of our friends' forces, we had seized a few thousands weapons: more than 1,000 of them were seized on Highway 1, 300 from Krek, 500 from An Giang province, 500 from Tay Ninh province, and over 500 from T2. With the cooperation of our friends' force, we had successfully attacked one military post and 4 police posts and persuaded a number of panic-stricken people and monks to follow us. Since the Lon Nol Government had been isolated, the present situation favored our activities, and we acquired strong support in the eastern area of Cambodia. The situation developed quickly. The Current Affairs Committee estimated that the situation will develop even faster, because the Lon Nol Government is very weak, the people are in the full-blown movement, and the Queen expressed the hope that Viet-Nam would help her and showed confidence in Viet-Nam because VN is resolute to oppose the Americans.

The Lon Nol clique proved its stupidity and barbarity through its policy of massacring both the Cambodia people and the Vietnamese residents. Several news agencies including western press agencies had criticized Lon Nol for terrorist activities.

This situation obviously substantiates the correctness of Directive 06, which states that our difficulties are temporary and favorable opportunities will bring the Cambodian and Indochinese People's Revolutionary movements to the next higher steps, rally a great number of the royalist people [?] to a large front, and definitely bring the S [possibly Sihanouk] Party to the side of the Revolution. This will create a situation in which the Cambodian people of all strata must join the Revolution, establish the Revolutionary administration, and organize the liberation armed forces. Though we do not see all the possibilities yet, the recent coup d'etat appears to have given the Revolution a great leap forward, created a revolutionary government and laid the ground for an anti-American front of the Indochinese peoples in conjunction with activities on the three battlefields while the imperialists are de-escalating the war and continuing to withdraw troops from SVN. The Revolutionary movement is progressing quickly along with the conduct of a [military] campaign in SVN. The enemy pacification and Vietnamization strategy has experienced failures, chiefly in the Mekong River Delta. Meanwhile, the Laos war experiences fast developments in the Plain of Jars... and yet the Americans dared not bring their troops into Laos. They will no doubt experience a defeat on the battlefield. The L Government had requested weapons, but no one dared give it weapons. The press commented that giving weapons to the weak Lon Nol Government is a sure way to supply weapons to the VC.

The U.S. has no capability to wage a war in [Cambodia] but has the capability to give [the Lon Nol Government] financial aid, weapons and advisors, and use the South Vietnamese lackeys to attack us; the U.S.'s principal means of attack are intelligence, artillery and aircraft.

The Cambodian situation proves that the situation assessment and policy of our Party were correct.

The American imperialists are very stubborn, and we should beware of their activities. For instance, the Americans had wanted to overthrow S in order to strike VN and implement the Vietnamization plan. They wanted to cut our transportation routes, destroy our storage facilities and base areas in order to cause difficulties to us, weaken our forces, force us to make concessions at the peace talks, and check the expansion of the Revolutionary movement in C. But after the fall of S the present

Government was so weak that as we began to act, it was falling by large chunks. The press said that the VC had expanded many base areas and they would rather expand their controlled areas than conduct attacks on the Phnom-Penh. This is a very delicate situation.

Confronted with this situation, our Party planned to focus efforts to "Resolve the SVN battlefield" [win militarily]* while striving to give maximum assistance to the People's Revolutionary Party of C and bring the Cambodian Revolutionary movement to the next higher stage. In the recent past, we had correctly executed this policy. So far, we had not done anything which badly hurts the SVN situation because our forces had been rationally employed in C and regardless how large are our forces to be committed, we will not get ourselves in trouble in C. Previously, the enemy thought we might be in trouble in C. But, unexpectedly, this Campaign had brought bitter defeats to the enemy, who was obliged to review his pacification program.

Being strategically defeated, the enemy will make new efforts which require our precautionary measures. His efforts in Z would be the intensification of intelligence activities, Biet Kich operations, bombings, and artillery shelling, in conjunction with the employment of concentrated infantry units. At present, he focusses on the destruction of our storage facilities by means of artillery fire and bombings. Specifically, in Ba Thu he concentrated eight Puppet battalions and one armored, moving five to six kilometers deep into [the Cambodian territory], in some areas the armored vehicles went as far as 10 Km [inside Cambodia]. He clung to a number of areas located along the route leading to Hong Ngu Highway 1, and Road 22 leading to Krek; he also planned to establish a number of white zones along the border area. Tactically, he would pull out his troops from a vulnerable position, deliver heavy bombings and artillery fire, then concentrate troops to reoccupy it. This is merely his planning, whether he can do it or not depends on the balance of friendly and enemy forces. At present, we are striving to expand our [base] area and establish our mastership over it.

* Note: This is a literal, translation of "giai quyet chien truong" which is a military slang for winning on a battlefield.

We now control an area stretching from Road 7 to the vicinity of the Mekong River, and from Mimot to an area adjacent to the Mekong River. This is an important base area. We had to establish a base area of 60 kilometers in every direction in order to hold 60,000 to 70,000 people who are completely on the side of S. Here, jungles are large and interspersed with a number of spacious rubber plantations, villages, hamlets, ricefields and farm lands which yield good productions if we know how to exploit them. In addition, tens of thousands of Vietnamese residents are now living along the bank of the Mekong River. This area may fit the transportation, postal-communication, and signal communication strategy, and insure communication with T2 and T3.

The Standing Committee, reminds us of its strategic intention, which dictates that we ought to establish base areas to ensure the performance of combat and production activities for a long period of time. Its policy is as follows:

1. Efforts should be made to develop the Revolutionary movement in a short period of time; strengthen and develop this movement into a steadfast combat and production movement, stressing the rallying of revolutionary people in lieu of occupying jungle areas. In this regard, we activated the Liberation Committees in 10 phum's and held meetings with representatives of 21 other phum's on 19. [Probably means on the 19th of April]. The coming month will be a decisive month in the performance of farm work and preparations for countering the enemy offensive activities. The responsible agencies should therefore select personnel for this mission.

2. We should ensure the establishment of relationship between the new and old base areas, and employ the latter as "springboards" to obtain access to other areas and provide mutual support. The reason is that if the enemy occupies our old base areas, he will no doubt strike us. In other words, we must safeguard our old base area.

3. Organization of messing and billeting in the present base area.

We should observe movement and bivouacing regulations, watch for the enemy presence, safeguard the base area, because the enemy has the capability to strike us with artillery, aircraft

and commando troops. He has tried to reoccupy the Krek post. The U.S. and puppet troop are still holding on Route 22 and the enemy has not given up Route 7. Traffic on this route is not safe because of the danger of being detected and attacked by the enemy.

The Standing Committee, was disturbed about the indiscriminate firing by a number of our cadre and members.

4. Concerning the people:

In the establishment of a relationship with the people, cadre and members should display a correct attitude, respect their habits and traditions, and absolutely not touch their property, because they treated us as their liberators. We should tactfully refuse what they offer us.

5. Everybody should work to help both the SVN and Cambodian revolutionary movements develop, properly fulfill our responsibility, and do production work in accordance with the prescribed criteria. First, we ought to produce ammunition because resupply is difficult.

Situation of the base area

The Ca-Ngot situation adversely hurts the friendly Revolution.

The Cabot Post had 500 men and the Cam Xe had 300 men.

Money donated by rubber plantations to the Revolution:
The Frenchmen in Krek City donated rice, fish sauce, and cassava to our forces.

The people in Krek said that when living in their areas, we should not leave any trace which might disclose our presence, as the enemy would kill them.

There are enemy agents still operating in the Cambodian revolutionary ranks.

Some of our men, during their movement rushed into the people's houses after being spotted by the enemy aircraft.

For the Cambodian people, firing had become a political matter. In Ca Mong, the Cambodian asked our men why we did not give them weapons.

While living in the friendly territory, to safeguard our lives and carry out combat missions we ought to respect friendly sovereignty and should not chase the Cambodian people.

In doing farm work, do not clear new jungle areas, but strive to plant cassava. Do not transport farm products along communication routes.

The base area requested the following:

More old hammocks, mosquito-nets, and rifles (MAS, German, and Red-Stock).

The coup d'etat was engineered because the Americans had been defeated in SVN. It was designed to stop the SVN Revolutionary force from coming into Cambodia, and to turn Cambodia into a new colony of the Americans.

Did the Lon Nol Government plan to sell Cambodia to the Americans?

The Americans wanted to expand the war but they were obliged to de-escalate the war.

The Cambodian Army does not have a just cause. Its personnel usually harass the people and are corrupt.

The people of 18 out of 20 provinces in Cambodia participated in demonstrations.

To urge the people to oppose press-ganging.

The Cambodians were asked to either fight or lose their country.

The compliments of S were addressed to the demonstrations.

Declaration of S concerning the activation of the Front.

Message sent from S.

Our statement.

The appeal made by the Communist Party: Counter foreign invasion.

Missions: Stand against the Lon Nol Government and strengthen forces to safeguard the Khmer Kingdom.

According to S, the Cambodians should take up weapons, kill tyrants, break loose the enemy's grip, disband Lon Nol's organizations, refuse to pay taxes, and strive to establish a new life.

Each village will have seven Committee members and each hamlet will have three Committee members. Twenty or 30 representatives of a hamlet and 30 representative of a village should hold a meeting.

On 19 and 20 [probably means on the 19th and 20th April] village Front Committees were activated and district Front Committees will be organized in early May.

Document No 9

Fifteen pages of handwritten notes, undated. Contents indicate written late April, 1970, and that unidentified writer was member of NVA/VC security unit stationed in Cambodia, March-April 1970.

The General Situation

1. The Situation of the Coup d'Etat in Cambodia [on the] (18 March 70).

The coup d'etat was under the direct leadership of the Americans. This scheme had the complete cooperation of the French. On the occasion Sihanouk was in France.

[Marginal note]: France forced him to stay right there, because his interests in France were many. After the coup d'etat and [the return of] stability, France would send Sihanouk back to be a Puppet. [End marginal note].

The scheme: The enemy's plan is to destroy the revolution in South Viet-Nam and to support the realization of the scheme of "de-Americanization" aimed at achieving victory over the Revolution in South Viet-Nam.

If the enemy succeeds this time, then he will succeed in his scheme of "de-Americanization" of South Viet-Nam and carrying out his new kind of colonialism.

Specifics of this enemy scheme

To block the supply route on which weapons, ammunition, food, and equipment are transported through Cambodia (especially via the port of Sihanoukville) and to block the supply route from the rear. (We still have about 50,000 tons of weapons, ammunition, military equipment and supplies and medicine stored in the depots at the port).

The enemy intends to seize [this material] to equip his 18,000 troops.

[Marginal note]:

If the enemy achieves this goal, he will cause great difficulties for us, since he will attack our rear bases.
[End marginal note].

On the military aspect:

The enemy scheme is to use U.S. and Puppet troops to attack from South Viet-Nam toward the border while the reactionary [Cambodian] troops will attack from Cambodia down [the border] with the aim of destroying our revolutionary forces. This was the enemy's wicked scheme, but it did not turn out as he wished. The Cambodian government is plagued by internal conflicts.

Sihanouk is supported by the Sang kung [Cambodian Youth Front] and the royal faction.

Lon Nol has the support of the Republican Party.

Therefore, there is a split of forces.

Right after the coup d'etat, the Lon Nol clique was busy settling their internal problems, by arresting and removing [opposing] personnel from their positions. They could not win the support of the people, they only control a number of personnel of the army and police with which to repress the people's movements. However, even these troops and policemen under the control of Lon Nol were confused. His Marines while on patrol did not dare drive their boats close to the banks of the Cuu Long [Mekong] River; they only drove in the middle of the River. In some areas, his policemen did not dare conduct search operations and his informers worked uncommittedly.

Troops in some local areas resisted the Lon Nol clique; they announced that they were supporting and following Sihanouk. (For instance: Uon Souynh has 8,000 troops.) The local administrations are virtually disrupted. The administrative machinery from high to low echelons is not functioning.

The higher echelon [of the Cambodian government] was eager but the lower echelon was uncommitted. The Lon Nol Government has no support. Only the U.S. recognized it. The French paid no attention to it.

In the face of such a situation, will the Americans dare to get involved in Cambodia (that is to openly bring troops and aircraft into Cambodia). The Americans are having their difficulties:

They are being bitterly and heavily defeated in Viet-Nam.

They are being defeated in Laos.

The American people are opposed to the expansion of the war in Indochina.

[Marginal notes]:

The U.S. is presently unable to bring her troops into Cambodia to destroy the Cambodian Revolution.

Capabilities: She can only provide weapons, money, and a number of advisors. [End marginal notes].

Therefore, [the U.S. Government] ordered its troops in South Viet-Nam and the Puppet troops to coordinate with the reactionary Cambodian troops in attacking us.

Real facts:

The enemy brought his armored vehicles five kilometers into K [Cambodia] territory (our radio has denounced this), and he dropped bombs over K territory.

At present every 1,000 Cambodian troops has two U.S. advisors.

Our radio denounced that the U.S. troops had infiltrated Ta Mo (Soai Rieng), and provided weapons to the [Cambodian] troops stationed in Ta Pong Fatong.

To cope with the current situation, our Party advocated the following: To resolutely frustrate the enemy's schemes.

To deal heavy blows to him in order to achieve greater success.

To take advantage of this opportunity to help the Cambodian Revolution take a new step forward. The success of this mission will help our Revolution (by expanding our base areas and giving us a safe location for our messing and billeting facilities, a safe base from which to defeat the U.S. and Puppet troops).

Recently, a meeting between our Party and the Parties of two friendly countries was held with the presence of Sihanouk and Pham Van Dong to discuss the Revolution in Indochina. The three countries being close to each other will mutually support each other, share difficulties and happiness in order to bring the Revolution in Indochina to victory.

As concerns the Revolution in South Viet-Nam, we must fight vigorously.

We must conduct attacks deep into the enemy base areas (the climaxing phase began 1 April 70). At the same time, we must frustrate the enemy schemes at the border.

We must perfect our bases (as prescribed by Resolution 9) and use them as a stable position for us from which we can provide support to our friends.

In regard to the friendly [Cambodian] Revolution,

This opportunity has created conditions for the further development of the friendly [Cambodian] Revolution.

Enlarge liberated areas and base areas.

For the development of our real strength we must:

Establish the United Front Committee.

Activate a liberation army (the Cambodian Liberation Army).

Develop militia and guerrilla forces.

Engage in production (to have food to continue the resistance).

[Marginal notes]:

Kill cruel tyrants and break the enemy's oppressive control.

Put pressure on enemy posts to force the troops inside to surrender or to withdraw.

Develop guerrilla warfare.

(Build combat villages and hamlets).

[End marginal notes].

Situation of the friendly [Cambodian] movement:

Forces are available but the ideology and sense of organization of our friends are poor.

Therefore, we must be patient in providing help for their movement (because their capability of learning is slow we must use explanations that suit their level of understanding when we request their help, they request us to provide them with weapons, medicine, food, provisions, etc.)

Our request for the friendly side to indoctrinate and motivate their people cannot be immediately implemented; therefore, we should be patient.

This was the situation of the friendly revolutionary movement. Assistance to this movement requires our efforts and enthusiasm. We must consider our friends' Revolution as our own. Only in this way can we achieve great victories.

Main mission of the security command committee

The mission assigned to our Group and Group 180 is 100 times [more difficult than before].

We must fight on two battlefields [in South Viet-Nam and in Cambodian territory].

Our missions: Defend our base, help our friends to enlarge their bases for the resistance, and build up their force.

Develop guerrilla warfare.

Build up strength (government and political groups).

Motivate the people to engage in production work (to meet harvest time).

[Marginal note]:

Develop friendly base camps in liberated areas as large as possible and as deep as possible, from 10 to 15 kilometers [End marginal notes].

Specifically

Military

Activate 13 armed propaganda units.

Activate one full strength battalion.

Establish a training school for our friends, troops, (Military training, tactical and technical subjects).

(To activate thirteen platoons and one battalion to assist our friends and fight along with them.)

(Unit 1 to Unit 7 -----) [Three words illegible].

Equipment Plan

Equip the Chinese and Vietnamese residents who have been recruited [for this program] (engaged in armed activities).

Build up guerrilla forces and combat forces to protect agencies and Base Area M40. Maintain order and security in our operational areas and the regulations on messing, billeting, and

movement of our troops (check the activities of enemy espionage, reconnaissance, and Special Forces agents) to protect our depots and base camps.

"The Cong Truong [Division] will take charge of large scale attacks." In addition, we must protect the corridors and establish new ones. (These missions must be carried out step by step under the leadership of higher echelons and in accordance with the specific plan of each unit.)

Political

The requirement in the leadership of all Party Committee authorities is to keep their personnel's ideology in pace with the development of the situation to have a thorough knowledge of the new situation and the requirements of the new mission: "International Mission."

Expanding the base camps of our friends is advantageous to us because we can use them as support for our attacks against the U.S.

Our relations with our friends are the ties between comrades, based on love, equality, and mutual respect.

Eliminate the thought that we are "a big country" and that the friendly country is poor and weak. We must be patient and must sympathize with our friends (sometimes the capability of a district military commander of the friendly country is only as good as a soldier of our army).

[Marginal note]: This is the real nature of our friends who live in a neutral monarchic society. [End marginal note].

(A number of our friends joined the revolution only since the last demonstration).

[Marginal notes]:

We must realize that our difficulties are temporary. (The enemy's protracted attacks caused difficulties to us). But our situation is basically advantageous. The present situation is creating all conditions for us to take advantage of the opportunities in order to win big victories for the Revolution. [End marginal notes].

Provide mutual support and share difficulties with our friends, our friends do not have a regime yet.

(After we attacked the enemy posts our friends seized all the war booty). We have to understand them because they actually are short of many things.

We should share with them what we have.

Political training

Indoctrination of cadre and soldiers:

1. Conduct propaganda to motivate friendly people to:

Stand up to overthrow the Lon Nol government, to establish a new government in accordance with the appeal of Sihanouk.

2. Stage a guerrilla warfare movement (with the participation of all the people in the fight against the enemy).

(Build up the guerrilla forces) in hamlets and in villages.
Maintain security and increase vigilance.

3. Initiate a production movement and motivate the people to farm to harvest the coming crops (do not leave ricefield uncultivated).

4. Organize the people into groups.

Establish the National United Front.

Organize [popular] groups.

5. Provide guidance for the civilian proselyting task.

(Teach the five principles of the civilian proselyting task to the soldiers).

Comply with the regulations on the civilian proselyting mission.

(There are 12 regulations).

6. Provide military and political training for our friends, so that they can implement the two missions [political and military] at the same time.

Rear Service:

Make sure we have an adequate quantity of equipment, and food provisions to stage the guerrilla warfare movement (we must share [equipment and provisions] with our friends.)

Enlarge base camps. Prepare weapons, ammunition, and food provisions to be used in future large-scale campaigns.

Work out a plan to protect our depots, disperse goods in different depots, and counter the enemy's Special Forces and the Biet Cach [possibly the Civil Irregular Defense Group].

Organizations:

Units 6 and 7 are to be merged into one element. [2 words illegible].

Units 5 and 8 are to be merged into one element.

Unit 4 must defend the base area and the commo-liaison route.

Units 1, 2, and 3 must stay close to the objective areas for operations.

Units 9, 10 and 11 are to (conduct armed propaganda together with our friends).

Villages:

Stay close to the objective areas to stage the guerrilla warfare movement.

Maintain order: Kill tyrants and destroy the enemy's administrative personnel.

Attention:

The rear service is presently a big internal problem for us. We have financial difficulties: We suffered great losses in monetary exchanges. Proceeds from exchanges have not been collected yet.

The aid from the rear [possibly North Viet-Nam] has not been available in time (and we must cover the expenditures for the revolutions of two countries).

Therefore, we must make all our brothers realize our present difficulties, so that they will practice thriftiness, especially to save rice and weapons and ammunition. In the future they may have to apply an economy system on clothing items and rice; they must mend their clothes for use. (In the future, they will get only one suit per year, they will have to do without the sufficiency they now enjoy such as dress, underwear, monthly allowances, etc).

"Carry out the policy of thriftiness in an appropriate manner"

This is a big ideological problem. If we fail to provide appropriate guidance, bad thinking will crop up. At the same time, we should realize that our present difficulties are only temporary.

The establishment of a government

We must strengthen the administrations at base-level so that they can perform their missions of killing cruel tyrants and breaking the enemy's oppressive control.

Terminology:

"Phum" means hamlet.

"Khum" means village.

The Village Committee is called the United Front Committee, it has the following six missions:

1. Unite the people from all strata who live in villages. Motivate them to rise up to kill tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control, and to overthrow the Lon Nol Government and the clique of reactionary lackeys.

2. Stage the guerrilla warfare movement.
3. Promote production to feed the people.
4. Pay attention to education, social welfare, and public health.
5. Provide food for troops and agencies.
6. Pay attention to carrying out the training and propaganda, and civilian proselyting tasks.

(Conduct political and ideological indoctrination).

(Rally the people of all strata into associations).

Organization

A [village] Committee is made up of seven members.

Assignment:

1. One village chairman, with overall responsibility. He must have prestige among the people.
2. One secretary, committee member, (who must be progressive).
3. One vice-chairman, in charge of military affairs.
4. One Committee member in charge of education, social welfare, and public health.
5. One Committee member in charge of production.
6. One Committee member in charge of food supply.
7. One Committee member in charge of civilian proselyting, propaganda, and training.

Note:

The village vice chairman in charge of military affairs is assisted by the following subordinates:

One in charge of concentrated guerrillas.

One in charge of militia and guerrilla movement (specially, in charge of defense).

One in charge of maintaining order (chiefly security).

Notes: The [Revolutionary] administration must not include elements belonging to the Lon Nol clique.

Hamlet administration

One hamlet chief, in charge of political affairs.

One hamlet deputy chief, in charge of military affairs.

One committee member, in charge of production.

Organization of associations:

The organization of the associations is aimed at mobilizing the people's forces.

At present, there are two organizations with respective executive committees:

1. The Youth Group
2. The Women's Association

Purposes of the armed propaganda task:

1. To expose the dark scheme of the U.S. imperialists, who planned the coup d'etat to overthrow the Sihanouk Government. Unmask and denounce the reactionary ultra rightist clique lackeys of the U.S. imperialists who betrayed the people and undermined the neutrality and peace of Cambodia and the friendship between the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples.

(Based on the statement of Sihanouk and that of our government).

[Marginal Note] : Unite the two peoples to oppose the common enemy. [End marginal notes].

To motivate the people to rise up.

2. To resolutely overthrow Lon Nol's reactionary government.

(Kill cruel tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control).

To help [friendly Cambodians] to establish local administrations, organize popular groups, and develop their forces and guerilla warfare movement (equipped with locally made weapons).

To build combat hamlets.

3. To motivate the people to conduct struggles. Explain to them that to achieve national independence and freedom in accordance with the policy of Sihanouk, the people must stand up to struggle. They must actively participate in:

- Demonstrations and struggles.

- Production.

- And in the protection task.

[Marginal notes]:

Take precaution against the enemy who would not hesitate to use violence [against demonstrators].

Pay attention to the maintenance of security .
[End marginal notes].

(Protect our forces and take precautions against terrorism, and the enemy's revenge).

Apply the two-step, three-prong approach.

(Explain what the two-step, three-prong approach is)

Military attack.

Political attack.

Military proselyting activities.

(When a demonstration is conducted at a post, we can induce the wives and mothers of enemy soldiers to make, entry into the post and call their husbands and sons to get out and return to a civilian life).

4. Concerning Chinese and Vietnamese residents in Cambodia: In areas where conditions permit to struggle in legal status, we must motivate them to struggle for social welfare and democracy. In areas where the conditions do not permit us to do so, we must establish contact, and motivate them to either join the liberation army of our friends, the friendly revolutionary movement, or send them to Viet-Nam to participate in revolutionary activities.

Methods:

Carry out the guideline of the "three togethers"

Use short questions and answers so the people can remember easily.

Concerning the monks, use propaganda to motivate them to oppose Lon Nol and support Sihanouk.

What are the current missions of the border-defense units?

A number of our tasks are no longer relevant such as to maintain diplomatic contacts to win the sympathy [of the former Cambodian government]. But we still have the responsibility of maintaining order in base camps and establishing relations with the [Cambodian] friendly agencies. We are now assigned additional missions such as to conduct ideological indoctrination for the K [Cambodian] people, and to build up a real strength for our friends.

In summary: Our prime mission is to fight the U.S. in South Viet-Nam.

Our mission in K [Cambodia] is an emergency mission. There, we must rush forward, take advantage of all opportunities to achieve victories. All [border defense] units must make their best efforts and be brave in performing their assigned missions.

These missions are new and heavy, therefore, all units should perform their assigned missions and at the same time learn experiences, to improve the performance of their missions. They should report on difficulties encountered during the performance of their missions so that Doan [Group] may help them.

All units must activate their armed propaganda units.

Select one hamlet as a pilot project before carrying out the program in the entire area.

Carry out political investigations in hamlets and villages to obtain the accurate information on the local situation which is necessary for our immediate and long-range missions.

The performance of missions in K must be made in coordination with other agencies instead of individually.

We must cooperate with our friends in areas where they are present.

In areas where they are not present, we must still carry out the tasks, then turn over [the results] to our friends.

Document No 10

Four pages of handwritten
notes dated 29 April, 1970;
one typed page "Code of
conduct"

This is a true copy of cable message, number 01/TK, dated 27 April [70] from the High Command of Mien [SVN] to units of Doan 180 [possibly unit, with headquarters elements responsible for the security of the base area] and agencies located in the base area.

Upon receipt of this directive, the above units and agencies should disseminate it to all cadre, personnel, and soldiers in order to help them fully understand and properly execute it.

29/4/1970
For the Command Committee
of Doan 180
/S/
Le Binh

No. 01 TK [priority: absolutely urgent-?]
27/4

QS - ATK

[Military Affairs - Regional Security]

Directive concerning the organization of inspection teams and the dissemination of the 10-point code of conduct in the establishment of relations with the local people.

The "K" [Cambodian] Revolution is rapidly developing. The liberated areas have been expanded, and now include plantations and rural and urban areas. The population in liberated areas is growing larger and larger. Most of them are eager to take part in the overthrowing of the Lon Nol-Matak clique. But they are not familiar with all of the revolutionary activities. The enemy is striving to conduct deceitful propaganda activities and to threaten and demoralize the people. He is also spreading hatred and suspicion between the K [Cambodian] people and our people.

In some places, the population is still trying to evaluate our behavior and actions while cooperating with us to attack the enemy. Thus, every word and action of our cadre and soldiers, who are stationed or operating in newly liberated areas, will greatly influence the spirit and thinking of the "K" people and our task of motivating the masses to join the Revolution. Recently, many armed action units, cadre, and soldiers have, by their correct attitude, won the confidence of the people, positively contributed to the rapid establishment of the Front Committees [possibly of the National United Front of Kampuchia Front], and created a good influence.

However, in many places, some cadre and soldiers are still violating discipline, which is adversely influencing the morale and thinking of the people and harming the good nature of the revolutionary army. Following are the most common undisciplined actions:

Our cadre and soldiers have often shot at random. Some of them have stood in the middle of a Cambodian village and shot at high-flying enemy aircraft with an AK assault rifle.

They did not follow our movement regulations and went anywhere they wanted. Some went close to and some crossed through Cambodian villages. Some of them went to the villages to purchase goods, some entered villages to request food, and others organized parties.

They have also violated the customs and habits of the [K] people.

To keep strict discipline among the troops, to maintain order and security in liberated areas, and to successfully strengthen our bases in accordance with the directive from the Current Affairs Committee and Party Military Committee for Mien [SVN] the Mien High Command orders:

1. Unit commanders should indoctrinate all of their cadre and soldiers and help them to fully understand the political significance of the 10-point code of conduct in the establishment of relations with the local people. Armed action unit members must learn, in addition, the "eight things they should do." Afterwards, they should again disseminate the regulations on troop messing and billeting, firing of firearms, and movement in border bases.

2. Battalions and units of the same level and higher, stationed or operating in base areas are instructed to activate teams called "Teams for the Inspection and Dissemination of the 10-point Code of Conduct" prior to 30 April 1970. These teams should be put into action after a day of training.

a. Specific organization:

Each D [battalion] or equivalent unit should organize a team composed of four or five men led by a B [platoon] cadre.

Regiments and divisions should organize one to three teams each.

Each village should organize a three-man cell to operate in the village (agency).

Each district military command should assign one platoon headed by a B [platoon] cadre to operate in the district.

The province military command may activate one team to operate in key areas where there are many problems.

The members of the above teams must come from the present authorized personnel, we need not recruit new personnel for this project. These teams are designed to meet the four immediate requirements as follows:

b. The border teams must fully understand the significance and contents of the 10-point code and the eight do's. They should then disseminate copies of the code to all cadre and soldiers operating in their areas of responsibility. When meeting a cadre or a soldier, they should ask him whether he knows the 10-point code of conduct. If necessary, the code should be read to him, and he should be asked to observe and disseminate it to others. These teams should also disseminate and check the observance of regulations in border bases on opening fire and on the movements of troops in accordance with prescribed routes and times. They should look for and prevent activities which violate the 10-point code of conduct and the border base regulations by disseminating the contents of the code of conduct and regulations and asking the violators to avoid repeated violations. In cases

where there are soldiers who gravely violate discipline or refuse to observe the 10-point code of conduct, thereby adversely influencing the common security and order, the team members may on their own or in cooperation with the local units take them to a discipline camp.

They should also assess the situation and collect information about examples of good discipline for prompt encouragement and reports to higher echelons.

c. The units themselves should fully understand the significance and contents of the 10-point code of conduct and the eight do's in order to take action in an exemplary manner. Commanders at all levels should directly check and follow up on all activities and learn the results or the work of various teams in order to provide additional guidance and take measures to ensure the successful accomplishment of their tasks. In case of discipline break by military personnel, the direct commander of the culprit (s), the Party Branch and two Party committees of higher echelon will be held responsible. If the offense is so grave as to require action of a military court on the culprit(s), his superiors will also face disciplinary measures.

The points on which leadership should be emphasized in the organization of and assistance to the UBMT [possibly Cambodian National United Front Committee] by action teams operating in K.

1. This task must be urgently carried out to timely meet the pressing requirements of the situation. However, careful preparations must be made first, as we must thoroughly understand the situation before starting the organization. We should avoid the tendency to drag our feet but at the same time we should also avoid the tendency to do a simplified, perfunctory job out of a lack of political responsibility

2. We should pay particular attention to influencing personalities, (including the monks), who are highly trusted by the people, and should invite them to join the Front Committee but under our close leadership. We should never admit into the Committee undesirable individuals, those who owe blood debts [to the Revolution] or have a hostile political attitude toward us. However, we must not be narrow-minded in selecting only perfect men, but we should improve them while on the job, providing them with proper indoctrination and political awareness.

3. Members of the Front Committees in charge of military and security affairs must be selected among the sympathisers who are active, and brave, who have good relations with us and are trusted by the people.

4. Once the Committees are activated, they should immediately carry out those tasks which will bring prompt results in order to show the effectiveness of the new government and arouse the people's enthusiasm toward the Front Committees. The armed action units should support the above cited committees in all civil, military, and administrative tasks.

5. Concerning the local government (Cambodian National United Front Committees), we must provide them full support, respect their opinions, and heighten their prestige. We must try to indoctrinate and persuade them, but not do the job for them, threaten them or compel them [to do it].

6. All measures taken against the people, including the accusation of bad people, the punishment of the "K" [Cambodian] traitors, the punishment through economic measures, etc., must be carried out by the Front Committees and [local] people and not by the action teams. Instead of simply killing them, appropriate punishment, ranging from warnings and house arrests up to the death penalty, should be applied against the "K" [Cambodian] reactionary traitors. If the confiscation of private property of reactionary individuals is necessary, we should motivate the people to do it themselves and share the property among themselves. In this way, the people are only recovering what they have lost and are not receiving a donation from us.

7. We should pay particular attention to selecting the best cadre with good ideological attitudes and revolutionary ethics and assigning them as advisors to the Front Committees. They should attend the Committees' conference, if invited, but no more than two should attend (including an interpreter). They must be devoted and humble while serving the Front Committees. They must be patient and wise while giving advice and in no circumstances should they lose control over themselves and shout at the committees. In essence, the entire action team is an advisory detachment whose mission is not merely to propagandize and give advice, but to closely cooperate with the people in their activities and specially to get a firm hold of the guerrilla units and village Military Affairs Committees.

8. The action team must study to thoroughly understand the doctrines of patriotism and proletarian internationalism and strictly comply with the civilian proselyting regulations. They should especially heighten the revolutionary nature and fine traditions of our people's armed forces and strictly observe the following points:

They should not reside in the people's homes, but should station in a separate place close enough to the people's homes to facilitate their tasks.

They should motivate the people to promote production and directly contribute to production work.

They should not abuse the people['s confidence] to trade and purchase their goods at a cheap price. They should report to higher echelons those areas which can insure supplies for our troops.

They should not receive any assistance or accept gifts from the people which could affect their living conditions.

They should not drink alcoholic beverages, as this could adversely influence the people. They should master the mission guidelines for the action team which are to motivate, indoctrinate, enlighten the people and rely on the people in order to work. They must always heighten vigilance while carrying out their tasks.

They should live closely to and affectionately with the people and practice the slogan: "Be liked and respected by the people." They should strictly observe disciplinary regulations and submit reports requesting instructions. They should regularly review past activities to gain experiences.

[Type page in original document]

THE 10-POINT CODE OF CONDUCT:

1. Do not absolutely enter pagodas or violate their environment.
2. Secure the people's assistance in all matters dealing with the pagodas
3. Take off your hat and do not make noise while passing or approaching pagodas or Buddhist monks.

4. Do not threaten or disturb the people. Respect the elders and adopt a correct attitude towards women, youths, and children.
5. Do not take anything from the people, either from their homes or from their fields.
6. Do not enter into private business with the people nor request or accept anything from them. The unit representative should explain this policy to the people and solve all problems arising from it.
7. Return to the people what has been borrowed in serviceable condition and pay for that which is damaged.
8. Do not station troops in the people's homes or do kitchen work in the Phum (hamlet).
9. In combat or in case of danger, sacrifice yourselves to save the people's lives and property.
10. Every request for the people's help should be made through the local Front Committees, local cadre, and action teams.