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5: Political Outlines by Agency of VC Ba Ria-Long Khanh Province Party Committee, VC Region 7. (U)

(C-May 71) Item 1: (1 page, typewritten; B-3) Circular 14/TB, dated 25 Nov 70, signed by Lê Văn Thành for C6 ((possibly agency of VC Ba Ria-Long Khanh Province Unit, VC Military Region 7)), reveals that from 19 Nov to 25 Nov 70, Suối Cát, Bão Định, Bão Bình, and Bão Vinh ((possibly Village Units, Xuân Lộc District, VC Ba Ria - Long Khanh Province)), the Special Action Unit of ((possibly Xuân Lộc City Unit)), and D2 ((possibly former 440th Local Force Battalion)) killed 69 enemy ((RVNAF/FWMAF)) personnel, collected 181 liters of rice, and indoctrinated 48 civilian families.

(C-Jul 71) Item 2: (10 pages, typewritten; B-5) Political outlines, undated and unsigned, ((possibly prepared by an unspecified agency of VC Ba Ria-Long Khanh Province Party Committee in late 1970)) relates to political lessons for friendly ((VC/NVA)) cadre in the Indochina war.

The document consists of two main parts. The first discusses the general friendly ((VC/NVA)) and enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) situation in Indochina, stating that the enemy sustained increasingly heavy casualties in personnel and equipment. Since Apr 70, there were 40,000 enemy personnel, including 10,000 US soldiers, put out of action, 500 aircraft downed, and 1,500 military vehicles destroyed throughout battlefields in SVN. As for armed forces subordinate to ((VC)) Ba Ria-Long Khanh Province Unit, they killed and wounded 3,000 enemy personnel including 1,030 US and Australian troops, destroyed 102 military vehicles, shot down 14 aircraft, caused 432,000 liters of gasoline to burn, and disorganized 21 ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense Force units. After the coup d'etat on 18 Mar 70 ((which toppled the Sihanouk government)), the enemy brought US and RVN troops into Cambodian territory in an attempt to wipe out friendly forces from the ((Cambodia-South Vietnam)) border area, destroy friendly base areas, and occupy key strategic positions with special reinforcements of Thai and Indonesian forces. However, once again, the enemy failed. 40,000 US, RVN, and FANK troops were killed as of May 70 and the Cambodian Liberation troops were stronger than ever. Concerning the situation in Laos, it was reported that regardless of fierce enemy operations and the presence of Thai forces, the Lao armed forces were

still capable of repulsing enemy units from Sầm Nứa, liberating Attapeu Province, and on 22 Jun 70, occupying Nông Búa ((Vietnamese Phonetic)) Post, the last outpost defended by enemy forces. As a result, the document praises the Cambodian, Lào, and Vietnamese people who succeeded in widening the liberated areas in northern and southern Laos and opening the Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia borders.

Subsequently, the document mentions difficulties caused by friendly forces. Particularly, as ((VC)) Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province was a strategic location, with Vũng Tàu harbor and such strategic axes of communication as Highways 15, 1, and 2, the enemy had striven to bolster their military and political pressure by employing small ((RVN)) Special Forces elements or applying ambush and raid tactics. They also increased their psywar, Chiêu Hồi, Phụng Hoàng, and Thiên Nga ((Swan)) activities along with economic measures aimed at blockading friendly entry and exit points and impoverishing the people. The document stresses that the enemy also encountered insurmountable difficulties. Their combat troops were thinly deployed throughout all areas of operations. The Nixon administration was politically isolated in the USA and in the world. In addition, it was quite clear that Lon Nol's Army ((meaning FANK)) was so weak that the discord between Cambodian and RVN troops was seriously heightened.

In conclusion, the document states that according to resolutions and directives from higher echelons, the future missions of units and agencies ((subordinate to VC Bà Rịa - Long Khánh Province)) were to: (1) Build up friendly forces both in quality and quantity; (2) strive to destroy enemy combat strength and war facilities; (3) motivate the population to rise up against the oppressive enemy control and the pacification program; (4) make full use of the three forces ((main, local, and guerrilla forces)) which were to cling to the battlefield and stay close to the people; and (5) boost agricultural production to meet food requirements.