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3/71

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2. SUBJECT: Espionage and Liaison Network of Cum 47 of K53 Research Office, Political Staff Department, VC Military Region 5. (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 21 September 1971
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6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3	13. PREPARED BY: <i>Robert E. Echols, Jr</i> EDWARD A. FELIX, CPT, MI CHIEF, PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Robert E. Echols, Jr</i> RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, MAJ, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns an award certificate and a notebook. The award certificate, dated 5 April 1971, signed by Le Huy, Assistant Chief of the Policy Office, Unit 602 ((possibly the Political Staff Department of)) VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, reveals that Cum 47 ((possibly Espionage Agency 47)) of K53 ((possibly the Research Office, Political Staff Department Headquarters, VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)) was awarded a certificate of commendation for its farm production achievements in 1970. A notebook, with entries dated between 1969 and March 1971, maintained by an unidentified member of D47, aka Cum 47 or Espionage Agency 47 of K53, contains information on personnel, missions and activities of Cum 47 in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

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(C) CDEC COMMENT: These documents were captured on 24 July 1971 in South Vietnam (BS229656; RVN MR 1) by B/123rd Avn Bn, 11/23rd US Inf Div. The

13.18.14

SVN Liberation Army

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((VC)) Tri-Thien-((Hue)) Military Region

Republic of SVN

Independence-Democracy-Peace-  
Neutrality.

### Award Certificate

Comrade: Cum 47 ((possibly Espionage Agency 47)).

Unit: K53 ((possibly the Reserve Office, Political Staff Department,  
Headquarters, VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)).

Award: Certificate of commendation for its self-sufficient farm  
production achievements in 1970.

5 Apr 71

For the Commander of Unit 602,

Assistant Chief of the Policy Office

/S/ Le Huy

No. 141/QD

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The medal was issued on 11 Apr 71.

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### Code Names

(For me with plain text) ((sic))

((Cover designations))

((Meaning))

QC 1	Escort and reception point.
((QC)) 2	Legal commo-liaison agent.
((QC)) 3	Semi-legal commo-liaison agent.
((QC)) 4	Thong qua agent ((possibly agent in charge of procuring GVN legal papers)).
((QC)) 5	Intermediary agent.
((QC)) 6	Espionage agent.
((QC)) 7	Legal cell leader ((possibly meaning agent handler)).
((QC)) 8	Cover story.
((QC)) 9	Disguised agent.
((QC)) 10	Agent operating and residing inside ((GVN controlled)) areas.

Code alphabet, code names, and code numbers (for use with plain text):

21	a	41	k	61	t	81	ô	11	on	31	ch	51	ong	71	iên	91	uổi	z	1
22	b	42	l	62	u	82	o	12	ôn	32	th	52	ông	72	iêm	92	ung	u	2
23	c	43	m	63	v	83	ư	13	ơ	33	ph	53	ang	73	iếp	93	uông	v	3
24	d	44	n	64	x	84	an	14	om	34	kh	54	ang	74	iết	94	uổng	x	4
25	đ	45	o	65	y	85	ân	15	ôm	35	tr	55	ang	75	yêu	95	oang	a	5
26	e	46	p	66	z	86	/	16	ôm	36	nh	56	anh	76	yên	96	iêng	t	6
27	g	47	q	67	ã	87	\	17	un	37	ng	57	ách	77	uôn	97	uyên	r	7
28	h	48	r	68	â	88	.	18	un	38	ng	58	ích	78	uôn	98	uyệt	q	8
29	i	49	s	69	ê	89	?	19	en	39	qu	59	inh	79	uoi	99	uynh	s n	9 0

Simple code:

	1	3	5	7	9	0	4	6
2	a	b	c	th	t	g	d	đ
4	kh	o	h	i	k	nh	l	o
6	m	n	ph	p	q	r	tr	g
8	s	u	v	an	x	y	anh	8
1	ô	ô'	ong	ê	uông	ã	â	7
3	on	ôn	am	ên	en	ên	ôn	6
5	ung	ang	em	êm	ông	yên	uyên	5
7	/	\	.	?	1	2	3	4

Cover designation:

CN ((possibly Cửa Ngõ: gateway)) Cao Doi Hamlet, Sach Village BM = H1.

CN : Hoà Mân Q.L 1 ((possibly Route 1)) = H2.

Legal communication agent: Bắc Tai = B2.

Agent in charge of procuring GVN legal papers:

Chu Sinh (Y) = T-1.

Thiên Hồng = T-2.

Thiên Chát = T-3.

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Alphabet code:

22	a	42	i	12	r	31	â
23	b	43	k	13	s	32	ã
24	c	44	l	14	t	33	ô
25	d	45	m	15	u	34	ô'

26	đ	46	n	16	v	35	u
27	e	47	o	17	x	36	/
28	g	48	p	18	y	37	\
29	h	49	q	19	ă	38	.
						39	?

51	ch	R	1
52	gh	a	2
53	kh	t	3
54	nh	u	4
55	ng	v	5
56	ngh	x	6
57	ph	y	7
58	th	u	8
59	tr	b	9
60	uyên	c	0

For use with Thái, Xuân, Ly.

NC -- Espionage agent.

101: Legal commo-liaison agent.

102: Semi-legal commo-liaison agent.

103: Semi-legal commo-liaison agent.

104: Thông qua Agent ((possibly agent in charge of procuring GVN legal papers)).

105: Gateway.

106: Cell Leader ((possibly agent handler)).

NC: Agent operating and residing in an inner ((GVN controlled)) area.  
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Special terms	KC ((sic))	Names of local areas ((provinces, districts, villages, and hamlets))	KB ((sic))
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))
Legal commo-liaison agent	1	Thu <sup>^</sup> a Thi <sup>^</sup> en	1
Semi <del>legal</del> commo-liaison agent	2	Quang Tri	2
Male cadre	3	Quang Nam	3
Female cadre	4	Quang Ngai	4
Escort agent	5	Hue	5
Reception agent	6	Da Nang	6
Attached one-way agent	7	Dong Ha	7
Official liaison regulations	8	Ai Tu	8
Alternate liaison regulations	9	La Vang	9
Regular liaison regulations	10	My Chanh	10
Liaison has been established	11	Pho Trach	11
Liaison could not be made	12	Dong Lam	12
Being oppressed ((by the enemy))	13	An Lo	13
Captured by the enemy	14	Tu <sup>2</sup> Ha	14
Cover story	15	An Hoa	15
Trading agent	16	An Cuu	16
Agent in charge of procuring GVN papers	17	Phu Bai	17
Commo-liaison agent	18	Cau Hai	18
Espionage agent	19	Nuoc Ngot	19

((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))
Plastic-coated ID card	20	Thửa Liêm	20
Safe conduct pass	21	Phước Tường	21
Infiltration gateway	22	Mũi Ne	22
Area of operation	23	Bach Ma	23
Being kept under enemy surveillance	24	Đình Lộc Village	24
Missing	25	Cao Đôi Sách Hamlet	25
Additional ((legal)) papers	26	Cao Đôi Ấp Hamlet	26
Dead letter drop	27	Cao Đôi Xá Hamlet	27
Live letter drop	28	Hoa Mãn Hamlet	28
Spy	29	Xóm Mè Hamlet	29
Espionage cell leader ((agent handler))	30	Xóm Thi	30
Radio site	31	Xóm Tài	31
Code	32	Kilometer Stone 3 B Ma ((possibly Bach Ma))	32
Invisible ink	33	Giã Chu	33
Camouflage of documents	34	Xóm Dền	34
		Đông Lưu	35

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Our organizations	CD ((sic))	Enemy organizations	ED ((sic))
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))
Cum ((sic))	1	Public security	1
Section	2	Police	2
Military Region	3	Military Police	3

((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))
Office	4	Popular Force	4
Department	5	Regional Force	5
Region Party Committee	6	Special Force	6
District Party Committee	7		7
Village Party Committee	8	Public security, secret service	8
District Unit	9	US troops	9
Village Unit	10	Puppet troops	10
District local units	11	Satellite troops	11
Village guerrilla- militia ((forces))	12	Airborne troops	12
Youth ((Association))	13	Marines	13
Women's ((Association))	14	Engineer	14
Security ((Section))	15	Artillery	15
Economy ((Section))	16	Hamlet Chief	16
Military Proselyting ((Section))	17	Pacification troops	17
		Intelligence	18
		Scout	19
		Village H/C ((possibly adminis- trative personnel))	20
		District H/C	21
		Province H/C	22



Means of activity	NS ((sic))	Means of transportation	NV ((sic))
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))
Film	1	Walk	1
Camera	2	Bicycle	2
Radio site	3	Car	3
Map	4	Plane	4
Binoculars	5	Canoe	5
Compass	6	Train	6
Bicycle	7	Boat	7
Legal clothes	8	Market	8
Legal equipment	9	Railway Station	9
Radio	10	Hotel	10

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Symbols (used in letters of introduction):

((Following are ranks and positions of cadre))

Combatant	5/1	Major	2/1
Assistant Squad Leader	4/1	Lieutenant	2/2
		Colonel	
Squad Leader	4/2	Colonel	2/3
Assistant Platoon Leader	4/3	Senior Colonel	2/1 ((sic))
Platoon Leader	3/5		
Company Executive Officer	3/1		
Company Commander	3/2		
Battalion Executive Officer	3/3		
Battalion Commander	3/4		

Party echelons:

Official Party member

A160

Probationary Party member	A161
Chapter Party Committee	C100
For Chapter Party Committee	C009
Party member	d106
For d ((possibly Battalion)) Party Committee	d0010
For E ((possibly Regiment)) Party Committee	E0012

Code: There are four digits.

The first may be any digit.

The total of the two middle digits must be 13.

The last digit indicates the date.

No. ((blank)) GT: Letter of introduction for Party activities No.

No. ((blank)) GT: Order number of the roster of Party members.

No. ((blank)): Four digits of a lock.

Name: Real name not written in code.

Date of birth: ((blank)).

Date of occupation: Date enlisted in the army.

ID card No.: Party echelon, rank in Government (written in symbols).

Passport ((possibly meaning travel order)) No.: Date admitted to the Party (written: year, month, day. The total number of digits is six).

For example: Date admitted to the Party: 1 Mar 48, should be: 480301.

Certificate of the district: Official day should also be written as above.

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KT indicates Party fees paid.

The month in which Party fees are paid must be clearly written.

The month and date (on the certificate) must be written clearly. The year is decreased by one year.

For the Chapter Party Committee: T/C.009.

Letter of introduction for (Group) activities.

The first paragraph: (same as that for Party members).

ID card No.: Grade of Group member.

Group member: Grade I.

Group Chapter Executive Committee: Grade II.

(Rank in government should be written next.)

Group membership card No.: Date admitted to the Group.

(Symbol is the same as for Party members.)

Number ... KT indicates group fees paid.

The date and month are written the same as for Party members.

Tm/B.008 ((sic))

Recommendations should bear the signature of political officers.

Number GT: Order number of the roster.

Letter of introduction for activities.

Code: Written as a fraction. The numerator indicates the month plus the unit. The denominator indicates the date plus the month.

For example: 13 Dec 69 should be written as: 65/9016 ((sic))

Denominator should include four or five digits.

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Monthly contact schedule.

Regulation for contacting Comrade Hà:

a. Normal ((regulations)): Contact days: 8, 9 and 28, 29 Mar 69.

8, 9 and 28, 29 Apr 69.

8, 9 and 28, 29 May 69.

(Twice every month. Each time, the first contact is made at the official contact place; the second, at the alternate one. This regulation is to be used until late May 69.)

Two contacts are made:

1. From 1230 hours to 1240 hours

2. From 1830 hours to 1840 hours

} Saigon Time

Contact place:

Official: House numbers 31 - 165 (Phan Bội Châu Street) Huế.

Recognition sign: A nylon bag containing a piece of bread and a pack of Ruby Red cigarettes held in the right hand.

Warning Sign: The bag is passed over to the left hand.

Passwords:

Question: Please, show me where Philip radios are sold.

Answer: That model is not sold here. There are only Sony radios.

Cover story: Buying a radio.

b. Special ((regulations)): (This type of regulation is to be used beginning in Jun 69 when contact cannot be made following normal regulations.)

Contact days: 1, 2 and 21, 22 of every month.

Contact place on 1 and 2: Huế

House numbers: 15, 25, 35 Phan Bội Châu Street (Huế)

Contact place on 21, 22: Đà Nẵng

House numbers: 152 to 176 Khải Định Street, Đà Nẵng

Only make contact at 1230-1240 hours

(Abandon the contact at 1830-1840 hours). Recognition, passwords, and warning signs are the same as those prescribed in normal regulations.

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The personnel must return on 23 Mar to Sister Q's house.

Attention: Particularly in Mar 69, make additional contacts on 18, 19. If contact cannot be made on those days, personnel must return on Sunday, 23 Mar ((69)). There will be someone to receive them. If the personnel only want to send letters, they should return to the lodging place.

Cadre in charge of demonstrations

ID card No. 704327 ((not very legible because it is crossed out in O.T.))

Name: Lê Thị Thanh ((not very legible because it is crossed out in O.T.))

Date of birth: 1929 ((crossed out in O.T.))

Place of birth: Nhuận Mãn, An Nhơn, B ((Binh)) Định ((not very legible because it is crossed out in O.T.))

Father: Lê Nghinh (deceased)

Mother: Lê<sup>^</sup> Thị Chanh (deceased)

Occupation: Farmer

Residence: 416/640 Phan Đình Phùng, Saigon ((not very legible because it is crossed out in O.T.))

Third Precinct Chief

Lê Văn Thận<sup>^</sup> ((not very legible because it is crossed out in O.T.))

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((Identification)) regulations ((and passwords)) for contacting ((Comrade)) Hùng.

a. Normal ((regulations)): (to be used from Mar ((69)) until late May 69).

Date: 11, 12 - 24, 25 Mar 69

4,5 - 14, 15 - 24, 25 Apr 69

4,5 - 14, 15 - 24, 25 May 69

Time: 1200 hours to 1210 hours

1800 hours to 1810 hours

} Saigon time.

Contact places: Official contact place: ((possibly in Front of)) houses No. 135 - 175, THD ((possibly Trần Hưng Đạo Street)) (Huê)

Alternate contact place: ((In front of)) Houses Nos. 24 - 78 PBC ((possibly Phan Bội Châu Street)) (Huê)

(Contacts are to be made three times per month. On the first day contacts will be made at the official contact place; on the second, at the alternate one. There will be two contacts made on each of these days at the hours mentioned above).

Recognition signs: A closed book or red covered notebook with a folded newspaper inside of it held in one hand.

Warning sign: Wear white glasses.

Passwords:

Question: Please, let me know whether APO 4321 is in Quang Tri Province.

Answer: I do not know. I only know that APO 4325 is in Do Linh.

Cover story: Asking about APO's and addresses of relatives' houses.

b. Special ((regulations)): Two contacts will be made every month. This regulation is used if contact cannot be made as prescribed in normal regulations.

Dates: 8, 9 - 28, 29 every month.

Time: Only make contact at 1200 hours - 1210 hours. (Abandon the contact at 1800 hours - 1810 hours.)

Contact place: Official: ((Houses)) Nos 31 - 45c THD ((possibly Trần Hưng Đạo)) Street, Hue.

Alternate: ((Houses)) Nos. 35- 105 (Hưng Vương) Street, DN ((possibly Đa Năng)).

Attention: Official contact place: Huế

Alternate contact place: Đa Năng

Other factors such as recognition signs, passwords, and warning signs are the same as in the normal regulations.

House No. 31, Lê Quang Photographer's

Return: On two Sundays: 30 Mar ((69)) and 6 Apr ((69)). If unable to contact Uncle Nam on 11, 12 and 24, 25 Mar ((69)), the personnel should return home on 30 Mar ((69)) or 6 Apr ((69)). There will be someone to receive them.

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Attention: If the personnel cannot contact Uncle Nam on 11 Mar ((69)), he must try to contact him on 24, 25 Mar ((69)) and the following days as stipulated in the normal regulations.

Passwords to be used when contacting Comrade Hung:

((I)) have met two children.

((I)) have met the boy or the girl.

((I)) am trying to find the two children.

The name of the Cum is: Cum 47 ((possibly Espionage Agency 47 of K53)) ((possibly the Research Office, Political Staff Department, Headquarters, VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)).

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Regulations for contacting Chu ((Uncle)) Nam

Regulations for Mar ((69)) are the same as former ones. There will be a change in regulations in Apr and May 69.

Dates: 6, 7 - 18, 19 Apr 69

6, 7 - 18, 19 May 69

Time: Twice each day: 1. 1300 - 1310 hours  
2. 1700 - 1710 hours } Saigon time

Contact place: Official: House Nos. 15 - 25 - 75 PBC ((possibly Phan Bội Châu)) Street, Huế.

Alternate: Houses Nos. 16 - 94, Bạch Đằng Street, Huế

Recognition sign: A paper bag containing a pack of Blao tea and a pack of sesame candy in the right hand.

Warning sign: The bag is moved to the left hand

Passwords:

Question: Would you tell me where house no. 30 on Duy Tân Street is located?

Answer: You cross the Tràng Tiền Bridge and go in the direction of An Cựu Market.

Cover story: Asking directions.

x x  
x

Attention:

Contact with Uncle Nam in Mar 69 is to be made on 11, 12 and 21, 22 ((sic)).

Now make the following changes.

11 Mar ((69)): ((Contact)) Hưng + Nam at the official ((contact place)).

12 Mar ((69)): ((Contact)) B2 + Nam ((at the)) alternate ((contact place)).

21 Mar ((69)) Hưng + Nam: Official.

22 Mar ((69)) B2 + Nam: Alternate.

((According to former regulations), ((contact with)) B2 and ((Uncle)) Nam ((is to be made in front of)) houses Nos. 11 - 81, Huỳnh Thúc Kháng Street, Huế.

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11 a	31 k	51 t	71 ô	91 an	21 om	41 tr	61 ich	z 1
12 b	32 l	52 u	72 ô	92 ang	22 om	42 th	62 yet	u 2
13 c	33 m	53 v	73 u	93 ang	23 om	43 kh	63 uyên	v 3
14 d	34 n	54 x	74 an	94 ang	24 ap	44 gh	64 iêng	x 4
15 đ	35 o	55 y	75 an	95 ong	25 ap	45 ngh	65 uông	a 5
16 e	36 p	56 z	76 /	96 ong	26 ap	46 ph	66 uông	t 6
17 g	37 q	57 a	77 \	97 on	27 at	47 iên	67 uóp	r 7
18 h	38 r	58 a	78 .	98 on	28 at	48 yén	68 uót	q 8
19 i	39 s	59 e	79 ?	99 on	29 at	49 iêm	69 uoi	n 9 s 0

- QC ((sic))
1. Escort and reception gate
  2. Legal commo-liaison agent
  3. Semi-legal commo-liaison agent
  4. Agent in charge of procuring GVN legal papers
  5. Espionage agent
  6. Cell leader ((possibly agent handler))
  7. Disguised agent
  8. Agent operating and residing inside ((GVN controlled)) areas

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Regulations for contacting ((Comrade)) Hà (in Jul, Aug, Sep 69)

a. Normal ((regulations)):

Dates: 14, 15 and 24, 25 Jul 69

14, 15 and 24, 25 Aug 69

14, 15 and 24, 25 Sep 69



Time: Morning: 1200-1210 hours

Evening: 1800-1810 hours

} Saigon time

Contact Place:

Official: Houses nos. 127-153, Trần Hưng Đạo Street, Huế.

Alternate: Houses nos. 15-43, Phan Bội Châu, Huế.

Recognition sign: A nylon bag containing two packs of peanuts and sesame candies is held in the right hand.

Warning sign: The bag is switched the left hand

Passwords:

Question: Where is the Chinese drugstore which sells good Korean ginseng?

Answer: Any drugstore sells that, but Nhân Sam ((another type of ginseng)) is rare.

Cover story: Asking about where to buy ginseng.

b. Special ((regulations)): Use the former regulations. Contacts are to be made during Oct, Nov and Dec 69.

Date: 1, 2 and 22 every month

Time: Same as in for normal regulations.

Contact place: Houses nos. 15, 25, and 35 Phan Bội Châu Street, Huế.  
Houses nos. 152 - 176, Khải Định street, Đà Nẵng.

Other factors are the same as in the normal regulations.

((This regulation)) was sent to Ha on 8 Jun 69.

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Special regulations for contacting Uncle Hai:

Contact place: Houses nos. 15 - 25 - 35 Phan Bội Châu Street ((possibly in Huế))

Time: 1300 - 1310 hours

1700 - 1710 hours

((This paragraph is crossed out in O.T.))

Special regulations for contacting Uncle Hai:

Contact place: Houses nos. 24 - 78 Phan Bội Châu Street ((possibly in Huế)).

Dates: Official contact place: 7, 17, 27 ((sic))

Alternate contact place: 8, 18, 28 ((sic))

Time: 1200 - 1210 hours

1700 - 1710 hours

Recognition sign: A rolled newspaper held in the right hand.

Warning sign: Switch the newspaper to the left hand.

Passwords:

Question: Would you change this 500 piastre bill for me?

Answer: I only have 200 piastre denominations.

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Special regulations for contacting Uncle Tam.

Contact Place: Houses Nos. 11 - 141 Huynh Thuc Khang Street ((possibly in Hue))

Date: Official contact place: 5 - 25 every month.

Time: 1200 - 1210 hours

1800 - 1810 hours

Recognition sign: A basket containing a rolled newspaper in the right hand.

Warning sign: Switch the basket to the left hand

Passwords:

Question: Would you change this 500 piaster bill for me?

Answer: I only have 50 piaster bills.

Signal:

Question: Wipe your face with a handkerchief.

Answer: Wind your watch.

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Identification Regulations and Passwords for contacting <sup>A</sup>Cau

Normal ((regulations)):

Contact place: Official: Houses Nos. 15-65, Phan Bội <sup>A</sup>Chau Street  
((in Hue))

Alternate: houses nos. 8 - 10, Tran Hung Dao Street ((in Hue))

Dates: 6, 20 Jul ((69))

10, 24 Aug ((69))

7, 21 Sep ((69))

Time: 1300 to 1310 hours

1700 to 1710 hours

Recognition sign: Hold a rolled book in the right hand.

Warning sign: Pass the book to the left hand.

Passwords: Question: What time is it?

Answer: It is exactly the time for contact, 1310 hours.

Signal: Question: Does your time correspond exactly to that on the radio.

Answer: It is two minutes late.

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#### New missions

Forced to remain on the defensive, ((our espionage agents)) could not carry out their missions as planned.

Secret missions: Recruitment of agents must be assigned to the local areas.

To whom will the task of sending letters and making reports be assigned later?

Time for execution.

Relations among comrades on missions.

How should cadre be administered and led?

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Identification regulations and passwords for contacting Ha.

(In Oct, Nov and Dec 69).

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Normal ((regulations)): Three times a month.

Dates: 2, 3 - 12, 13 - 22, 23 Oct 69.

2, 3 - 12, 13 - 22, 23 Nov 69

2, 3 - 12, 13 - 22, 23 Dec 69

Time: Morning: 1130 hours to 1140 hours

Afternoon: 1730 hours to 1740 hours

Contact place: Official: Nos. 81 - 175, a grocery store on HTK ((Huỳnh Thúc Kháng)) Street ((possibly in Huế))

Alternate: Nos. 18 - 96, a candy shop on B ((Bách)) Đàng Street.

Recognition sign: Hold a packet wrapped in a transparent paper bag containing two pieces of cloth or a pair of black pants and a white shirt.

Warning sign: Switch the packet to the left hand.

Passwords: Question: Please show me the shop where Thái silk is sold.

Answer: Thái silk is rarely sold at this time. Please, buy the Japanese nylon crepe which is also good.

Cover story: Ask about buying cloth.

Attention: Contact is to be made at the official contact place on even days and at the alternate contact place on odd days.

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#### Examination of Comrade Tam's Self-Critique

##### Strong points:

He displayed a brave fighting spirit even in his performance of specialized missions. He was bold and courageous, had a high sense of responsibility, and paid attention to everything to ensure the maintenance of materials.

On specialized points, he was quick, receptive, and efficient.

Weaknesses:

He was bad tempered towards the people. He also showed poor maintenance of materials, a poor sense of organization and discipline, and complacent and simple attitudes toward work.

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Working with Comrade Thiet.

In the face of the critical situation of Lon Nol, the US has blatantly intervened in Cambodian internal affairs with the intentions of:

Saving the Lon Nol regime.

Attacking our rear service organizations in Cambodian territory.

This intervention has caused difficulties for us, but we succeeded in holding the area and obtaining victories in both military and political fields.

Friendly forces have three alternatives:

1. Maintain the intermediate defensive line of the US and Puppets in ((possibly)) Coc Paxe, ((two words illegible)) 935 ((sic)).
2. Conduct attacks around A Luoi, Co Ka Va.
3. Conduct large-scale attacks outwards toward A Tu, La Hap, Tam Ténh, A Đoi Sepole, and Muong Phen ((these names are not very legible in the original text)) with emphasis on (A Đoi and ((possibly)) Phu Kh) in order to intercept the supply route from the north.

If we do not make preparations, the enemy will possibly destroy our storage facilities to cause difficulties for us. ((Our personnel)) will lack determination and be embarrassed and demoralized; low morale will result. Moreover, we shall be confused in providing efficient leadership.

However, the enemy will also meet many disadvantages:

We have already made preparations (the Cairo conference on ((the situation)) in Africa-Asia and Laos). The opinions of ... ((sic))

(Document attached) ((sic))

1 Aug 70

DISSEMINATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ((POSSIBLY VC TRI-THIEN-HUE)) MILITARY REGION PARTY COMMITTEE AND TW ((POSSIBLY MEANING THE NVN HIGH COMMAND)).

1. Study the directive of the Military Affairs Party Committee ((possibly VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)) and TW.

2. Solution of the situation in Cambodia.

3. Tri-Thien ((Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces)) situation.

4. Direction of future missions.

1. Assessment of the situation.

Friendly activities: Since 1968, we have changed our military strategy to a "General Offensive and Uprising" to fight the enemy whose leaders are the US imperialists. For that reason, the struggle between the enemy and us is the strongest of all.

The limited war in SVN lies within the international war strategy. Thus, it bears protracted and drastic characteristics.

In order to carry out the strategy and plan for a long-term international war, the enemy has implemented the Vietnamization plan by adopting the pacification plan as the national policy. He adopts that policy to confront us with a long-range struggle.

Following are the four major enemy activity plans:

((Continue)) the accelerated pacification plan ((initiated)) in 1968.

Intercept, disrupt, and destroy our commo-liaison corridors.

Develop the Puppet Army and Government.

Build various defensive lines.

Recently, we focussed our activities on foiling the enemy pacification plan. In Region 5, we have succeeded in disrupting 65 percent of the enemy pacification activities, thus frustrating his scheme to pacify this ((military)) region. We also intensified the political struggle movement in cities and towns. In Tri-Thien, the struggle movement of the local students was conducted under our limited guidance. The Buddhist movement has also risen but has been undermined; therefore, it is not yet strong.

There are three Buddhist factions:

An Quang (progressive) and Thich Tam Chau (CIA), Buddhist sects and the Buddhist faction following ((Generals)) Don and Dinh (the 3rd strength.)

The War Invalids movement is still constantly and actively being conducted.

((Marginal note:))

All "mũi" ((detachments)) have one by one begun to participate in the Tri-Thiên Battlefield.

((End of marginal note)).

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#### Achievements.

We have created the basic conditions for gaining achievements.

1. We continued to develop revolutionary forces and made great improvements in the building of materiel installations in Region 5, Nam Bộ, and Tri-Thiên.

We destroyed the enemy's potential to liberate ((that part of)) lower Laos which is located in the "three border" area. ((The liberation of lower Laos)) further consolidates the position of the "Three Countries' Revolution" and helps maintain communication between the corridor ((possibly an allusion to the Hồ Chí Minh Trail)) and our base area ((possibly meaning NVN)).

2. The revolutionary base area in NVN was also strengthened.

3. We ((VC)) have gained the approval and support of many countries in the world.

The three countries of Indochina have formed one battlefield to fight the enemy and increase our strength.

#### Enemy activities.

He succeeded in implementing part of his Vietnamization plan and expelling revolutionary forces from cities and towns.

He succeeded in preventing us from launching large operations, pacifying a number of important areas in the lowlands, and consolidating the Puppet Army and Government.

Causes ((of our failures)): Revolutionary activities were not conducted regularly. The deficiencies of our cadre and personnel have facilitated Vietnamization.

Revolutionary personnel are encountering difficulties in performing their tasks.

(Because they do not yet thoroughly understand the ((Party)) policy of fighting a protracted war), they also failed to master our policy on activities to be conducted in the three areas ((mountains, lowlands, and cities)) and that of conducting three-pronged attacks from mountainous and rural areas. Therefore, objectively we have met many difficulties.

#### Enemy defeats.

The failures that the enemy has suffered in Indochina and Vietnam have produced a far-reaching influence in the USA:

Large expansion of the US antiwar movement.

Contradictions among members of the US administration.

Dissension among the people because of racial discrimination.

Financial and economic difficulties.

As of May 70, the US budget lacked two and a half billion ((dollars)) and had to borrow money.

Since Nixon took office, poverty and unemployment have prevailed in the country.

Because the US has sustained great defeats in VN, they failed to acquire a monopoly in Asia and had to decentralize power by adopting Vietnamization.

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3. In Laos, we maintained and expanded liberated areas and thwarted the enemy plan to conduct air and artillery attacks against liberated areas.

We succeeded in destroying an element of the enemy mobile force, developing our armed forces, and achieving outstanding progress in all fields of activity. The prestige of friendly forces was thus partly raised.

#### Weaknesses:

Guerrilla warfare was still weak. Most important areas are under enemy control.

The liberated area was not efficiently consolidated.

The development of forces still left much to be desired.

#### A. Cambodia.

We helped the Cambodian Revolution to liberate five provinces.

In early Jun 70, we eliminated 26,000 Lon Nol troops.

Weaknesses. The revolutionary force was rapidly developed but not strongly consolidated. It has not yet dealt heavy blows to the enemy.

#### 2. Evolution of the Cambodian situation.

The situation in Cambodia is not simple and had great significance. Cambodia has gone ((smoothly)) from nationalism to socialism, in theory and in practice.

Although a neighbor of VN, an embattled country, and oppressed by the US power and might, Cambodia stayed a neutral and peaceful country and did not stage an armed struggle. For that reason, many socialist countries have followed the example of Sihanouk.



The situation in Cambodia still concerns the strategy and strategems applied in Indochinese countries. To achieve a Revolution, a country must possess the five following factors: An army, the Party, a government, a front, and international support. Because Sihanouk is a progressive and a man of outstanding reputation, his enhanced prestige can rally the people.

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War and peace: The US imperialists might expand the war in Indochina and throughout Asia.

The danger of war has united the Asian people.

((Therefore we must try to)) unite the entire population of Indochina to struggle against the US Imperialists. We must maintain unanimity and solidarity and carry out the policy of assembling all the ((Indochinese)) people to isolate the enemy. The revolution in Cambodia has the same law of development as that of Vietnam: To progress toward socialism, a nationalistic country must begin with a proletariat revolution.

## 2. New Changes ((in the situation)).

The Indochinese Revolution uses the main lines of our Party policy as a foundation. There are three main factors ((which cause these changes)):

In the development of the Indochinese Revolution, which we will inevitably win, both we and the enemy tried to avoid war in Indochina. Defeated, the enemy foolishly expanded the war to support his Vietnamization plan.

Although defeated, the enemy is still very stubborn. He foolishly expanded the war to Cambodia to ward off our blows in SVN and attempted to implement his plan of localizing the war.

The relations among the people of three Indochinese countries will create new solidarity. This is due to the characteristic of the war in Vietnam and the coup d'etat ((in Cambodia)). Yet, the ((Indochinese)) Revolution owes its rapid development to Vietnam which guides the Indochinese people in their struggle.

## 3. What has the enemy done and what will he do?

The enemy will not give up the war in Vietnam, but will prolong it, and he will continue his Vietnamization plan.

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((The enemy)) has four strategic plans.

### Immediate plans:

1. Prevent our attacks and attack our rear areas and aggressively carry out his pacification program; these are his two main plans.

2. Assemble reactionary forces of different countries to form the Southeast Asia Anti-Communist Front. ((This Front)) may consist of Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Laos.

3. The enemy may attack NVN with all kinds of forces, especially air-power. He will intensify political and diplomatic attacks against us.

((Enemy situation in)) Laos:

((The US)) failed to expand the war and implement its Vietnamization plan. If it expanded the war ((to Laos)), the US would cause dissension with Thailand. It wanted to divide Laos transversally to prevent ((our infiltration to the South)) while Thailand wanted Laos be divided longitudinally to secure its defense. Phouma was uncommitted in this matter."

The US did not want to expand the war in Indochina, but it had to because of its failure in ((SVN)). It did not anticipate that Sihanouk could strike back. After overthrowing ((Sihanouk)), the US placed itself before another anti-US front besides the US antiwar front and the anti-US league advocated by the people of the three Indochinese countries.

By bringing troops to Cambodia, the US helped revolutionary forces to develop rapidly, and it became increasingly bogged down.

The Lao Revolution has a very great influence on the Vietnamese and Cambodian Revolutions and has put the US in a state of embarrassment.

((Marginal note:))

Enemy failure in Laos:

We liberated Canh Đông Chum, Attopeu, and Savannakhet which constitute a large liberated area.

((End of marginal note)).

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Thailand:

3. ((Enemy activities)) in Quang Tri and Thừa Thiên Provinces in 1970:

To implement his Vietnamization plan, the enemy carried out the following:

a. Pacification efforts: Organized an inter-family control system, set up covert intelligence networks and rural police organizations, elected village administrative committee chiefs, gathered 50% of the people's rice, and continued to encourage the people to return to their former residences. He succeeded somewhat in sowing suspicion and dissension among the people and revolutionary forces.

In an attempt to restore the Puppet government and army to power, he succeeded in upgrading troops, conscripting youths, and improving the People's Self-Defense Force.

Unsuccessful ((in his pacification efforts)), the enemy had to release the people ((from his relocation areas)). But the enemy cannot control the people. This is advantageous to the Revolution.

Instead of being destroyed by the enemy, revolutionary agent networks have developed.

His plan of gathering rice has been limited.

b. Enemy plan of preventing our attacks:

Before Mar 70, he prevented our attacks from the area contiguous to the areas bordering ((possibly cities)). Since Mar 70, he has defended the middle line. The US sent Puppet troops to the front line to preclude our operations, but they failed.

c. Strengthening of the Puppet government and army: The US succeeded in conscripting youths and upgrading troops.

Regional Force personnel made some improvement. (They operated in mountainous areas).

((Marginal note:)) ((The enemy)) has two plans:

1. Secure a strong position.
2. Expand the war to Cambodia to create pressure ((on NVN)).

((End of marginal note.))

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The US has handed over many military installations to the Puppet ((army)), reinforced two doan ((groups)) ((sic)) of artillery and river forces in Cửa Viêt and Thuận An, etc ... ((sic)).

Enemy governmental personnel from hamlet to province have been elected.

He was unsuccessful in organizing a covert espionage net. His capability has decreased. Because of heavy personnel losses, a shortage of 10,500 could not be replaced in time.

d. Intensification of the defense system: ((RVNAF)) important strongholds are secured with a system of underground tunnels. Tyrants ((GVN officials)) have secret tunnels to use.

4. Upcoming mission plan:

In the near future, the enemy will continue to carry out his four previous plans. Consequently, two possibilities exist:

1. The enemy will maintain the same position or may conceal a little ((sic)). During the rainy season, he may pull his troops to the ((possibly city)) bordering areas.

2. He might attack our rear area and even Laos, and cut off Route 9.

Presently, the second possibility seems remote. If it becomes a reality, he cannot create more difficulty for us now ((in the rainy season)) than in the dry season.

Whether the enemy can implement this plan or not will depend on our efforts and the objective situation of the world.

((Whatever may happen)), we are always determined to step up ((our activities)) and struggle with patience until final victory is attained.

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However, we must exert efforts to gain victories within a short period of time.

Quang Tri and Thừa Thiên Provinces occupy a very important position. Under all circumstances, we must firmly maintain our position, combat guidelines, and policies. We must also exert new efforts for self-help and self-improvement.

Specific tasks ((to be performed)) from now until the end of the year ((possibly 1970)):

Military activities: We must exert efforts to intensify military activities in the lowlands.

Attract enemy regular force units to pin them down, and attack the enemy even during the rainy season.

General organization and leadership: We must aggressively attack the enemy both at the front and in rear areas.

Strengthening of forces: We must preserve and maintain our forces and direct due attention to qualitative and quantitative improvement.

We must properly treat sick soldiers, provide adequate food for our soldiers, and observe preventive medical measures to insure that 80% of our personnel ((can fight)). Soldiers should also be well-trained so that they become alert, but have feelings and respect for human ((dignity and life)).

Farm production: We must be prepared to practice self-help and support friendly units operating in the front.

Farm production has a very important strategic value:

It lightens the burden on NVN.

((Farm production)) must be developed according to ((the requirements of)) our forces. An element specialized ((in farm production)) should be reorganized and placed under the direct responsibility of a unit commander.

We must be able to achieve self-sufficiency by Sep 70 to make preparations for 1971.

Ideology: We must maintain our class viewpoint and ideology, and insure that our plan is properly carried out. We must also concentrate our efforts and intelligence to annihilate the enemy pacification program.

In all circumstances, we must firmly maintain our positions, formations, and mission plans, and promote our sense of self-help for self-improvement.

We must improve our abilities, leadership, and technical and tactical skills.

In short, we have two primary missions:

Counter enemy pacification efforts; gain control of the ((city-)) bordering area, and be ready to attack the enemy in his rear areas.

2. Perform farm production for self-help and conduct rear service activities on the spot.

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#### SUMMARY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF K53.

##### 1. Assessment of espionage activities between 1965 and 1969-1970:

The unit collected information on the situation along Route 9 and the defensive system of the 1st ((RVNAF)) Division. It also took possession of a valuable document (original text) dealing with the pacification plan for 1968 and opinions of intellectual circles, the Buddhist clique, and political factions etc ... ((sic)). (Men were sent to contact Lê Khắc Quyến, ((possibly Chief)) of an ((unspecified)) religious sect ((possibly to draw him to our side)).

##### Force build-up:

The unit contacted, investigated, and employed a number of prospective agents who have gathered intelligence information.

It recruited a few low-level prospective agents in charge of providing lodging and food for other agents and collecting information.

It recruited some legal gtv ((possibly commo-liaison agents)) in charge of escorting and receiving Cúc ((possibly Political Staff Department, Headquarters, VC Tri-Thiên-Huế Military Region)) cadre, and brought two radios to the city ((possibly Huế City)).

It formed mui's ((detachments)) and two cum's in two directions ((sic)), and unified espionage stations of TW ((possibly meaning the NVN High Command)) and local areas in accordance with the directive of TW.

It assigned a number of cell leaders to temporarily help Cúc cadre exercise their leadership.

Though in a poor state full of hardships and difficulties, the cadre and soldiers of K53 were still well-trained. They still held firm to their areas of operation and battlefields creating favorable conditions for the agent force to develop.

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They had friendly relations with local areas and enjoyed the confidence and help of the latter. They were also trusted, loved, and supported by the people. However, some of them still displayed deficiencies.

Specifically, cadre had a high fighting spirit and firm determination. They did not balk at hardships nor fear sacrifice and always held firm to their areas of responsibility, so they accomplished all their assigned missions.

Their class viewpoint was stable through many grave trials. They were experienced in the establishment of "gates" and commo-liaison lines, and the organization of low-level agents.

Weaknesses:

Their experiences in planting espionage agents into enemy high-level organizations were poor.

Types of cadre:

Section cadre:

A number of comrades were systematically trained, but their period of operation was short so their experiences were still few. A number of others were highly experienced, but were not systematically trained. They did not understand new lessons nor know how to properly apply their experiences.

Cum cadre:

Most of them were experienced in communication activities. However, they were not systematically trained in espionage activities.

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"Mobile force" cadre: Displayed devotion to duty when on TDY and had considerable experience in the performance of tasks. Their sole weakness is that most of them lived in rural areas, so they were not familiar with cities. They succeeded in recruiting agents in charge of providing lodging and food for other agents.

Espionage cell leaders ((possibly agents' handlers)) succeeded in infiltrating two espionage agents, Phuong and Phuc, into ((Huế)) City to operate under legal ((RVN)) status. These two agents are to contact other agents, gain access to objectives, and familiarize themselves with city life.

Weaknesses: Espionage cell leaders could establish contact with ((enemy personnel)) and exploit information from them, but they failed to plant their agents in the right high-level organizations of the enemy, so they have not yet met mission requirements.

Commo-liaison agents: They were experienced. Previously, they worked well, but now due to the difficult situation, their capability to recruit new agents is more or less limited.

## II. PREVAILING SHORTCOMINGS:

There were neither cell leaders operating inside ((possibly Huế City)) nor agents in charge of recruiting new agents, except the one agent who moved in and out ((possibly of Huế City)).

There were no efficient agents to operate in LU ((Chinese character meaning mountain)) areas except for a few low-level ones who failed to penetrate objectives and worked with less effectiveness.

The communication system in stepping stones ((VC term for a base of operation designed to expand offensive activities over adjacent areas)) was unstable.

Legal commo-liaison agents were too few in number. Some of them were oppressed by the enemy, and we have not yet reestablished contact with them.

As a result of our failure in planting espionage agents in UA ((mountainous)) areas, we could not collect intelligence information on these areas as required by TW.

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### Reasons for shortcomings:

1. We do not yet fully understand the general situation and missions of the Revolution. Particularly in the military region, we did not know how to adopt guidelines of the espionage branch flexibly nor keep abreast of the actual situation in our areas of activity, etc ... ((sic)). Therefore, we have encountered ever increasing difficulties in espionage activities.

TW Cục ((possibly COSVN)) did not exercise close control over the performance of missions in the Tri-Thiên area.

Sometimes, we missed opportunities to recruit additional espionage agents. We usually had difficulty in communication. Sometimes internal dissension still occurred.

Our organization has not yet been stabilized. We place more emphasis on the consolidation and development of ((the agent network)) in our base area than on the recruitment of additional agents in enemy rear areas. The battlefields in enemy rear areas were not well prepared.

In the past, our espionage agents usually operated far from local unit Party committees, so they received less leadership.

2. Operating procedures were still poor and simple. Cell leaders assigned by TW to recruit agents did not do their best to recruit agents in local areas nor know how to take advantage of the relations between the two regions ((SVN and NVN)) to persuade the people to join our espionage network.

### 3. Leadership:

Missions assigned to cell leaders were beyond or not suitable to their capabilities, and no criteria were prescribed for them. That is why they could not perfectly accomplish their missions though we have closely observed their activities, learned the reasons for their weaknesses, and ideologically improved them.

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The leadership was not concentrated, and command levels did not receive full knowledge concerning objectives.

4. Organization and leadership: Assign another espionage mission to the espionage cum's which are located far from ((headquarters)) and have difficulties in communication.

5. Areas of activity were stirred up. This causes us difficulties.

6. The attitude of the people of all strata was advantageous to the Revolution, but after the ((1968)) General and Uprising, they became pacifistic.

## II. POLICIES AND MISSIONS FOR 1970 AND 1971:

Tri-Thien-Hue occupies an important position and is our objective.

Since early Spring 1968, the enemy has increased his suppression and terror.

Our influence is widening among the people of all strata and the movements of Buddhist followers and students.

Our advantages: Having sustained failure, the enemy had to de-escalate the war.

Our position is becoming increasingly firm and our influence is constantly expanding.

The situation is more stable than before. The people's revolutionary movement has the means to develop.

After expanding the war throughout Indochina, the enemy had to scatter his troops thinly which led him to military failure and political disadvantage. His action has greatly affected the spirit of the people of all strata.

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Our difficulties:

Enemy pacification and defense plans in cities and rural areas have brought about difficulties for us.

Enemy personnel are pacifistic.

Our areas of activity are not stable, and our legal status was not well maintained. We met with difficulties in staying close to the people.

By controlling the people and changing their papers ((ID cards)), the enemy can learn our operating procedures.



Missions:

Guidelines:

Consider the motivation ((of the people)) to perform revolutionary tasks as a main mission. Along with this, resort to every kind of trick to secretly plant agents in high-level enemy organizations to collect intelligence information, thus fulfilling immediate as well as future requirements.

The most important mission is strategic information.

Another important mission is to develop our forces.

Objectives:

Headquarters of the 1st ((RVNAF Infantry)) Division, Tri-Thien Sectors, and Puppet police offices. We must contain the enemy in his positions and destroy him.

Main activities:

1. Concentrate all forces to build up our forces inside ((enemy areas)).

2. Quickly activate "gateways" to receive and escort ((cadre going in and out of enemy controlled cities)), and recruit legal commo-liaison agents.

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There are three major tasks:

1. The first one consists of successfully solving problems concerning cell leaders and their legal status.

2. The second consists of using information agents ((informants)) successfully. ((This is a cadre task.))

3. The third one consists of continuously providing guidance (for commo-liaison personnel).

1. How to solve problems concerning cell cadre:

Some cell leaders were sent by TW ((possibly the NVN High Command)), but particular attention is to be given to training cell leaders on the spot.

((Marginal note)): Including specialized staff assistants.  
((End of marginal note)).

There are several several means of procuring cell leaders.

We may request the ((Tri-Thien-Hue)) Military Region and local areas to provide cadre who can operate in cities under legal status.

We may choose agents with legal status to train as cell leaders.

We may request the ((Political Staff)) Department, ((Headquarters, VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)) to assign cadre to recruit cell leaders for us. (At present, we must make positive efforts to provide food and lodging for cell leaders to help them acquire legal status).

While we are making preparations to train cell leaders for long-range requirements, we must assign mobile cadre.

We must evaluate qualifications of cadre of K53 ((possibly Research Office, Political Staff Department, Headquarters, VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region)). If they are weak, we must improve and train them and then assign them to operate in ((enemy areas)) under legal status.

2. How to solve problems concerning information agents operating in QDT (MR1), especially in Hue and other areas and how to use information agents successfully.

We may entice agents into working for us through their relatives in NVN or liberated areas. Or we may recruit agents among people from enemy areas and mountainous areas.

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We must carry out seven steps. First we must study records of personnel to see if they are qualified for TB ((possibly intelligence)) activities.

3. We must promptly activate "cua ngo" ((gateways)) and recruit legal commo-liaison personnel.

We must gradually avoid using semi-legal commo-liaison personnel due to the current situation. We must mainly use legal commo-liaison agents.

We must stay close to movements in local areas and allow the people to participate in these movements so as to establish areas ((of operation)), activate "cua ngo," and recruit agents.

We have assigned Comrade Khiem to directly and indirectly receive and escort visitors.

4. Experiences concerning espionage and commo-liaison activities.

a. Commo-liaison activities: We must determine the role of the commo-liaison agent in support of espionage activities.

The distance between Cum ((47)) and commo-liaison agents must be reasonable so that the cum can promptly provide guidance for these agents.

We must ensure that liaison can be continuously maintained between ((espionage)) cell ((leaders)) and commo-liaison agents at night.

We must organize reconnaissance and military proselyting personnel must ensure security for commo-liaison cadre while travelling.

We must select commo-liaison agents among persons who are familiar with routes and can talk with students on their way home from school and aged persons.

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If commo-liaison agents cannot contact each other due to enemy sweep operations, they must select dead letter drops.

When the people previously relocated in resettlement centers leave these centers to return to their native villages to make a living, we must seek means of contacting them.

Commo-liaison agents must use a cover story in their conversations to preserve secrecy.

They still have many shortcomings. They must observe the principles of preserving secrecy and compartmentalization.

b. Espionage activities:

Operating methods: Five

1. The first operating method consists of entering ((GVN areas)), pulling back to ((mountainous areas)), and then entering ((the GVN areas)) again.

We must attach importance to this operating method when studying our objectives.

2. Cell leaders are either provided by TW or trained in local areas. We must attach more importance to locally trained cell leaders. We can select cell leaders among agents, receptive civilians or available cadre.

3. The third operating method consists of using mobile cadre. We may recruit only a small number of cadre.

((Marginal note:)) It is a very appropriate ((operating method)).  
((End of marginal note.))

4. The fourth operating method consists of using old agents who are not qualified for collecting information ((on the enemy situation)) to recruit new agents who are qualified to do so.

We must recruit agents in secondary areas, but we must send them to main areas.

5. We must use semi-legal espionage agents in coordination with legal ones, and illegal espionage agents in conjunction with legal ones according to the circumstances. We must have penetration agents.

We must make preparations in advance.

How to solve the above problems

To be efficient, an ((espionage)) network must plan information agents in IU ((mountainous areas)). We must ensure that liaison can be maintained between penetration and outside commo-liaison and espionage agents and that these agents have favorable conditions for messing and billeting, and an appropriate cover occupation, ... ((sic)).

We must recruit ((commo-liaison and espionage)) agents principally by relying on their blood relations. Recruiting agents is comparable to the Party task of motivating the people to join the Revolution.

We must recruit ((commo-liaison and espionage agents)) according to plans and by successively carrying out the following steps:

1. Publish want ads in newspapers for employees.
2. Make the acquaintance of persons, then investigate and study them.
3. Indoctrinate and train new recruit.
4. Then put them to the test by assigning them tasks.
5. ((Accept them as true agents)) and organize them.
6. Provide guidance for newly recruited agents in their collection of information ((on the enemy situation)).

When a cell leader decides to go to enemy areas, he must appoint someone to replace him in case he will be gone too long due to difficulties encountered.

How to solve problems concerning legal status:

The most basic task is to recruit ((commo-liaison and espionage)) cadre in local areas.

((Commo-liaison and espionage cadre)) assigned ((by TW)) constitute the most important problem.

a. Disguisement.

((Friendly)) cadre residing in areas or transferred from other areas may disguise themselves as persons formerly KIA but whose deaths have not been announced; as persons returning from abroad; as those who have gone to make a living and are missing; as those who are transferred to other areas without having their names registered; and as those who come from areas devastated by the war.

After disguising themselves, cadre must procure false papers.

b. Professions:

First of all, cadre must look for or create an acquaintance on whom they may rely. It is even better if this acquaintance is a friendly cadre.

They must select in advance an appropriate job in order to avoid choosing jobs which are contrary to the Revolution's interests and ethics of the cadre.

c. Guidance for the use of newly recruited cadre.

We must indoctrinate newly recruited cadre, keep them under surveillance, assess their ideological situation, seek to know their family status, etc. ... ((sic)). We must enlighten them on Party policies.

We must fully understand requirements concerning investigations so as to use newly recruited cadre. When indoctrinating newly recruited cadre, we should increase their sense of discipline and must not exploit their sentiments.

We must provide extremely specific guidance for newly recruited cadre because almost all of the pertinent problems are complex. To provide effective guidance, we must know newly recruited cadre, i.e., we must know their biographical data, their qualifications, their ((former)) positions, state of mind, aspirations, feelings, relations, family status, etc... ((sic)).

We must make newly-recruited cadre strengthen their determination and eliminate shirking attitudes and opportunism.

((We must)) properly assess the ((enemy)) situation in ((objective)) areas. We must ensure secrecy, the unexpected character and promptness ((in all of our activities)).

((One line illegible))

We must carefully disguise conversation ((several words illegible)). We must create conditions to appear discreet and normal.

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((Marginal note:)) 5/8-70 ((possibly 5 Aug 70)).

((End of marginal note.))

Review of activities concerning some tasks (since 1969)

Characteristics of the ((enemy)) situation.

((Quang)) Tri and ((Thua)) Thien Provinces are situated in the northernmost area ((of SVN)) so they become hotly contested areas.

In spite of our successes, the enemy, due to his stubborn nature, continues to implement the Vietnamization and accelerated pacification programs and the "clear and hold" strategy. He prevents ((our activities)) in border areas and occupies key positions on the intermediate line. He intensifies ambushes and sweep operations in lowland areas.

In cities, he conducts searches and raids and increases security measures by forcing the people to change their ID cards and other papers, specifically in the areas of operations of ((Cum)) 47 and 43.

Results obtained and achievements gained

In DB ((possibly espionage activities))

We have trained two cell leaders.

We continue to consolidate ((espionage)) agencies and use agents.

We are studying to broaden our relations with a number of ((receptive)) individuals ((whom we want to recruit as espionage agents)).

We have activated two or three espionage agencies.

We have exploited a sizable amount of valuable information.

In commo-liaison activities:

We have ensured the success of 10% ((sic)) of our commo-liaison activities. We have been determined to overcome difficulties and have dared to work in a resourceful manner.

We have been able to carry out commo-liaison activities continuously and promptly.

We have discovered ((possibly meaning reestablished contact with)) a number of ((former)) agents.

Strong points:

High determination  
Creativeness and resourcefulness  
Spirit of unity and unanimity  
Much experience.

Weak points:

Limited professional skills  
Incorrect awareness of enemy schemes and lack of vigilance  
Improper execution of principles.

Reasons (for our deficiencies):

Due to long distances, the military region did not provide prompt leadership for various sections.

Our personnel had poor capabilities and lacked practical experiences.

The situation in our area of operation created difficulties for us.

There were no cell leaders in the inner perimeter.

Our personnel lacked legal ((RVN)) papers

Remaining problems to be settled:

Lack of cell leaders operating in the inner perimeter.

Lack of legal ((RVN)) papers for personnel.

Lack of commo-liaison personnel and the standstill of commo-liaison activities.

Activation of "cua ngo" ((gateways))

Limited support and assistance of local ((forces))

K53 ((sic))

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ACTIVITY PLAN OF CUM 47

(for the period from Sep 70 to Dec 71)

I. AFFIRMATION OF THE CUM'S ROLE AND MISSIONS:

It is an espionage agency which provides information for the military

Region and TW ((possibly the NVN High Command)).

Common missions:

It has two missions: Espionage and commo-liaison:

Every effort is focussed on urgently developing our forces in the inner perimeter and ensuring leadership ((commo-liaison task)). The two missions are carried out simultaneously.

Immediate purpose:

A commo-liaison network must be established to convey leadership from higher echelons to available agents.

Specific tasks:

s. "Mui" ((detachments)) should consider the activation of a commo-liaison network as the main task and concurrently carry out espionage activities within the assigned areas in accordance with the limited requirements.

I. SPECIALIZED ACTIVITIES:

1. Activation of a commo-liaison network:

Gateways:

✓ Establish two gateways in Hai Thuong and ((Hai)) Phu Villages of Hai Lang District and in Phong An Village of Phong Dien District.

The gateways in ((Hai)) Phu and ((Hai)) Thuong Villages were to be completed in Mar 71.

The gateway in Phong An Village was to be completed in late Mar 71.

Each gateway was to meet the following requirements:

One or two agents in charge of procuring legal ((GVN)) papers.

One or two agents in charge of collecting information.

Ensure the proper use of camouflage.

Properly assess the friendly and enemy situations in the areas of operation.

Legal commo-liaison agents.

There would be four legal commo-liaison agents. (Each mui ((detachment)) was to have two agents.)

During the first half of 1970, recruit two capable commo-liaison agents; during the last half of 1970, recruit two additional commo-liaison agents.



As a matter of urgency, the establishment ((of a commo- liaison network)) should be completed as soon as possible.

2. Establishment of an espionage network:

Investigation and recruitment:

a. Missions of Mui's ((detachments)):

Contact local (district and village Party Committees) to detect individuals who are the proper age and are qualified for intelligence activities.. They should place more emphasis on their own assigned areas of operation than the others. Two steps of the mission must be accomplished by Jun 71 and Dec 71.

((Marginal notes))

Step 1:

Are the individuals concerned the required age?

Do they have any ((political)) relationships?

Step 2: Cum ((sic))

((End of marginal notes))

The first step consists of discovering qualified individuals and investigating their personal histories, political attitudes, tendencies, and relationships.

Requirements:

We must recruit two individuals by late Dec 70 and one more during the first half of the year ((sic)).

To train legal cell leaders ((meaning agent handlers)), we should try to recruit qualified individuals among teachers and students.

Requirements: The task must be completed by late Mar 70, but the qualified individuals must be recruited as soon as possible.

We should recruit one or two agents who can dispatch our cell leaders ((meaning agent handlers) to RVN controlled areas)) to operate under legal status.

Conditions for recruits:

They must be male and must legally join ((VC)) ranks.

We must complete Step 1 by late Jun 71 and Step 2 by late Dec 71.

Each mui ((detachment)) must recruit one or two agents who can provide messing and billeting facilities for our personnel disguising as draft dodgers. This must be completed by late ((unspecified month)) 1971.

It must at least look for one agent who can provide messing and billeting facilities for cadre, cell leaders or commo-liaison personnel operating in Hue and Quang Tri.

b. Missions of cadre:

According to the current situation, the first step consists of the following missions:

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Contact local ((VC)) authorities of ((Quang)) Diên and ((Triệu)) Phong Districts to collect information concerning the local situation and to request messing and billeting facilities in order to create a foothold from which Cum ((47)) may establish relations with intermediaries ((Cầu Bàng An Cư)) ((sic)) and Sister Lan in ((Quang)) Diên District.

Send Tung to Quang Diên and Tien to Triệu Phong to assess the situations.

Assign an element to investigate Phien in Triệu Thưởng Village ((of Triệu Phong District)) and the development of the current situation in Hải Lê Village ((of Hải Lang District)).

Immediately investigate available individuals and recruit more agents.

After investigation, ((Cum 47)) must evaluate the capability of the recruited individuals. The plan for each mission step will be drafted later.

Depending on the individuals concerned, a Cum may employ Mui ((detachment)) cadre to carry out this task.

Implementation:

Reassignment of Mui cadre:

Hải Lang ((District)):

Hải Thưởng and ((Hải)) Phú ((Villages)):

Thái, Tâm, Phó, Kỳ, and Sơn.

Phong Diên ((District)):

Phong An ((Village)):

Xuân, Tung, Lý, Sy, and Thanh

Cum 47 Headquarters:

Luân, Thiên, Cam, Vương, Liên, Tri, Lương, and Phóng.

Requirements:

Each mui ((detachment)) must have three or four security reconnaissance cadre. Party organization is the same as previously.

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Assignment of personnel:

During the first period, Phong Diên ((District)) assigned:

Comrade Văn to Hải Lăng ((District)).

Tiến to ((Triệu Thưởng Village)), Triệu Phong District

Thai to ((Cum 47)) Headquarters.

((Marginal notes:))

Tiến and Văn were in an espionage network.

Thai and Xuân were in a commo-liaison network.

((End of marginal notes.))

Problems to be settled:

Reinforce the ((Cum)) with four armed security reconnaissance agents,

Give letters of introduction to four Cum Cadre who have been sent to four districts.

Headquarters' letter will be better.

((Marginal note:))

Which problem is the main one?

((End of marginal note.))

II. SELF-SUFFICIENT PRODUCTION IN 1971:

We were determined to attain 80% (of self-sufficient production and requisition and production of food).

Plan:

Requisition and purchasing task: 50% ((of strength)) (12 comrades)

Self-sufficient production task: 50% ((of strength)) (12 comrades)

Personnel strength in the rear:

6 comrades in the rear

12 comrades + 3 comrades who were professionals in the field of production.

If each ration was one lon ((can)) of rice per day, we should need 90 casks of rice, equal to 180 casks of unhusked rice, for a year.

Production criteria:

Nine casks of rice seed.

25,000 manioc plants.

Average criteria:

Five professional production cadre should support 15 other other cadre in self-sufficient production.

Ten cadre should carry out the specialized task and other missions at the same time.

Requirements:

Procure five casks of rice seed.

Purchase tools with our own money and ask higher echelons for supplies.

Request to be reinforced with three professional production cadre.

Lend food for use during the first three months of the year.

Demand ((to be exempted from)) food contribution for half of 1970 due to famine.

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((Plan of)) development.

The Party:

Improve Party members' and cadre's skills qualitatively and quantitatively.