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WF 11  
U.S. SEEKS TO DESTROY FACILITIES IN CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES (3000)

WASHINGTON, MAY 3 -- THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER ARE TRYING TO DESTROY FACILITIES, NOT RPT NOT MEN, VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW SAYS.

"WE'RE TRYING TO DESTROY THE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO MOUNT OFFENSIVES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM," THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED MAY 3 IN AN INTERVIEW ON THE NATIONAL TELEVISION PANEL PROGRAM, "FACE THE NATION."

MR. AGNEW OBSERVED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE U.S. FORCES IN THE REGION BECAME "SERIOUSLY THREATENED" BY COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH "AN UNENCUMBERED ACCESS TO THE SEA THROUGH WHICH SUPPLIES" COULD COME OO THE SANCTUARIES IN GREAT QUANTITY.

AS A RESULT, HE EXPLAINED, IT BECAME NECESSARY -- AS PART OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM -- "TO NULLIFY AND NEUTRALIZE THE CAPABILITIES FOR STRIKES FROM THESE SANCTUARIES." SOME OF THESE STRIKES ON CERTAIN AMERICAN UNITS HAD ALREADY COMMENCED, HE NOTEDVMMWP THE "-1,9)91 5#3 -:589,, HE STRESSED, "IS NOT RPT NOT TO GO INTO CAMBODIA, BUT TO TAKE AND REDUCE THESE SUPPLY DEPOTS, THE HOSPITAL COMPLEXES, THE COMMAND NETWORK, THE COMMUNICATIONS, THE WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS FACTORIES AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES THAT ARE THERE.

"WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO GET AT IS FACILITIES, NOT RPT NOT MEN," HE ADDED.

PAGE 2--AGNEW

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPT FROM THE BROADCAST:

(BEGIN EXCERPTS)

QUESTION: MR. AGNEW, AMERICAN PLANES HAVE JUST CARRIED OUT A LARGE NEW ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM. IS THIS PART OF OUR EFFORT IN CAMBODIA AND ELSEWHERE, TO CARRY THE WAR TO THE ENEMY AND FORCE HIM TO THE PEACE TABLE?

ANSWER: THE ATTACKS IN NORTH VIETNAM, JUST ACROSS THE DMZ, HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN ONES OF WHAT WE CALL PROTECTIVE REACTION. AS FAR AS I KNOW, THESE ATTACKS THAT YOU ARE FERRING TO FIT INTO THAT CATEGORY.

Q: MR. AGNEW, THESE PARTICULAR NEW AIR ATTACKS SEEM TO BE ON A MORE MASSIVE SCALE AND, ACCORDING TO VARIOUS REPORTS, AIMED AT ENEMY SUPPLY DEPOTS AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE. IS THIS NOT PART OF A STEP-UP IN THIS PROCESS, NO MATTER WHAT YOU CALL IT?

A: I DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MAGNITUDE OF THESE REPORTS, AND I BELIEVE THE INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN RECEIVED THUS FAR HAS NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY ANY CREDIBLE SOURCE. I AM NOT READY TO COMMENT ANY FURTHER THAN THAT ON THEM.

Q: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, THE SANCTUARIES IN CAMBODIA HAVE BEEN THERE FOR MANY YEARS, AS YOU KNOW. WHY DID THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER THEM SO CRUCIAL NOW?

PAGE 3--AGNEW

A: WELL, AS YOU KNOW, WHEN THE SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT WAS FUNCTIONING, THE ABILITY OF THE COMMUNISTS TO SUPPLY AND BUILD AND EXTEND THE SANCTUARIES WAS MARGINAL BECAUSE THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF REGULATION OF THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE, THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF HANDS-OFF AS FAR AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG WERE CONCERNED, ABOUT THE INCURSIONS THEY MADE INTO THE CAMBODIAN COUNTRYSIDE. SINCE THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN OVER, AND EVEN BEFORE THAT, THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS TO EXTEND AND CONSOLIDATE AND MAGNIFY THE CAPABILITIES OF THESE SANCTUARIES. WE HAVE HAD THEM UNDER OBSERVATION FOR SOME TIME. NOW THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE CLEARLY TRYING TO ESTABLISH AN UNEMCUMBERED ACCESS TO THE SEA, THROUGH WHICH SUPPLIES CAN COME TO THESE SANCTUARIES IN GREAT QUANTITY, WE FEEL THE SECURITY OF AMERICAN FORCES IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED AND IT BECAME NECESSARY AS PART OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM, TO NULLIFY AND NEUTRALIZE THE CAPABILITIES FOR STRIKES FROM THESE SANCTUARIES. SOME OF THESE STRIKES HAD BEGUN ON CERTAIN AMERICAN UNITS ALREADY.

Q: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, THE INDICATIONS SO FAR ARE THAT THE SANCTUARIES ARE FAIRLY EMPTY, THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SEEM TO HAVE LEFT. WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES DO NOW? DOES IT JUST KEEP ADVANCING INTO CAMBODIA?

PAGE 4--AGNEW

A: NO RPT NO. THE EXPECTATION WAS THAT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE OPERATIONS, THE COMMUNISTS, BEING SURPRISED, AS THEY WERE HEAVILY SURPRISED, WOULD FALL BACK AND THAT WE WOULD NOT ENCOUNTER MUCH IN THE WAY OF ENEMY RESISTANCE IN THE EARLY DAYS AND POSSIBLY, DEPENDING UPON THEIR CAPABILITY TO MOUNT SOME KIND OF COUNTER OFFENSIVE, NONE AT ALL. THE PURPOSE OF THE STRIKES INTO THE SANCTUARIES IS NOT TO GO INTO CAMBODIA BUT TO TAKE AND REDUCE THESE SUPPLY DEPOTS, THE HOSPITAL COMPLEXES, THE COMMAND NETWORK, THE COMMUNICATIONS, THE WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS FACTORIES AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES THAT ARE THERE. AND YOU MAY NOT HAVE NOTICED, BUT LAST NIGHT A CORRESPONDENT REPORTING FROM ONE OF THE AMERICAN UNITS INDICATED THAT WHEN TANKS MOVED INTO A FIELD THERE THE WHOLE FIELD VIRTUALLY COLLAPSED AS PART OF AN UNDERGROUND NETWORK OF PREPARED DEFENSES.

Q: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, IF YOU EXTEND THE LOGIC OF WHAT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT AS WELL HAVE SAID, NAMELY THAT THE SANCTUARIES

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N CAMBODIA ARE A THREAT TO AMERICAN MEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM, ISN'T THE MAIN SANCTUARY IN NORTH VIETNAM, AND DOESN'T IT ARGUE FOR, AT ONE POINT, EITHER RESUMING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM OR DOING SOMETHING ABOUT WHAT THE PRESIDENT CALLED "THE REAL HEART OF THE TROUBLE"?

PAGE 5 -- AGNEW

A: LET ME MAKE A VERY IMPORTANT DISTINCTION IN THAT RESPECT: THE DMZ, THE BORDER BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, IS A VERY SHORT BORDER. IT IS CAPABLE MILITARILY OF BEING DEFENDED WITHOUT A GREAT AMOUNT OF EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO WILL HAVE TO DEFEND IT IN THE FUTURE. BUT THE SANCTUARIES THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT COVER A CONSIDERABLE FRONTAGE AND AT ONE PLACE, AT THE PARROT'S BEAK, AS YOU KNOW, THEY ARE A SCANT THIRTY-FIVE MILES FROM SAIGON, SO YOU CANNOT COMPARE THE THREAT FROM ABOVE THE NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER WITH THE THREAT THAT EXISTS TO THE MOST HEAVILY POPULATED PART OF VIETNAM WHICH IS, OF COURSE, IN THE SOUTHERN AREA, AROUND SAIGON AND TO THE SOUTH.

Q: COULD I ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT THE PARROT'S BEAK. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE TAKEN OVER THE DEFENSE OF THEIR COUNTRY, CONFRONTING THE PARROT'S BEAK AS WELL AS OTHER CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES. NOW, SINCE VIETNAMIZATION HAS GONE SO WELL, ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATION, WHY DID WE HAVE TO USE AMERICAN TROOPS, WHY DID WE NOT USE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE WHOLE OF THIS SANCTUARY OPERATION?

PAGE 6 -- AGNEW

A: IT BECAME A QUESTION OF THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT OFFENSIVES IN THESE SANCTUARIES OF A MAGNITUDE THAT WOULD MAKE THEM PREEMPTIVELY SUCCESSFUL. AND, OF COURSE, THE UTILIZATION OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE PARROT'S BEAK WAS A HEAVY ONE WITH, - 87,3345-, \$ 85, Q

RETA REPTING LINE

AS I UNDERSTAND IT, QUITE AN ELLITE GROUP OF TROOPS BEING EMPLOYED. THE AMERICAN TROOPS GOING INTO COSVN (NORTH VIETNAM'S CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM) HEADQUARTERS, OF COURSE, WERE ALSO SOME OF OUR FINEST MEN. THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHT WAS THAT WE MUST SUCCEED IN THESE OPERATIONS FROM A POINT OF TIME AND OVERWHELMING STRENGTH IN ORDER TO KEEP THE CASUALTY RATE DOWN. THE MISTAKES IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN TO SOME EXTENT THE FACT THAT, IN EMPLOYING OUR FORCES, WE HAVE ALWAYS UTILIZED THEM IN SEGMENTS AND FRACTIONS TO MEET THE BARE MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH WERE CONSTANTLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. THE PRESIDENT DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE THAT MISTAKE HERE.

Q: I GOT SOMEHOW THE IMPRESSION FROM YOU THAT YOU FELT THAT THE ENEMY COULD NOT RPT NOT MOVE OUT OF THIS AREA AS WE MOVED IN. YET WE HAVE HEARD FROM CBS NEWSMEN WHO HAVE INTERVIEWED PRISONERS ON THE SPOT THAT THEY HAD 48 HOURS' WARNING AHEAD OF TIME, AND SO FAR AS WE HAVE MOVED IN THEY SEEM TO HAVE MOVED OUT AHEAD OF US.

A: I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE UNDERSTOOD WHAT I SAID. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE ENEMY IN TERMS OF MEN, OF INDIVIDUALS.

PAGE 7 -- AGNEW

WE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN THAT THE COSVN HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN HIGHLY MOBILE. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THEIR SECURITY PREPARATIONS, THEY MOVE WHETHER THEY ARE THREATENED OR NOT. THEY CONSTANTLY MOVE FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION, BUT THEY CANNOT MOVE THESE FACILITIES, SUCH AS HOSPITALS AND THE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AND THE DUMPS FOR THE MUNITIONS AND, OF COURSE, OTHER SUPPLIES. WE DID CAPTURE A CONSIDERABLE BATCH OF UNIFORMS, FRESHLY LAUNDERED,

YESTERDAY, WHICH WERE PART OF A LAUNDRY OPERATION THERE. SO, YOU SEE, WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO GET AT IS FACILITIES, NOT MEN. WE ARE TRYING TO DESTROY THE CAPABILITY, THE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO MOUNT OFFENSIVE INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

Q: BUT WHAT YOU ALSO TALKED ABOUT WAS CUTTING THIS NEW LINE THAT THEY HOPED TO MAKE FROM NEW SEAPORTS, PRESUMABLY, SINCE SIHANOUKVILE IS NOW SEEMINGLY OUT OF THEIR REACH, NEW COMMUNICATIONS LINES FROM NEW SEAPORTS TO THIS AREA. NOW, IF WE DON'T STAY IN, HOW DO WE CUT THOSE LINES AND KEEP THEM CUT?

A: I DIDN'T SAY A WORD ABOUT CUTTING LINES TO SEAPORTS. ALL I SAID WAS THAT THE NEED TO GO INTO THE SANCTUARIES AND DESTROY THEM CAME ABOUT BECAUSE THEY WERE SUPPLYING AND ENLARGING AND STABILIZING THE SANCTUARIES BECAUSE OF THE NEW LINES YOU MENTIONED. WE SEE NO NECESSITY TO GO IN AND CUT THESE LINES, IF WE CAN DESTROY THE SANCTUARIES THEMSELVES.

PAGE 8 -- AGNEW

Q: DO YOU THINK THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE?

A: WHERE ARE THEY GOING TO BRING THEM? THERE WON'T BE ANYTHING LEFT TO BRING THEM TO, IF WE DESTROY THEIR UNDERGROUND NETWORK.

Q: HOW ARE YOU GOING TO DESTROY IT? THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN RUNNING SWEEPS THROUGH WAR ZONE C RPT C SINCE I WAS THERE, WHICH IS OVER THREE YEARS AGO, A SERIES OF OPERATIONS THAT WERE ALL GOING TO WIPE THIS AREA OUT, AND WE ARE STILL DOING IT. WAR ZONE C RPT C IS STILL A WORKABLE AREA.

A: YOU POINT UP ANOTHER DISTINCTION, THE REASON WHY WE HAVEN'T DISCOVERED OR DONE ANYTHING MUCH ABOUT ELIMINATING THESE INSTALLATIONS IS BECAUSE ALL WE HAVE DONE SO FAR IS SWEEP. YOU CAN'T DO THIS WITH A SWEEP. OUR TROOPS ARE MOVING IN, WE ARE SWEEPING, WE ARE THEN GOING TO CONSOLIDATE OUR POSITIONS AND PROVIDE FOR OUR OWN SECURITY, AND THE LATTER DAYS OF THIS OPERATION WILL BE DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO A SEARCH AND DESTRUCTION OF THESE INSTALLATIONS. WE HAVE NEVER DONE THAT BEFORE.

Q: WE HAVE DONE IT REPEATEDLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO USE THE AREA.

A: WE HAVE NEVER ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY A HEADQUARTERS OR A MAJOR INSTALLATION SUCH AS THIS.

Q: IF YOU GO BACK, YOU WILL FIND THAT WE TOOK BULLDOZERS INTO AREAS THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE USING IN THE SOUTH.

A: BUT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESTROYING A FEW BUNKERS AND INSTALLATIONS OF A FIGHTING OUTFIT AND DESTROYING A MAJOR HEADQUARTERS THAT RELATES ALMOST IN MAGNITUDE TO AN ARMY GROUP OR EVEN LARGER.

PAGE 9 -- AGNEW

Q: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT SPOKE THE OTHER NIGHT ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR THE UNITED STATES PROVING THAT IT IS NOT A PITIFUL HELPLESS GIANT, I THINK, TO USE HIS WORDS. WHY DON'T WE STRIKE OUT TO WIN THIS WAR THEN?

A: BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAS EMBARKED ON A COURSE OF VIETNAMIZATION AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AND SEPARATION FROM THIS CONFLICT. WE KNOW WE CAN'T WIN A GROUND WAR IN ASIA. THAT IS PERFECTLY OBVIOUS. WE ALSO KNOW THAT VIETNAMIZATION IS THE PROPER COURSE TO PURSUE, TO DISINVOLVE AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN FROM THIS WAR AND, AT THE SAME TIME, PREVENTING THE CONSTINUED INCURSIONS OF THE COMMUNISTS INTO AREAS WHERE THE PEOPLE DON'T WANT THEM. NOW, I WOULD ASK YOU TO REVIEW IN YOUR OWN MIND THE INITIATIVES THAT HIS COUNTRY HAS TAKEN FOR PEACE. WE HAVE SAID TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, "WE WILL WITHDRAW OVER A TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD IF YOU WILL WITHDRAW AND LET THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY." SINCE 1969 WE HAVE REDUCED OUR BOMBING STRIKES IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY 20 PERCENT. WE HAVE MADE EVERY CONCEIVABLE INITIATIVE IN PARIS, TO BE REBUFFED BY THE COMMUNISTS. NOW, ALL WE HAVE TO DO AT THIS

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POINT, IN ORDER TO KEEP ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THEM TO NEGOTIATE FROM GOOD-FAITH, WHICH THEY OBVIOUSLY HAVEN'T DONE YET, IS TO CONTINUE OUR VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM SUCCESSFULLY SO THAT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY REALIZE THAT AFTER THE AMERICANS ARE GONE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WILL STILL STAND BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR GOALS OF AGGRESSION.

PAGE 10--AGNEW

Q: WHY SHOULD THEY COME TO PARIS AND NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY, MR. VICE PRESIDENT, IF WE HAVE ALREADY PROCLAIMED, AS THE PRESIDENT DID AGAIN THE OTHER NIGHT, THAT WE ARE WITHDRAWING FROM SOUTH VIETNAM? WHAT IS THE INDUCEMENT FOR THEM TO NEGOTIATE?

A: THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT ONLY NEGOTIATING WITH US, THEY ARE NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE GOING TO BE THERE A LONG TIME.

Q: DO YOU FEEL THAT THIS INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA TENDS TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM IS TURNING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTO A FIRST-RATE ARMY?

A: YES, I DO, AND I THINK IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT IN THE TIME WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM CAN MOVE AS FAST AS TO SUPPORT THE TYPE OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS COMMITTED TO. NOW, WE WILL ONLY HAVE ABOUT 284,000 TROOPS LEFT IN SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER NEXT SPRING'S WITHDRAWALS ALREADY ANNOUNCED HAVE TAKEN PLACE. IN THAT TIME, IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO HANDLE ITSELF, BUT NOT IF WE STAND STILL AND ALLOW THE ENEMY TO MASS FORCES ALONG THE SANCTUARIES WHERE HE CAN STRIKE WITHIN A FEW MILES AT WILL WITH GREAT FLEXIBILITY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. I WOULD LIKEN IT TO A SITUATION WHERE IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD THERE IS A KNOWN ARSONIST WHO IS ACCUMULATING FIREBOMBS ACROSS THE STREET FROM YOU. NOW, THE MERE FACT THAT HE HASN'T THROWN ONE IN YOUR HOUSE YET DOESN'T DIMINISH HIS CAPABILITY. WE ARE TRYING TO DIMINISH THAT CAPABILITY.

PAGE 11--AGNEW

Q: COULD I ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT PHNOM PENH -- IF I MAY. IF THE ENEMY DECIDES TO MOVE ON PHNOM PENH, THE CAPITAL OF CAMBODIA, HAS THE UNITED STATES UNDERTAKEN AN OBLIGATION TO DEFEND THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT NOW?

A: ABSOLUTELY NOT RPT NOT.

Q: WELL, IS THERE TO BE NO RPT NO PROGRAM OF CAMBODIANIZATION, AS THERE WAS A VIETNAMIZATION? HOW CAN WE LEAVE THE CAMBODIANS WITH THE VIETNAMESE, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FREE TO MOVE INTO THERE WITHOUT THE CAMBODIANS ARMED, EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND READY, AS WE HOPE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WILL BE?

A: WELL, WE HAVE NO RPT NO RESPONSIBILITY TO THE CAMBODIANS. THE CAMBODIANS ARE ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST THE ASSISTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS. THEY HAVE APPEALED TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ASKING THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SOVIET RUSSIA TO HAVE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION COME AGAIN INTO THE AREA AND TO INDOCHINA TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT, BUT THE RUSSIANS HAVE VETOED AND INDICATED THAT THEY WILL VETO SUCH A MOVE. AND THE INDIANS, WHO ARE PRESENTLY THE HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION, ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WITHOUT SOVIET APPROVAL.

Q: WE HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY TO CAMBODIA, YOU FEEL, OF ANY KIND, MORAL OR OTHERWISE, OR MILITARY, STRATEGIC, AS THE FLANK OF SOUTH VIETNAM?

PAGE 12--AGNEW

A: AS FAR AS THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN

VIETNAM IS CONCERNED, OUR EMPHASIS AND THRUST IS TO PROTECT THAT FLANK SO THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM CAN GO FORWARD AND THAT AMERICANS CAN DISENGAGE FROM VIETNAM AND COME HOME.

Q: WELL, WE ARE OCCUPYING PIECES OF CAMBODIA AND OBVIOUSLY HAVE SOME RESPONSIBILITY --

A: WE ARE NOT OCCUPYING ANY PART OF CAMBODIA. THERE IS NO OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA ENVISAGED OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED IN THIS OPERATION.

Q: WELL, THE ADMINISTRATION IS TALKING ABOUT, WHAT, TWO MONTHS, TEN WEEKS?

A: EIGHT WEEKS WAS THE OUTSIDE LIMIT THAT WAS DISCUSSED, AS THE TIME NECESSARY TO DESTROY THESE INSTALLATIONS. I DON'T THINK YOU CAN CHARACTERIZE THAT AS AN OCCUPATION.

Q: BUT MY POINT, SIR, IS THAT IF WE LEAVE THE CAMBODIANS WITH THEIR SMALL ARMY, WITH THEIR SCATTERED WEAPONS, CANNOT AND WILL NOT RPT NOT INEVITABLY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGAIN AND AGAIN COME DOWN, HOWEVER SLOWLY THEY MUST, INTO THIS AREA?

A: I THINK I CAN ANSWER THAT BY SAYING THAT WE HAVE GOT A RATHER AMBITIOUS IDEA OF WHAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE CAPABLE OF. THEY HAVE ABOUT 67,000 TROOPS IN LAOS RIGHT NOW. THEY HAVE 48,000 TROOPS IN CAMBODIA. THEY ARE TRYING TO FIGHT A WAR IN VIETNAM. THEY HAVE BEEN IN A WAR FOR YEARS AND YEARS AND YEARS AND THEY ARE QUITE DEBILITATED AND DECINATED, AND I DON'T THINK THEY ARE CAPABLE WITH ANY KIND OF RESISTANCE OF CONTINUING THIS FIGHT. NOW, I ASSUME THAT THE CAMBODIANS WILL TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT THEIR COUNTRY. THEY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD.

PAGE 13 -- AGNEW

Q: YOU WILL PARDON MY SAYING SO, SIR, AND WHILE I AM SURE YOU HAVE MORE FACTS AT YOUR FINGERTIPS THAN I HAVE, I HAVE HEARD THAT STATEMENT LIKE EVERY YEAR OR EVERY TWO YEARS FOR THE PAST SIX YEARS, AND IT HAS NEVER TURNED OUT TO BE QUITE AS TRUE AS WE HAD HOPED. THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE NEVER TURNED OUT TO BE AS WEAK AS WE HAD WANTED THEM TO BE.

A: WELL, YOU WOULD ADMIT, I BELIEVE, THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DIMINUTION IN THEIR CAPABILITY AND IN THEIR ACTIVITY IN RECENT YEARS.

Q: YOU MEAN LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

A: YES, EXACTLY.

Q: MR. VICE PRESIDENT, YOU SUGGESTED EARLIER THAT NOTHING CAN PREVENT THAT WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM AND THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM, AS WE KNOW IT. WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE IS SOME STIFF RESISTANCE NOW ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA AND THERE ARE NEEDED THERE RESERVES OF AMERICAN TROOPS? AS WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, THEY WILL BE SENT IN IF NEEDED. DOES THAT NOT RPT NOT JIMMY THE TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL? DOES THAT NOT RPT REQUIRE PERHAPS MORE TROOPS?

A: WE HAVE NEVER SAID THAT WE WOULD SEND TROOPS INTO CAMBODIA. I DON'T KNOW WHERE YOU GOT THAT IDEA.

Q: I MEAN INTO THE SANCTUARIES. I AM SORRY.

A: IF YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THIS LIMITED OPERATION, YES, WE HAVE OTHER TROOPS ON STANDBY THAT CAN BE SENT IN THERE BECAUSE, AS I EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE TO AN EARLY QUESTION, WE DON'T INTEND TO TAKE FOREVER TO COMPLETE THIS OPERATION AND WE ARE GOING TO SEND WHAT FORCE IS NECESSARY TO DO IT.  
(END EXCERPTS) ITEM

AF-12

CORRECTION WF 11 (U.S. SEEKS) (90)

PAGE TWO, FOURTH GRAF, MAKE IT XXX THAT YOU ARE REFERRING TO FIT XXX.

PAGE NINE, MAKE END OF FIRST GRAF READ XXX WIN THIS WAR THEN REPT THAN? XXX.

- 13 -

PAGE TEN, FOURTH GRAF, FOURTH LINE, MAKE IT XXX THE PRESIDENT  
IS COMMITTED XXX.

PAGE 11, THIRD GRAF, THIRD LINE, MAKE IT XXX THE NORTH VIETNAMESE,  
FREE TO XXX (INSERTING COMMA).

PAGE 13, FIFTH LINE, MAKE IT XXX HAD HOPED. THE NORTH  
VIETNAMESE XXX.

SAME PAGE, FIFTH GRAF, SECOND LINE, MAKE IT XXX CAN  
PREVENT THE WITHDRAWAL XXX. ITEM

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