

2. SUBJECT: (U) VC/NVA Activities In
The RVN and In CAMBODIA

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BLACK BEARD ICP

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5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: CMIC, SAIGON, VS
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13. PREPARED BY: MILTON L. BARNES
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6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: Returnee Interrogation

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15. SUMMARY:

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(C) This report contains information extracted from a translation of CMIC ARVN Elm Report No 2194/TTTVHH/BT. Included is limited information concerning the assembly capability of VC forces, VC activities in CAMBODIA, VC recruiting, the morale of VC cadre, resolutions, the attendance of foreign advisors at a COSVN meeting, and a Russian reporter in the SR-2 area. THIS REPORT PARTIALLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF BLACK BEARD ICP (BTA UNK).

1. (C) Background Information:

a. Name: NGUYEN VAN NANG (NGUYEENX, VEAN NANG), aka HAI THANH (HAI, THANH), CMIC 3039-70

b. Rank: LTC

c. Position and Unit of Assignment: 1st XO; SR-2, R

d. DPOB: 1924; TAN SON NHI Vil, GO VAP Dist, GIA DINH Prov, RVN

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

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e. Parents' Names: Father, NGUYEN VAN DI (NGUYEENI, VEAN DI), deceased; Mother, TRAN THI HAI (TRAANL, THIV HAI), deceased

f. Circumstances of Return. On 18 May 70, source was hiding in the BA RAY Area (vic XT155075) with his brother, NGUYEN VAN DOT (NGUYEENI, VEAN DOTS; squad cadreman of the 400th Rear Svc Gp), and a nephew, NGUYEN VAN BAC (NGUYEENI, VEAN BACS; secretary to source), in order to defect to the QUEO BA Post (aka DUC HUE SF Post) (vic XT320090). On 19 May 70, they arrived at the MY QUY Area and stayed there until approx 1500 hrs. They then continued moving but were spotted by the VC. His younger brother and nephew were killed. Source escaped and moved north. At approx 0700 hrs on 20 May 70, he rallied to the AN THANH LP Post.

g. Significant Activities:

(1) 1945 to 1961. Before Sep 45, source worked as a farmer in TAN SON NHI Vil, GO VAP Dist, GIA DINH Prov. In Sep 45, source joined the resistance movement as a member of a vanguard youth group. In 1947, source became a squad leader in Detachment 12, which operated in the GIA DINH-CHOLON Area. In 1948, source was promoted to assistant platoon leader; in 1949, he was promoted to Plat Ldr of the 38th Plat, 3d Co, Detachment 12. In 1950, the DONG MAI Regt was activated and it included Detachment 12, the 302d Bn, the 303d Bn, and the 306th Bn. Source was made the XO of the 80th Co, 302d Bn. In 1952, he was promoted to company commander of the same unit. In 1952, he was assigned as the XO of the 302d Bn; in Jul 54, he was made the commander of the same unit. His unit regrouped to RVN and landed at SAM SON Beach; from there, it moved to THO XUAN Dist, THANH HOA Prov, RVN. In 1955, the 330th Div was activated, and source was made the chief of staff of the 1st Regt. In 1956, source was sent to a military training course at BACH MAI Airfield, HANOI City, for two years. Upon completion of that course, he became an instructor at the infantry school and was promoted to the rank of senior captain. In 1956, he was assigned as the commander of the 83d Regt, JGS. Source was then promoted to major.

(2) 1961 to 20 May 70. In 1961, source underwent infiltration training near XUAN MAI, HA TAY Prov for one month. The PHONG NAM Infil Gp was organized and was put under the command of LTC TA MINH KHAM (TAV, MINH KHAAM). The PHONG NAM Infil Gp consisted of three elements, each which consisted of the cadre belonging to one of three regiments. Each element had approx 200 cadre members from squad level to regimental level. Source was the leader of one element, the 3d Co. In 1962, when the group reached the KA TUM Area, TAY NINH Prov, RVN, source was assigned as director of the Army School, R. In 1965, source was assigned as the chief of the BINH TAN Element, MR-4. In late 1967, MR-4 was dissolved in order to activate SR-2, and source was made the 1st XO, SR-2. In 1968, source commanded two battalions, the 308th Bn and the 64 Bn, which attacked the 6th Precinct, SAIGON, in the first general offensive in 1968. In May 68, when the second offensive began, source was the chief of staff of an SR-2 forward headquarters of which was located in the TAN BOU Area. In Dec 69, source, who was still 1st XO, SR-2, assumed the position of commander of the 1st Elm, SR-2, located in the BA VU Area. Source held that position until he returned on 20 May 70. For further information concerning source's significant activities, see CMIC IR No 6 029 0599 70.

h. Additional References: CMIC Exploitation Guide; previous reports published on the same source, CMIC IR Nos 6 029 0566 70 and 6 029 0607 70

2. (C) Additional Information Concerning SR-2:

a. Assembly Capability of VC Forces:

(1) Movement. A communications system was established whereby the VC forces could be notified to move to an assembly area within a given time. A company-size unit could assemble at a given point within 12 hours. A battalion-sized unit could assemble at a given point within 24 hours.

(2) Preparations. Upon the receipt of orders for an operation, the battalions were notified to make preparations. A reconnaissance element was notified to reconnoiter the objective approx one month before the day of the operation. The battalion commander and the PO were notified to make preparations approx seven to 10 days before the day of the operation. The remaining battalion cadre were notified no earlier than four days before the day of the operation.

(3) Marching Time and Distance. During the dry season, the various VC units could move approx 20 to 25 kilometers in one night. Normally, they traveled approx four kilometers per hour and marched five to five and one-half hours per night; during the rainy season, it took the units approx 33 percent more marching time to cover the same distance.

b. VC Activities in CAMBODIA:

(1) Mission. The mission of the May 70 Offensive was to help restore SIHANOUK to power. The offensive was expected to be completed in approx 10 to 15 days.

(2) SR-2 Participation. SR-2 was ordered to send the 267th the 269th, and the 6B Bns; the 128th Arty Bn; and two sapper companies into CAMBODIA. A regimental command staff was established to assume command of those units (NFI).

(3) Post Offensive Action. After SIHANOUK's restoration to power, the units were to remain in CAMBODIA in order to help SIHANOUK establish a new government.

(4) Planned Propaganda Activities. The VC found the people's force, which aided the VC in CAMBODIA, to be very poor in every respect; however, the VC were required to use this force in conducting the major portion of the offensive. It was for this reason that the VC hurriedly established advisory groups. The advisory groups were sent to CAMBODIA in order to help the Cambodian Communists and the Pro-SIHANOUK Cambodians conduct propaganda activities. These activities were to be directed toward the rural populace in order to motivate them to support the planned offensive. The Cambodian Communists were reported to be active in the KOMPONG CHAM, PREY VENG, and KAMPOT Areas.

c. VC Recruiting. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the populace was no longer confident in the VC. Due to this lack of confidence, the VC had trouble in trying to recruit people. The VC forced some people to join, but those personnel would only accept an assignment in a LF unit. The efficiency of the guerrillas had steadily decreased since the 1968 Tet Offensive. In the past, every village had a LF platoon, and a district LF had a strength equivalent to one to two companies. Those units' strengths have steadily decreased; recently, a district LF had one platoon-size unit (approx 20 to 25 personnel) which was called a company. Due to the decreased strength, approx 15 to 20 percent of the replacements received by LF units have been NVA soldiers. Recently, MF units have been utilized to fulfill the missions of LF units.

d. Morale of the VC Cadre. An unknown number of VC cadre had lost confidence in the Communist Party's strategic policy. This strategic policy called for a three-prong attack. The three-prong attack consisted of a military prong, a political prong, and a military proselyting prong. The military prong did not gain any military victories. The political prong did not succeed in making the people revolt against the government. The military proselyting prong did not cause any dissension among the ARVN regional forces. It was not believed that the VC could gain any favorable military positions or win any favorable military victories which would support their political position at the PARIS Peace Talks. They did not believe that the guerrilla warfare was coordinated with the masses of the people. They did not believe that as matters stood guerrilla warfare would aid the Communists in gaining control of the government.

(1) Resolution 9. Most cadre admitted having failed in the 1968 general offensive phase. Resolution 9, which was subsequently issued, called for maintaining enthusiasm behind the general offensive and general uprising. This lowered the morale of most of the cadre, because they realized that the VC plan could not materialize. At this time, the majority of the cadre were discouraged and were not confident in the Communist Party's plan for continuing the fight, because there was a limit to their endurance.

(2) Political Situation. Most military cadre at battalion and higher levels no longer believed that it was possible to reach a political solution. It was originally believed that the GVN would accept political arrangements for a coalition government resulting from the PARIS Peace Talks. They realized that no political arrangement was reached because the VC did not gain any positions of military value with which to force a political solution. The high level cadre were hopeful that the PARIS Peace Talks would settle the hostilities in the RVN. The VC used military forces in trying to force the GVN to accept a coalition government. The Communist policy, according to what the cadre had learned, meant that only military gains could settle the war.

(3) Discord Among the Cadre. Because the NVA cadre believed that the VC cadre had poor leadership qualities there was discord between the VC and NVA cadre. Also, the VC cadre did not like the NVA cadre because they felt that the NVA cadre acted as if they were superior. After the death of HO CHI MINH, there was improvement in relations between the VC and NVA cadre.

e. Foreign Advisors. In Jul or Aug 68, source attended a COSVN meeting in TAY NINH Prov, RVN. Other members of the SR-2 cadre were also present at the meeting, the purpose of which was to critique the 1968 general offensives. There were 16 Communist Chinese advisors present at the meeting. A colonel was the group leader and the remaining advisors were majors or lieutenant colonels. The advisors were at COSVN prior to Feb 68. During the meeting, the advisors critized the VC general offensive. They said that the general offensive did not agree with MAO TSE TUNG'S the three phases of guerrilla warfare. The VC felt that it was unnecessary to observe the stage of building defense forces because, with the support of the NVA forces, they had enough manpower to pass directly into the general offensive phase. The Communist leaders decided to start the general offensive phase in 1968 and to maintain this phase until they acquired final victory. The VC cadre stated that they followed that strategy when they utilized the NVA forces in the general offensive phase. The advisors disagreed and stated that the VC were in a contention phase and not in a general offensive phase. After this meeting, PEKING recalled the advisors to COMMUNIST CHINA.

f. Information Concerning Resolutions:

(1) Resolution 9. Source had not received any resolutions supplementing Resolution 9. He only received instructions and documents to be used as a guide to the implementation of Directive 136, Resolution 9. Resolution 9 was a resolution promulgated at a COSVN high level conference and was released in late 1968. The resolution mentioned a major strategic phase and the necessity for maintaining a high combat spirit for the general offensive phase. Whenever a new resolution was released, it would stop one phase of activity and begin a new phase of activity. A resolution was not used as a supplement for another resolution.

(2) Resolution 8. The contents of Resolution 8 called for a plan of action in preparation for the general offensive in 1968. The resolution was intended to establish a theater of operations that would help bring about a coalition government in the RVN.

(3) Resolution 14. This resolution was released by the NVN Central Labor Party in 1960 and 1961. The contents of this resolution called for the use of guerrilla warfare and political struggle to gain control of the RVN and to reunite the country.

g. Russian Reporter. In Jul 68, a Russian reporter came to the area of SR-2 and wrote articles concerning the activities of the NLF. The name of the reporter was unknown. He came from PHNOM PENH and remained in the BA THU Area for three days. His destination was unknown.

(U) ARVN COMMENTS: None

(C) US COMMENTS: The information in this report was extracted from a summary translation of CMIC ARVN Elm Report No 2194/TTTVHH/BT.