

REFORT CLASS

COUNTRY

NORTH VIETNAM/CAMPODIA

DOI

MAY 1971

SUBJECT

APPRAISAL OF MORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMECDIA


ACQ

Vietnam, Saigen. Fimid no.

SOURCE

THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL. IT REPRESENTS THE VIEWS OF THIS AGENCY'S BERICR OFFICER ON THE SCHOOL IT IS AN INTERPRETATION BASED ON PRZYTOUSLY REPORTED INFORMATION. FREPARED FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE, IT IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BULLEY TRAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS IN THEIR CAN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

BUHHARY. EFFORTS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS TO PSYABLISE
AR INDICAMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTUSE IN CAMBODIA TO COMTROL THE POPULATION AND MORILISES IN SUPPORT OF THE HORIZ
VICTUALISES MALITARY AND LOGISTICS REPORT HAVE EAST FAIRLY



7 2 -

SUCCESSFUL. THEY COME AND NORTH VIRTHAMESE CONTROL OF THE INFRA-STRUCTURE AFFRARS TO BE SECURE FOR THE FORESERABLE FUTURE DESPITE GROWING PROBLEMS NOT THE LEAST OF WRICE IS HAVING TO WORK AMONG A TRADITIONALLY EDSTILE PROPER. IN CONTRAST TO THESE EXPORTS TO BUILD IN INFRASTRUTURE, THE VISINANCSE COMMUNISTS HAVE APPARENTLY SET A LOTER PRIORITY ON DEVELOPING A STRONG KEIZER COMMUNIST PARTY. RATHER THAN DEVOTING TIME AND EXPORT TO ESTABLISHING THE PARTY, THEY ARE MORE CONCERNED AT THE MOMENT WITH PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTERING CAMPODIAN TERRITORY UNDER THEIR CONTROL. MAINTAINING AND SUPPLIFIED THEIR OWN WILLTARY FORCES, AND organizing a nationwide guzerilla export against the inexperienced BUT BURGEONING CAMEDDIAN ARMY (FANK). IN WOST URBAN CENTERS OF CARRODIA, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ALSO APPEAR TO BE GIVING LOW PRIORITY AT THIS TANE TO THE CREATION OF A CLANDESTINE SETWORK OF SUPPORTERS AND AGENTS - THEY HAVE AT ANY RATE HAD ONLY LIMITED SCHOOLS IN TEYS ARDA, END SUMMARY.

1. IN THEIR 'EFFORTS TO CREATE & REMER ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE, THE VIRTHAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE DIVIDED CAMBODIA INTO

FIVE 'EGICUS, AND TO DATE HAVE MANAGED TO SET UP SOLL SWET OF

FUNCTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS STAFFED DI REFERS EN AT

LUART TEN OF CAMBODIA'S 19 PROVINCES THAT HAVE CONCENTRATED THEIR .

REFORMS ON THE HASTERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY - THE AREA THROUGH


THICH NONE THE DEVELOPING COMMUNIST LOGISTICS CORRESON THOM LAOS

TO THE LOWER HALF OF SOUTH VIITHAM. THERE PROPHERS IN THE STARSELY

FOR LATER NORTHHAST WHERE THE NORTH VIITHAMEST AND VILLY (YOU

ALLOHALY HALT SULD TELLY COURSEL AND DEVICED TO THE TOTAL

TO THE TERMINATE OF THE TANK ARREST AND SOUTH THEM.








- 2. IN THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF STUNG TRENG, KRATIE, RATANAKIRI, MONDOLLIRI, PREAR VIHEAR, ALD KOMPONG THOM THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A MORE COMPREHENSIVE KNMER ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE THAN HE HAS YET BEEN ABLE TO DO IN OTHER AREAS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN STUNG TRENG PROVINCE IS TYPICAL OF HOW THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PROCEEDED IN THIS AREA.
- 3. DURING THE LATE SPRING AND EARLY SUMMER OF 1970 THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS IN STUNG TRENG APPOINTED PROVINCE, DISTRICT. VILLACE AND HANLET ADMINISTRATIONS FROM AMONG MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN RANKS IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE LOCAL POPULATION AND TO MOBI-LIZE IT IN SUPPORT OF THE VIET CONG (VC) /NORTH VIETNAM ARMY (MVA). BY WID-SUMMER 1970, THE POPULATION HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY RESTIVE UNDER VIETNIMESE OCCUPATION, WITH ITS TIGHT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, FREQUENT CONFISCATIONS OF VILLAGZ FOOD SUPPLIES, AND MILITARY TRAINING AND CONSCRIPTION, WHILE THEY DID NOT EASE THISE MEASURES. THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS THAT SUMMER BEGAN AN EFFORT TO TURN ADMINISTRATION OVER TO CAMBODIANS AND TO MAKE THEMSELVES LESS CON-SPICUOUS. KHMERS WERE RECRUITED AND TRAINED TO TAKE OVER THE DAY-TO-DAY RUNNING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, AND THE VIET-NAMESE BEGAN TO DEAL WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION THROUGH KIMER INTER-MEDIARIES RATHER THAN DIRECTLY. THE KHMER COMMUNISTS AND NOW OSTENSIBLY IN CHARGE OF THE ENTIRE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMENISTS PULL THE STREETS OF WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, ONLY A FRONT FOR A VIETNAMESE COM-HUSBER MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NORTHBASTERY CAMEODIA. .
- IN STUDY TRENG AS ELSEWHERE IN THE NORTHEAST, THE KEMER CHG/MIDATION IS EXPERIENCING SOME PROBLEMS— KAMER COMMUNIC PANKS AND EURDAD THIN AND SUPPER FROM A SUCRTAGE OF COMPETENT, OF UNITED CAMPEG. TO MISSE OUT THE IMPRASTRUCTURE, AND ALSO TO ACCOMMIDATE






THE NON-KEMER POPULATION OF THE NORTHEAST, THE VIETNAMESE COM-MUNISTS ARE USING LAO AND EVEN THAI CADRES. IN ADDITION, MILI-TARY AND POLITICAL TRAINING CAMPS HAVE BEEN CREATED, AND HANOI-TRAINED KEWER CADRES CONDUCT SOME OF THE COURSES BEFORE HEADING SOUTH TO TAKE UP MORE PERHANENT ASSIGNMENTS. LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT IS ANOTHER PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH THE VILLAGERS MUST WORK WITH THE COMMUNISTS, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY GROUND SWELL OF POPULAR BACKING FOR THE COMMUNIST CAUSE, AND THERE MAY RVEN HAVE BEEN SOME ERCSION OF WHAT SUPPORT THE COMMUNISTS INITIALLY DID ENJOY. AS EARLY AS OCTOBER 1970, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE STARG TRENG PROVINCIAL LIBERATION FRONT REPORTEDLY SAID THAT MOST OF THE PEASANTS IN THE PROVINCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE KHIER COMMUNISTS AND THAT THE NVA DREW MOST OF ITS SUPPORT FROM LAC AND OTHER TRIBESMEN IN THE AREA. THAT SAME MONTH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STUNG TRENG DISTRICT COMMITTEE CLAIMED THAT ONLY 30 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF STUNG TRENG SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF STRANOUK. THE SHEER COMMUNISTS ARE THEMSELVES PARTLY TO BLAME. THEIR HIGH-HANDED METHODS AND PREQUENT RESPET TO COERCION, INTIMIDATION, AND ASSASSINATION ALIENATE MANY PROPLE. SOME LONG-TIME RHYER ROUGE NOW INCORPORATED INTO THE COMMUNIST INTRASTRUCTURE HAVE ALSO USED THEIR NEWFOUND POWERS TO SETTLE OLD SCORES WITH GOVERN-MENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY AUTHORIPIES WHO TRACKED THEM DOWN AS BANDITS UNDER THE SIHANOUK REGIME.

5. DESPITE THE SHORTCOBINGS OF THE KEMER ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS, INCLUDING OUTBURSTS OF ANTI-VIETRABLESE SENTIMENTS BY SOME MEMBERS, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE HAVING LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IK NORTHEASTERN CAMEDDIA; BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT POPULAR GRUNDLING JEOPARDIZES NVA CONTROL. IN SUM, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNICIS IN NORTHEASTEIN CAMEDDIA HAVE ESTABLISHED A VIETUAL








MILITARY OCCUPATION BEHIND A FACADE OF INDIGENOUS CONTROL.


- 6. THE SITUATION IN SUCH AREAS AS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PROV-INCES OF KANDAL, PREY VENG, SVAY RIENG, KOMPONG SPEU, TAKED AND MAMPOT PRESENTS THE COMMUNISTS WITH A MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEM. HERE THEY MUST COMPETE FOR CONTROL OF A POPULOUS AREA WITH PANK AND ARVE FORCES. FURTHERMORE, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MUST DEPEND IN SOME MEASURE ON THE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OF THE KHMER COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE THEY HAVE CREATED IN THESE HEAVILY-POPULATED AREAS. WITH THE HELP OF THEIR CADRES DRAWN FROM SOUTH VIETHAM, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE AIDING THE EMBERS IN CREATING ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES AND MILITARY FORCES FROM THE HAULET TO THE PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS. IN SOME AREAS THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS SIMPLY EXPANDED THEIR EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER PROVINCES TO INCLUDE PORTIONS OF CAMBODIA. THE KHMER COMMUNISTS, HOWEVER, ARE PRESSING THE VIET-NAMESE COMMUNISTS TO RESTRICT THEIR DIRECT ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE TO ETENIC VIETNAMESE VILLAGES AND HAWLETS ONLY, AND IN GENERAL ARE BECOMING MORE INSISTENT THAT THE VIRTNAMESE COMMUNISTS RELINQUISH COMMAND POSITIONS IN THE MINER COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND RESTRICT TEEMSELVES TO AN ADVISORY BOLE.
- T. BY AND LARGE, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE ACQUIESCED IN MARY SUCH KHMER COMMUNIST DEM-NDS FOR GREATER AUTONOMY, PROBABLY IN PART DUE TO THE INFUSION IN RECENT MONTHS OF MORE BELIABLE HANCI-TRAINED KHMER COMMUNIST CADRES INTO LEADERSHIP POSITIONS.

 MANY OF THESE GADRES HAVE BEEN IN MORTH VIETNAM SINCE 1954 AND AND PRESUMABLY FULLY INDOCTRINATED COMMUNISTS, NOT AVERSE TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE VO/NVA. IN MAMEDIT PROVINCE, MOR MEANING.

 MILICAL INTERES, WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST HELP, ARE SHOULDERING ACIDE THE LESS TRUSTMANDESE COMMUNIST LEADERS, TIGHTHING DESCRIPTION, CONDUCTING MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRAINING CONTRESS.







AND EMPHASIZING SKHANOUK LESS AND COMMUNISM MORE, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT IMPACT THESE HANDI-TRAINED CADRES WILL HAVE OVER THE LONG RUN. IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, THEY COULD PROVE CAPABLE OF CREATING A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION WITH WHICH TO THREATEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT THAN EXISTS TODAY.


- 8. THE VIETNAMESE AND KRIMER COMMUNISTS DO NOT YET SEEM TO BE MAKING A MAJOR REFORT TO BUILD A CLANDESTINE INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA'S URBAN AREAS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE NOT MEGLECTING THESE AREAS ENTIRELY. FOR INSTANCE, A CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION IN PENON PENH WHOSE MEMBERS DESCRIBE THEUSELVES AS BELONGING TO THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT" REPORTEDLY EXISTS AMONG WORKERS OF THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL BAIL-ROAD; AND TWO MEMBERS OF A NET OF "EXTREME LEFTIST" FORMER HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WERE ARRESTED IN PRINCE PENE IN DECEMBER 1970 FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RECENT TRIAL OF TWO OF SIHAHOUK'S CHILDREN AND IS ACCOMPLICES ON CHARGES OF SUB-VERSION DID NOT REVEAL ANY DIRECT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION. IN ADDITION, WEILE THERE HAVE BEEN ISOLATED INSTANCES OF FRO-COVAUNIST LEAFLETS APPEARING IN PROVINCE TOWNS, CAMBODIAN AUTEORITIES THERE HAVE NOT REPORTED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY ORGANIZED COMMUNIST Groups.
- 9. THE KHMER COMMUNIST IMPRASTRUCTURE IS FAR FROM BEING MCWOLITHIC AND SUFFERS FROM A VARIETY OF PROBLEMS. MANY OF ITS DEFFICULTIES AND USE AS A RESULT OF ITS DESPARATE ASSOCIATION OF ADDRESSHEE. GIVEN THE PRAGMATIC NATURE OF THE COMMUNISTS' RECRUITABLY PITCH. ANY CRISVANCE AGAINST THE COVERNMENT IN PRIOR FROM IS USED TO EXCOURAGE PROPLE TO JOIN THE "LIBERATION FRONT." THIS IS TUNG CREATES A FERTILE PIZED IN WHICH INTERNAL DISSENSION CAR CROSS. THE MAJOR DIVISION APPEARS TO BE EXTRESS THE SO-CALLED "OLD"



EFFECTING A REVOLUTIONARY RESTRUCTURING OF CAMBODIAN SOCIETY,
AND THE "WEN" EHMER COMMUNISTS WHO JOINED THE MOVEMENT AFTER
SIHANOUK'S OUSTER AND DESIRE TO RESTORE RIM TO POWER. THERE ARE
ALSO GROUPS LED BY FREEBOOTERS, SMUGGLERS, AND BRIGANDS
INTERESTED ONLY IN USING THE TURNOIL CAUSED BY THE WAR AS A
COVER FOR THEIA COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES.

10. FRICTIONS EXIST NOT ONLY WITHIN THE SHEER IMPRASTRUCTURE BUT ALSO BETWEEN THE KHMERS AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS. FIRE-FIGHTS BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIES ARE RELATIVELY COMMON AND THEY HAVE OCCURRED IN PRACTICALLY ALL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY OPERATE TOGETHER, THE INNEDIATE CAUSE OF MANY DISPUTES IS ECONOMIC IN NATURE. DISAGREEMENTS HAVE CENTERED PARTICULARLY ON THE RIGHT TO TAX, REQUISITION SUPPLIES, AND RESISTRIBUTE LAND. ANOTHER RECURRING SOURCE OF TROUBLE 18 THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' GENERAL REFUSAL TO GIVE THE KHMER MILITARY, PARTICULARLY LOCAL PORCES, MODERN WEAPONS. RHMER COMMUNIST GROUPS HAVE BUEN RAIDED VISTNAMESE COMMUNIST WRAPONS CACEES TO OBTAIN ARMS. THE KRISTENCE OF FISSURES AND ANTI-VIETNAMEST ATTITUDES WITHIN THE KEMER COM-MINIST INFRASTRUCTURE IS ALSO A SOURCE OF CONFUSION FOR THE GENERAL POPULACE, WHICH IS A PREQUENT WITNESS TO AND VICTIM CF THE RESULTANT DISPUTES AND AN OBJECT OF CONTRADICTORY PROPAGAN-DIZING. PROBABLY PARTLY AS A RESULT OF TEIS SITUATION, SOME KHMER COMMUNISTS HAVE BECOME DISTRIBUTIONED AND HAVE RALLIED TO THE PHROM PENE GOVERNMENT. ACCURATE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE NO COMPREHENSIVE CAMEODIAN COVERNMENT RALLIER PROGRAM EXISTS. THE CAUBODIAN MILITARY CLAIMS, HOWEVER, THAT I 722 PERSONS RALLIED TO THE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1970 AND MARCE 1971; AN AVERAGE OF 344 PER MONTH.

11. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM FOR THE VIZINAMESE COMMUNISTS, OF COURSE, IS THAT THEY, AS THE TRADITYONALLY HATED AND THARLD





CEPTS AND LEADERSHIP ON AN ALIEN AND LISSENTIALLY HOSTILE POPULATION.

VIBTNAMESE COMMUNIST CADRE WEST GENERALLY RELY ON INTERPRETERS

TO STATE THEIR CASE TO THEIR KHMER ALLIES, A SITUATION WHICH

UNDOUBTEDLY LEADS TO CONFUSION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IN ADDI
TION, THE MAJOR EMPHASIS ON THE VC/RVA EFFORT IN CAMBODIA IS ON.

ESTABLISHING RELIABLE INFILTRATION ROUTES IN THAT COUNTRY TO

BRING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES THROUGH TO SOUTH VISTNAM. THE VIET
NAMESE THEREFORE ESSENTIALLY WISH TO USE THE KHMER INFRASTRUCTURE

IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST EFFORT TO CARRY ON THE WAR


IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND MANY KHMER COUNUNISTS NATURALLY RESENT THE

LOWER PRIORITY THE VIETNAMESE THEREBY GIVE TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST

THE GOVERNMENT IN DERVE PENE.

- 12. THE VC AND NVA GENERALLY SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE CF
 EHMER PROVOCATIONS AND DEMANDS, ACCOMMODATING THE CAMBODIANS
 WHEN THEY JUDGE THAT THIS WILL NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THEIR OWN MILITARY EFFORTS. FOR ALL THEIR CONCESSIONS, HOWEVER, THE VIETNAMESE
 COMMUNISTS APPEAR DETERMINED TO KEEP TES UPPER HAND. VIETNAMESE
 ADVISORY CADRES CAN BE FOUND AT ALL LEVELS OF THE REMER COMMUNIST
 INFRASTRUCTURE AND ISSUE ORDERS TO ITS LEADERS. SELECTIVE TEXRORISM
 IS ALSO USED TO COW DISSENTERS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE VIETMAKESE COMMUNISTS EVERYWHERE HAVE THE UPPER HAND BY VIRTUE OF A
 WILLITARY APPARATUS WHICH THE KHMER COMMUNISTS CANNOT HOPE TO MATCH.
- 13. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT LET DONE SO, WE BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNISTS IN CAMBODIA WILL EVENTUALLY ATTEMPT TO UPGRADE THE RUDIMENTARY KEMBE COMMUNIST PARTY (ECP) TO PARALLEL THEY ADMINIST TRATIVE AND MILITARY CROANIZATION. TO DATE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PLACED A HIGGER PRIORITY ON THE EMPORT TO ESTABLISH AN IMPRISHECTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY EFFORT AND IT IS






DIFFICULT TO FAULT THEM FOR THIS, GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK TO BUILD A KEMER INFRASTRUCTURE FROM SCRATCH WITH ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE AND KEMER CADRE AVAILABLE FOR THE JOB. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT SOME RETURNING HANOI-TRAINED KEMER CADRE MAY NOW BE ATTEMPTING TO BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO AN EMERYONIC KCP. ONE SUCH RECENTLY RETURNED CADRE, FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTEDLY WAS APPOINTED A KCP DISTRICT SECRETARY IN KAMDAL PROVINCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE VET MAKING A SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT TO BUILD UP A KCP.

- 14. On the military side, the evidence points to an increase in the number of khier communist troops to perhaps as many as 10.000, but not necessarily to an appreciable increase in capabilities. Nost of these forces are local militia, but others operate as battalion-mize units. Emmer communist regimental-size units have also been reported. Vietnamese communist awvisors and instructors work closely with these emmer troops, and often vietnamese troop units are attached to the khier communist unit. Khier units apparently do not operate independently but are subordinate to the operate vietnamese communist military headquarters. In any event, the poorly trained, ill-equipped, and desertion-plagued kener communist units eave only a marginally effective military capability and are most often employed in local security and rear bervice activities.
- 15. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN RESTABLISHING AND CONTROLLING AN INDIGENOUS CAMEODIAN INFRASTRUCTURE. BY AND LARGE THEY HAVE USED FOR-IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS TO OBTAIN RECRUITS AND, FAILING THAT, HAVE SIMPLY COERCED PROPLE INTO JOINING. THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT YET FEEL COMPORTABLE WITH THEIR KHEIZE ALLIES, HOYEVER. AND BAVE REFRAIMED FROM GIVING THEM AN INDEPENDENT HILITARY CAPABILITY.





- 10 -

IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN KHURR COMMUNIST ASSERTIVENESS TOWARD THEIR VIETNAMESS ALLIES. THERE IS LESS OF THIS IN THE SPARSELY POPULATED HORTHEASTERN PROVINCES WHERE THE RHIMER COMMUNISTS ARE WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON THE VIGTNAMESE. BUT IN THE POPULOUS EAST-CENTRAL PROVINCES WHERE THE VC/NYA HAVE TO BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT TO MAINTAIN SOME POPULAR SUPPORT, SERIOUS PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE TREM. TO BE SURE, THE KHMER COMMUNIST ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION CREATED LARGELY BY THE VIETNAMESE COM-MUNISTS SEEMS TO BE ACCOMPLISHING THE IMMEDIATE SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES OF SUPPORTING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY AND LOGISTICS EFFORT AND HELPING TO KEEP FANK TROOPS TIED DOWN IN MORE OR LESS FIXED POSITIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN CREATING A KHMER INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH IS ABLE TO SUPPORT THEM EXCEPT IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS A CON-TINUING PREPONDERANCE OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WILLTARY FORCE. NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE KHHER COMMUNISTS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO TERRATEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SERIOUSLY IN THE ABSENCE OF VIZTNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY SUPPORT.

16. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USHACY USAID CORDS DIR/JUSPAC (MR. MICKEL ONLY) 7TH AIR FORCE USARY NAVFORV 1021 FAS 525TH MI GP OSI CINCPAC ARPAC PACEFLT PACAF

