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VIETNAM
 030150 Z CITE SAIGON 3 JUNE 1971
 PRIORITY DIRECTOR
 ENTEL
 BUZDATA NO PROJECT. PREPARED BY STATION STAFF. NOT
 COORDINATED WITH REQUEST COMMENTS. INDEX. NO FILE.
 FILED

REPORT CLASS
 COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/CAMBODIA
 DOI MAY 1971
 SUBJECT APPRAISAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG EFFORTS
 TO ESTABLISH A COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON. FIELD NO.
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 THE SITUATION.

SUMMARY. EFFORTS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS TO ESTABLISH
 AN INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA TO CON-
 TROL THE POPULATION AND MOBILIZE IT IN SUPPORT OF THE NORTH
 VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND LOGISTICS EFFORT HAVE BEEN TAKEN

Approved for Release
 Date July 1986

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SUCCESSFUL. VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTROL OF THE INFRA-STRUCTURE APPEARS TO BE SECURE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE DESPITE GROWING PROBLEMS NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS HAVING TO WORK AMONG A TRADITIONALLY HOSTILE PEOPLE. IN CONTRAST TO THESE EFFORTS TO BUILD AN INFRASTRUCTURE, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE APPARENTLY SET A LOWER PRIORITY ON DEVELOPING A STRONG KMER COMMUNIST PARTY. RATHER THAN DEVOTING TIME AND EFFORT TO ESTABLISHING THE PARTY, THEY ARE MORE CONCERNED AT THE MOMENT WITH PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTERING CAMBODIAN TERRITORY UNDER THEIR CONTROL, MAINTAINING AND SUPPLYING THEIR OWN MILITARY FORCES, AND ORGANIZING A NATIONWIDE GUERRILLA EFFORT AGAINST THE INEXPERIENCED BUT BURGEONING CAMBODIAN ARMY (FANK). IN MOST URBAN CENTERS OF CAMBODIA, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ALSO APPEAR TO BE GIVING LOW PRIORITY AT THIS TIME TO THE CREATION OF A CLANDESTINE NETWORK OF SUPPORTERS AND AGENTS - THEY HAVE AT ANY RATE HAD ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS IN THIS AREA. END SUMMARY.

1. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO CREATE A KMER ADMINISTRATIVE INFRA-STRUCTURE, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE DIVIDED CAMBODIA INTO FIVE REGIONS, AND TO DATE HAVE MANAGED TO SET UP SOME SORT OF FUNCTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS STAFFED BY KMERES IN AT LEAST TEN OF CAMBODIA'S 19 PROVINCES. THEY HAVE CONCENTRATED THEIR EFFORTS ON THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY - THE AREA THROUGH WHICH RUNS THE DEVELOPING COMMUNIST LOGISTICS CORRIDOR FROM LAOS TO THE LOWER HALF OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THEIR PROBLEMS IN THE SPARSELY POPULATED NORTHEAST WHERE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG ALREADY HAVE FULL MILITARY CONTROL ARE EVIDENTLY MORE SERIOUS THAN IN THE HEAVILY POPULATED SOUTHEAST WHERE THEY HAVE GAINED THE COOPERATION OF THE CAMBODIAN ARMY. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE THE PERPETRATOR OF VIETNAM (ARTH)

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2. IN THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF STUNG TRENG, KRATIE, RATANAKIRI, MONDOLKIRI, PREAH VIHEAR, AND KOMPONG THOM THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A MORE COMPREHENSIVE KHMER ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE THAN HE HAS YET BEEN ABLE TO DO IN OTHER AREAS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN STUNG TRENG PROVINCE IS TYPICAL OF HOW THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PROCEEDED IN THIS AREA.

3. DURING THE LATE SPRING AND EARLY SUMMER OF 1970 THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS IN STUNG TRENG APPOINTED PROVINCE, DISTRICT, VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATIONS FROM AMONG MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN RANKS IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE LOCAL POPULATION AND TO MOBILIZE IT IN SUPPORT OF THE VIET CONG (VC)/NORTH VIETNAM ARMY (NVA). BY MID-SUMMER 1970, THE POPULATION HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY RESTIVE UNDER VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION, WITH ITS TIGHT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, FREQUENT CONFISCATIONS OF VILLAGE FOOD SUPPLIES, AND MILITARY TRAINING AND CONSCRIPTION. WHILE THEY DID NOT EASE THESE MEASURES, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS THAT SUMMER BEGAN AN EFFORT TO TURN ADMINISTRATION OVER TO CAMBODIANS AND TO MAKE THEMSELVES LESS CONSPICUOUS. KHMER WERE RECRUITED AND TRAINED TO TAKE OVER THE DAY-TO-DAY RUNNING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, AND THE VIETNAMESE BEGAN TO DEAL WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION THROUGH KHMER INTERMEDIARIES RATHER THAN DIRECTLY. THE KHMER COMMUNISTS ARE NOW OBTENSIBLY IN CHARGE OF THE ENTIRE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS PULL THE STRINGS OF WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, ONLY A FRONT FOR A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA.

4. IN STUNG TRENG AS ELSEWHERE IN THE NORTHEAST, THE KHMER ORGANIZATION IS EXPERIENCING SOME PROBLEMS. KHMER COMMUNIST RANKS ARE SPREAD THIN AND SUFFER FROM A SHORTAGE OF COMPETENT, COMBATED CAPES. TO FLESH OUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE, AND ALSO TO ACCOMMODATE

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THE NON-KHMER POPULATION OF THE NORTHEAST, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE USING LAO AND EVEN THAI CADRES. IN ADDITION, MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRAINING CAMPS HAVE BEEN CREATED, AND HANOI-TRAINED KHMER CADRES CONDUCT SOME OF THE COURSES BEFORE HEADING SOUTH TO TAKE UP MORE PERMANENT ASSIGNMENTS. LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT IS ANOTHER PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH THE VILLAGERS MUST WORK WITH THE COMMUNISTS, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY GROUND SWELL OF POPULAR BACKING FOR THE COMMUNIST CAUSE, AND THERE MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN SOME EROSION OF WHAT SUPPORT THE COMMUNISTS INITIALLY DID ENJOY. AS EARLY AS OCTOBER 1970, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE STUNG TRENG PROVINCIAL LIBERATION FRONT REPORTEDLY SAID THAT MOST OF THE PEASANTS IN THE PROVINCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE KHMER COMMUNISTS AND THAT THE NVA DREW MOST OF ITS SUPPORT FROM LAO AND OTHER TRIBESMEN IN THE AREA. THAT SAME MONTH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STUNG TRENG DISTRICT COMMITTEE CLAIMED THAT ONLY 30 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF STUNG TRENG SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF SIHANOUK. THE KHMER COMMUNISTS ARE THEMSELVES PARTLY TO BLAME. THEIR HIGH-HANDED METHODS AND FREQUENT RESORT TO COERCION, INTIMIDATION, AND ASSASSINATION ALIENATE MANY PEOPLE. SOME LONG-TIME KHMER ROUGE NOW INCORPORATED INTO THE COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE HAVE ALSO USED THEIR NEWFOUND POWERS TO SETTLE OLD SCORES WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES WHO TRACKED THEM DOWN AS BANDITS UNDER THE SIHANOUK REGIME.

5. DESPITE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE KHMER ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS, INCLUDING OUTBURSTS OF ANTI-VIETNAMESE SENTIMENTS BY SOME MEMBERS, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE HAVING LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA, BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT POPULAR GRUBBLING JEOPARDIZES NVA CONTROL. IN SUM, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS IN NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA HAVE ESTABLISHED A VIRTUAL

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MILITARY OCCUPATION BEHIND A FACADE OF INDIGENOUS CONTROL.

6. THE SITUATION IN SUCH AREAS AS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF KANDAL, PREY VENG, SVAY RIENG, KOMPONG SPEU, TAKEO AND KAMPOT PRESENTS THE COMMUNISTS WITH A MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEM. HERE THEY MUST COMPETE FOR CONTROL OF A POPULOUS AREA WITH PANK AND ARVN FORCES. FURTHERMORE, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MUST DEPEND IN SOME MEASURE ON THE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OF THE KHMER COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE THEY HAVE CREATED IN THESE HEAVILY-POPULATED AREAS. WITH THE HELP OF THEIR CADRES DRAWN FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE AIDING THE KHMER IN CREATING ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES AND MILITARY FORCES FROM THE HAMLET TO THE PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS. IN SOME AREAS THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS SIMPLY EXPANDED THEIR EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER PROVINCES TO INCLUDE PORTIONS OF CAMBODIA. THE KHMER COMMUNISTS, HOWEVER, ARE PRESSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS TO RESTRICT THEIR DIRECT ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE TO ETHNIC VIETNAMESE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS ONLY, AND IN GENERAL ARE BECOMING MORE INSISTENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS RELINQUISH COMMAND POSITIONS IN THE KHMER COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND RESTRICT THEMSELVES TO AN ADVISORY ROLE.

7. BY AND LARGE, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE ACQUIESCED IN MANY SUCH KHMER COMMUNIST DEMANDS FOR GREATER AUTONOMY, PROBABLY IN PART DUE TO THE INFUSION IN RECENT MONTHS OF MORE RELIABLE HANOI-TRAINED KHMER COMMUNIST CADRES INTO LEADERSHIP POSITIONS. MANY OF THESE CADRES HAVE BEEN IN NORTH VIETNAM SINCE 1954 AND ARE PRESUMABLY FULLY INDOCTRINATED COMMUNISTS, NOT AVERSE TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE VC/NVA. IN KAMPOT PROVINCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THESE KHMER, WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST HELP, ARE SHOULDERING ASIDE THE LESS TRUSTWORTHY KHMER COMMUNIST LEADERS, TIGHTENING DISCIPLINE, CONDUCTING MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRAINING COURSES.

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AND EMPHASIZING SIHANOUK LESS AND COMMUNISM MORE. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT IMPACT THESE HANOI-TRAINED CADRES WILL HAVE OVER THE LONG RUN. IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, THEY COULD PROVE CAPABLE OF CREATING A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION WITH WHICH TO THREATEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT THAN EXISTS TODAY.

8. THE VIETNAMESE AND KHMER COMMUNISTS DO NOT YET SEEM TO BE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO BUILD A CLANDESTINE INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA'S URBAN AREAS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE NOT NEGLECTING THESE AREAS ENTIRELY. FOR INSTANCE, A CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION IN PHNOM PENH WHOSE MEMBERS DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS BELONGING TO THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT" REPORTEDLY EXISTS AMONG WORKERS OF THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL RAILROAD; AND TWO MEMBERS OF A NET OF "EXTREME LEFTIST" FORMER HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WERE ARRESTED IN PHNOM PENH IN DECEMBER 1970 FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RECENT TRIAL OF TWO OF SIHANOUK'S CHILDREN AND 18 ACCOMPLICES ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION DID NOT REVEAL ANY DIRECT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION. IN ADDITION, WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN ISOLATED INSTANCES OF PRO-COMMUNIST LEAFLETS APPEARING IN PROVINCE TOWNS, CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES THERE HAVE NOT REPORTED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY ORGANIZED COMMUNIST GROUPS.

9. THE KHMER COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IS FAR FROM BEING MONOLITHIC AND SUFFERS FROM A VARIETY OF PROBLEMS. MANY OF ITS DIFFICULTIES ARE USE AS A RESULT OF ITS DISPARATE ASSORTMENT OF ADHERENTS. GIVEN THE PRAGMATIC NATURE OF THE COMMUNISTS' RECRUITMENT POLICY, ANY GRIEVANCE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN PHNOM PENH IS USED TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO JOIN THE "LIBERATION FRONT." THIS IN TURN CREATES A FERTILE FIELD IN WHICH INTERNAL DISSENSION CAN GROW. THE MAJOR DIVISION APPEARS TO BE BETWEEN THE SO-CALLED "OLD"

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KHMER COMMUNISTS (MANY OF WHOM ARE KHMER ROUGE) INTENT ON EFFECTING A REVOLUTIONARY RESTRUCTURING OF CAMBODIAN SOCIETY, AND THE "NEW" KHMER COMMUNISTS WHO JOINED THE MOVEMENT AFTER SIHANOUK'S OUSTER AND DESIRE TO RESTORE HIM TO POWER. THERE ARE ALSO GROUPS LED BY FREEBOOTERS, SMUGGLERS, AND BRIGANDS INTERESTED ONLY IN USING THE TURMOIL CAUSED BY THE WAR AS A COVER FOR THEIR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES.

10. FRICTIONS EXIST NOT ONLY WITHIN THE KHMER INFRASTRUCTURE BUT ALSO BETWEEN THE KHMERS AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS. FIRE-FIGHTS BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIES ARE RELATIVELY COMMON AND THEY HAVE OCCURRED IN PRACTICALLY ALL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY OPERATE TOGETHER. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF MANY DISPUTES IS ECONOMIC IN NATURE. DISAGREEMENTS HAVE CENTERED PARTICULARLY ON THE RIGHT TO TAX, REQUISITION SUPPLIES, AND REDISTRIBUTE LAND. ANOTHER RECURRING SOURCE OF TROUBLE IS THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' GENERAL REFUSAL TO GIVE THE KHMER MILITARY, PARTICULARLY LOCAL FORCES, MODERN WEAPONS. KHMER COMMUNIST GROUPS HAVE EVEN RAIDED VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WEAPONS CACHES TO OBTAIN ARMS. THE EXISTENCE OF FISSURES AND ANTI-VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES WITHIN THE KHMER COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IS ALSO A SOURCE OF CONFUSION FOR THE GENERAL POPULACE, WHICH IS A FREQUENT WITNESS TO AND VICTIM OF THE RESULTANT DISPUTES AND AN OBJECT OF CONTRADICTION PROPAGANDIZING. PROBABLY PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THIS SITUATION, SOME KHMER COMMUNISTS HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED AND HAVE RALLIED TO THE PHNOM PENE GOVERNMENT. ACCURATE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE NO COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT RALLIER PROGRAM EXISTS. THE CAMBODIAN MILITARY CLAIMS, HOWEVER, THAT 1 722 PERSONS RALLIED TO THE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1970 AND MARCH 1971, AN AVERAGE OF 344 PER MONTH.

11. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM FOR THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, OF COURSE, IS THAT THEY, AS THE TRADITIONALLY HATED AND FEARED

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OUTSIDERS, ARE ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS AND LEADERSHIP ON AN ALIEN AND ESSENTIALLY HOSTILE POPULATION. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST CADRE MOST GENERALLY RELY ON INTERPRETERS TO STATE THEIR CASE TO THEIR KHMER ALLIES, A SITUATION WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY LEADS TO CONFUSION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IN ADDITION, THE MAJOR EMPHASIS ON THE VC/NVA EFFORT IN CAMBODIA IS ON ESTABLISHING RELIABLE INFILTRATION ROUTES IN THAT COUNTRY TO BRING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES THROUGH TO SOUTH VIETNAM. THE VIETNAMESE THEREFORE ESSENTIALLY WISH TO USE THE KHMER INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST EFFORT TO CARRY ON THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND MANY KHMER COMMUNISTS NATURALLY RESENT THE LOWER PRIORITY THE VIETNAMESE THEREBY GIVE TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN PHNOM PENH.

12. THE VC AND NVA GENERALLY SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF KHMER PROVOCATIONS AND DEMANDS, ACCOMMODATING THE CAMBODIANS WHEN THEY JUDGE THAT THIS WILL NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THEIR OWN MILITARY EFFORTS. FOR ALL THEIR CONCESSIONS, HOWEVER, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS APPEAR DETERMINED TO KEEP THE UPPER HAND. VIETNAMESE ADVISORY CADRES CAN BE FOUND AT ALL LEVELS OF THE KHMER COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE AND ISSUE ORDERS TO ITS LEADERS. SELECTIVE TERRORISM IS ALSO USED TO COW DISSENTERS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS EVERYWHERE HAVE THE UPPER HAND BY VIRTUE OF A MILITARY APPARATUS WHICH THE KHMER COMMUNISTS CANNOT HOPE TO MATCH.

13. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT YET DONE SO, WE BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNISTS IN CAMBODIA WILL EVENTUALLY ATTEMPT TO UPGRADE THE PRIMITIVE KHMER COMMUNIST PARTY (KCP) TO PARALLEL THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION. TO DATE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE PLACED A HIGHER PRIORITY ON THE EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY EFFORT AND IT IS

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DIFFICULT TO FAULT THEM FOR THIS, GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK TO BUILD A KHMER INFRASTRUCTURE FROM SCRATCH WITH ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE AND KHMER CADRE AVAILABLE FOR THE JOB. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT SOME RETURNING HANOI-TRAINED KHMER CADRE MAY NOW BE ATTEMPTING TO BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO AN EMBRYONIC KCP. ONE SUCH RECENTLY RETURNED CADRE, FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTEDLY WAS APPOINTED A KCP DISTRICT SECRETARY IN KANDAL PROVINCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE YET MAKING A SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT TO BUILD UP A KCP.

14. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE EVIDENCE POINTS TO AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF KHMER COMMUNIST TROOPS TO PERHAPS AS MANY AS 10,000, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO AN APPRECIABLE INCREASE IN CAPABILITIES. MOST OF THESE FORCES ARE LOCAL MILITIA, BUT OTHERS OPERATE AS BATTALION-SIZE UNITS. KHMER COMMUNIST REGIMENTAL-SIZE UNITS HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ADVISORS AND INSTRUCTORS WORK CLOSELY WITH THESE KHMER TROOPS, AND OFTEN VIETNAMESE TROOP UNITS ARE ATTACHED TO THE KHMER COMMUNIST UNIT. KHMER UNITS APPARENTLY DO NOT OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY BUT ARE SUBORDINATE TO HIGHER VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY HEADQUARTERS. IN ANY EVENT, THE POORLY TRAINED, ILL-EQUIPPED, AND DESERTION-PLAGUED KHMER COMMUNIST UNITS HAVE ONLY A MARGINALLY EFFECTIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY AND ARE MOST OFTEN EMPLOYED IN LOCAL SECURITY AND REAR SERVICE ACTIVITIES.

15. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN ESTABLISHING AND CONTROLLING AN INDIGENOUS CAMBODIAN INFRASTRUCTURE. BY AND LARGE THEY HAVE USED NON-IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS TO OBTAIN RECRUITS AND, FAILING THAT, HAVE SIMPLY COERCED PEOPLE INTO JOINING. THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT YET FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH THEIR KHMER ALLIES, HOWEVER, AND HAVE REFRAINED FROM GIVING THEM AN INDEPENDENT MILITARY CAPABILITY.

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IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN KHMER COMMUNIST ASSERTIVENESS TOWARD THEIR VIETNAMESE ALLIES. THERE IS LESS OF THIS IN THE SPARSELY POPULATED NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES WHERE THE KHMER COMMUNISTS ARE WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON THE VIETNAMESE. BUT IN THE POPULOUS EAST-CENTRAL PROVINCES WHERE THE VC/NVA HAVE TO BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT TO MAINTAIN SOME POPULAR SUPPORT, SERIOUS PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THEM. TO BE SURE, THE KHMER COMMUNIST ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION CREATED LARGELY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS SEEMS TO BE ACCOMPLISHING THE IMMEDIATE SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES OF SUPPORTING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY AND LOGISTICS EFFORT AND HELPING TO KEEP FANK TROOPS TIED DOWN IN MORE OR LESS FIXED POSITIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN CREATING A KHMER INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH IS ABLE TO SUPPORT THEM EXCEPT IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS A CONTINUING PREPONDERANCE OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCE. NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE KHMER COMMUNISTS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO THREATEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SERIOUSLY IN THE ABSENCE OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY SUPPORT.

16. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID CORDS DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) 7TH AIR FORCE USAFV NAVFORV 1021 FAS 525TH MI GP OSI CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF [REDACTED]

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