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Directive, March 27, 1970,
signed "Chin Vinh" (no further
identification, tone suggests
"Chin Vinh" a senior officer
or political officer in SVNLA)

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D I R E C T I V E

Guidance on some specific points concerning relations
between K [possibly Cambodian] officers and us.

After hearing the declaration of S [possibly Sihanouk], K
officers in several places wanted to contact us. All areas are
to use all possible means to contact these officers immediately
if they have not yet come to contact us. We must boldly contact
them by assigning personnel who know them to establish contact
with them or sending cadre who know them to infiltrate their
areas in order to meet them and find out their intentions. The
following instructions must be observed:

1. Regarding all K [Cambodian] officers in general, if they
support Prince S, we should advise them to:

- a. Thoroughly maintain secrecy.
- b. Get a firm hold of the trustworthy personnel.
- c. Urgently stock food provisions and ammunition.
- d. Secretly maintain regular contacts with us.
- e. Prepare an [alternate] base area for emergencies.

2. Regarding those officers who do not have or who have
very few (less than one company troops), in addition to the above
recommendations, we should also advise them to sound out their
superiors and friends, to gather more forces through motivation
and propaganda, and to maintain secret contacts with us.

3. As for those officers who control a large force of batta-
lion size or larger, we should advise them to:

a. Get a firm hold of their subordinate forces. Pay attention to making their subordinate officers and soldiers understand the situation, support the five-point declaration of S and unite to fight the Americans and their lackeys for independence and neutrality. Officers should take good care of their soldiers.

b. Extend their influence over other friendly units, win the sympathy of their superiors and that of administrative personnel of all echelons, propagandize and instigate the people to participate in demonstrations against Lon Nol, as was done in Kompong Cham and Mimot.

c. Remain in their positions, do not transfer the command of their units to anybody else, do not let the forces under their command be moved away by higher authorities, and be determined to suppress the US lackeys who have infiltrated their units and their area of responsibility. If under heavy pressure act boldly by declaring a secession, staging a localized coup d'etat and organizing their resistance.

d. Encourage and assure them that we stand behind them and support their action.

4. With regard to other officers who have powerful troops and area of influence, such as officers in charge of a province or a military region, if they dare rise up and declare their opposition to the US lackeys, we should encourage and wholeheartedly support them in this action. We should look for means of coordinating our activities with theirs.

5. While contacting them, we should pay attention to upholding and promoting their spirit of self-help for self-improvement. We should point out to them that their duty is to save their country. As for us, out of friendship for the two peoples and out of friendship of S., we are ready to provide them with every assistance, including cadre and armed forces. During the conversation, we should discreetly find out their attitude toward the Red K [possibly Cambodian communists].

27 Mar 70

Chin Vinh