


VIET-NAM

DOCUMENTS AND RESEARCH NOTES



THE VIET CONG'S MARCH: APRIL 1970 BLANK
DO NOT EXPANDING CONTROL IN CAMBODIA

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DOCUMENT No. 88

JANUARY 1971

**THE VIET CONG'S MARCH-APRIL, 1970
PLANS FOR EXPANDING CONTROL IN CAMBODIA**

A Documentary Record

THE VIET CONG'S MARCH-APRIL, 1970
PLANS FOR EXPANDING CONTROL IN CAMBODIA

--A DOCUMENTARY RECORD--

The Vietnamese People's Army--North Viet-Nam's regular troops (NVA) and the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army--the Viet Cong (VC)--began infiltrating men into South Viet-Nam through Cambodian territory as early as 1962. Gradually permanent installations or sanctuaries were established on the Cambodian side of the border and used as launching bases for attacks in South Viet-Nam. The Cambodian government estimates that by the end of 1969 no less than 50,000 Communist-led Vietnamese troops were stationed in these sanctuaries.

This collection of ten captured enemy documents shows the importance the Vietnamese Communists attached to the Cambodian bases, their intention of using them in "Campaign X" an offensive operation planned for Spring, 1970, (the first phase of which was in fact launched in March) and their reaction to the "new situation" brought about by the Cambodian National Assembly's creation of a government unwilling to sanction continued Vietnamese Communist violation of Cambodian neutrality. After a moment of shock their reaction was to endeavor to expand their base areas, moving deeper into Cambodian territory, and to guide in Cambodia, the organization of the National United Front of Kampuchia -- nominally headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Peking. At the same time the Vietnamese Communists undertook a parallel operation, to organize within the NUFK structure a tight Communist control system, manned by Vietnamese, supplemented if possible by members of the small Cambodian Communist movement.

Documents 1, 6, 7 and 8 in this collection were released to the press in Saigon on October 19, 1970 by the United States Mission in Viet-Nam. The remainder are here made available to the public for the first time. All of these documents were written before the Government of Viet-Nam and United States forces' interdiction of the Cambodian sanctuaries. Underlining is as in the originals. Arrangement is chronological in so far as dates are known or can be deduced.

The first document consists of notes made during August and September, 1969, by a cadre of "J-12 Section" of the SVNLA, which is probably the Political Staff Department of the SVNLA's Border Area Office. The Border Area Office directed the operations of VC units based in a long stretch of territory with camps, for the most part in Cambodian territory, straddling the boundary between the two countries.

". . . The border area is a very important area," the writer noted, "which we are striving to secure in order to protect our agencies and forces which are located there to support the battlefield." He then recorded a very imprecise analysis of Cambodian politics, which included a recognition of Prince Sihanouk's tolerance of the presence of Vietnamese Communists in his country, and an admission of the hostility which Cambodian soldiers and people, nonetheless, felt towards them.

Document No. 2 is a resolution adopted by the People's Revolutionary Party Committee of "J-12 Section," on the "situation during the first quarter of 1970." It indicates that the border area units were to have a major role in the "large military operations [which] may take place on all battlefields," and that "the Standing Committee of C. 69 [COSVN--the Central Office for South Viet-Nam, the Hanoi directed military-political command center for operations in most of South Viet-Nam], and the Party Military Affairs Committee are taking particular interest in our border activity branch." Besides recognizing the friction which existed between the VC and the Cambodian people, it reveals the poor morale, which characterized both North Vietnamese and VC troops in the sanctuaries at the end of 1969. A retraining program for the despondent troops is outlined.

Just eight days after the dismissal of Prince Sihanouk by the Cambodian National Assembly, the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam," on March 26, 1970 issued a "declaration" giving its version of the events which preceded that action, and pledged its support to Sihanouk's newly created "National United Front of Kampuchia." It is printed as Document No. 3.

No definitive statement of the operations COSVN had planned as "Campaign X", the Spring 1970 campaign, has yet become available in captured documents. Document No. 4,

however, states that it was launched "on the night of March 31", with, the document claims, initial success. While, as Document No 2 shows, a Spring campaign was planned by the NVA/VC prior to the March 18 change of government in Cambodia, by April 3 it was envisioned as a part of an Indochina-wide thrust. "The success of Campaign X," Document 4 states, "combined with the rapid development of the revolution movement in Cambodia and the great successes of the Lao Revolution has created more favorable conditions for our side and has changed the situation on the SVN battlefield in particular and that of the Indochina battlefield in general." The unit which originated this "Urgent Directive" was a rear services headquarters stationed in the border sanctuaries. Attention is devoted to political reorientation of its subordinate units and to their performance as supply agencies.

Document No. 5 consists of the handwritten notes of two meetings, one held on April 9, one on April 20, 1970 by an unidentified, probably rather low level, "military council." They were signed by its secretary. The first set of notes outlines the objectives of the Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia as of April 9. They included making war on the Cambodian forces, expanding the VC bases and assisting "friendly" Cambodian groups "to develop their armed and political forces." The April 20 notes are concerned with the tactical problems of the unit.

On April 16 the Command Committee of Doan 180 issued a "circular" to all units subordinate to it providing them "guidance for tasks in Cambodia." It is Document No. 6 in this collection. "Doan" translates literally as "Group". It has been encountered in a number of captured documents, and appears to mean a specialized armed force, varying in size according to its mission. The careful spell out of political-organization details and cautions in this directive suggests that Doan 180 was made up of a number of detachments, and was one to which political missions were entrusted. It may have been an armed security regiment.

The circular is critical of the Doan's and of armed propaganda units' performance in establishing revolutionary local governments in villages and hamlets in Cambodia which had come under Vietnamese Communist military control. It then lays down criteria for selection of Cambodian personnel for both administrative and "Cambodian Reunification Front" committees.

A network of women's, youths' and farmers' associations remarkably like that prevailing in North Viet-Nam and on paper in National Liberation Front influenced "zones" in South Viet-Nam was also envisioned. But, "we must avoid the impression that such organizations are initiated by the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army or the 'Viet Cong'. While Buddhist monks and intellectuals are to be told that their leaders are 'Sihanouk and the Front. . . It is advisable to tell the working class people that the Cambodian Revolution is led by the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia."

There is no indication of the precise date of Document No. 7, twelve pages of unattributed handwritten notes, but like Document 6 it reflects thinking and experience of the Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia between April 15 and 29, 1970. Party Committees in NVA and VC units are to activate "groups" to assist Cambodians in carrying out their revolution. Civilian People's Revolutionary Party Committees in Tay Ninh and Kien Tuong provinces of South Viet-Nam, which border on the Cambodian base areas, were, under COSVN direction, also to assist in this task, as were 'Party Chapters of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia and 'the Party network' of Cambodian Communists. Detailed instruction on the organization of local units of the "National United Front of Kampuchia," of guerrilla forces and security agencies follow.

The next document, No. 8, is a report of a "base area meeting," held on April 19. It cited a Directive 06, presumably from COSVN, whose optimistic assessment of the "revolutionary movement" in Cambodia seemed to be borne out by events. Therefore "our Party", meaning the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet-Nam, could plan to "resolve the SVN battlefield" as well as to continue to assist the Cambodian revolution to reach "the next higher stage". The Vietnamese leaders at the April 19 meeting were also anxious to employ their old base areas as "springboards to obtain access to other areas and provide mutual support." There was, however, some apprehension expressed at the meeting that rank-and-file VC conduct towards the Cambodian people was not quite what it should have been.

"Sihanoukville's" importance to NVA/VC operations is stated in Document 9, which recapitulated the military and political situation in Cambodia after March 18. These notes were jotted down sometime between April 25 and April 30. Their author thought that: "The U.S. is presently unable to bring her troops into Cambodia

to destroy the Cambodian Revolution." He had, however, received news that: "Recently, a meeting between our Party and the Parties of two friendly countries was held with the presence of Sihanouk and Pham Van Dong to discuss the Revolution in Indochina. The three countries being close to each other will mutually support each other, share difficulties and happiness in order to bring the Revolution in Indochina to victory." The meeting referred to is the so-called Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference which took place on April 24-25, 1970(*).

Commenting on "the Cambodian Revolution" and the opportunities it presents to the NVA/VC, the document noted that "liberated areas and base areas" could be enlarged, and a Cambodian "Front" and "militia and guerrilla forces" created. Terrorist tactics could also be employed as they had been in Viet-Nam to "kill cruel tyrants and break the enemy's oppressive control."

The principal problem seems to have been that "the ideology and sense of organization of our Cambodian friends are poor." The document provides an unflattering analysis of the "friendly" Cambodians' revolutionary capacities from the NVA/VC's point of view. Patience was necessary in dealing with them, the document stressed, and outlined in detail the local organizational forms the Vietnamese should guide the Cambodians in establishing.

Document No. 10, the final one in this collection, was written on April 29, 1970, the day before Government of Viet-Nam and United States forces began their interdiction campaign in the border sanctuary areas. Like Document No. 6 it was prepared in the headquarters of Doan 180. It is a "true copy" of a cable sent to Doan 180 by the "High Command of Mien," either COSVN or SVNLA headquarters, on April 27. The message begins with a criticism of the actual conduct of NVA/VC troops in Cambodia, and an instruction to unit commanders to "indoctrinate all of their cadres and soldiers and help them understand the political significance of the 10-point code of conduct in the establishment of relations with the local people." A typed copy of the code was appended. Inspection teams to secure compliance with the code were to have been set up.

(*) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No 80

"The Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference."

The instruction then spells out how the Vietnamese troops were to continue molding the "Front Committees" and local revolutionary administrative units in occupied Cambodia. Particular efforts were to be made to select "the best cadre with good ideological attitudes." Vietnamese "action teams" must stimulate the "Front Committees" to accuse and punish "bad people," with "appropriate punishment ranging from warnings and house arrests up to the death penalty," rather than themselves performing these tasks.

Document No 1

Notebook entries, August to September 1969 by a cadre of J-12 Section (possibly Border Area Office, Political Staff Department, Headquarters SVNLA)

1. Importance of border areas: The border between Cambodia and Vietnam is 930 kilometers long. The areas along it constitute a rear area which directly influences the resistance war in South Vietnam. Supplies and weapons are brought through this area.

2. Characteristics: Through these areas we could establish contact with the world and the great rear area. For this reason, the U.S. and puppets are striving to cut us completely from Cambodia.

I. SCHEMES

1. The U.S. and Puppets are trying to isolate the South Vietnam Revolution. The U.S. has poured in money to bribe the Cambodian Government in order to control the border areas and drive us out.

To achieve their purpose, they have sent out spies from SVN and Cambodia to the border areas. These spies, (from South Vietnam) composed of Special Forces, commandos, and reconnaissance agents are disguised as cadre and Liberation troops, wearing same uniforms, and carrying the same equipments as the Liberation troops.

The spies who came from Cambodia mingled with the people under the pretense of visiting their relatives or doing business [or enlisting in our ranks]. They inquired about our bases and storage facilities and then sent either Special Forces or B-52 bombers to attack us.

In short, what the Cambodians knew, they reported to the U.S. and Puppet troops who then used air and artillery to attack us in the border areas. (The U.S. troops launched the following attacks in the border areas.)

Attacked our base areas in March 69.
Attacked Areas 50 and 71 in May 69.
Attacked Area 91 in August 69.

Recently, they attacked Sau Ro's area, eight kilometers inside the Cambodian territory.

2. They kidnapped our personnel, seized the documents then either killed or released the victims. They claimed that the victims were arrested by the Cambodian authorities, in reality, they seized the documents which they sold to the Americans who then used the information to launch heliborne troops to attack our border area.

The ultra-rightists constantly criticized the Cambodian [Government]. They said that the B-52's attacked Cambodian territory because Cambodia harbored the "Viet Cong."

The enemy is trying to win Cambodia's sympathy in order to control the border areas.

He is attempting to destroy our rear area, our support area and create dissensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples.

He criticized the Cambodian people and Government and those who support us.

In conclusion, the border area is a very important area which we are striving to secure in order to protect our agencies and forces which are located there to support the battlefield.

II. THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT CONSISTS OF THREE TYPES OF MEMBERS

1. The rightist faction: This faction consists of people with narrow-minded nationalism. They always seek to create dissension between the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples and push the Cambodian Government to cut all relations with us, to cease supporting us and stop all trade activities with us.

2. Ultra-Rightists:

This faction consists of totally pro-American individuals.

3. Neutral Faction:

This faction consists of those who have a progressive political tendency. They want to support us and maintain Cambodia's independence and neutrality.

Due to the confusing political situation in Cambodia and the diversity of factions within the Cambodian government, we have met many difficulties in our diplomatic relations with Cambodia from the Central down to the local levels.

The [Cambodian] Government's policy

1. The Cambodian Government still maintains diplomatic relations with us, because it knows that we have achieved great victories. They also know that we are strong and have a righteous cause, and for this reason, the world supports us. Cambodia will always be our neighbor. Therefore, it cannot break off relations with us.

Cambodia needs our support to resist the U.S. and Puppet [South Vietnam] aggression.

2. Cambodia intends to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. in order to receive economic aid because Cambodia is having economic difficulties:

Cambodia has lost crops in all areas of the country. The national budget has a deficit of four billion Riels [Cambodian currency, 55R = \$1.00 U.S.]

In addition, there are the negative and precarious aspects:

1. She is afraid that if we gain a complete victory, our Revolution will have an influence on the [Cambodian] Revolutionary movement and cause the Cambodian people to uprising.

What is the origin of the negative aspect? It originates from this country's feudal and bourgeois regime. The bourgeois class rules Cambodia; it fears any type of bourgeois Revolution and has to take precautions.

However, Cambodian still needs to rely on our forces.

1. The Cambodians still rely on our forces because they fear that the U.S. will exert pressure on them. By relying on our forces, not only can they maintain their independence, but also have an opportunity to exert pressure on the U.S.
2. We are strong. We have a firm political standpoint and a good cause. We also have the support of Sihanouk which increases our prestige.
3. After we win victory, Cambodia will live side by side with our country, a peaceful country with a correct policy. For this reason, Cambodian cannot fail to support us.

Results obtained:

Cambodia failed to receive financial aid from the U.S. and to strengthen her weak economy. She finally realized that the Vietnamese and the socialist bloc, were her true friends. For instance, Cambodia has received a donation of four million metric tons [sic] from NVN, and 10 million metric tons [sic] from China. While we assisted her, we did not intervene in her internal affairs. As for the Americans, they would provide aid to Cambodia only if she met the following conditions:

1. Not allow the Viet Cong to station [their troops] on the [Cambodian] border.
2. Allow the U.S. to re-install an ambassador in Cambodia.
3. Allow the U.S. to establish an airline from Saigon to Bangkok, via Phnom Penh.

It is obvious that the U.S. assistance is conditional and a threat to Cambodia. Cambodia did not dare accept it.

III. OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CAMBODIA

Since our foreign policy is a correct one, the Cambodian Government promptly recognized the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and invited our government to visit Cambodia and received us warmly. The Cambodian Chief of State joined the

government of North Vietnam to mourn the death of Uncle [Ho Chi Minh]. He also invited our Prime Minister to visit Cambodia.

These are the good aspects of Cambodia.

Our position:

1. Our position is strong and our political stand is sound. This is clearly realized by the Cambodian Government.
2. We gained the sympathy of the Cambodian labor class. Therefore, we are required to observe the following points:

When encountering difficulties caused by the Khmer people, we should not be confused, but remain calm and believe in the Front. If we are captured [by the troops], we should display a firm political attitude, affirm our position and abstain from making irresponsible statements.

Conversely, if we meet favorable conditions, we should not lose our vigilance.

Our shortcomings:

1. We did not respect the [Cambodian] territorial integrity.
2. The messing, billeting, and movement regulations of our troops were not strictly observed. We fired carelessly and killed people and cattle. This adversely affects our influence upon the Khmer people.
3. Our soldiers were not courteous and did not display equality toward the Cambodian people in dealing with them.

They failed to live up to the code of the People's Army. In some areas, they either lowered the prestige of the revolutionary forces or revealed military secrets. They failed to understand the Cambodian people. They did not discriminate between friend and foe.

IV. [ANTICIPATION OF] THE FORTHCOMING
SITUATION AND OUR MISSIONS:

Characteristics: The U.S. will sustain more failures on the SVN battlefield and will fail in its attempt at establishing its influence in Cambodia. This is why they will react more strongly, and will attack deep in the border areas to pressure Cambodia. They will try to sow division among Cambodian ranks and undermine the solidarity of Cambodia and our country. As for Cambodia, insurmountable difficulties will arise if she demands aid from the U.S.

Therefore, the border area situation will be more complicated in the near future.

Our mission:

Our chief mission is to continue to win Cambodia to our side for the benefit of our frontlines, our messing, and our billeting at the border.

Our required attitude:

1. We should firmly maintain the attitude of a man who is fighting for a just cause, and who is winning.
2. We should treat the Cambodians as our equals, we should be friendly but constantly vigilant.
3. In trying to win Cambodia to our side, we should consider the Cambodian population as our main objective and try to win their support.

All participants have displayed a correct attitude during the indoctrination course. [They were all serious and satisfied]. Everyone joined in the discussion.

Results obtained: They all realized the importance of the border area which is our direct rear area and also our base area. Before the indoctrination, they failed to understand this important point. They only thought that the Cambodians were hospitable people.

The U.S. and Cambodia's schemes:

Our personnel have realized that Cambodia cooperated with the U.S., and provided them with intelligence information. Concerning the espionage activities, they had thought that the enemy spies and Special Forces personnel only existed in SVN, while in Cambodia only Cambodian officers and soldiers could cause us difficulties. They failed to notice those persons who are disguised as traders, or people visiting their relatives. Due to the lack of vigilance, they did not keep an eye on the merchants or people who frequently went into the woods. They thought that the latter were woodsmen or smugglers, (but did not consider the possibility that they might be enemy spies coming from inside Cambodia).

Evaluation of the positive and negative of Cambodia.

The participants understood the nature and composition of the Cambodian Government, which displayed a negative attitude by maintaining diplomatic relations with us while re-establishing relations with the U.S.

Review of our past attitude:

We did not respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia and looked down on the Cambodian people. For instance, our messing, billeting, and movement have had adverse effects on the Cambodian people's standard of living.

Our personnel were afraid of only Cambodian officers who rode motorcycles, but [five words illegible].

They paid little regards to the Cambodian people.

They were inclined to impress the Cambodian people with their weapons and thought they could bribe them with money.

They have not made positive efforts to assist our [Cambodian] friends and promote solidarity [between our two people].

Confirming the class nature of the Cambodian people.

In the forthcoming missions we may meet [sic].

We should maintain a friendly attitude with them, but we must also observe the traditions and regulations of our army.

It will be possible for some of us to be arrested.

Our attitude should be: any statement we make should be in compliance with our policy and strategy.

We must also know that when the enemy does arrest us that we must call upon our revolutionary pride, and remain faithful to the Party and loyal to the people.

We will lose the virtue of the Revolutionary Army if we disclose any secrets.

We would rather die than reveal secrets. To persuade them of our good intentions, we should talk only about the friendship between the two peoples. (If they try to bribe us or buy us off, we must firmly maintain our revolutionary pride to make them admire us.)

The best measure is to heighten our vigilance under all circumstances.

Border [unit]

Presently, each unit has one set [of kitchen utensils]. It is requested that the utensils be increased by 50% so that they can entertain guests. The rear service needs the following items:

- One cauldron for each units [sic units]
- Seven cauldrons for the inter-unit.
- Each cauldron should be large enough to cook rice for 12 people.
- One machete for each unit.
- One saw for each inter-unit.

Clothing for [Unit] 89. Since the beginning of this year, we have only received eight suits and 95 meters of nylon.

Allowance for administrative office and for reception of guests (August 69).

Allowance for repair of bicycles not issued (Sept. 69).

Document No 2

Nine typewritten pages, undated,
contents indicate was written
December 1969 or January 1970
by Party Committee, J-12,
(possibly Border Area Office
Political Staff Department
Headquarters SVNLA)

The People's Revolutionary Party
SVN

Party Committee of J.12

R E S O L U T I O N

J-12 PARTY COMMITTEE'S LEADERSHIP DURING
THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1970

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION DURING THE
FIRST QUARTER OF 1970:

1. The first quarter of 1970 is part of the dry season of the year. It is a period during which large military operations may take place on all battlefields. The U.S. and Puppet Army may have strong reactions against us. They may conduct strong attacks against our rear bases along the border area especially against our important areas of operations.

2. The rate of movement and transportation, the messing and billeting activities, and the number of storage depots will increase. Therefore, the situation will become more complex.

3. The favorable relationship between us and Kampuchia [Cambodia] may possibly be maintained as it is now or become even better. However, it may become bad due to internal contradictions of the changes in organization, the provocative actions of the U.S. and the rightists, or the bad attitudes of our personnel in the border area. These difficulties, if any, are only temporary and localized. The general trend continues to be favorable.

K [Cambodia] always uses the assistance given us in the matters of messing, billeting, traveling, and especially transportation as a lever to put pressure on us concerning the Red K by restricting our own messing and billeting activities [sic].

4. The resistance against the Americans may last a long time. Hardships and the fierceness of the war are increasing and the implementation of the new policies concerning the wounded and sick soldiers is causing complicated development in the ideology and feelings of many cadre and troops, especially those who were born in North Viet-Nam.

5. The missions in the border area have increased and become more complicated while our cadre's skills, ethics, sense of responsibility, and capability to handle the missions independently, are poor. Thus, in order to accomplish our missions successfully, we should promptly train our cadre operating in the border area. These cadre should be large in number and possess good qualities and professional knowledge.

6. The reorganization and reassignment of the border inter-units will influence the thinking, ideology and feelings of a number of cadre and troops.

The above characteristics are an indication of the complexity of the situation in the coming period. However, we have many advantages. The most basic advantage is that the Standing Committee of C.69 and the Party Military Affairs Committee are taking particular interest in our border activity branch. Moreover, we are under the direct leadership of the Political Department and supported by friendly units. Most of our cadre, Party members, and troops display a high sense of responsibility in performing their duty. They are experienced and devoted to their missions.

If we know how to learn from our experiences in 1969 and strive to build up a strong Party body and a cadre staff, we will be sure of successfully achieving the missions assigned by higher echelons.

II. SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP TASKS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1970

A. Leadership over Activities in the Border Area.

1. We should increase the control of activities at district, province, and sub-province levels, especially province and sub-province levels. This mission is very important because it involves not only messing and billeting activities, but also the transportation of major goods during the forthcoming dry season.

2. We should strengthen our relationships with the [possibly Cambodian] people, authorities, and other military units in the villages along the [Vietnam-Cambodia] border. Efforts should be made to obtain support from the [Cambodian] people. We should give them adequate assistance in matters concerning public health and social welfare. We should encourage them to work on production and provide them with favorable conditions for earning their living. We should indemnify the people for any damages or losses caused by our troops, settle all misunderstandings and troubles, and strengthen solidarity and friendship between the people and us.

3. We should coordinate rear service activities with border area tasks so as to fulfill the requirements of the rear service in border area and provide effective support to our immediate front line activities.

While coordinating our activities, we should indoctrinate inter-units and border units to thoroughly understand our principles and provide the rear service branch with favorable conditions for accomplishing its missions. In all contacts with K, border cadre should assume the principal role. They should avoid inflexibility which is detrimental to the accomplishment of the mission or non-observance of principles leading to delay in fulfilling the requirements of the rear service branch.

4. We should help province and district military commands improve the organization and activities of the villages and areas, and rearrange their troop formations and messing and billeting activities to suit the local political situation, terrain features, and the characteristics of each unit and agency.

5. We should increase combat preparedness and counter-sweep activities, attack on Biet Kich [Special Forces], and activities to detect and arrest [enemy] intelligence agents. Attention should be paid to investigating suspects and strangers coming from other areas. We should, together with the Security Section, closely watch the entry and exit points and main communications routes. Inter-units should secure entry and exit points and routes leading from U.S.-Puppet controlled areas to the border area.

Inter-units and border units should classify the people in their area of responsibility according to their political attitudes and establish files of all those whose political backgrounds are questionable.

We should closely watch the activities of the armed outlaws. We should heighten our vigilance and avoid their dishonest acts. We should try to avoid provocative actions, because any clash between those people and us will cause us difficulties in the present political situation.

6. We should reorganize our sections, agencies, inter-units, and border units to suit the present situation and mission. Preparations should be made for the opening of training courses in military and border tasks.

B. Matters Relating to Leadership in the Strengthening of Internal Organizations.

In compliance with the political activity plan for 1970 of the Political Department, and in accordance with the present situation of the unit, the leadership in strengthening of internal organizations during the first quarter of 1970 will focus on the following tasks:

1. Political indoctrination and ideological guidance:

We should continue to thoroughly understand Resolution 9 of the Central Political Department, the policy of the General Offensive and Uprising, and the strategic determination of the Party, in order to thoroughly understand the characteristics of the border situation and border tasks. We should continue to exercise leadership over the implementation of Directive 120 of COSVN and the resolution concerning the border. We should

motivate all cadre and troops to overcome difficulties and strive to successfully carry out the missions assigned by the Party Military Affairs Committee and the Military Command.

We should immediately initiate a strong emulation movement to foster pride in achieving merits right in the first month of the first quarter and bring a new transformation to our morale, ideology, and working attitude in 1970. In order to strengthen the Border Party body ideologically and politically, the solidarity, and unity of mind in the entire Party body, all personnel should set good examples in every field, including ideology, task performance, Party activities, specialized missions, and output.

During the first quarter, efforts should be concentrated on fulfilling the following requirements:

Strengthen the ideological stand on absolute revolution and the determination to achieve every mission under any circumstances. Oppose rightist and pessimistic attitudes, such as the fear of protracted war, hardships and difficulties, war fierceness and sacrifices and complex situations. All of these fears lead to sluggishness, wait and see attitude, or loss of aggressiveness.

We should strengthen the internal unity from higher to lower echelons, maintain good coordination between cadre and troops, implement collective democracy and take pride in criticism and self-criticism. We should promote the sense of collective master-ship and the sense of organization and discipline and improve our revolutionary ethics by developing the good examples of cadre and opposing individualism and "freedomism" which induce the individual to be too much concerned with the questions of life, death, pleasure, and hardship, to insist in enjoying pleasures, to become partial, selfish, corrupt, and licentious and therefore to be harmful to internal unity and revolutionary ethics.

We should heighten the sense of political responsibility, the spirit of performing tasks, and improve our attitudes based on a detailed, specific, proper, and careful plan. Cadre, in particular, should overcome the habit of doing work superficially and carelessly. They should improve the prestige and conduct of unit personnel at all times.

Along with conducting the regular ideological indoctrination, in the forthcoming ideological and political indoctrination task, we should concentrate our leadership on the spring political reorientation campaign (which, according to the directive of the Political Department, will be conducted in the first quarter).

We should continue to step up an emulation movement to achieve merits in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of our Party.

2. Strengthening the Party and [Youth] Group:

We should use as a basis the final recapitulation of the campaign for the building of "Four-Good" Party Chapters in 1969 to continue the same campaign for 1970.

First of all, we should fully realize that the campaign for the building of "Four-Good" Party Chapters is the basic link in the building of the Party, agencies, and units. It is also a central link for all campaigns in the base-level units. Thus, we should be fully aware of the purpose, significance, and requirements of the campaign to build "Four-Good" Party Chapters. In the course of the indoctrination, attention should be paid to fulfilling the following requirements:

We should give maximum attention to training Party members, especially cadre Party members. We should train them in such a manner that they will have the desire for self-improvement. We should train them on class ideology, the ethics and the pride of a Party member in combat, in missions, and in Party activities.

[Marginal note]: of 70% of Party members who reached the "Four-Good" criteria, 40% are rated "Superior."

We should exercise close control over Party member activities, especially their ideology. We should train them to overcome erroneous tendencies such as sticking too much to formalities, jealousy, inflexibility, and the lack of seriousness.

We should give maximum attention to increasing the quality of the activities of the Party Chapter, Chapter Party Committees, and Party cells in order to ensure that these activities reflect the quality of leadership and combativity.

We should improve the ability of the Party Chapter secretaries and Party cell leaders to ensure successful task performance, especially when they have to work independently or when the unit has to operate alone. We should consider the building of "Four-Good" Party cells, Group Sub-Chapters, and units as an important mission.

We should coordinate our efforts in building "Four-Good" Party and Group Chapters with the efforts in countering the enemy's attacks, maintaining security, increasing production, and practicing thrift.

Development of the Party:

We should firmly grasp the guidelines on developing the Party quantitatively and qualitatively. Development should be coupled with efforts to consolidate the Party and to continue the drive to recruit the Ho Chi Minh class of Party members in compliance with the COSVN Resolution. Particular attention should be paid to the following:

We should firmly grasp the class policy of the Party and the principles and procedures concerning the recruitment of Party members, and avoid admitting those whose personal history is unclear or those who have not yet been tested for a period of time.

Along with the development of the Party, we should improve the quality of all Party members. During the first quarter, all inter-unit Party Committees, Party Chapters, agencies, sections should open a short-term training course for new Party members and for those members who need improvement. At the same time we should educate all Party members, in the months to come, in accordance with the basic program of the [Political] Department.

3. Cadre Task:

We should thoroughly understand the Party's policies concerning the cadre task. We should constantly improve the cadre qualitatively and quantitatively to ensure an adequate number of cadre to fulfill future missions. Following are immediate requirements of the cadre task:

- Readjust the assignment of cadre in accordance with the plan to rationalize the organization and staffing pattern. This will increase the leadership quality in the inter-units and units. We should also strengthen a number of important elements in the agencies and sections.

- Urgently, actively, and regularly train cadre and improve their ability by conducting training courses within each branch, on-the-job, and through practical missions. We should improve the cadre in all fields, especially in the ideological, political and professional fields.

- Strengthen the management of cadre and properly implement the four types of management: Party Committee's collective management, unit Commander's management, Party Chapter's management and specialized agency's management.

- Implement the annual review of cadre's performances. Use the results of the review to help the cadre improve his training in a practical way.

- Pay maximum attention to solidarity among cadre, especially among cadre in the Party Committees and among cadre holding responsible positions. We should take prompt action to strengthen the poor solidarity now existing in a number of unit Command Committees.

Pay more attention to taking care of cadre, especially the aged and invalid. We should have full information on their state of health and timely send to convalescence camps or hospitals those who are weak or seriously ill. At the same time, we should pay attention to their sentiment and stabilize their living conditions to assure that the cadre perform their missions without worrying about their families. (concerning those comrades in the unit who have children)

4. We should continue to give close guidance to the drive motivating vigilance against the enemy and preservation of secrets against enemy spies.

One of the most important tasks at the present time is that of preserving secrets against enemy spies. In light of the situation which is evolving in a decisive way, in order to cope with the

activities on an extremely complicated base of operations on the border and to deal with an extremely obdurate enemy, we should fulfill the following security mission requirements:

- We should maintain the monthly alert system in the unit, indoctrinate the cadre and troops to heighten their revolutionary vigilance and control all relationships with the exterior [of the base camp]. We should eradicate all manifestations of subjectiveness and vain talkativeness, activeness which give away our secrets especially in our contacts with traders or merchants and in our relations with the K authorities, officers, and troops. We should pay particular attention to indoctrinating and controlling translators and prescribe regulations concerning the relationships with K in border areas which are to be strictly observed.

- We should be, at all times, fully aware of the political situation in the units. Our immediate task is to complete the individual files of unit members, carry out the investigation of newly assigned soldiers, and possess full information on security targets [sic]. We should interest ourselves in the administration of the army and take timely action to discover and correct erroneous thoughts and suspected activities. We should be determined to prevent our troops from abandoning their mission or deserting. We should heighten our vigilance against the enemy's psychological warfare and Chieu Hoi [Open-Arms] activities directed against our organizations from all directions.

In the time to come, all units must have full information on each individual member. Inter-units must be informed of the status of all cadre from squad leader to higher echelons.

We should continue to build a vanguard unit in matters of security maintenance for 1970. Motivating personnel to maintain security should be closely coordinated with the building of "Four-Good" Party Chapters. The building of vanguard unit is included in the criteria of the "Four-Good" campaign.

5. Guidance for successful implementation of policies concerning wounded soldiers who have poor health and who are to be evacuated to A [possibly NVN] in accordance with plans.

Failure to implement this task will adversely influence [personnel] ideology and our organizations in the border area. The present ideological trend shows some negative signs which are affecting the missions. Therefore, all Party Committee authorities and unit commanders should be fully aware of the policies of the Party Military Affairs Committee in order to provide sound and close leadership. It is necessary to assign a cadre to take charge of providing guidance for the implementation of this task (specific plans should be worked out with guidance from the staff).

In the course of indoctrination, all cadre and troops, including those who are to be evacuated [to A] and those who have to remain, should thoroughly understand our policies so as to maintain solidarity. Action should be taken to organize and stabilize the situation as promptly as possible so as to avoid confusion, disappointment, or a long wait which will affect the unit's task. For those who are to be sent to A according to the plan, we should indoctrinate them carefully. They should have a good ideology, a responsible attitude, a thorough knowledge of the ideological concepts, a strict observance of the revolutionary requirements, and a firm determination to maintain the traditions of the People's Army. They should also avoid manifesting self-aggrandizement, self-centeredness or demanding excessive favors, attitude which would give bad examples to the unit.

Guidance should be provided for each step in the implementation of this task, placing emphasis on political indoctrination. All rights and privileges should be respected so as to ensure good implementation of the policies.

6. Sound guidance should be provided for the rational organization of the authorized strength.

We should heighten the sense of responsibility, organization, and discipline of the cadre and troops. We should train them to be ready to carry out the arrangements to rationalize the organization of the unit. On this basis, we should see that the units and inter-units closely cooperate with one another in the transfer and taking over of responsibilities. The proceedings should not in any way cause interruption to the normal operations of the border.

We should indoctrinate the cadre on the sense of community and guard them against particularism and narrow-mindedness. Property should be tightly administered, accounts should be properly settled, efforts should be made to avoid wastage, corruption and shady operations which cause suspicion and harm our solidarity.

The proceedings should not upset the personnel's mind and organization. All organization operations must be kept secret.

PLAN FOR 1970 MILITARY TRAINING

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNIT SITUATION:

More than half [of the personnel] of the border [unit] that have been assigned from various Cong Truong [possibly divisions] are sick and wounded.

The unit, because of its conditions and missions, has had to disperse on a long line and operate independently in a fairly complex situation.

The enemy operates deeper and deeper in K [Cambodian] territory conducting airstrikes and sending in reconnaissance and Biet Kich [Special Forces], etc. . . [sic]

Cadre and soldiers, although they have operated in border areas for two or three years, are still unable to meet the present requirements.

II. REQUIREMENTS OF THE 1970 MILITARY TRAINING:

To effectively support the battlefield and accomplish the 1970 military training mission, the section prescribes the following training requirements:

1. Practical subjects applicable to missions and combat will be taught.

2. Unit leaders and assistant leaders will be trained in organization, coordination, on the spot combat command, and the application of proper measures to deal with various situations.

3. Be sure that the entire training program will be taught and that the subjects taught in 1969 be reviewed.

4. Be sure that after the training, cadre and soldiers are either fair or excellent [in combat performances].

III. TRAINING SUBJECTS

a. Tactics

1) Searching activities and combat actions of reconnaissance patrols.

2) Reconnaissance during combat.

3) Unit cadre and members are to be trained in organization, coordination, combat command, and application of proper measures to deal with various situations.

4) Review the subject of searching for the enemy, making contact with the enemy, engaging the enemy, and warning procedures.

b. Techniques

1) Review the first firing training lesson (kneeling and standing positions).

2) Security guards are to be trained in night firing, using time limit targets at a distance of 50 meters.

c. General subjects

1) Security tasks in border missions.

2) Fundamentals of the intelligence task.

3) Throwing grenades at targets at a distance of 20 or 25 meters.

4) Rapid throwing of grenades over white ant hills [dirt mounds] in the forests.

5) Some internal regulations.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND EXECUTION

- Section:
- Train assistant inter-unit leaders, a number of unit leaders, and assistant unit leaders.
 - Assign organic training cadre to various areas to cooperate with inter-unit leaders in implementing the plan.

- Inter-units:
- Give training to cadre of their own inter-units.
 - Draft monthly training plans.
 - Keep abreast of the activities of various units, correct their errors, prepare and submit initial and final reports.
 - Organize tests after each training period.

- Units:
- Unit leaders, assistant unit leaders or instructors designated by the unit, are to undertake the training.
 - The unit will make specific plans for the instruction.
 - Unit leaders are to undertake the training, give corrections, and perform political tasks during training.
 - The unit will report the results obtained to the inter-unit after each training period.

V. MATERIALS

Documents, notebooks, refills for BIC ball-point pens, kerosene for use in night firing, and batteries for flashlights are to be furnished by the section.

VI. TIME

- Training
- Members of the Section are all trained at one time.
 - Inter-units are trained from three to five days.

Breakdown of training time

- From March to April [1970]: General subjects
- From May to July [1970]: Tactics
- From August to October [1970]: Review and test.

VII. LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

1. Party Committees of inter-units, Party Chapter Committees, and Party Chapters should pay attention to directing the military training. They should make cadre, Party members, Group members, and soldiers realize the significance of the military training so that the latter will willingly make efforts to drill and meet the requirements.
2. They should provide guidance for cadre at unit level and for the comrades taking charge of the training. When giving the units training, they should provide the units with adequate materials, training aids, etc.
3. Democratic principles should be applied during the training. Sessions should be held to comment on the training methods and practical training.
4. Training principles and regulations should be strictly executed. Measures should be taken to prevent accidents during the training.

REAR SERVICE TASKS

1. Review the rear service tasks performed in 1969 to learn the leadership strengths and weaknesses. Implement economic and financial policies, increase production, practice thrift, and take appropriate measures against corruption and waste of the Party's property (meetings sponsored by the section to discuss specific subjects).
2. Check the norms for production increase; have the situation well in hand for proper supervision ensuring that the norms are met and surpassed and requirements for a 3-month self-sufficiency are met. Proceed with making a specific inventory of unit property; have the property under close control and devise ways for proper use. Ensure observation of the Party's policy of achieving economy. Better the living conditions of unit members.

3. Solve all problems which came up in 1969 and still exist, concerning J [sic] and friendly agencies. Problems which are not yet solved should be clearly justified.

4. Conduct physical examinations for cadre and soldiers, firmly grasp the situation in order to properly observe the policies regarding sending of personnel to A [possibly NVN], and give them treatment and care. Step up hygienic and disease prevention activities.

To ensure successful performance of rear service tasks, Party Committee authorities and unit commanders should give concern to and closely direct these activities. They should assign personnel to perform these tasks and work out specific plans. They should thoroughly know the policies [concerning rear service activities] and monthly and quarterly criteria and set forth criteria for every month and every quarter. They should review their activities, make initial reports, and submit reports [to higher headquarters] on time. Finally, they should try to find shortcomings and determinedly observe the principles, standards, and policies [regarding rear service activities].

Document No 3

Two and a fraction pages,
typed. Dated 26 March 1970.

D E C L A R A T I O N

OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET-NAM
ON THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

For the last decade, the U.S. imperialists have continuously carried out a policy of intervention and invasion against different nations in Indo-China in an attempt to convert these nations into new-styled colonies and military bases. Although they have been dealt heavy blows in Viet-Nam and sustained continuous failures in Laos and Cambodia, they are still very obdurate and wily.

At present, the Nixon Administration is prolonging the war of aggression in South Viet-Nam through the plan of Vietnamization of the war; on the other hand it is flagrantly escalating the war in Laos, and continuously infringing upon the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and neutrality of the Cambodian Kingdom. It is also striving to undermine the fighting solidarity of the Indochinese people.

Particularly at the beginning of March 1970, the henchmen of the U.S. imperialists in Cambodia, headed by Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, initiated an insane campaign against the people of Viet-Nam, sowed hatred between the [Cambodian and Vietnamese] peoples, and colluded with the Saigon Puppet Government to counter the SVN people's resistance against the U.S. for national salvation.

At the same time, they initiated a despicable campaign of slander aimed at overthrowing Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia, an outstanding politician who was resolved to safeguard peace, neutrality, unification, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Cambodia within her existing borders. He had also patiently maintained the solidarity, friendship and mutual support between different peoples in Indo-China, and energetically supported the South Vietnamese people against the U.S. aggressors. Thanks to

the sound and clear-sighted policy pursued by Sihanouk, the Cambodian Kingdom lived in peace and independence and enjoyed an ever rising position in the world. Obviously, the U.S. imperialists and those who support the coup d'etat in Cambodia are acting against the legitimate interests of the Cambodian people, disrupting the friendship and solidarity between the three nations in Indo-China, and opposing the SVN and Lao people's anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation. They are plotting to convert Cambodia into a military base and a new-styled colony of the U.S., intensify and broaden the war throughout Indochina, and implement the so-called "Asian doctrine" of President Nixon of using Asians to fight Asians.

In a statement made on 23 March 70, Norodom Sihanouk, the legal Chief of State of the Cambodian Kingdom, solemnly pronounced, on charge of treason, the dissolution of the Lon Nol Government, the National Assembly and Royal Council of the Kingdom. Sihanouk appealed to the Cambodian people to bravely stand up, unite closely within the National United Front of Kampuchia, unite with the forces of anti-imperialist people of brother countries, and resolve to fight against the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Cheng Heng clique and their U.S. masters in order to liberate the country and safeguard the independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

The appeal for national salvation made by Chief of State Sihanouk inaugurated a new phase in the history of struggle for the defense of the noble interests and sacred aspirations of the Cambodian people. This appeal will certainly enjoy the strong support of the Cambodian people and win the sympathy and broad support of people all over the world.

The Republic of South Viet-Nam and the Cambodian Kingdom are neighboring countries. The SVN people and the Cambodians are brothers and friends who fight side by side and always support and encourage each other in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys Thieu-Ky-Khiem, and the Khmer Kray [sic].

Since its establishment in June 69, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam has clearly expressed its own policy toward the Cambodian Kingdom: To maintain friendly relations, and implement the policy of good neighborhood, with the Cambodian Kingdom on the basis of

respecting the independence, sovereignty, and neutrality of Cambodia; to recognize and honor the territorial integrity of the Cambodian Kingdom within the existing borders; both sides will always respect each other and will not interfere in each other's affairs.

With its immutable policy, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of SVN and the SVN people wholeheartedly welcome and support all the correct policies mentioned in the historic declaration of Sihanouk, Chief of State of the Cambodian Kingdom, on 23 March 70, support the just and noble struggle of the Cambodian people against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys aimed at protecting their sacred rights and contributing to the safeguard of peace in Indo-China and in Asia.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government and SVN people highly appreciate the hearty support of the Cambodian people and Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk who have backed our resistance against the U.S. for national salvation. We promise to make every effort to foster and maintain a good solidarity and friendship between the Khmer and Vietnamese people forever.

The SVN people and the Provisional Revolutionary Government will patiently step up the resistance against the U.S. for national salvation, closely coordinate with the friendly Cambodian people, and provide mutual support in fighting the common enemy to achieve final victory.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government and the SVN people believe that with their traditions of invincible and valiant struggle against the imperialists, the Cambodian people will rally under the national salvation flag of Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk and will win a glorious victory. The Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao people, united in their struggle, having the sympathy and support of people all over the world, including the American people and the governments of peace-and justice-loving countries, will certainly defeat the U.S. imperialist aggressors, the most cruel enemy of the Indochinese peoples, as well as of progressive mankind.

Miền Nam Việt-Nam
[South Viet-Nam]
26 March, 1970

Document No 4

Two long, two short
typewritten pages,
dated 3 April, 1970

S.25

No. 054/CT

3 April 1970

"SECRET"

URGENT DIRECTIVE

Concerning the opening of a phase of political
activities in support of Campaign X.

Canh [wing] 7 TO: All units subordinate to Doan [Group] (1)
[hand written address]

The shooting was heard throughout the entire Mien [South VN].
On the night of 31 March 70, all armed forces of South Viet-Nam
simultaneously conducted infantry and artillery attacks on a series
of U.S. -Puppet bases, positions, command posts, stores, airfields,
military ports, fire bases, military training centers, and Chieu Hoi
[Open-Arms] centers.

The enemy admitted that by the end of 31, 242 bases in the
four tactical zones [CTZ] had been attacked.

Campaign X had begun

This campaign has an important bearing on the general
situation throughout the year 1970. This is a phase of overall
attacks in the three areas [urban, mountainous, and rural] through
the means of strong military attacks, political uprisings, and
extensive military proselyting activities. This is also a long term
campaign which differs from the previous ones. Its purpose is to
defeat an important step of the enemy's pacification plot in order
to proceed toward basically frustrating his plan for "Vietnamization
of the war" and destroying his illusion of the attaining success from
position of strength.

(1) Probably meaning all units subordinate to S.25 Rear Service
Department.

The success of Campaign X combined with the rapid development of the revolutionary movement in Cambodia and the great successes of the Lao Revolution has created more favorable conditions for our side and has changed the situation on the SVN battlefield in particular and that of the Indochina battlefield in general. In addition, it has had a strong effect on the new deterioration confusion, and deadlock of the U.S.-puppet clique, and is creating new opportunities for us in the year 1970 and in the [performance of] future missions.

In compliance with the Party Military Affairs Committee's directive, all units must carry out a phase of political activities to increase enthusiasm for serving Campaign X.

In the areas where political reorientation has been completed, the purpose of this phase of political activities is aimed at consolidating the results of the political reorientation to a further degree. On this basis, we should make each unit and each individual see the mission, meaning, and position of Campaign X, so they will be able to work out plans and set forth norms for their own activities. (Units that have not yet received political reorientation will also conduct political activities in accordance with this directive).

All units must quickly conduct indoctrination and discussion on the purpose and significance of the campaign in order to make all cadre and soldiers clearly understand the following:

Campaign X is important for the entire year. It will greatly influence the development of the situation in the whole war theater.

The success of Campaign X will lead the US-puppets into a new deterioration of their situation and create new strength, and favorable conditions for our side during the whole year of 1970 and the years that follow.

Presently, our subjective efforts are playing a direct and decisive role in the development of the general situation. Each effort, even the smallest one, exerted by our side to increase our effectiveness at this moment can bring about important results that we could never obtain in normal times.

Through indoctrination based on the above contents, we can reaffirm the cadre's and soldiers' responsibilities. They will know what they must do specifically to contribute their efforts to serving the campaign. We must steadily motivate the subjective efforts of everyone and every unit in order to cope with the present situation and mission. We must also promote enthusiasm in everyone, so that they will rush forward and satisfactorily serve in combat.

Increase vigilance in the rear to guard against the enemy's insane reaction.

In order to serve the Campaign, fight continuously and victoriously, and to insure effectiveness in the performance of missions that follow in the new situation, we must urgently and positively guide [agricultural] production for self sufficiency to meet harvest time. All units on the frontline must carry out this task immediately. At the same time, we must instruct everyone to practice economy in all fields. Especially rice must be strictly administered, preserved, weighed, checked and used sparingly, severe disciplinary action must be taken against waste, misappropriation, and improper use [of rice].

Upon receipt of this directive, unit heads and the Party Committee authorities must do as follows:

Carefully discuss this directive.

Work out plans and norms for Campaign X and present them to units after explaining the meaning and the purpose of the campaign. (Particularly, they should mobilize as many [personnel] as needed to rush forward to the frontline).

Initiate this emulation phase of "GAINING GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS TO RETURN A FAVOR TO UNCLE [HO]." Preliminary reports will be made by 19 May and plans for emulation among individuals and units must be worked out.

Hold unit meetings to thoroughly explain the meaning and purpose [of Campaign X]. Discuss the norms and initiate the emulation phase.

It is necessary to correct the cadre's and troops' erroneous thoughts which might affect the accomplishment of missions and the development of enthusiasm.

Units that do not directly advance forward must be prepared ideologically and ready to support the units on the frontline and carry out any emergency tasks assigned by Doan.

Have a plan for disseminating daily information on our victories to every soldier .

As for the Party Committee authorities and commanders of agencies, after discussing this directive, they will organize a briefing to discuss the seven teachings of Chairman Ho and check them against the daily practical work:

- The will must be very firm
- The plan must be meticulous
- The control must be very careful
- The coordination must be very close
- The execution must be very correct
- Cadre must be very exemplary
- Secrecy must be strictly kept

Attention must be paid to the organization of the emulation campaign among the cadre and the dissemination of examples of good men accomplishing good work. Records of merits, and reports of achievement must be disseminated daily and weekly within the Doan.

Upon receipt of this directive, all units must immediately conduct indoctrination and report the results to the Doan Political Section.

For the Standing Committee of the
Doan [Group's] Party Committee
Secretary
S/Nguyen Phan

Document No 5

Three long handwritten pages
on ruled paper, signed notes
of conferences held on
9 April and 20 April, 1970.

9 April 70
[illegible word]

A Conference Was Held By The Military Council
To Assess The Situation And To Discuss The
Forthcoming Tasks

I. Enemy situation:

The U.S. coordinated with the French to overthrow the
Sihanouk Administration and to establish a pro-American, rightist
government with the purpose of constructing military bases to
attack Indo-Chinese countries.

Characteristics of the X Campaign:

Enemy Schemes:

1. Strengthen the Khmer Army to attack Indo-Chinese
countries. Recruit and strengthen the Cambodian army.
2. Establish the stooge, reactionary Lon Nol, Sirik Matak,
and Cheng Heng Government.
3. Massacre the Khmer people.
4. Arouse deep hatred between the Khmer people and our
forces.

Our Party and the friendly Party were determined to launch
attacks against the enemy, establish and expand revolutionary base
areas, and rush forward to secure a decisive victory.

Objectives:

1. Destroy a number of White K troops [of the Lon Nol Government] and U.S. and Puppet forces. Expand the friendly bases and dominate the battlefield.
2. Establish and consolidate revolutionary authorities. Support the people in the conduct of demonstrations.
3. Create favorable conditions for the friendly [Khmers] to develop their armed and political forces.
4. Create favorable conditions to expand our Party's revolutionary base areas and also those of the friendly Party.

Purposes of the Campaign

1. To maintain our position for continuous attacks.
2. To develop a close relationship between our forces, the friendly forces and international forces in order to create favorable conditions to achieve a decisive victory.
3. To motivate the progressive people to support the Chief of State [possibly Sihanouk] and to arouse deep hatred against the U.S. and their henchmen.
4. To expose the criminal acts of the U.S. imperialists who have invaded Cambodia.

Our Mission and Determination

The Regiment has the responsibility of conducting attacks on two objectives having the characteristics of a sub-sector and district seat. Efforts must be made to overrun the targets, to capture PW's and to seize weapons.

D1 will take charge of attacking one objective.

D2 will attack one objective, and our unit will attack one objective having the characteristics [mentioned above].

The attack will be conducted on N - Night as prescribed. They must successfully annihilate the enemy, capture PW's, seize weapons, and collect war booty which will be transported to the rear area. At the same time, all problems concerning the evacuation of the dead and wounded must be settled satisfactorily.

After accomplishing the tasks mentioned above, these two battalions must cling to the enemy areas and counter the enemy's reaction including those of the Americans and Puppet forces (if any). Only when they receive the order to hand the position over to a friendly unit will they be allowed to move in the specified direction.

Difficulties:

New battlefield, new mission, and new combat target, necessity to hold the ground for a prolonged period.

Advantages :

Our troops all have high determination. After they had attended the political reorientation course, their ideology was particularly enhanced. They display enthusiasm in performing all tasks assigned by higher echelons, especially combat activities. Their will to fight was displayed in the military operation from Tu Khue to Cambodia. They showed good working attitudes in their daily activities, such as messing and billeting, etc . . . Their thinking no longer reflects weak concerns.

They also had a high sense of responsibility and a firm determination to strengthen their units.

These units inherited the heroic tradition of Phan Dinh Gioc from the nine years of resistance against the French. Presently, after four years of attacks against the U.S., they are cited as outstanding units.

Furthermore, the enemy troops are not familiar with the terrain features of the battlefield. Their weapons and equipment are in short supply. The Party of our friendly country has good experience in struggling and is closely coordinating with our Party to destroy the enemy. The majority of the Khmer people side with Sihanouk. The Lon Nol Government fails to control Cambodian troops as well as the population in different provinces.

We are carrying out an international mission. However, it is very advantageous for the liberation of South Viet-Nam.

Therefore, we must be determined to promote our combat spirit to launch continuous attacks against the enemy and strictly observe military discipline.

We must strictly maintain the revolutionary pride, ethics, and heroic traditions of our army and our unit.

We must possess high determination to defeat the enemy in the first attack and continuously cling to his areas to launch successive attacks on his troops day and night, to hold the ground for a prolonged period.

We must strengthen our independent combat spirit and promote security maintenance. Strictly execute the Party's policy and guidelines concerning the preservation of weapons and troop strength. All troops are required to observe revolutionary and ethical attitudes as well as the heroic traditions of our army.

Opinions contributed during the discussion:

Comrade Que: There are many dogs in the area of operation. Our troops are not familiar with the methods of attacking two-story houses.

Comrade Dieu: Our troops are not familiar with the terrain features, and they may become lost. Moreover, the streets have many intersections and crossroads.

Comrade Lam: In the attack against the city, close coordination must be made to give mutual support. In addition, we must attack the enemy fiercely to capture PW's and seize weapons. Make the best use of our forces to gradually transport war booty and goods to our base areas.

We should strive to economize on ammunition, so that we may cling to the enemy area and fight him for a prolonged period.

Comrade Thuan: Due to a lack of combat experience, the enemy has a low technique in the use of weapons. The morale of their troops is also very low because they are fighting without a goal. Our troops have gained good experience in the attacks against the U.S. and have achieved great victories in the Tan Hung and So Hoi battles, etc . . .

They have displayed a good awareness in the correct execution of the policies [of higher authorities].

To avoid and overcome terrain obstacles, the tactical three-man formations in the squads and platoons should closely stick together.

Comrade Thanh: B-40 can reach the second floor of two-story houses and grenades or explosive charges can be used to break up doors, etc . . .

Concerning the dogs, we should not worry about them. The reason is that we have succeeded in approaching U.S. bivouac sites which also had dogs.

Due to the enemy aircraft and artillery fire, it is difficult for us to cling to the enemy areas. For this reason, we are able to seize the enemy's weapons and ammunition to equip our troops, only when we conduct attacks against him.

Comrade Luan: Though our units are newly organized and our troops are not familiar with the terrain features, we will successfully attack the enemy if we have high determination.

Comrade Tung: The tactics of clinging to the enemy areas is very new to our troops. Therefore, in fierce attacks, we should try to coordinate with other units; though we must be ready to fight independently if necessary, in order to meet the requirements of the missions assigned by higher echelons.

Finally, all members of the squad pledged determination to simultaneously attack the enemy and to strengthen their forces. They will strive to comply with the 12 combat guiding principles of the Party to encircle and annihilate the enemy, to seize

weapons and equipment for the strengthening of their forces, and to create favorable conditions for clinging to the enemy areas to achieve wounded soldiers and the collection of war booty. They will avoid any shortcoming which may limit the success of the company.

The entire conference unanimously agreed with the above facts.

The conference was ended
at 11:00 hours on 9 April 70
Signature of the secretary:
/S/Thai

Conference of the Military Council

I. Study of the situation and mission.

1. Situation and characteristics of the enemy:

The enemy is located in an area which has the characteristics of a sub-sector or district seat where there is a dense population and many markets. The terrain is flat and houses are covered with tile and iron sheets. In the middle of the area, there is Road 13 and an airfield.

With the above characteristics, the enemy can easily receive reinforcements.

2. Friendly situation.

Our superiors are determined to destroy the whole area during the night.

Characteristics of enemy situation: Armored reinforcements can quickly arrive in the area.

Friendly mission: Our units are ready to replace friendly units and to attack enemy reinforcements which come from Go Minh or Cam Che or which come by air in a vertical envelopment tactics. By all means, we must try to annihilate the enemy troops.

II. Discussion.

Discussion on tactical problems and ambush tactics of the Party. Following is an account of the discussion of each cell and each squad on the combat tactics to be adopted:

Que: The chairman should specify whether I will take charge of getting reinforcements in the area or of replacing a friendly unit before I can express my opinion.

Tinh: My Company Executive Officer has not disclosed the combat tactics to be adopted, so it is difficult for us to express our opinions.

Loi: We will express our opinion more clearly if you clearly describe the movement of troops, degree of the troops' determination, the practice of technical and tactical skills, and affirmation of ideological concepts.

Combat tactics: If the forward unit fails to overrun the enemy position, we will immediately replace it, adopting the tactics of dividing each squad into three-man cells. The mobile units will conduct ambushes and maneuver advance and rear blocking elements.

Confirmation: The spirit of attacking by surprise should be reaffirmed.

Phuc: As far as the troop movement is concerned, our troops must be well prepared for their movement and have light equipment. They must be determined to advance towards the enemy positions. When arriving at the enemy positions, our troops must maintain absolute secrecy, perform missions assigned by higher echelons, and move close to the enemy. In the interception of reinforcements, our troops must be always ready for movement in order to accomplish their missions.

Liem: After thoroughly understanding the mission, I realize that the operation will be successful if all cadre know what they are responsible for.

Generally speaking, all cadre and troops must meticulously prepare their equipment and help each other to fulfill their tasks.

Furthermore, they must maintain the secrecy, so that friendly units can accomplish their missions and our units can avoid difficulties. Our platoon pledges that in spite of our weariness, when arriving at the enemy position, we will immediately carry out the missions assigned to us and resolutely accomplish them.

Quan: In compliance with the resolution of the Party Chapter, my squad is determined to perform future missions with good results. My unit will be lightly equipped. All comrades in my unit will help each other to carry out the mission. They will maintain secrecy to help friendly units accomplish missions. We are always ready to act as mobile troops. We will try to strictly carry out the Party's policies and keep all comrades in the squad from committing errors.

Thuan: [Blank]

Luan: We will implement the resolution of the Party Chapter. After fully understanding our missions and receiving a sand table exercise, we are assured of success in the movement tonight. My squad has meticulously prepared for the coming movement. We will maintain secrecy, so that our friendly units can accomplish their tasks. When arriving at the troop concealment location, we will launch attacks against the enemy. We will deeply penetrate the enemy position and attack him in order to capture his troops and seize war booty.

Thus, my whole squad is determined to accomplish the future mission and then coordinate with other squads to fulfill the platoon's mission.

Loc: In accordance with the resolution of the Party Chapter, we will accomplish our task of the forthcoming X phase. The first thing we should do is to stick to the battlefield.

During break times, all comrades must encourage each other to study the missions. During movement, we must save water and avoid drinking fresh water to protect our health. When passing the posts of Popular and Regular Forces, we must maintain absolute secrecy. When arriving at the predetermined position, we must construct sanitation facilities. Precaution should be taken to avoid any trace of movement and smoke caused by cooking.

When carrying out missions near the people, we must prove ourselves as soldiers of the revolutionary army.

When being assigned combat tasks, we must try with our utmost efforts to perform them. When being wounded, we must not groan. We must properly carry out the policies concerning wounded and dead and war booty.

Cang: During this time, we must all carefully prepare for our operation. We must unite and help each other. During movement, we must maintain the secrecy of friendly units. In addition, we must properly comply with the policies towards wounded and war dead and those concerning war booty.

When performing missions among the people, we must conform to their customs.

Quac: In order to accomplish the forthcoming task, we must stay close to our formation during movement. We must maintain absolute secrecy, so that we can help friendly units to fulfill their tasks. Every comrade must confirm his ideological concept and strengthen his determination to ensure that 100% of our strength will engage in combat. Furthermore, we must properly observe all policies of the government.

Sang: During the operation, we must maintain absolute secrecy. The operation will be successful if we have high determination, help each other and unite with each other, and quickly move our troops. I, myself, have high determination, and I am ready to replace my comrades to perform any mission.

Duc: During this time, I will try to stay close to my combat formation and maintain secrecy when passing the posts of Popular Forces. I will avoid making noise, so I can help my friendly units to perform their tasks. I am ready to attack the enemy. I will make every effort to accomplish any mission assigned by higher echelons.

II. Finally, all soldiers promise to resolutely fulfill their tasks. They are determined to attack and to deeply penetrate the enemy area. They will properly carry out the military and civilian proselyting plans and the policies concerning wounded, war dead, and war booty. In addition, they will overcome hardships and difficulties to help friendly units accomplish their missions with the best results.

All comrades in the military council are unanimously determined to fulfill their missions. Everyone is determined to correct shortcomings and fulfill their tasks.

The conference ended at 0915 hours on 20 April 1970.

Secretary
/S/ Tran Van Thai