

Hold a Party headquarters congress to review activities during the last six months ((of 1970)) and preview the leadership task for the first six months of 1971.

Indoctrinate Party members (according to the documents provided).

Make a recapitulative report at the end of the year and select Four-Good-Quality cadre and Party members.

The Group:

Organize a Group Chapter Congress

Indoctrinate Group members.

Select Four-Good-Quality Group members and Chapters.

Improve Group members' capabilities.

Units:

Improve the professional skills of cadre, cell leaders, and security reconnaissance personnel.

Schedules:

From 1 to 3 Sep ((unspecified year)): Prepare Party Committee meetings.

From 3 to 5 Sep ((unspecified year)): ((Party headquarters)) congress.

From 5 to 15 Sep ((unspecified year)): Professional training course.

From 16 to 25 Sep ((unspecified year)): Pick up rice and attend training courses.

From 26 to 30 Sep ((unspecified year)): Prepare an activity plan.

Notices:

Lien asked for legal papers so he might move to the military region.

Thiet sent a letter to Tung.

EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

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According to the ((Political Staff)) Department and Section.

Strong points:

Our soldiers displayed bravery, high determination, confidence, and creativity.

Weak points:

Passive and rightist attitudes were still prevalent at times and places. Leadership was ineffective; therefore, missions and guidelines were not well understood.

Reasons:

Cadre and soldiers did not fully understand the common missions and guidelines of the branch or know how to cleverly promote the Revolution using intelligence stratagems for the present and for the future.

Their determination was not high.

Their specialized skills and leadership capabilities were poor.

Organization was unstable and changed very often.

The leadership of the military region was not prompt and that of the section and Cum ((47)) ineffective.

The enemy's situation and the papers ((required by him)) ((sic)).

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There were no cell leaders inside ((enemy controlled areas)).

The subjective reasons were important.

II. MATTERS UNDERSTOOD:

1. Guidelines and missions:

Cadre and soldiers understood basic difficulties and advantages.

Disadvantages:

Caused by enemy activities and the necessity for ((legal)) papers.

Pacifistic attitude displayed by NQNG ((sic)).

The stepping-stone areas bordering cities are unstable.

Enemy security activities and the necessity for ((legal)) papers.

Pessimism in the face of missions and a lack of self-confidence.

Advantages:

We are on the way to victory while the enemy is on the way to defeat.

Particularly, in the Tri-Thien ((Hue)) ((Military Region)) we become ever stronger while the enemy becomes ever weaker. Meanwhile, the student struggle against the enemy is being promoted.

The professional training brought about good results and experiences.

2. Characteristics of missions:

The strategic missions of the section are fundamental. The campaign requires close coordination.

Missions: Strengthen our forces inside ((enemy controlled areas)) to fight the enemy in the new situation.

Ensure the communication task.

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Guidelines:

This is a motivation task for the Revolution of the Party, in conjunction with intelligence activities which help us study our objectives.

Cadre and soldiers did not perform their missions widely and carefully. They paid too much attention to the communication activities but neglected espionage activities. They paid attention only to immediate tasks but neglected long range ones.

The factors of continuity, secrecy, and protraction ((sic)).

Problems to be solved:

1. Cell leaders: There are two methods of training new cell leaders, training them in local areas and infiltrating them from the outside. Each method has its own difficulties which we must study and overcome.

The difficulty of infiltrating cell leaders from the outside is to legalize ((their papers)). We can infiltrate them directly from the outside or through an intermediate area of operation. We can solve the above difficulty by infiltrating them under a disguise which is 90% legal.

The difficulty of training new cell leaders in local areas is to choose the right individuals to be trained. We can discover them ourselves or ask local personnel to select them because our agents are available. We should use the training method which best suits the present situation and provide effective leadership.

2. Establishing an agent network (to collect information):

We should understand the five motivation steps for the Revolution of the Party.

We must understand the ~~emotional and consanguineous relationship~~ ((of these agents)).

Establish an element to study their biographical data.

There are two methods: Pulling out and attacking ((sic)).

a. Pulling out: We should use good intermediary agents, understand the five steps, and isolate pacifistic attitudes.

b. Attacking: This method requires much care, patience, and close leadership. We should aim at students and youths evading **conscription** and solve their illegal status problems.

We cannot use the attacking members to recruit agents ((sic)).

We should create favorable conditions.

3. Establish "cua ngo" ((gateways)) and legal commo-liaison agents:

a. Gateways: The following factors are necessary:

The situation in the area of operation must be well in hand.

Exercise the factors of secrecy and surprise.

Have intermediary agents; prepare a cover story.

Be brave and creative.

There are two forms: Direct and indirect.

Direct: ((Two words illegible)), ambush.

Ensure prompt leadership with an interval of one night ((between)) detachments and gateways ((and)) commo-liaison agents).

b. Commo-liaison personnel:

There are two kinds of commo-liaison personnel, legal and illegal.

In the present situation, we should use legal communication personnel only. We cannot allow semi-legal commo-liaison agents to operate alone, but must use all means to support them.

We are facing great difficulty in recruiting legal commo-liaison personnel and exercising leadership over them, but the tasks assigned to them have always been performed well.

We have advantages and disadvantages in employing different kinds of commo-liaison personnel. For instance, we can recruit semi-legal commo-liaison personnel and administer them easily, but we will find it difficult to get ((GVN)) legal papers for them.

LESSON

This lesson must be studied carefully and understood thoroughly.

1. It is important that we understand the policy of our branch concerning recruitment and leadership tasks.
2. In recruiting commo-liaison cell leaders, we must select those capable and with legal status. What recruitment means and training must we use for them ?

Selecting personnel is a complicated job that requires great patience and skill.

3. Recruitment of information agents is a very important task. Information agents must have legal status.

4. We are required to thoroughly understand the task of recruiting legal commo-liaison agents.

The recruitment task requires great efforts and sound procedures. We must be more vigilant.

5. In recruiting commo-liaison and espionage agents, we must strictly adhere to the principle of compartmentalization for secrecy.

Conclusion:

We have improved our methods of debate and our knowledge, and raised our sense of responsibility. However, we must further study the methods of application ((of the principles)) and must be patient and positive in our activities.

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Missions assigned to front spearhead elements and rear "cum's".

Criteria and time prescribed for elimination of objectives ((meaning enemy personnel)).

Criteria for the "gateway".

Objective Phan Ban Hoa.

Self-sufficiency production.

Congress to be held by the Party Headquarters.

What matters are considered main issues.

((Three words illegible))

Review of tasks performed since early 1970.

1. Characteristics of the situation in the area of operation ((of Cum)) 47:

(Phong Quang - Triêu Hải)

Northern Hue and areas surrounding Quang Tri City comprise a strongly disputed battlefield. The enemy strives to step up pacification activities and check bordering areas, causing us great difficulties.

Cadre and units are newly assigned to the area of activity. The "new" and "old" Area of Operation 47 are reorganized into one.

Area of Operation 47 failed to make contact with old agents. We must activate a "gateway" to receive cadre ((going in and out of GVN-controlled areas)) and recruit additional agents.

Our failure resulted from an unfavorable situation and difficulties caused by the enemy. Long was arrested. Long rallied to the enemy through Chiêu Hồi. In addition, our capability was limited. Food was in short supply.

((Agents in Area of Operation 47 must)) display a high determination and have close coordination in activities ((to achieve their future missions)).

((They)) must procure food, master the situation in the area of operations, in H. Lóc ((sic)) Hải Thủy. Each mui ((detachment)) is required to have two illegal commo-liaison agents, one semi-legal commo-liaison agent, and two agents in charge of procuring ((GVN legal)) papers.

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Recruitment of agents:

Comrade Thái recruited one legal commo-liaison agent and one agent in charge of procuring ((GVN)) papers, and established a "gateway" to escort cadre.

Our agents encountered great difficulties in their work after the death of Quyet and Tuan. Comrade Thanh, who replaced Comrade Tuan, was KIA in Mar 69.

As instructed by higher echelons, our agents resumed the mission of escorting cadre in May 69. However, the mission was performed in phases and not on a regular basis.

No enemy personnel were found in this area, so counteraction has not yet been taken.

A 10-day schedule

Agenda:

Recapitulative reports by the department and "cum": One day

Discussion: One day

Report on experiences and guidance on several problems: One day

Discussion of other problems: Seven days

((The discussion includes:)).

Experiences on espionage activities and application of the five ((espionage)) methods: Four days.

Experiences in communication activities: Three days.

Son:	600	4600	/17
Xuan:	500	420	26 ((sic))
		8	

Phien:	500	4600	/18
Tam:	400	100	255
		100	
		10	
	2000		

Rice is sufficient for 15 ((individuals)) for a month. Five nylon sheets. Two pots. Sugar. Dried food. Ten ang. ((One ang equals approximately six kilograms)) of go ((sic)). Dried food. Five flashlights.

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Methods of organization and motivation.

1. Planting ((our personnel)) in ((enemy organizations)) and pulling out ((enemy personnel to our organizations)) (Son).

a. For planting our personnel into enemy organizations, we must select competent, ~~mature individuals with stable political standpoints~~ and great prestige. In recruiting these individuals, we must pass through the following steps:

Investigate them and test their capabilities:

Politically indoctrinate them and secretly train them.

Assign them missions and prescribe the liaison regulations for them.

b. To pull out enemy personnel, we must choose those whose relatives can provide support.

We must study training mobile cadre in local areas.

leaders. Training for these cadre will differ from that for legal cell

((Failure)) of Vietnamization of the war ((is due to:))

Enemy failure in VN battlefield. He has devoted all efforts to Vietnam, but failed in his strategy.

World objective is Soviet Union and Red China. ((sic)).

Five enemy schemes:

Accelerated pacification program

Checking ((our activities))

Building up Puppet forces

Economic restoration

Rallying anti-Communist parties

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The situation in Tri-Thien ((Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces))

Enemy schemes:

1. Building up his forces: The enemy made positive efforts in conscripting youths, upgrading forces, and upgrading R2 ((sic)) to a brigade.

CQ ((possibly RVNAF)): The enemy increased technical equipment for artillery, navy, and engineer forces and transportation units.

He stepped up the strengthening of Regional Forces to give his regular forces mobility.

He also strived to reduce US casualties.

Regional Forces: The enemy gave the Regional Forces the responsibility of pacification activities in delta areas in lieu of regular forces which were to move to mountain and forest areas ((two words illegible)).

The enemy attempted to arm the people and carry out self-sufficiency, self-administration, and self-defense.

Specifically, the enemy conscripted youths to upgrade forces and increase combat capability.

He screened and consolidated his forces.

His efforts were devoted to the establishment of hamlets under the control of Popular Forces. (The Popular Forces would gradually replace the Regional Forces in villages and hamlets.)

The Regional Forces would gradually withdraw ((from villages and hamlets)) to reinforce the regular forces.

Results:

By conscription, the enemy provided prompt replacements for his forces. The Regional Force was stronger than our local forces. In certain areas, the enemy began to develop his combat efficiency, and Popular Force units replaced Regional Force units.

Regional Force units began to engage in combat against our forces in the delta areas, and move to the bordering areas.

The regular forces were reinforced with two artillery d's ((battalions)) (8 d's) ((possibly totalling eight artillery d's)): One river assault group, one junk force C ((possibly company)), three coastal force groups operating on the coast, and one reconnaissance c equipped with radios. Their firepower was also increased.

The enemy forces had great mobility (using both air and waterways). By late Jun 70, the 101st ((US)) Airborne Division had 310 aircraft.

The Puppet forces succeeded in defense missions, thus achieving the first step of the de-Americanization program. In 1970, the mobile ((regular)) forces ((numbered)) approximately seven to nine ((divisions)).

Enemy failures:

1. Casualties sustained by the enemy in 1970 were greater than the number of youths conscripted. Therefore, he could not provide sufficient replacements for his forces. He could not activate the 2nd Brigade for the demarcation line ((DMZ)).

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Enemy casualties:

From Jan to Sep 70, we killed 18,674 enemy troops, including 9,372 US troops and 86 tyrants, and destroyed three E ((regiments)) light command posts, five d ((battalion)) command posts, four d's ((battalions)), 46 c's ((companies)) and 69 b's ((platoons)), including 36 Popular Force b's. We inflicted heavy losses on the 3rd Regiment, 101st Airborne Division; 1st ((RVNAF)) Regiment; 54th ((RVNAF)) Regiment; and 10 other d's. We also destroyed 738 aircraft, 94 artillery pieces, 225 vehicles including 143 armored vehicles, and 10 boat convoys.

2. Enemy troops were demoralized. They feared death and wanted to defect.

3. The enemy could not support pacification activities in lowland areas for a long period of time since he was busy coping with our troops in the border areas.

4. The enemy lacked transportation means.

2. Pacification activities:

1. The enemy tried to consolidate and expand his controlled areas.

2. He carried out economic self-development projects, established agricultural associations, and granted loans to farmers to buy farm implements.

3. He also tried to strengthen the ruling machinery.

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Future Tasks and Situation

Characteristics ((of the situation)):

Although the enemy suffered heavy defeat, he still remained stubborn and made efforts to **execute** his Vietnamization plan.

1. The enemy is deescalating, and will continue to do so. By 15 Apr ((71)), 150,000 ((US)) troops will be withdrawn from SVN.

2. On one hand, the enemy deescalates the war; on the other, he fiercely fights against us. He may bring his troops back to Cambodia if the situation becomes **more** complicated.

3. He is making every effort to establish an anti-Communist defensive line in Southeast Asia (unite Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia into one bloc).

Enemy Contradictions and Vulnerabilities:

1. US troops will be withdrawn from SVN to a limited strength, and the situation of the battlefield will turn to our favor.

The US will maintain only 250,000 troops ((in SVN)) (consisting of the 1st Cavalry, 101st Airborne, Americal, and 4th US Divisions).

Contradictions in enemy plans and his capabilities:

2. The expansion of the war into Cambodia made the enemy become constantly weaker and drove him into rapid collapse because his forces were thinly deployed on the SVN battlefield, thus exposing many vulnerabilities.

3. The withdrawal of US troops after their (US and Puppet) failures in the escalation of the war did not strengthen the Puppet forces, but plunged them into irreversible straits.

4. The Asian Anti-Communist Alliance will be weakened inevitably. It was established and sponsored by the US which is now in a defeated position.

5. The more the enemy expands the war, the greater difficulties he will encounter in political, economic, and military fields. His measures taken in withdrawing a small part of ((US)) troops ((from SVN)) were only to calm public opinion.

6. The more the US expands the war, the more it becomes isolated and suffers serious failures.

General tasks ((for friendly forces)):

Motivate the people in two parts ((SVN and NVN)) to frustrate the Vietnamization plan and support the two friendly nations ((Laos and Cambodia)); strengthen the base area, pursue a general strategy, and bring the anti-US Resistance to final victory.

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Plan adopted by the enemy in Tri-Thien ((Huê)) battlefield:

The Tri-Thien area has many strategic lines of communication with Hue and Da Nang as political centers.

It is a mountainous battlefield where we have conditions to develop friendly main force units. Due to the location being adjacent to NVN, it can receive direct reinforcements.

Strategically, it plays a very important role.

Our three missions:

1. Gain control, continue to destroy a large part of enemy potential and war facilities, and take the initiative on the battlefields; gain control of mountainous and fringe areas. We must apply flexible measures to gradually defeat the enemy and liberate and gain control of each area.
2. Employ the offensive strategy and coordinate the three areas.

3. Increase combat preparations such as rear service, war facilities, movement system, etc ((sic)).

Possibilities:

- 1.. In the future, the enemy may launch more attacks on our intermediary lines and intercept our axes ((of supply)).
2. He will concentrate his efforts on attacks against strategic corridors.
3. Throughout SVN, the situation may evolve suddenly ((in our favor)).

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10 Nov ((year unspecified))

RESOLUTION (OF THE POLITBURO)

Situation: Since Jan 70, a very important change has taken place in Indochina.

1. Cambodia: A battlefield where the US suffered serious failure and had to withdraw its troops. However, it still nurtures an ambition of prolonging the war and withdrawing its troops while in a strong position and continues to daringly send its troops to Cambodia in attempt to destroy our key agencies, ravage our storage facilities, and oppress the Cambodian Revolution.

Establish a military alliance bloc.

Comments:

The US failed to realize ~~its~~ intentions and had to return to the defensive position. Throughout Indochina, ~~it~~ was driven into irreversible straits.

Enemy weaknesses:

Both the Lon Nol Government and the Puppet Army are very weak.

The US had not made preparations for the battlefield ((possibly Cambodia)).

The evolution of the situation helped us create a new Vietnamese - Cambodia - Laos Alliance. The people's movement has been strongly developed.

1. The role of Sihanouk after his overthrow:

He showed an inclination to socialism.

2. Alliance of the three countries:

Previously, these three countries formed a party called the Indochina Communist Party. But, since 1951, they separated from one another, making the situation more complicated. Until 1965, friendly ((VC)) forces coordinated with Laos in the fight against the US.

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As far as the Cambodians are concerned, on one hand, they supported us, but on the other, they oppressed the Communist Party. After the deposition of Sihanouk, our Party enthusiastically supported the Cambodian Revolution, and the Indochina Alliance was formed in accordance with the situation requirements.

The Cambodian Party gained striking victories and grew rapidly, from a Party which was only capable of providing guidance for political struggles to a powerful Party with a government, strong armed forces, and a ((political)) front. It has achieved significant military victories, liberated an important and strategic axis of communication, and two-thirds of the ((Cambodian)) territory.

On the contrary, the Lon Nol Government is isolated and on the way to collapse. Therefore, the US has to send its troops to Cambodia to support the Lon Nol Government, creating new difficulties for the US.

2. SVN:

1. The enemy pacification plan met with difficulties, especially in Region 5, Nam Bộ, and Tri-Thiên. The enemy is skinking back and we have gained several advantages. We will certainly succeed in frustrating his pacification program.

2. City movements: The struggles of war invalids, students, and workers have been strongly developed.

Characteristics: These movements have been coordinated with one another and, recently, the women's movement came into existence.

Under the leadership of the Party, these movements have been conducted in accordance with Party slogans and lines. Being oppressed by the enemy, they were developed from legal status to semi-legal and illegal status.

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The people's struggles for peace and cessation of war have aggravated contradictions among enemy factions.

3. The armed forces have been reorganized according to the battlefield situations. They have reached maturity in combat and gained greater victories. The guerrilla forces have been developed and political forces have been established legally and illegally.

Weaknesses:

In combat: Our quantity remained poor.

Our political struggles were not strongly conducted. Although the victories we gained in Cambodia were of great significance, we failed to change the overall situation.

Causes: Our combat capability was still underdeveloped so that we could not create any great changes in the general situation.

We did not master the prescribed guidelines and failed to adopt proper methods of action. (On-the-spot training was not conducted satisfactorily.)

Battlefield preparations left much to be desired.

Coordination between the three areas was loose.

b. North ((VN)) become a large rear base for the three Indochinese countries.

3. Laos:

The US imperialists suffered serious failures and the Laos ((meaning Lao Communists)) gained striking victories, thus promoting Lao prestige throughout the world. The Vang Pao bandits were driven away, and the people displayed a high revolutionary enthusiasm.

We succeeded in liberating Attapeu, Saravane, and the Plain of Jars, etc ...((sic)).

((Laos)) is an important area connecting B ((possibly NVN)) with South ((VN)) and is the corridor of the three countries.

In our strong position, we can widely develop our diplomatic struggles.

General assessment:

The Indochinese theater of operations is in a new stage of development which was caused by:

Unification and unanimity between the three Parties.

Mutual standpoint ((of the three countries)) on peace, independence and neutrality, and common strategic purposes.

The US scheme of using Asians to fight Asians was frustrated, and the US is isolated more than ever. Support of people from all over the world towards the three Indochinese countries is very strong, and the US imperialist schemes will be exposed completely. As a result, the enemy could not implement his furtive schemes.

II. FUTURE ENEMY SCHEMES AND POLICIES:

The US will continue to de-escalate the war and gradually withdraw its troops ((from SVN)). In conjunction with their withdrawal, the US will fiercely fight against us on the three battlefields and in NVN; however, its ((military)) activities will be somewhat limited.

They will do their utmost to establish an alliance bloc ((in Asia)) in an attempt to implement their scheme of using Asians to fight Asians (particularly, the Indochinese troops from SVN) and assign the Puppet Army to replace US forces.

In NVN, they may attack the southern portion of Military Region IV and conduct sabotage activities.

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Positively undermine the Cambodian Revolution. Send the SVN Puppet troops to Cambodia to play the key role.

Strive to defend Phnom-Penh and big cities; gain the control of densely populated areas and strategic hamlets.

Coordinate combat activities in various areas in Laos; attack our corridors; and coordinate with other countries to form the Southeast Asia Alliance ((including Japan)), because the countries in Indochina hold an important position.

Enemy contradictions and vulnerabilities.

1. The US has to withdraw its troops from VN. However, it intends to prolong the war. Puppet troops are not capable of replacing US troops. Furthermore, Puppet troops have to play the key force in the Indochinese countries. Our forces and position have been increasingly developed. Therefore, in a certain period of time, the enemy and friendly balance of forces will turn in our favor.
2. The US expands the war to Cambodia without a well prepared plan. It will encounter danger.
3. The US wants to shift the burden of the war to Puppet troops and consolidate the latter, but this is impossible.
4. The US is planning to concentrate forces in Asia, but it cannot rally any sizeable force. The contradictions among the US and its lackies have become sharply aggravated.

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(Since they are in defeated a position how can they rally forces?)

5. The US spares no effort in expanding the war in Indochina. At the same time, it wants to reduce war expenditures. The more it prolongs the war, the more it encounters economic and financial difficulties and becomes isolated from the world.

Enemy strong points.

His troops are numerous. His firepower is still strong. He has strengthened his defense system and increased countermeasures against our forces.

He still occupies important areas of operation .

The US still possesses much military and economic potential.

The enemy has encountered increasing difficulties and profound contradictions. As for us, our forces and positions have been strongly developed. We have exerted all efforts to shift the balance of forces in our favor. The situation is favorable for us to rise up to gain victories in order to end the war.

III. MISSIONS.

Indochina becomes a battlefield.

1. We should motivate the people in both zones ((meaning NVN and SVN)) to unite with the people of other countries in Indochina to perseveringly carry on the Resistance until complete victory; increase military and political struggles; foil enemy pacification plan; provide wholehearted support for the Cambodian and Lao peoples; break all enemy schemes; consolidate the North; and increase our vigilance ((against enemy plans)).

((Marginal notes:)) Be ready to engage in combat, intensify diplomatic struggles, and strive to gain victories in each country in order to lead the Revolution to overall victory in Indochina. ((End of notes.))

Guidelines: Develop our new offensive position and consolidate bases in three countries. Indochina is a battlefield where the people have the same interests, geographical position, and fighting traditions.

To carry out the global strategic scheme, the US strives to consolidate Thailand in order to use it as a ((military)) base.

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Therefore, our present targets are the US imperialists, Thai leaders, and reactionaries of three countries in Indochina.

Friendly side: We should concentrate efforts on attacking US imperialists and their henchmen in SVN, Cambodia, and Laos and liberating the people of the three countries. Our forces include the peoples of three countries with the VN force playing the key role. The three countries have the same policy and a common goal ((of fighting the US)).

2. We must clearly understand the guidelines of this war in which the entire people participate in offensives and uprisings to gain piecemeal victories to achieve the final goal. This is the guideline of the Indochinese War.

Military activities should be carried out in conjunction with political activities according to each area. We must conduct three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas.

3. We must master the guidelines of a protracted war. While fighting the protracted war, we should strive to gain victory as soon as possible. The US imperialists are stubborn, but our effort is the decisive factor to win the war.

4. We must strengthen our new strategic position in Indochina.

We should resolutely and continuously conduct military and political attacks with appropriate methods. First of all, we should strongly attack the enemy in order to create a firm position in rural and delta areas to support our attacks on cities. We should step up the activities of our main force in areas of emphasis.

We must strengthen our armed forces, strongly develop the guerrilla warfare movement and our local forces, strengthen our main forces on all battlefields in Indochina, and BDDF ((possibly local special action units)); liberate Cambodia and Laos, and defend North Vietnam.

((Marginal notes)): We should conduct a partial uprising to gain piecemeal victories, then lead the Revolution to a general offensive to achieve a complete victory. ((End of notes.))

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We should spare no efforts in consolidating our rear areas. It is the most decisive factor at present.

We should strengthen political and military ((forces)), develop a self-sufficient economy, and strengthen national defense system.

We should strive to carry out the rear service task in order to fulfill strategic requirements.

We should improve leadership and organization.

12 Nov

Resolution adopted by the Party Committee of the Research Office ((Political Staff Department, VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)).

a. Characteristics of the situation.

The development of the situation on the battlefield has caused us many difficulties. Consequently, we failed to accomplish our mission.

Recently, we have improved our cadre's professional skills and conducted a motivation phase to increase the capabilities of Party members.

We have made them understand the activity plan and mission more deeply and strengthened their standpoint and knowledge.

We have improved organizational skills.

We have been confronted with numerous difficulties caused by enemy combat schemes. However, we will be able to overcome them because of our favorable situation.

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b. Plan for new missions.

According to the resolution passed by the Politburo, we should exert all efforts to strengthen our new offensive position and foil the enemy pacification scheme.

We should strive to improve and develop our capability. Immediately, we should establish stepping-stone areas, entry and exit points to establish a "gateway" (concentrate our efforts on building up new forces), and strengthen inside forces.

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We should strongly strengthen Party Headquarters in political, ideological and organization fields and create favorable conditions to accomplish missions assigned by the higher echelons.

Main mission: Strengthen the inside force to serve the Central Headquarters and military region Party Committee.

We have three specific major tasks:

- a. Provide effective leadership to accomplish specialized activities and strengthen units and agencies.
- b. Implement missions in all fields aimed at strengthening the Party.
- c. ((Develop)) self-sufficient production.

1. Leadership for accomplishment of missions:

Make all Party Headquarters members, especially Party Committee members, agents, and cadre operating in the front, thoroughly understand our plans for 1970-1971. On that basis, strengthen their belief ((in the Revolution)) and their determination to accomplish the missions assigned by higher echelons.

Specifically, those who are given a new mission should ensure accomplishment of Step 1 of the plan (six months).

Requirements: We should maintain our prestige in local areas.

As for the two available agent networks, they should concentrate efforts on training members to assume temporary command of a unit and escort cadre.

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We should consolidate the organization of the various staffs and all agent networks. Their organization must be compact.

We must improve cadre and troops and strictly observe all regulations and policies adopted by the military region. Selling, purchasing, and exchanging items for personal profit are not allowed. We must oppose liberal tendencies and lack of discipline.

We must review the performance of missions in 1970, evaluate achievements on leadership, and rate emulation achievements for awards.

2. Party task and political task.

We must strengthen the overall leadership; promote the leadership of the Party; strengthen the Party; improve personnel's professional skills; concentrate efforts on increasing the Party members' capabilities; live up to the slogan: "All is devoted to 800,000 people in Tri-Thiên-Huá;" and continue to indoctrinate personnel to understand their missions more thoroughly in compliance with the directive.

We must intensify indoctrination of the people and create favorable conditions for the people and Group members to realize their ideals and correctly implement the directive.

We must work out an ideological plan: We should positively attack the enemy under any circumstance.

Requirements of ideological task:

We must strengthen our standpoint under any circumstance and enhance our sense of responsibility toward the political task and our fighting spirit and high determination to perform the task.

We must overcome the lack of confidence ((in the Revolution)), of stable morale in the performance of tasks, and of a

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sense of responsibility. Reliant attitudes, inferiority complexes, and fear of a protracted war and hardships must also be overcome.

Strengthen solidarity and conduct more critique and self-critique sessions. Make efforts to fulfill the seven requirements. Combat individualism. Start a new life with simplicity and hard work without jeopardizing the revolutionary ethics and with wholehearted ideology.

Conduct more Party Chapter and cell caucuses and improve the capabilities of Party Committees.

Increase the control and administration of internal ranks. Consistently implement all directives and resolutions of higher echelons.

All Party Chapters and Party cells must closely control Party members in all aspects.

Cadre mission: According to their authority, Party Committees have the right to recommend promotions, conduct inspections, handle disciplinary actions, and issue awards.

Increase the preservation of secrecy.

3. Self-sufficient production.

Strive to fulfill the requirements prescribed by higher echelons.

Provide guidance for ((lower echelons)) to practice thrift, have a self-sufficient spirit, and combat corruption and waste.

Directive

14 Nov ((70))

Attack of the enemy to gain control of the fringe ((area)).

1. The position and the significant meaning of the fringe area:

The fringe area of TTH ((possibly Tri-Thiên-Huê^A)) is from the edge of the forest down to Highway 1 where ((enemy)) bases, urban areas, and the densely populated areas on Highway 2 are located. This is the fringe area between the jungle, bases, lowlands, and cities.

This fringe line is located in a position of extreme importance.

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For the enemy, this is the area where his mobile forces are concentrated to intercept us. Moreover, it is also an area where his artillery and armor forces, key command agencies, and tyrannical ringleaders are concentrated. It is also a springboard from which he can launch attacks on both mountainous and lowland areas.

For us, this is an area from which we can launch attacks against key enemy agencies and an area linking the three areas where bases of our districts, villages, and doan's ((groups)) are located. (As soon as the situation on the battlefield ((in this area)) is developed ((in our favor)), these areas will become bases of various groups.) This area is also a place favorable for us to support struggle movements in urban areas.

Therefore, to successfully gain control of lowland areas, we must first seize control of this fringe area.

In order to gain control of this fringe area, we must compete with the enemy in a protracted and fierce struggle until the conclusion of the war. The enemy will stubbornly defend this area because it is a position of strategic importance for both us and the enemy.

2. Enemy schemes:

The enemy has resorted to military, political, and economic schemes against our armed and political forces in an effort to drive them away from the people. Following is his pattern of activities conducted in areas adjacent to forests, hills, and in villages to oppress and bribe the people in order to relocate them.

In areas adjacent to forests: He has set up an increasing number of blocking positions and employed Special Forces and scouts to launch search operations and raids in coordination with air strikes.

On barren hills: At night he employs infantry units in coordination with armored vehicles, mines, and artillery forces ((to set ambushes)) on paths which we frequently use. In the daytime he deploys artillery troops on high points to observe our movements to enable him to set night ambushes.

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In areas along Highway 1:

His main activities are to set ambushes inside and outside villages to attack our forces during their movements. In addition, he has resorted to oppressive measures to prevent local inhabitants from contacting us to reveal his presence.

3. Enemy strengths and weaknesses and our advantages and deficiencies:

Enemy strengths:

He has numerous forces with a highly mobile capability of armored vehicles and aircraft. His various arms and Special Forces can provide mutual support.

When our activities were reduced, the enemy conducted terrain reconnaissance and altered the terrain features. He worked out combat plans, organized combat preparations, and improved attacks by small elements.

Enemy weaknesses: In general, enemy troop morale declined. Those in fringe areas are aggressive, but if we strongly attack them, they will be demoralized and retreat. Enemy forces are not patient enough to constantly hold on to these areas, thus they have to retreat.

When his forces are being dispersed in small elements, they can not provide mutual support when attacked. Thus, we can destroy the enemy with only small elements.

The fringe line is hundreds of kilometers long; therefore, the enemy forces are not numerous enough to guard the line. Thus, we can successfully attack them if we know how to exploit their vulnerabilities.

Friendly advantages:

Thanks to the leadership of Region ((5)) Party Committee, the military region, various groups, and various districts, we understood the importance of the mission to be carried out in the fringe area. We have thus made efforts to implement the determination ((of higher echelons)).

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Our forces have been deployed ((in given positions)).

The battlefields in mountainous areas have been increasingly developed in our favor.

Movements in lowland areas have been also steadily developed.

Our command, leadership, and combat capabilities were improved. We have been through trials and given training and learned many lessons.

Deficiencies:

Our troops were already deployed, but their determination to fight the enemy was not strong (especially detachments).

The leadership organization and plans for coordinated actions and leadership were not close. This affected the development of our forces and resulted in overlapping efforts.

The preparation of the battlefield in the fringe area was unsatisfactory in these fields: Command posts, fortifications, roads, materiel, and WIA.

4. Our missions:

1. We must deploy our forces in alternative positions with the enemy. We must also maintain a "fine tooth comb" position to frustrate the enemy plan for linking his positions together.

2. Maintain a linking position between the three areas and increase our attacks to gradually break enemy defense lines and foil his plans for land encroachment. We must win over the people and seize control of them.

3. We must control and hold on to our areas of operation in each area. We must attack enemy rear bases, communication lines, tyrants, People's Self-Defense Force members, and US Special Forces troops. We must maintain our corridors in mountainous and lowland areas. We must force the enemy to retreat in order to seize control of the fringe area and create conditions to frustrate his pacification plan.

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5. Mission requirements:

1. Determination of objectives:

Enemy forces in the fringe area and on different battlefields are our objectives of attack. But we must first attack infantry forces conducting search operations, Special Forces, and scouts conducting operations with the support of helicopters and armored vehicles.

Guidelines: Conduct small, medium, continuous, and penetration attacks against enemy forces conducting search operations, scouts, and Special Forces to force them to retreat and create conditions for larger attacks.

We must launch our attacks on a large scale with emphasis placed on main objectives, thus forcing the enemy to cope with us in many directions.

We must attack enemy troops that land at forest edges and barren hills and are supported by air activities.

We must conduct attacks against the enemy while recruiting agents, motivating the people, and procuring and collecting food.

We must attack the enemy with inside and outside forces in coordination with forces conducting hit-and-run attacks.

Methods of attack.

Employ many elements to operate day and night in forest edges and on barren hills and communication lines.

1. ((Attack)) enemy blocking forces, forces conducting search operations, scouts, Special Forces, helicopters, and armored vehicles. Organize engineer cells, squads, and platoons armed with light and compact equipment to conduct ambushes and raids.

Organize attacks against helicopters and armored vehicles.

Establish watchtowers to keep close surveillance on the enemy.

Attack enemy forces conducting search operations and air, ground, and armored vehicle forces.

Organize engineer and reconnaissance cells to remove enemy mines. Attack him by establishing minefields in places where he may land. Attack him when he returns to the pick-up area after the battle.

2. ((Attack)) tyrants and Popular and Special Forces. Organize people's military intelligence nets to collect information on the enemy. Use special action and guerrilla units in coordination with secret guerrilla units to perform this task.

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Disguise ourselves and penetrate enemy controlled areas to attack him.

Attack Popular Force units and main tyrant agencies.

3. Conduct mortar attacks against enemy bases and district seats. ((In such attacks)), we must conceal ammunition ((at fire positions)) in advance. By doing this, only a small force is needed.

Attack the enemy with sappers and use small elements to conduct deep thrusts.

Attack enemy forces blocking our routes of withdrawal and his reinforcements and elements responsible for preventing us from killing tyrants.

Attack large enemy base areas and destroy his essential areas.

Engineer elements should use rudimentary weapons.

4. Attack communication lines, sewers, bridges, vehicles, ships, and enemy forces protecting bridges and roads.

5. Prior to penetration attacks, we must deploy our troops at predetermined areas to keep abreast of the enemy in order to prepare the battlefield and objectives.

2. Establishment of bases along the fringe area:

Build multi-line fortifications and trenches for concealment of WIA in many places to facilitate mutual support.

Make plans for combat defense, security, patrols, and keeping abreast of the enemy.

Each district must have a surgical team to provide emergency aid for WIA and sick personnel.

3. Organization for protecting corridors:

Ensure the safety of corridors from lower to higher echelons. Conduct hit-and-run and penetration attacks by military forces in coordination with political forces. ((Prepare)) rear service materials, one b ((sic)).

From doan ((group)) to districts down to villages and deep areas, probationary and official ((Party members)) must be available.

Missions of platoon-size units and above:

Corridors must have secret cells.

Organize reconnaissance cells to keep abreast of the enemy to ensure the safety of corridors.

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4. Indoctrinating the masses:

All political and armed forces must carry out the indoctrination of the masses.

All of them must attack the enemy while indoctrinating the masses.

Make strenuous efforts to implement the civilian proselyting policy.

Attack the enemy to support the people's struggles.

Districts are responsible for regimenting the people into organizations and recruiting agents. All ((types of)) forces must obey local ((agencies)).

5. Rear services in local areas:

Strive to procure and collect foods and motivate the people to increase production. Combat the storage of a substantial quantity of rice ((by the people)). Ensure the safety of corridors and properly organize the requisitioning, purchasing, and storage of provisions.

The requisitioning and purchasing of provisions are important tasks; therefore, the rear ((areas)) must contribute their efforts to the performance of these tasks.

Recover and make the most efficient use of dud ammunition.

6. Organization of uniform command:

((Exercise a uniform command in)) both small and large areas. According to the situation in ((each area)), organize the administration of different units placed under the supervision of districts and groups in order to improve their capabilities of attacking the enemy.

7. Political and ideological tasks:

Because of the nature of the struggle, we are required to pay proper attention to the political and ideological tasks. We must take the initiative to attack the enemy.

Adopt effective combat methods in attacking the enemy, and foil his schemes.

Ensure preparations of the battlefield and organization for combat in order to effectively attack the enemy.

Ensure the security of our base areas.

Consistently implement the military and civilian proselyting plans and other policies. Maintain a good relationship with local ((agencies)).

8. Improve our roads and mechanized ((equipment)) and strengthen our main force groups and self-sufficient production ((units)).

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16 Nov ((70))

Conference ((to review the achievements in)) lowland areas.

Assessment of counterpacification:

1. Achievement of great victories:

a. We defeated a portion of the enemy pacification plan:

We destroyed many of his war facilities.

We broke the enemy oppressive control in a number of hamlets.

We occupied and strengthened fringe areas.

We maintained and developed our forces in many villages and hamlets.

b. We created a new strategic position:

We started to link the three areas together and exert a ((military)) pressure on the enemy.

We have gradually created a new offensive position by using both covert and overt forces.

We have exerted an influence over the people and our prestige was heightened.

We unified policies and guidelines in the Party Headquarters.

c. The significance of our victories:

From a position in which we were forced to retreat, we have shifted into an offensive position and created new conditions for advancing.

2. However, the victories were not complete :

a. These victories could not change the balance of enemy and friendly forces in hamlets and villages.

The number of enemy forces destroyed and depleted was small.

Enemy oppressive forces are still numerous.

Our political and armed forces were reduced.

b. Our newly liberated areas are narrow and the ((revolutionary)) awareness ((of our cadre)) is not high.

Strong areas under mixed control have 40,000 ((people)).

Weak areas under mixed control have from 60,000 to 100,000 ((people)).

c. Although our troops had been deployed to operate in the areas surrounding cities, we did not attain great achievements and were unable to frustrate enemy combat tactics.

Our military bases and transportation corridors were still attacked by the enemy.

Our troops' material life has been poor. Our combat fortifications were not carefully constructed.

We did not gain full support of the 160,000 people residing along Route 1.

d. We failed to recruit revolutionary agents in densely populated areas where the people are rich. The shortcomings greatly limited our achievements. Therefore, special efforts must be made to fulfill our tasks.

3. Specific causes of our achievements:

1. We had proper policies and activity plans.
2. The people were determined to participate in the struggle movement.
3. The political and armed forces as well as the three types of forces all made great efforts in accomplishing their missions.
4. Due to objective conditions and reinforcements from higher echelons, we obtained notable achievements throughout the three Indochinese countries.

Causes which limited our success:

We still had many shortcomings because we did not fully understand our guidelines and failed to improve our revolutionary awareness or take proper measures against enemy schemes.

II. VALUABLE LESSONS TO BE STUDIED:

1. Assessment of the enemy situation:

Since the enemy considers the pacification plan as a state policy, he has concentrated efforts on adopting cunning schemes and maintaining close coordination between various forces and the general forces throughout the three areas with modern war facilities and proper command.

Therefore, we must use our general strength and all types of forces to attack the enemy in all three areas. We must both attack him and strengthen our forces to counter his offensives.

2. Our main attacking direction in the three areas is the lowlands. The border area is considered as a pivot point ((meaning a strategically located position through which VC forces can move from VC liberated areas into RVN controlled areas)). However, we cannot freely operate in villages and districts in lowland areas.

The main objectives to be attacked are ((RVN)) main forces, Regional Forces, and, especially, village and hamlet administrative personnel. But, we did not strongly carry out this task.

We must fiercely attack the enemy to deplete his potential and frustrate his cunning schemes. Presently, the destruction of the enemy strength and disorganization of his ranks is ineffective.

If we fail to take specific measures to effectively attack the enemy, we will certainly lower our troop morale and spoil our combat tactics.

In general, we drafted effective activity plans and infused our soldiers with a good combat morale. However, concrete measures towards villages and hamlets have not been appropriately taken.

3. We must frustrate the enemy pacification plan and change the balance of forces between us and the enemy in military, political, and ideological fronts in every hamlet or village. Since we did not have a good revolutionary awareness, we did not properly assess the enemy and friendly situation. As a result, we failed to set forth specific plans for attacking the enemy, strengthening our forces, and realizing the main purposes of our important tasks.

We must strengthen our in-place forces with direct leadership and training in the proper areas.

Political and armed struggle movements must be simultaneously conducted to change the balance of enemy and friendly forces.

Villages and hamlets must have their own activity plans to ensure success.

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4. Three-pronged attacks: In the past, since we did not clearly understand the significance of our military and political tasks, we did not pay strict attention to drafting specific struggle plans, reporting to higher echelons, and organizing military training courses, etc ... ((sic)).

5. Organizational task:

We must pay attention to details in enemy and friendly activities. This will prevent the enemy from undermining the morale of cadre and the people. In addition, we must strictly observe organizational methods and operating procedures of the Party and other important branches. Command and leadership must also be united in different areas.

III. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TRI-THIEN ((POSSIBLY TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION)) BATTLEFIELD IN 1970:

a. ((Tri-Thien-Hue battlefield)) is located close to Socialist NVN. It has a strategic transportation corridor adjacent to Đà Nẵng and Huế ((cities)). Its present missions, as well as those of Nam Bộ and Tây Nguyên ((Western Highlands battlefields)), are much greater than before.

The enemy intended to use Route 9 to attack central and lower Laos. Therefore, we must concentrate efforts to spoil his wicked schemes.

b. Lowland rural areas: In lowland rural areas, we are engaged in heavy confrontations with the enemy. If we effectively change the balance of enemy and friendly forces, we will contribute greatly to the general development of the situation.

c. 1971 has a great military and political significance. Therefore, the enemy and friendly forces will meet a great challenge. In spite of its obstinacy, the US has to continue its troop withdrawal. (In the middle of 1971, its remaining troop strength will be approximately 300,000.) It may even withdraw more troops from SVN. Then, the Puppet Army will have to assume heavier combat responsibilities and the people will be seriously demoralized. The ((Puppet Government)) will suffer an economic crisis, and, as a result, the people's struggle movement will certainly be developed.

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The Puppet presidential election will be held in 1971. Due to its stubbornness, the US will again participate in combat. Therefore, we must make maximum efforts to create new favorable conditions.

d. Friendly activities: In 1971, conditions on the battlefield will turn to our favor. Therefore, we must have specific activity plans and maintain close unity among our personnel.

Our forces have conducted repeated attacks against the enemy and obtained offensive positions throughout the three areas.

The people displayed new enthusiasm in their struggle movement. Our leadership has been effectively improved. Nevertheless, our recent achievements were still very low. Therefore, we must continually eliminate existing shortcomings and take appropriate measures to defend our rear base areas from enemy attacks.

d. We should adopt practical experience gained in the past 10 years when we encounter difficulties, and focus maximum efforts on attacking the enemy and ((motivating the people)) to rise up to gain greater victories.

IV. GUIDELINES FOR GOOD MISSION PERFORMANCE:

1. Specific missions to be accomplished:

In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo ((VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)), we must spare no efforts to promote our strategic offensive position throughout lowland and rural areas, strengthen our military forces in important rural areas, intensify guerrilla activities, and motivate the people.

Missions to be fulfilled by the entire ((Tri-Thiên-Huê)) Military Region:

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We must conduct continual attacks against the enemy throughout the three areas, strengthen our forces in all aspects, create new offensive positions, concentrate our forces to frustrate the enemy pacification plan, and gain the people's support.

Specific criteria:

We must destroy the enemy and develop our forces in the three areas and change the balance of enemy and friendly forces.

We must destroy enemy armed forces and strengthen our own.

We must disorganize enemy political organizations, frustrate his wicked schemes, and motivate the people to join the Revolution.

We must destroy the oppressive enemy control machinery and reactionary organizations and consolidate revolutionary authorities in rural areas and our military bases.

Specific contents:

Our armed forces must become much stronger than those of the enemy. The people's organizations must be stronger than the enemy oppressive forces. Party organizations must be stronger than enemy ((political)) parties.

3. Requirements: We must liberate 90 percent of the villages and hamlets in the entire ((Tri-Thiên-Huê Military)) Region. Some districts must control 100, 60, or 70 percent of their subordinate villages and hamlets.

Questions for discussion:

Since the region lies in the countryside, which areas should be designated as districts and villages?

Rural areas: Why must our troops firmly hold the border areas to conduct attacks against the enemy in fringe, deep, and densely populated areas?

Prescribe specific plans for supporting our troops.

Classification of areas: Since the rural and border areas are within the enemy defense network, the people in these areas are subject to constant ordeals. We must use these areas as our pivot point through which our ((VC)) forces can move from ((VC)) liberated areas into RVN controlled areas.

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The border areas are divided into two types as follows: Densely and sparsely populated areas. In densely populated areas, the revolutionary movement was not widely developed.

In liberated areas, the people had high revolutionary awareness. They were separated and divided by the enemy.

We should not use concentrated forces to counter enemy attacks, but should deploy small in-place elements to attack the enemy and annihilate tyrants. We should intensify our political struggle movement and develop to the greatest extent the victories we have gained on the battlefield.

Areas bordering cities are densely populated with wealthy people. There, the enemy adopted demagogic schemes to attract the people. He had many shortcomings. We did not satisfactorily motivate the people because we lacked sufficient underground agents.

We should strive to recruit more agents to serve as our foothold, particularly those who have legal ((GVN)) status.

The assembly areas bear the characteristics of a detention camp. There, our revolutionary underground force is strong and the people display a high revolutionary awareness. We should strongly motivate the people to move to our base areas. If they are determined, we should help them settle difficult problems concerning their living conditions and the enemy terrorism.

12 Mar 71:

Working with Comrade Tam:

1. Communication task:

The communication task must be completed from early Apr to late Jun 71, as follows: Activate one gateway unit to receive cadre ((going in and out of RVN controlled cities)) with enough agents with legal ((GVN)) status to collect information in our areas of operation and to keep abreast of enemy activities.

Train communication agents to improve their professional skills and recruit one to be trained on specialized tasks.

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Activate one installation to provide messing and billeting facilities for cadre operating in Quảng Tri and Huế' cities. Particularly, elect one legal ((agent)) cell leader and one espionage agent among the former LL b ((sic)) agents to collect ((RVNAF)) documents.

Maintaining contact with Mr. Văn in AC ((possibly the An Cầu area of Huế City)):

1. Collect information and public opinion on the Saigon ((Government)).

2. Ensure sufficient material facilities for the cell ((possibly the communication cell)) and reserve a three-month food supply for five cadre.

Purchase necessary goods for Cum ((possibly Cum 47 or Espionage Agency 47 of K53)) and Phong ((possibly the Political Staff Department, VC Tri-Thiên-Huế' Military Region)).

Anticipate and select Cum's new location.

3. Consolidation of the unit:

Conduct indoctrination training courses for personnel to improve their ideology and political knowledge in compliance with prescribed regulations.