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Notebook entries, August to  
September 1969 by a cadre of  
J-12 Section (possibly Border  
Area Office, Political Staff  
Department, Headquarters  
SVNLA)

8/69

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1. Importance of border areas: The border between Cambodia and Vietnam is 930 kilometers long. The areas along it constitute a rear area which directly influences the resistance war in South Vietnam. Supplies and weapons are brought through this area.

2. Characteristics: Through these areas we could establish contact with the world and the great rear area. For this reason, the U.S. and puppets are striving to cut us completely from Cambodia.

#### I. SCHEMES

1. The U.S. and Puppets are trying to isolate the South Vietnam Revolution. The U.S. has poured in money to bribe the Cambodian Government in order to control the border areas and drive us out.

To achieve their purpose, they have sent out spies from SVN and Cambodia to the border areas. These spies, (from South Vietnam) composed of Special Forces, commandos, and reconnaissance agents are disguised as cadre and Liberation troops, wearing same uniforms, and carrying the same equipments as the Liberation troops.

The spies who came from Cambodia mingled with the people under the pretense of visiting their relatives or doing business [or enlisting in our ranks]. They inquired about our bases and storage facilities and then sent either Special Forces or B-52 bombers to attack us.

In short, what the Cambodians knew, they reported to the U.S. and Puppet troops who then used air and artillery to attack us in the border areas. (The U.S. troops launched the following attacks in the border areas.)

Attacked our base areas in March 69.  
Attacked Areas 50 and 71 in May 69.  
Attacked Area 91 in August 69.

Recently, they attacked Sau Ro's area, eight kilometers inside the Cambodian territory.

2. They kidnapped our personnel, seized the documents then either killed or released the victims. They claimed that the victims were arrested by the Cambodian authorities, in reality, they seized the documents which they sold to the Americans who then used the information to launch heliborne troops to attack our border area.

The ultra-rightists constantly criticized the Cambodian [Government]. They said that the B-52's attacked Cambodian territory because Cambodia harbored the "Viet Cong."

The enemy is trying to win Cambodia's sympathy in order to control the border areas.

He is attempting to destroy our rear area, our support area and create dissensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples.

He criticized the Cambodian people and Government and those who support us.

In conclusion, the border area is a very important area which we are striving to secure in order to protect our agencies and forces which are located there to support the battlefield.

## II. THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT CONSISTS OF THREE TYPES OF MEMBERS

1. The rightist faction: This faction consists of people with narrow-minded nationalism. They always seek to create dissension between the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples and push the Cambodian Government to cut all relations with us, to cease supporting us and stop all trade activities with us.

### 2. Ultra-Rightists:

This faction consists of totally pro-American individuals.

### 3. Neutral Faction:

This faction consists of those who have a progressive political tendency. They want to support us and maintain Cambodia's independence and neutrality.

Due to the confusing political situation in Cambodia and the diversity of factions within the Cambodian government, we have met many difficulties in our diplomatic relations with Cambodia from the Central down to the local levels.

#### The [Cambodian] Government's policy

1. The Cambodian Government still maintains diplomatic relations with us, because it knows that we have achieved great victories. They also know that we are strong and have a righteous cause, and for this reason, the world supports us. Cambodia will always be our neighbor. Therefore, it cannot break off relations with us.

Cambodia needs our support to resist the U.S. and Puppet [South Vietnam] aggression.

2. Cambodia intends to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. in order to receive economic aid because Cambodia is having economic difficulties:

Cambodia has lost crops in all areas of the country. The national budget has a deficit of four billion Riels [Cambodian currency, 55R = \$1.00 U.S.]

In addition, there are the negative and precarious aspects:

1. She is afraid that if we gain a complete victory, our Revolution will have an influence on the [Cambodian] Revolutionary movement and cause the Cambodian people to uprise.

What is the origin of the negative aspect? It originates from this country's feudalist and bourgeois regime. The bourgeois class rules Cambodia; it fears any type of bourgeois Revolution and has to take precautions.

However, Cambodian still needs to rely on our forces.

1. The Cambodians still rely on our forces because they fear that the U.S. will exert pressure on them. By relying on our forces, not only can they maintain their independence, but also have an opportunity to exert pressure on the U.S.
2. We are strong. We have a firm political standpoint and a good cause. We also have the support of Sihanouk which increases our prestige.
3. After we win victory, Cambodia will live side by side with our country, a peaceful country with a correct policy. For this reason, Cambodian cannot fail to support us.

Results obtained:

Cambodia failed to receive financial aid from the U.S. and to strengthen her weak economy. She finally realized that the Vietnamese and the socialist bloc, were her true friends. For instance, Cambodia has received a donation of four million metric tons [sic] from NVN, and 10 million metric tons [sic] from China. While we assisted her, we did not intervene in her internal affairs. As for the Americans, they would provide aid to Cambodia only if she met the following conditions:

1. Not allow the Viet Cong to station [their troops] on the [Cambodian] border.
2. Allow the U.S. to re-install an ambassador in Cambodia.
3. Allow the U.S. to establish an airline from Saigon to Bangkok, via Phnom Penh.

It is obvious that the U.S. assistance is conditional and a threat to Cambodia. Cambodia did not dare accept it.

III. OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CAMBODIA

Since our foreign policy is a correct one, the Cambodian Government promptly recognized the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and invited our government to visit Cambodia and received us warmly. The Cambodian Chief of State joined the

government of North Vietnam to mourn the death of Uncle [Ho Chi Minh]. He also invited our Prime Minister to visit Cambodia.

These are the good aspects of Cambodia.

Our position:

1. Our position is strong and our political stand is sound. This is clearly realized by the Cambodian Government.

2. We gained the sympathy of the Cambodian labor class. Therefore, we are required to observe the following points:

When encountering difficulties caused by the Khmer people, we should not be confused, but remain calm and believe in the Front. If we are captured [by the troops], we should display a firm political attitude, affirm our position and abstain from making irresponsible statements.

Conversely, if we meet favorable conditions, we should not lose our vigilance.

Our shortcomings:

1. We did not respect the [Cambodian] territorial integrity.

2. The messing, billeting, and movement regulations of our troops were not strictly observed. We fired carelessly and killed people and cattle. This adversely affects our influence upon the Khmer people.

3. Our soldiers were not courteous and did not display equality toward the Cambodian people in dealing with them.

They failed to live up to the code of the People's Army. In some areas, they either lowered the prestige of the revolutionary forces or revealed military secrets. They failed to understand the Cambodian people. They did not discriminate between friend and foe.

IV. [ANTICIPATION OF] THE FORTHCOMING  
SITUATION AND OUR MISSIONS:

Characteristics: The U.S. will sustain more failures on the SVN battlefield and will fail in its attempt at establishing its influence in Cambodia. This is why they will react more strongly, and will attack deep in the border areas to pressure Cambodia. They will try to sow division among Cambodian ranks and undermine the solidarity of Cambodia and our country. As for Cambodia, insurmountable difficulties will arise if she demands aid from the U.S.

Therefore, the border area situation will be more complicated in the near future.

Our mission:

Our chief mission is to continue to win Cambodia to our side for the benefit of our frontlines, our messing, and our billeting at the border.

Our required attitude:

1. We should firmly maintain the attitude of a man who is fighting for a just cause, and who is winning.
2. We should treat the Cambodians as our equals, we should be friendly but constantly vigilant.
3. In trying to win Cambodia to our side, we should consider the Cambodian population as our main objective and try to win their support.

All participants have displayed a correct attitude during the indoctrination course. [They were all serious and satisfied]. Everyone joined in the discussion.

Results obtained: They all realized the importance of the border area which is our direct rear area and also our base area. Before the indoctrination, they failed to understand this important point. They only thought that the Cambodians were hospitable people.

The U.S. and Cambodia's schemes:

Our personnel have realized that Cambodia cooperated with the U.S., and provided them with intelligence information. Concerning the espionage activities, they had thought that the enemy spies and Special Forces personnel only existed in SVN, while in Cambodia only Cambodian officers and soldiers could cause us difficulties. They failed to notice those persons who are disguised as traders, or people visiting their relatives. Due to the lack of vigilance, they did not keep an eye on the merchants or people who frequently want into the woods. They thought that the latter were woodsmen or smugglers, (but did not consider the possibility that they might be enemy spies coming from inside Cambodia).

Evaluation of the positive and negative of Cambodia.

The participants understood the nature and composition of the Cambodian Government, which displayed a negative attitude by maintaining diplomatic relations with us while re-establishing relations with the U.S.

Review of our past attitude:

We did not respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia and looked down on the Cambodian people. For instance, our messing, billeting, and movement have had adverse effects on the Cambodian people's standard of living.

Our personnel were afraid of only Cambodian officers who rode motorcycles, but [five words illegible].

They paid little regards to the Cambodian people.

They were inclined to impress the Cambodian people with their weapons and thought they could bribe them with money.

They have not made positive efforts to assist our [Cambodian] friends and promote solidarity [between our two people].

Confirming the class nature of the Cambodian people.

In the forthcoming missions we may meet [sic].

We should maintain a friendly attitude with them, but we must also observe the traditions and regulations of our army.

It will be possible for some of us to be arrested.

Our attitude should be: any statement we make should be in compliance with our policy and strategy.

We must also know that when the enemy does arrest us that we must call upon our revolutionary pride, and remain faithful to the Party and loyal to the people.

We will lose the virtue of the Revolutionary Army if we disclose any secrets.

We would rather die than reveal secrets. To persuade them of our good intentions, we should talk only about the friendship between the two peoples. (If they try to bribe us or buy us off, we must firmly maintain our revolutionary pride to make them admire us.)

The best measure is to heighten our vigilance under all circumstances.

Border [unit]

Presently, each unit has one set [of kitchen utensils]. It is requested that the utensils be increased by 50% so that they can entertain guests. The rear service needs the following items:

One cauldron for each units [sic units]

Seven cauldrons for the inter-unit.

Each cauldron should be large enough to cook rice for 12 people.

One machete for each unit.

One saw for each inter-unit.



Clothing for [Unit] 89. Since the beginning of this year, we have only received eight suits and 95 meters of nylon.

Allowance for administrative office and for reception of guests (August 69).

Allowance for repair of bicycles not issued (Sept. 69).