

De Gaulle.

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ee for the position. We are fortunate
our country to have many highly
qualified men who would accept will-
ingly this grueling responsibility as a
patriotic service and who would dis-
charge the duties superbly.

If some political considerations, not
related to defense, are put aside, a suc-
cessor could be selected promptly. Cer-
tainly the dismissal or resignation of
Secretary McNamara was not a sudden,
sur-of-the-moment move. Certainly his
successor must have been considered be-
fore Mr. McNamara's transfer to the
World Bank was approved by all of the
interested parties.

The new Secretary must be intimate-
ly familiar with the 1969 Department
of Defense budget now being prepared by
the administration. The preparation of
the budget is one of the most important
and crucial responsibilities of the Sec-
retary of Defense. The fiscal year 1969
budget is the essence of the Department
of Defense plans and operations for 1969.
The Department of Defense budget is the
largest in the Federal Government. The
Defense budget affects every American,
yes, even every inhabitant of our globe.

Because of our present fiscal crisis,
which also affects directly and adversely
every American citizen and most people
in the world, the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 1969 cannot be
sanct. The fiscal year 1969 budget of
the Department of Defense needs more
consideration, more attention, and more
scrutiny than any other part of our Fed-
eral budget.

The man in charge of the Department
ought to be thoroughly familiar with,
and intimately involved in, the prepara-
tion of his departmental budget. Unless
he is to be a simple "yes man" or figure-
head, he must be given an opportunity
for full participation in the preparation
of his budget. If he is to be effective, he
should not be forced by the tardiness of
his appointment to accept cold another
Secretary's budget.

Conversely, a lame duck Secretary
should not be permitted to impose his
views upon the new Secretary through
the device of preparing the budget with-
in which the new Secretary must work
for 18 months or more.

The budget is fundamental, the very
key, to all departmental action. The new
Secretary should not be excluded if we
are to expect satisfactory performance.

The necessity of the new Secretary
being knowledgeable about his Depart-
ment's budget is of special significance
to the Committee on Appropriations. I
can foresee the new Secretary appearing
before the committees of the Congress
and disclaiming sufficient knowledge to
testify in a manner and to the degree
necessary for the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees to ascertain
the facts necessary to evaluate properly
the budget requests. Such future frus-
tration can be obviated easily by the im-
mediate announcement of the new
Secretary.

If the new Secretary could be ap-
pointed now, he could start to acquaint
himself with the operation of the De-
partment. And we could still utilize the
services and knowledge of Secretary

McNamara until he assumes his bank-
ing duties.

The obstacles and responsibilities of
the new Secretary are too great to
handicap him at the starting blocks.

DE GAULLE'S DANGEROUS FOREIGN
POLICY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
ALBERT). Under previous order of the
House, the gentleman from Alabama
[Mr. SELDEN] is recognized for 30 min-
utes.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, last week,
for the 16th time in half as many years,
the President of the French Republic
shared his views of the international
scene with the world press. He took the
occasion to bar Britain once more from
Europe; to intensify his attack on the
international role of the dollar; to invite
French-Canadians to form a sovereign
state; and to distribute most of the
blame for the Middle East crisis to Israel
and the United States.

If any of us had any lingering doubts
as to what General de Gaulle's independ-
ent foreign policy is all about, they
should now be laid to rest. That policy
is one of implacable hostility toward the
United States; it is one of obstruction-
ism in Atlantic and European affairs; it
is one of cynically promoting distrust
among neighbors and instability abroad
when the interests of France seem to be
served thereby.

In my view, French foreign policy is
not just mischievous; it is increasingly
destructive and even in some respects
dangerous. It is time that we openly and
frankly labeled it as such. And it is also
time to shed any illusions that if we only
altered our own policies in this or that
respect, if we only admitted that we were
wrong and the French were right in vari-
ous past disputes, General de Gaulle
would somehow change his nature and
become more cooperative, or indeed
change his views and participate in the
building of a harmonious Atlantic com-
munity.

Mr. Speaker, like many of my col-
leagues, I have refrained until now from
speaking out on this subject, and for
what I think were good reasons. I respect
and admire the French people; and I
respect and admire the leadership Gen-
eral de Gaulle has provided them at dif-
ficult times during their history. By
assuming power in 1958, he quite pos-
sibly saved France from a disastrous civil
war while managing to bring the costly
and tragic Algerian conflict to an end.
Under his regime France has known an
unprecedented period of political and
economic stability. During the Berlin and
Cuban missile crises, his government
stood firmly by the side of the United
States and the other Western Allies.

Hence like others, Mr. Speaker, I have
been reluctant to conclude that General
de Gaulle had definitely chosen a path
of noncooperation and destructive dis-
sent in alliance and world affairs. I have
watched his actions in NATO and other
forums with growing apprehension. But
I have held my peace in the hope that
quiet, patient diplomacy could smooth
out some of the difficulties in Franco-

American relations. I have listened to
his nationalistic excesses with dismay,
but I have thought that others could
reply more effectively than ourselves.

The time has now come, however, for
Americans to talk back and to talk back
firmly and frankly. If we look at the rec-
ord, it becomes perfectly clear where
General de Gaulle stands and in what
direction he intends to lead France. It is
a mistake to think that we can afford to
sit back and wait until he disappears
from the scene and then all will be well.
It is even more of a mistake to think that
the damage he may do can be undone in
the future. Lest others falter for the lack
of our leadership, the first step toward
effectively countering his policies is to
make it crystal clear where we stand,
and what we think.

In the recent past General de Gaulle
has usually accompanied his most dis-
quieting announcements with the sooth-
ing words that France remains the ally of
her allies and the friend of her friends.
But judging by France's recent record of
cooperation in any number of areas, I can
only conclude that this is a strange ally,
and a still stranger friend.

There is no need for me to review the
successive steps De Gaulle took between
1958 and 1966 to disengage France from
military cooperation in NATO. I think all
of us continued to hope that with some
good will on the part of France, and per-
haps some greater flexibility and under-
standing on our part, France's grievances
within the Alliance could be assuaged.
That hope was shattered last year when
France abruptly withdrew her ground
forces from NATO command and ousted
allied military headquarters and United
States and other allied forces from
French soil. The move from France and
the building of new installations in other
locations have cost the United States and
other NATO countries hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. There is no certainty that
French soil, French airspace, or French
forces will be available to the Alliance in
a time of tension or armed conflict. Mil-
itary authorities are unanimous in con-
cluding that NATO's military posture has
been weakened, and that communica-
tions between NATO's northern and cen-
tral sectors and NATO's southern sectors
have become dangerously uncertain.

Is there not ample reason to ask, Mr.
Speaker, what kind of ally it is that
continues to accept the benefits of alli-
ance while withdrawing from the mili-
tary organization that makes that
alliance effective? Are we going to agree
to the proposition that an ally can ac-
cept or reject at whim the obligations
that alliance imposes? For example, are
we really going to welcome French par-
ticipation in the building of an advance
early warning and communications sys-
tem that clearly benefits France, and at
the same time acquiesce in the with-
drawal of French air defense units that
should be supporting that system for the
benefit of all?

Last year General de Gaulle and vari-
ous of his followers assured us that the
Atlantic Alliance continued to be neces-
sary. Last month we learned that Soviet
paratroops and a high Soviet military
official had visited French military in-

installations as part of some ill-defined exchange program. Last week it was reported that the French Chief of Staff had written an article in which he discounted the value of alliances, and advocated the building of a French nuclear deterrent force capable of meeting a threat not just from the East but from any area of the world.

Need I remind my colleagues that at the same time the Soviet Union has increased its defense budget by 15 percent, that it has acknowledged the development of a fractional orbiting bombardment system, that it is building antimissile defenses around its major cities, that it has significantly increased its naval presence in the Mediterranean, that it is supporting the training and equipment of Warsaw Pact forces at levels that are not being matched by NATO forces? In these circumstances I think that we should ask ourselves whether the ultimate security of our country and the free world can rely even in small part on an uncertain, erratic ally.

Last year, Mr. Speaker, France expressed its disinterest in further participation in NATO's integrated military organization. This year France is resisting any reformulation and updating of the Alliance's political purposes. Indeed, it now seems likely that French objections will bring to nothing the so-called Harmel exercise—a study of NATO's future role and tasks initiated last year by Belgium's foreign minister. If France were a full-fledged participating member of the Alliance, her veto in such affairs would be acceptable. But France by her own choice is no longer a full-fledged participating member of the Alliance. And it seems more than likely that she will opt out completely within the next few years. I fail to see why, in these circumstances, we should continue to give France a veto over the future development of the Alliance and why we should continue to bow to the whims of General de Gaulle when it probably will not alter his policies by one iota and will leave us with no policy at all.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot force France to remain a loyal member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Nor can we, on this side of the Atlantic, force France or the other European countries to accept Britain as a member of the Common Market. We can, however, point clearly to the dangers inherent in the course General de Gaulle has chosen to follow. The fabric of European and Atlantic cooperation has been seriously strained by the assaults of General de Gaulle. Yet, continued and improved European and Atlantic ties remain vital to the security and stability of Western Europe and of the whole free world.

History notes—though General de Gaulle seems to forget—that American, British, and Canadian troops freed Europe of the Nazi yoke during World War II. They have remained only to insure that Soviet power would not expand into Western Europe. Now General de Gaulle, ignoring the lessons of 20th century history, is daring them to leave while Soviet power remains arrayed in full force in the heart of central Europe. The danger is that he just might succeed. The British

have taken a firm and long-awaited step toward Europe. But there is surely a limit to how many times the British people will accept the humiliation of being told in the most arbitrary fashion that they are unworthy. Americans, by their sacrifice and commitment in the past half-century, have vowed a break with isolationist policies. But Americans also may tire of hearing the Gaullist line that they have no role to play in a European settlement and that the burdens they have carried and still bear on behalf of Europe are assumed only to preserve American influence in Europe.

Just suppose, Mr. Speaker, that we accept General de Gaulle's theory that Soviet intentions in Europe are and will remain all sweetness and light for the foreseeable future. Does French foreign policy in Europe thereby take on a more positive aspect? I think not. By loudly vaunting the virtues of independence, General de Gaulle has invited others to follow suit. By berating West Germans and other Europeans for their close ties with the United States, he has fostered a divisive tug-of-war between Atlantic and European loyalties. By arrogantly assuming that what is good for France is good for Europe, by acting as if the voice of De Gaulle were the voice of Europe, he has impeded that coordination of European policies that he pretends to seek. By headlong pursuit of close relations with the Soviet Union, he has aroused fears among Germans that some kind of tacit alliance is being formed against them.

One may sympathize with General de Gaulle's ultimate vision of a technologically advanced, strong, reunited, and peaceful Europe in the affairs of which neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has a dominant voice. But it is baffling to contemplate the building of such a Europe without Britain. And the danger should be faced squarely that, by impatiently forcing the pace of change, General de Gaulle is sowing seeds of discord and distrust that could reap bitter fruit indeed.

But perhaps I am being too harsh, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps there are some realms, some areas of the world where we can commend current French foreign policy. International monetary cooperation, for example? Or what about United Nations peacekeeping, or the work of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference? Latin America? The Middle East perhaps, or Southeast Asia?

But what do we find but an empty chair for France at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, still another empty chair for France in SEATO, and a still warm but empty chair for France in the London Gold Pool. If we look at the U.N., we find some unpaid assessments for U.N. peacekeeping activities. In the Middle East we discover that strict neutrality in word and deed really means a blatantly opportunistic stance. As in other areas of the world, General de Gaulle has acted on the cynical assumption that others would stand in the breach if need be while France pursued her own independent course of enlightened self-interest.

As chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, I am, of

course, especially interested in the list intrusion into our hemisphere. Latin America we can recall General de Gaulle's much publicized 1964 visit, during which he predictably urged Americans to seek their independence from the power to the north. But his visit with his audiences was not over, and some leaders he visited him for his friendly advice. Moreover, the French Government has only taken no steps to cut off such heavy equipment as earthmoving machinery, trucks, and sugar-processing machinery to Castro's Cuba, it has provided government backing for the finance these exports. We can conclude that the French Government is either oblivious to the far-reaching effects of Castro's guerrillas or looks favorably on the mischief they cause by the diversion of resources from the effort to counterinsurgency efforts.

And what of Vietnam? Irony of fate, one of the first steps in the agony of Vietnam was taken in 1954 when General de Gaulle's provisional government moved to regain French control in Indochina. But today the French are creating conditions that led to the present U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia. Somehow General de Gaulle finds it equitable to fulminate against so-called U.S. aggression against Vietnam, while omitting any reference to Vietcong terrorism and the North Vietnamese regulars in Vietnam. General de Gaulle has for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. But, typically, he has not told us what power is going to create the conditions prerequisite to neutralization, and what power is going to enforce that.

Mr. Speaker, the record I have viewed is scarcely reassuring. Perhaps most disturbing of all is General de Gaulle's recently renewed attack on the dollar, and what I can only call Canadian folly. I do not think the dollar is going to fall under the influence of De Gaulle, or that the Canadian position is about to break up as a result of a siren song to French Canadians. In both instances De Gaulle's policies assumed a new dimension of irresponsibility; in both instances the policies used to condemn America as a power is more categorical than even in both instances there was and is but real danger of unleashing untrollable forces that would in one case severely disrupt the world economy and in the other case bring tragedy and bloodshed to the peaceful and quiet nation that lies to our north.

The spectacle of the French Government, who is ultrasensitive on the subject of the sovereign independence of its own country, urging the French Canadians to form an independent state to join a worldwide French crusade against American power is quite preposterous.

I might add, Mr. Speaker, that the friends of France have ample reason to doubt whether De Gaulle has laid a foundation for stable democratic government in France when he departs from the scene. But most of them act on the assumption that this is a problem for French people to solve and in which

should seek to have no say. Needless to say, the political problems of the sovereign state of Canada are ones for Canadians to solve and in which the French Government has no right to intervene. Nor is France's own record of political stability such as to warrant its president's gratuitously advising other nations regarding their governmental systems.

The same holds true, Mr. Speaker, for the monetary and fiscal policies followed by the United States and the measures adopted to remedy the U.S. balance-of-payments situation. These policies are certainly devised with an eye to their international effects and are the subject of discussion in appropriate international forums. But they are not matters in which General de Gaulle or his financial officials have any right to intervene. Yet, intervention is basically what they have been up to for a number of years. The French have refused to contemplate any major overhaul of the international monetary system until the U.S. deficit is removed. They have systematically converted their surplus dollars into gold to the tune of over \$2 billion worth being moved not merely from one vault to another in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York but from New York to Paris.

What else is this but a bald attempt to pressure the U.S. Government into supporting some antediluvian ideas on the price of gold and the gold standard? Similarly, what else is the oft-repeated charge that the United States is exporting inflated dollars to Europe and following a deliberate policy of takeover in respect to European firms but an attempt to get the United States to adopt restrictive policies to alleviate what are basically French and European problems. Dollars do not flow to areas where they are not wanted and needed. If the French Government wants to keep dollars and U.S. firms out of France, it certainly has the means to do so. It would surely not be inappropriate to suggest to the present French Government that it concentrate on its own problems before it tries to put in order other people's fiscal houses.

Mr. Speaker, I have tried to say what has weighed heavily on my mind without rancor toward General de Gaulle. But it is difficult not to feel resentment when much of what is evil or disagreeable in the world is labeled of American origin and when the differences that are normal among friends and allies are purveyed for world consumption in terms of systematic hostility. More important, however, are the points I made in my opening remarks. I think that the time has come to discuss fully and frankly the dangers to the security of the free world that lie on the solitary path along which De Gaulle has chosen to lead the great nation of France. I think that such a discussion would serve to clarify and firm up our policies toward France in any number of forums. Above all, I think that such a discussion would clear the air of illusions that, if we somehow reformed our ways, according to General de Gaulle's edicts, he would reform his.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to congratulate the distinguished gentleman from Alabama for a masterful compilation of facts and of logic against that man De Gaulle. General de Gaulle is the most ungrateful man since Judas Iscariot betrayed his Christ 2,000 years ago.

Mr. Speaker, I have proposed to the Armed Services Committee that we seriously bring to the attention of the House of Representatives that every single American soldier interred in that great ungrateful soil of France be brought home regardless of the cost. The Secretary of Defense has opposed this. I believe we should do this, and then let those gaping holes be a constant reminder to that nation—a nation whom we have snatched from the jaws of disaster in two World Wars—that they are no longer our friends, but our enemies.

This man De Gaulle is not our ally. He has declared war on this country. It is time we should declare war on him. The best way to do it, Mr. Speaker, is to hit him in his pocketbook and deny him this gold.

Moreover, Mr. Speaker, we should consider selling our wheat in the world market and in Europe below their cost. That is a way to bring this man De Gaulle to his knees.

Mr. Speaker, this man De Gaulle has gone to Vietnam and fought this country.

The gentleman in the well, Mr. SELDEN, is performing a great service. We should no longer turn our cheek to this man De Gaulle. There is an old saying back home where I come from, Mr. Speaker, that "there is no education in the second kick from a mule." This man De Gaulle has kicked us too many times, Mr. Speaker, and it is time for this Nation to start kicking back.

Again I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SELDEN. I thank my colleague the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who is always forceful and to the point.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I carry no torch for President de Gaulle of France, but let me say that he does what he conceives to be in the best interests of France. I have wished many, many times that we in the United States had a head of the government who put the interests of the United States before those of some foreign governments.

I would further say to the gentleman from Alabama that, while we are discussing De Gaulle, we might well turn our attention to the perfidious British.

It has been suggested that this country declare a form of financial and economic war upon France. I say that we

should take the same punitive action against the British. I do not know that France is running ships into Haiphong with supplies for the Communist North Vietnamese. I see no long line of ships from France in any of the listings out of the Defense Department or any other agency of this government indicating that the French are sending their ships into Haiphong. So I say that, while we are castigating the President of France, let us at the same time say to the British "Pay up your debts to this country." As long as the British continue to supply our enemies, let us wage economic and financial warfare evenhandedly and across the board.

Mr. SELDEN. While I do not condone British trade either with Vietnam or Cuba, I might say to the gentleman from Iowa that the French Government has taken no steps to cut off exports of heavy equipment such as earth-moving machinery, trucks and sugar-producing machinery, to Castro's Cuba. As a matter of fact, the French Government has even provided government backing for credit to finance these exports.

Mr. GROSS. Neither have the British cut off trade with Cuba.

Mr. SELDEN. Yes, the British also are still trading with Cuba.

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mr. SELDEN. Which I do not condone. Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I want to congratulate the distinguished gentleman from Alabama for this very, very important speech he has delivered here today and for the great service he has rendered not only to the United States but also to the cause of freedom throughout the world.

I agree with the gentleman that it is high time those of us in responsible positions in this Government ought to take public notice of the scandalous behavior of General de Gaulle.

In this Member's judgment, the last press conference he held clearly indicated to this Member that De Gaulle is a sick man. His attacks on the United States, his attacks on England, his attacks on Canada, his attacks on the efforts of England to become a member of the Common Market, his anti-Semitic outbursts all indicate that here is a man who has lost all sense of perspective and all sense of judgment.

He may think he can walk on water, but I do not think he can. I do not believe many other people think he can.

He may think he is indestructible, but I do not think he is indestructible.

A sad part of this whole era of De Gaulle's present drive to destroy the unity of the free world and his great threat to freedom, as the gentleman in the well quite properly pointed out, could be understood, perhaps, if he alone were doing these things, but the sad part of this whole episode is the ineffective opposition of responsible leaders of France, by sitting back idly and almost cowering under his irresponsible behavior.

While I do not want to inject myself into French politics as an American, among those who have contributed a great deal to the survival of France—a nation that was almost totally wiped off the map of the earth and could have been—this country and the American people made great sacrifices to preserve French independence, and it would seem to me that the French people, the French Parliament, the French press, have a responsibility. They cannot hide behind the towering De Gaulle and say, "We are helpless." They have the wherewithal to marshal the public opinion of the French Republic to show this demagog that he cannot get away with this indefinitely.

Where is the voice of the French people? Where is the voice of the French press? Where is the voice of the French Parliament? Where is the voice of the other leading spokesmen of France?

I say it is not enough for us just to stand here and say that De Gaulle is a sick man as we watch him on his reckless course to break up the unity of the free world.

I hope the French people are going to recognize the fact that, as one Member of this Chamber, I hold them just as responsible as this irresponsible leader of their country. If they want to take their place in the family of free and democratic nations then they as citizens have to assume the responsibility of making sure that De Gaulle realizes his nation is not behind him in this irresponsible course.

I might say that there is a flicker of hope, and perhaps a redeeming factor. I saw a report the other day which indicated public opinion polls are now beginning to reflect the disillusionment and complete contempt of a growing number of Frenchmen for this self-styled savior of the world. I hope that opportunity grows, and I hope that this man sooner than later is going to be isolated in his reckless mania to try to restructure the world into a pattern of his own grandiose thinking.

It is my hope that the message the gentleman delivered on this floor today is going to reach the French people, because in the final analysis they are going to be the final arbiters of his irresponsible conduct. I congratulate my colleague for the great contribution he made today.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the gentleman for a masterful exposition of the facts on our De Gaulle problem. For a while some people said I was conducting a one-man war against De Gaulle. I am happy that I am no longer a "lone wolf."

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding and congratulate my colleague for bringing this important topic to the attention of this body. I find much with which to agree in the comments that he made. However, I have two ques-

tions. Is it really unnatural for any proud nation such as France to seek to have its own means of defense; namely, nuclear weapons? I raise that question in the light of the long-standing U.S. policy which has not only looked with disfavor upon the development of nuclear forces by France but which has actively resisted this development. That is my first question. I have a second question. The gentleman mentioned the close relationship between France and the Soviet Union. This second question that I seek to raise has to do with the relationship of the French and the Soviet Union, which I deplore greatly. However, I wonder if it is really unnatural to see this development in the light of the long-standing U.S. effort to work out a treaty with the Soviet Union to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to any other nation which, in the eyes of Frenchmen, could well be directed against French interests. Here we are seeking a very intimate relationship with the Soviet Union which is essentially a bilateral deal. I am sure the gentleman from Alabama will agree with me that this will naturally cause some concern on the part of an ally like France.

Mr. SELDEN. I will be happy to respond to the gentleman. If he heard my entire statement, he knows that I made no criticism of French efforts to have a separate nuclear force. I did criticize them for being part of an alliance while, at the same time, doing a great deal to obstruct the alliance to which they are a party.

As far as preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is concerned, both the United States and Russia are anxious for France to be a party to any agreement that can be worked out. As a matter of fact, there is a chair provided for France at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva which France has chosen to leave vacant.

Mr. FINDLEY. I agree and I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

CONGRESSMAN CHAMBERLAIN URGES CLOSING MEKONG RIVER TO STOP CAMBODIAN "BACK- DOOR" AID TO VIETCONG

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HAGAN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to include extraneous matter and tables.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, as one who has been deeply concerned for some time about the role of Cambodia in the struggle in Vietnam, I have been following very closely the barrage of recent press reports detailing various ways in which this self-proclaimed neutral country serves as a sanctuary and a "back door" source of supply for Communist troops.

These revelations serve only to confirm once again what has appeared both in public as well as classified intelligence reports for the past 2 years or more and have prompted my efforts to endeavor to focus attention on this very serious problem. It is my hope that this new, wide-

spread interest in the press will now lead the administration to take more effective action to find some means to stop this aid and comfort to our enemy which is substantially helping to prolong the war.

Immediately upon my return from serving on a special House Armed Services Committee assignment to Vietnam in the spring of 1966, I expressed my conviction that something must be done to prod Cambodia to live up to its policy of "strict neutrality." On May 4, 1966 in remarks in the House citing reports after report of the nature and extent of the use of Cambodia by Vietcong and North Vietnamese units, I specifically urged that steps be taken to insure that ships entering South Vietnam from the South China Sea and following the course of the Mekong River as it meanders through the delta area to the Cambodian capital port city of Phnom Penh did not carry goods destined to be of help in any way to the enemies of South Vietnam. It was inconceivable to me that this busy avenue of commerce right through the South Vietnam's "rice bowl of the world" could in effect be tolerated as an artery of supply for the Vietcong just as the Ho Chi Minh trail is used in the north.

Despite persistent reports to the contrary, I was repeatedly assured by the State Department as late as November 15, 1966, that the problem really was not a serious one and that everything that could and needed to be done to contro this traffic was being done. Only 13 days later, on November 28, 1966, it was announced in Saigon that in order to stop the smuggling of guns and ammunition to the Vietcong, South Vietnamese gunboats were being deployed to escort all foreign ships traveling the Mekong River to reach Cambodia. Although this action was belated, it was an encouraging step for it admitted the existence of the problem that had theretofore been denied.

Still unanswered, however, was the question of doing something about the other forms of this "back door" aid. Consequently, I have continued to urge that the Mekong River be closed until such time as the Cambodian Chief of State Prince Sihanouk, lives up to his claim of "strict neutrality." A substantial part of Cambodia's seaborne trade travels the Mekong. During 1965 a total of 410 ships used this route. In 1966 such arrivals at Phnom Penh numbered 309 and through the first 8 months of 1967 the figure stands at 210. The very volume of this traffic suggests its importance to Cambodia.

Closing the Mekong would undoubtedly put strong pressure on the Cambodian economy which, in view of its involvement in supplying large quantities of rice among other things, to the Vietcong, where persuasive action is particularly needed. Such a move, I believe, would be fully within the provisions of the treaty governing this international waterway which provides that riparian states may take unilateral action to insure that river traffic does not threaten their general security. The open hostility of Cambodia toward the Saigon government would in itself justify such action.

Last June, Prince Sihanouk announced

Cambodia's decision to recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole and genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people in their heroic struggle against the U.S. invaders and their lackey," that is, until such time as the North Vietnamese had succeeded in uniting the country under Hanoi's control. A correspondent for the Washington Evening Star reported last week that:

The diplomatic missions of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong conceal machines for propaganda and infiltration aimed at turning Cambodia into a "third front" from which to fight the United States and Saigon government in South Vietnam.

Under these circumstances, there can be no serious question about the legality of closing the Mekong.

Nonetheless, it is apparently the policy of the State Department to do nothing because of the possibility of offending Sihanouk, on the assumption presumably that our inaction will somehow prompt him someday to return to the fold of the free world.

I seriously question, however, that it is wise to base our approach to this problem on this tenuous "prodigal son" assumption. It is frequently theorized that Sihanouk really may not know the extent to which his country is being used by the Vietcong. While, of course, he may not know where each and every VC encampment is, no knowledgeable person could possibly conclude that Sihanouk is as politically naive as some would have us believe. Based on such speculations our policy has not succeeded in changing the situation for the better in the last 2 years. No doubt Cambodia is faced by many difficulties, but so is South Vietnam. An allegedly neutral nation, which, through either acts of omission or commission, threatens the security of its neighbor should nonetheless be brought to account. Since January 1, 1966, over 13,000 Americans have been killed by an enemy which derives great and increasing advantages from Cambodian resources. In one battle alone recently at Dak To in which Communist troops entering South Vietnam from Cambodia were involved, the cost was 287 U.S. dead and 1,000 wounded. To anyone who continues to question the use of Cambodia by the enemy, I would simply cite a few of the many recent stories about the nature and extent of this backdoor aid. For instance Time magazine in its December 1, 1967, issue states in part:

The Communists have dotted Cambodia's 600-mile frontier along South Viet Nam with dozens of jungle encampments, of which at least five are classified by U.S. intelligence as major bases (see map). The network, which stretches from the marshlands of the Mekong Delta into the bloodied hills of the Central Highlands, is believed to support six regiments of North Vietnamese regulars as well as innumerable Viet Cong guerrillas—a total of up to 20,000 men who are kept busy raiding and reconnoitering along the border. A key base is tucked away in Cambodia's "Parrott's Beak," just 40 miles west of Saigon, which also harbors one of the several jungle hospitals established by the Communists.

Sihanouk Trail. According to the detailed picture that emerges from boxloads of intelligence reports in Saigon, the camps are used as training centers, supply storehouses and marshaling points for such large-scale

Communist operations as last month's attacks on Loc Ninh, which lies directly across from the two major bases, and the fighting at Dak To, which faces another base at the intersection with Laos.

Most of the heavy military equipment for the Communist troops continues to come down the pipeline from the North through Laos, but the Communists manage to fill most of their food and clothing needs within Cambodia itself. Under a procurement system involving the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh, the Communists buy up to 100,000 tons of Cambodian rice a year. Until the Cambodian army cut itself into the lucrative trade recently in order to raise money for Sihanouk's pet welfare programs, it was handled almost exclusively by Cambodia's colony of Chinese merchants.

Associated Press reporters George McArthur and Horst Faas in a story appearing in the Washington Evening Star, November 20, tell that:

A Vietcong camp showing signs of recent use was found on the border opposite War Zone C about 70 miles northwest of Saigon. It had been used for several months and could have been a staging area for Loc Ninh Battle only 9 miles away earlier this month.

William Beecher, writing in the New York Times of November 24, 1967, relates that:

United States officials agree that while some rice is acquired by enemy troops in South Vietnam and a little is brought from North Vietnam, a substantial quantity is purchased in Cambodia for the use of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units. There are intelligence reports that large supplies of rice are brought in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian Capital, and moved by Cambodian Army trucks toward the Vietnamese border.

Donald Kirk in a dispatch from Phnom Penh appearing in the Washington Evening Star, November 24, states:

Highly informed sources here report the fishing village Ream on Cambodia's southern coast is the point at which arms are landed for shipment through Cambodia to Communist forces in South Vietnam.

In the December 11, 1967, issue of U.S. News & World Report, in an article entitled "Cambodia—Growing Base for Vietnam Reds" it is said:

Americans and South Vietnamese killed and wounded in recent costly battles at Dak To and Loc Ninh had in effect, been fighting under a tight leash. The reason: Communists used bases inside "neutral" Cambodia to build up their forces for those battles, U.S. planes and artillery were banned from attacking the build-up points.

When the tide of fighting turned against the Reds, they fled back to "safe sanctuaries" in Cambodia. Once across the border the Communist forces were immune from superior American firepower.

And a few paragraphs later in the same article:

The Dak To campaign is just one example of how the Reds use the Cambodian "sanctuary" for immediate tactical advantage. It has other important uses as well. Rice grown in Cambodia ends up in the hands of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units. The Cambodian Government openly sold 30,000 tons to the Viet Cong in 1966. Communist agents were able to buy at least that much, perhaps far more, on the open market.

Mr. Speaker, the problem of Cambodia is getting worse, not better. Our policy, for far too long, has danced to Sihanouk's tune, only to have him move closer and closer in support of the enemies of South Vietnam.

It may well be that the Cambodian Army, even if it wanted to, would be incapable of adequately policing its own borders. Even so, it is my view that a great deal more could be done, than is now being done. The U.S. proposal to finance a more extensive and effective surveillance of the Cambodia-South Vietnamese border and Cambodia's ports is, of course, desirable, but the composition of the International Control Commission makes it most doubtful that any such plans are likely to be implemented.

The enemy has carried the war into Cambodia. It has done so with Sihanouk's political and material support. Unhesitatingly he expresses "total solidarity" with the Vietcong and has repeatedly acknowledged aiding the Viet Minh and the Vietcong. Recently he is quoted as saying:

We have made a verbal agreement with the Viet Cong concerning trade. The Viet Cong buy our rice, medicines and other goods and pay with dollars.

Only a few days ago Sihanouk is reported to have written the National Liberation Front Ambassador to Cambodia urging that "our brotherly solidarity must be further strengthened without interruption."

Mr. Speaker, it is clear beyond all reasonable doubt that Cambodia has given, and continues to give, substantial help to the Vietcong. No knowledgeable military official with whom I have talked, either while in Vietnam some 18 months ago or since, has expressed any doubt about it. Why then, I ask, do we not urge the Saigon Government to close the Mekong River at the Cambodian border? Since January 1965, South Vietnam has, in fact, refused to permit Communist-flag ships, or vessels coming from Communist ports, or carrying Communist goods, access to the Mekong and I hasten to point out that this action created no particular international difficulties, a fact which should conclusively answer the argument that South Vietnam has no legal basis for actions to control the use of the Mekong River within its boundaries. With the Cambodian economy making such a vital contribution to the Vietcong and the enemies of South Vietnam, why should South Vietnam continue to permit Cambodia-bound ships to sail some 150 miles right through its sovereign territory, and in addition require the diversion of its limited naval resources to provide escorts for this traffic to insure no contraband is discharged on the way.

It is currently reported that U.S. military commanders are recommending that Cambodia's other major seaport, Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand, be quarantined to stop the flow of Communist weapons and ammunition to the Vietcong; and that a "hot pursuit" policy be adopted to allow them to cross the Cambodian border and destroy the enemy bases. These hard decisions may well have to be made. However, I would respectfully suggest that consideration first be given to closing the Mekong River to all Cambodian traffic. This can be accomplished quickly and easily without any loss of life and without any great risk of confrontation with any other power. Our message to Sihanouk would be received loud and clear. Furthermore,

this action would immediately choke Cambodia's only other major seaport with vessels diverted from the Mekong thereby compelling the Cambodian Government to utilize its hard pressed port facilities for goods needed purely for legitimate domestic purposes. In sum, I believe the ultimate result should help immeasurably in the achievement of our objective to dry up Cambodia as a source of supply to the enemy, but without direct military action.

Our failure to insist that Sihanouk maintain a policy of genuine neutrality, has created conditions that have the grave potential of intensifying the war. The chances of a major expansion of the conflict into Cambodia have in fact increased, not decreased. This trend of events must be reversed. To delay action

further only invites an even greater problem in the future. Sihanouk must be shown that his one-eyed neutralism will not be tolerated. To continue to base our policy on the slim hope that someday Sihanouk will decide that the Vietcong will lose the war, is self-defeating. We have failed to make it in Sihanouk's interest to stop aiding the enemy. I suggest again that the loss of this important outlet to the sea would be an appropriate and a wholly justified means for encouraging Sihanouk to establish a policy of "strict neutrality."

Mr. Speaker, we have recently had some encouraging reports from General Westmoreland about the progress of the conflict. However, it has been widely reported that he has expressed deep concern over the problem of Cambodia. It is

apparent that our efforts to curb the flow of supplies from North Vietnam have forced the enemy to look more and more to Cambodia. While this war is different in many respects from any we have fought in the past, it is the same in at least one basic element. That is, without supplies, the enemy cannot continue to carry on the struggle. It is abundantly clear that if this war is to be shortened, this back-door aid to the enemy must be stopped. It is time our policy faced up to this fact and produced results.

Mr. Speaker, at this point in the Record I insert a table showing the level of free world shipping to Cambodia, through the first 8 months of 1967, according to Department of Defense information, together with several recent press accounts concerning Cambodia:

FREE WORLD SHIPS IN CAMBODIA, 1967

	Panama- nian	United Kingdom ¹	French	Jap- anese	Cyprus	Singa- pore	Nether- lands ²	Indo- nesia	Spanish	Norwegian	Greek	Switzer- land	Den- mark	Italy	India	Paki- stan	Libe- rian	Total
PHNOM PENH																		
January.....	10	1	5	6			2											22
February.....	5		5	8														20
March.....	11		5	6	1													23
April.....	14			7			3											24
May.....	10	1	4	8			2	1										26
June.....	16		5	8			5											35
July.....	15	1	4	10			3	1										35
August.....	8	1	4	9			3											26
Total.....	89	4	32	62	1	19	3	1										211
SIHANOUKVILLE																		
January.....	3	1	4	2	1				1	2								14
February.....	3		7	1						1	2	1	1					18
March.....	3		4	2	1					1	3			1				14
April.....		2	7	1	1					2	1	1						15
May.....		3	7	1						1	3							14
June.....	1		6	1			1				5	1				1	1	18
July.....	1	1	7	1							2		2					14
August.....	3		5															
Total.....	13	11	47	9	3	1			1	8	18	4	4	1	1	2	1	124
Grand total.....																		335

¹ British. ² Dutch.

[From Time magazine, Dec. 1, 1967]

CAMBODIA: BUILDUP ON THE BORDER

Confronted by persistent allied military pressure, North Vietnamese infiltrators are finding their old south-bound routes to be increasingly hazardous traveling. The DMZ and the South China Sea coast have been virtually sealed off, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail's Laotian branch is being steadily pounded from the air. That leaves only Cambodia as a relatively bomb-free route into South Viet Nam. This kind of end run is hardly new to the Communists, who have often used Prince Norodom Sihanouk's neutral kingdom as a gateway and a sanctuary. But the rising intensity of the war is causing them to use Cambodia more and more as a launching pad and supply depot.

The Communists have dotted Cambodia's 600-mile frontier along South Viet Nam with dozens of jungle encampments, of which at least five are classified by U.S. intelligence as major bases (see map). The network, which stretches from the marshlands of the Mekong Delta into the bloodied hills of the Central Highlands, is believed to support six regiments of North Vietnamese regulars as well as innumerable Viet Cong guerrillas—a total of up to 20,000 men who are kept busy raiding and reconnoitering along the border. A key base is tucked away in Cambodia's "Parrot's Beak," just 40 miles west of Saigon, which also harbors one of the several jungle hospitals established by the Communists.

SIHANOUK TRAIL

According to the detailed picture that emerges from boxloads of intelligence reports in Saigon, the camps are used as training centers, supply storehouses and marshaling points for such large-scale Communist operations as last month's attacks on Loc Ninh, which lies directly across from two major bases, and the fighting at Dak To, which faces another base at the intersection with Laos.

Most of the heavy military equipment for the Communist troops continues to come down the pipeline from the North through Laos, but the Communists manage to fill much of their food and clothing needs within Cambodia itself. Under a procurement system involving the Chinese embassy in Phnompenh, the Communists buy up to 100,000 tons of Cambodian rice a year. Until the Cambodian army cut itself into the lucrative trade recently in order to raise money for Sihanouk's pet welfare programs, it was handled almost exclusively by Cambodia's colony of Chinese merchants.

DELICATE BALANCING

Other food, medicines and soft goods arrive by ship from North Viet Nam and China at Sihanoukville, Cambodia's outlet on the Gulf of Thailand. They are then trucked over the U.S.-built Friendship Highway to Phnompenh and sent to the border bases along routes that the American military has named the Sihanouk Trail. Occasionally, V.C. guerrillas buy surplus Chinese small

arms from local Cambodian commanders, but this is strictly local enterprise by Sihanouk's low-paid officers.

On his recent visit to the U.S. General William Westmoreland expressed concern and anger at this enemy buildup just beyond the reach of his troops. There has even been some talk among the military of a Cuba-type "quarantine" of Sihanoukville. But the idea hardly pleases U.S. diplomats. However annoying they find Sihanouk's warm embrace of Hanoi's cause, they recognize that he is engaged in a delicate balancing act to keep his country out of the Communist grip. Even if he fully appreciated the magnitude of the infiltration—as he does not seem to—and were determined to kick the Communists out, his 30,000-man army could hardly cope with the North Vietnamese regulars.

U.S. officials hope that Sihanouk's neutrality may gradually become a little less Red-tinged. Occasionally they are encouraged by such actions as Sihanouk's recent forceful response to Peking's propagandizing in Cambodia; he closed down Red-lining newspapers and threatened to recall his ambassador. But Sihanouk has a way of dissipating good will quickly. Recently he has been mixing particularly virulent attacks on the U.S. ("neo-colonialist aggressor") with denials that the Communists are using Cambodia as a sanctuary. Last week, angered by the discovery of a Communist camp site inside Cambodia by three American newsmen (Time, Nov. 24), Sihanouk declared that henceforth his borders would be sealed to all U.S. journalists.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1967]

CAMP IN CAMBODIA LINKED TO VIETCONG
(By George McArthur and Horst Faas)

ON THE CAMBODIAN BORDER, November 19.—The carefully camouflaged Vietcong camp was hidden beneath lush jungle about four miles inside neutral Cambodia.

The signs were unmistakable, despite Cambodian denials, that countless numbers of men and tons of supplies had crossed this jungle site and gone on to the war in South Vietnam.

The camp's occupants, probably several hundred men from a major headquarters command group, had left but days before. Some had been in the area the previous night, as shown by fresh footprints after a heavy rain. One soldier had left a mosquito net, still rigged over a hammock.

From the camp and stretching toward the unmarked frontier with Vietnam was a heavily traveled military road. Monsoon rains had turned stretches of it into a bog. Engineers had laid down a covering of neatly trimmed logs capable of supporting heavy trucks. Tracks indicated many had passed that way.

The road crossed the border barely nine miles from the South Vietnamese town of Loc Ninh, scene of a bitter battle this month. American commanders said the enemy chose this battlefield because of its nearness to the sanctuary of the border—a sanctuary denied by Cambodia's neutralist ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The Prince has recently qualified his position by saying his 34,000-man army could not possibly seal the 500-mile border.

Sihanouk has been informed of our discovery of the camp. His reaction has not been disclosed.

INVESTIGATION PROMISED

But Premier Son Sann said a Cambodian investigation will be made.

"It is impossible that the camp was used for any long period of time," the Premier said. "It was not a sanctuary."

He acknowledged that there had been some crossings of the frontier by Communist forces, but he said his government has always demanded withdrawal as soon as intrusions were discovered.

[UPI correspondent Ray F. Herndon, who was also among those who visited the camp, reported that he had "the distinct impression" that the Cambodian government did not know such a camp existed.]

Reporters visited the frontier at the invitation of Prince Sihanouk, who offered military escorts and ordered provincial officials to cooperate with Western newsmen.

AREA PINPOINTED

When we drove to the district capital of Mimot, about 15 miles from the frontier, and pointed out precisely where we wanted to go, no difficulties were raised.

The site we asked to visit, chosen on the basis of information from qualified sources, was a thin track branching off National Route 7 and barely shown even on detailed maps. From the paved highway which parallels the border north of War Zone C, the track was hardly noticeable, the entrance shrouded by trees.

On each side were signs warning against smoking, forest fires or the unauthorized cutting of timber. Walking down the twisting trail, there was nothing out of the ordinary save the unusual number of tire and cart tracks on a small dirt road that ostensibly led nowhere.

ROAD DISCOVERED

Then, a few hundred yards into the woods, the corduroy road of logs burst into view. To one side was a small camouflaged clearing surrounded by a drainage ditch.

The small military escort was embarrassed. A young lieutenant said perhaps the road was used by timberthieves. Another suggested it was built by the forestry department.

We asked to come back the next day, with a bigger military escort to go deeper into the jungle. The major in charge of our escort agreed, but his earlier friendliness was gone. Prince Sisawath, a cousin of Prince Norodom who was along, remarked somewhat bitterly: "I suppose you will write about the Sihanouk trail."

Next morning, when we started back to the jungle, the Prince was absent but there was a full escort including an army truck with a 20-mm cannon. This, it was explained, was to protect us from possible attack by intruding American planes.

TRAIL TO CAMPSITE

Back in the jungle, a little path off the corduroy road led within half a mile to the Vietcong campsite. There was no mistaking the neat military order, the shelter, the little bamboo desks and tables.

Everything was camouflaged. Some shelters contained pens used by the Vietcong to keep pigs or chickens. Many bits of evidence, even a page from the camp's supply department, were found. A North Vietnamese medical supply bag had also been left behind.

Anyone who has seen similar camps in Vietnam itself could be certain this was a guerrilla camp. Its location indicates that the Vietcong regularly uses Cambodian Route 7, which runs east from the capital of Phnom Penh and roughly parallels the South Vietnamese border for about 40 miles above War Zone C, where much of the fighting in Vietnam has taken place in the past year.

One such camp, of course, does not prove the American contention that the Vietcong systematically violate the Cambodian frontier and use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary.

The Americans say, however, that such camps are numerous along the northern half of the 500-mile Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 20, 1967]

RED CAMP SITE IN CAMBODIA CONTRADICTS ROYAL DENIALS

(By George McArthur and Horst Faas)

PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA.—The discovery of a Viet Cong camp site four miles inside Cambodia has angered Prince Norodom Sihanouk and raised doubts about his past denials that Vietnamese Communist forces were given sanctuary in his country.

Cambodia's ruling prince reportedly regards the discovery by American newsmen as a fabrication and part of a campaign against him by the U.S. press.

The Viet Cong camp, showing signs of recent use, was found on the border opposite War Zone C, about 70 miles northwest of Saigon. It had been used for several months and could have been a staging area for the Loc Ninh battle, only nine miles away, earlier this month.

The prince, who contends the United States is the aggressor in Vietnam, reportedly told intimates the reports of the camp were part of a campaign inspired by the U.S. Command in Saigon to justify military operations against Cambodia.

RECORDS DISCOVERED

Evidence of Viet Cong occupancy found in the camp included military records written in Vietnamese, North Vietnamese medical supplies and similar items. Dated scraps of paper indicated the camp had been used for several months dating back to last February.

There were unmistakable signs that several hundred men, probably from a major headquarters command group, had used the camp. Occupants had left only a few days before.

From the camp a heavily traveled road went through the dense jungle to the frontier, crossing it nine miles from Loc Ninh. Logs had been put down to counteract the monsoon mud. Tracks indicated many heavy trucks had used it.

One embarrassed young lieutenant escorting the reporters said perhaps the road was used by timber thieves. Another suggested it was built by the forestry department.

BELIEVED IN GOOD FAITH

Reporters visited the frontier at the invitation of Sihanouk. Diplomats in Phnom Penh felt that despite his stated sympathies with the Viet Cong he did not believe the Communists were seriously using Cambodian territory as a staging area.

The prince did not qualify his invitation to the frontier. He offered military escorts and ordered provincial officials to cooperate with Western newsmen. They did.

When reporters drove to the district capital of Mimot, about 15 miles from the Vietnamese frontier, and pointed out precisely where they wanted to go, no difficulties were raised.

The district administrator, Oung Hong Cheng Hor, an affable 39-year-old career civil servant, laughed and said nothing would be found.

CHARGES OFTEN MADE

American officers have charged for years that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese use Cambodia as a sanctuary when the going gets too rough for them.

American authorities in Vietnam have pinpointed at least 20 permanent camp sites, many of them in a five-mile area adjoining the border where the Cambodian army does not patrol and has no significant posts.

Competent authorities say the Viet Cong operate just as clandestinely in Cambodia as they do in Vietnam. They select areas where they are unlikely to meet Cambodian soldiers, particularly the virtually uninhabited northeast where Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam come together.

BORDER SITE REPORTED

Impartial foreign sources in Phnom Penh have knowledge of Viet Cong forces in Cambodia. Many contend the number is far greater than anything suspected by Prince Sihanouk.

A fenced, well-guarded, maximum security camp is reported to have been installed long ago along the border in Mondulkiri Province opposite the lower reaches of the Vietnamese highlands.

Other bivouac and transit areas are reported in Mondulkiri and adjoining Ratanakiri provinces. A 400-bed hospital has been reported near the district town of Mimot, in Kampong Cham Province.

Sources in Phnom Penh who asked not to be identified also gave this information:

Along the border of Kampong Cham Province, where rubber plantations are frequent, about 20 percent of the workers are of Vietnamese origin and many are members of the Viet Cong. Workers disappear for several days and plantation managers suspect they duck across the border for short operations.

Some competent authorities in Phnom Penh contend that Sihanouk does not know the extent to which his territory is being used by the Viet Cong.

Others say the prince has intentionally ignored Viet Cong activity, particularly in the jungled northern provinces where his government has little control anyway.

In the southern provinces bordering Vietnam on the Mekong Delta, his orders to stop Viet Cong infiltrators have been relatively effective.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 20, 1967]

U.S. PLANES FEARED—CAMBODIANS PATROL BORDER WITH CAUTION

(By Donald Kirk)

ROUTE 19, NEAR THE CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAM FRONTIER.—The Cambodian army lieutenant stopped at a tumbled-down pile of logs and boards and raised his hand. "That's no-man's land," he said, pointing to the east. "We cannot go farther."

Half a mile away in a jungle clearing, trees

painted white by the International Control Commission set up by the 1954 Geneva agreement mark the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam.

"We once had a permanent post here," said the lieutenant, sitting on the log remains of the old fortification. "But it was too difficult to supply. Now we just send patrols."

He added that even the patrols did not walk the last half mile to the frontier for fear of attacks by American planes.

As he spoke the sound of jets reverberated through the dense jungle. The planes, invisible through the bushes and towering trees, were apparently a mile or so away, well within South Vietnam.

But American pilots don't always observe the border so scrupulously.

AMERICAN LEAFLET

A sergeant picked up an American propaganda leaflet showing a B52 dropping bombs. The back of the pamphlet explained that the B52 raids were "necessary" to wipe out the Viet Cong.

The sergeant said he had never seen B52s near the Cambodian-Vietnam frontier, but cited five cases in the last month in which American reconnaissance planes and helicopters had attacked near O Yadao, the name of the last regularly manned Cambodian outpost, three miles inside the frontier.

He said one soldier was hurt in a rocket attack early this month and several civilians had been killed or wounded in a nearby village.

The flimsy thatched roof huts of O Yadao mark the last point toward which even jeeps can slog down Route 19, once an important French road to the Vietnam highland center of Pleiku, but now a potholed single lane closed to all but occasional military vehicles.

A dozen men commanded by a tall, craggy sergeant of Montagnard extraction are assigned to watch for both American planes and Viet Cong soldiers, whom the Americans are certain rely on Cambodia's eastern frontiers to regroup and rest after fighting in South Vietnam.

The sergeant, named Ek Sem, said his men occasionally fired a Chinese antiaircraft gun, placed in the middle of the encampment, but so far had not hit any of the planes.

DENIES SEEING VIET CONG

He denied having ever encountered any Viet Cong. "We go on patrols every day," he said. "We never see anything."

If he does, he said his orders are not to fire but simply to ask them to return across the frontier.

The provincial governor and army commander, Chhor-Sien, said only 2,000 soldiers were assigned to the entire province, which covers the northeast corner of Cambodia, a mountainous, dense jungle region.

Chhor-Sien said his men had not seen a single Communist soldier, either Vietnamese or Viet Cong, and confirmed the impression that American planes were of much greater concern.

At Pak Nhail, a company-sized outpost on Route 19 eight miles west of the border, he pointed to a small heap of shrapnel and tubing, souvenirs, he said, of an American rocket attack on July 30 in which a woman was killed in a village 100 yards away.

As he spoke, a Montagnard woman ran from the village to the post. She said an American rocket had killed her 5-year-old son two weeks ago. "I was with my family in my home," she told an interpreter, displaying a jagged scar on her left arm she said was caused when she was hit by shrapnel in the same attack.

Soldiers at the post said they saw American reconnaissance planes at least three times a day, but explained the planes only fired "two or three times a month."

The governor also claimed the Americans had dropped defoliating chemicals as far as

12 miles inside the Cambodian frontier, destroying about 1,000 square miles of rubber plantations and uncultivated forests.

"The Americans drop defoliants several times a month," he said. "But we have never seen Viet Cong there. The war across the border is none of our business."

PLANTERS REPORT REDS

French planters in the region, however, disputed the governor's contention that no Viet Cong cross the border. "It's clear that in hot fighting the Viet Cong move backward sometimes," said one plantation manager. "A year ago VC unit was pushed inside Cambodian territory and given 24 hours to leave. And it did."

He added that it was almost impossible for Cambodia's miniscule, ill-equipped forces in the province even to know of the existence of Communist camps in the rough, trackless hills.

"That would require very precise aerial observation," he said. "So the Cambodians don't bother them."

One planter claimed the Communist forces held medical facilities and supply posts in the hills, but did not think they could hide away an entire division, as the Americans have charged.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 24, 1967]

RED PORT REVEALED—CAMBODIAN VILLAGE IS REPORTED USED

(By Donald Kirk)

PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA.—Highly informed sources here report the fishing village of Ream on Cambodia's southern coast is the point at which arms are landed for shipment through Cambodia to Communist forces in South Vietnam.

These sources, including French planters who have lived and worked in this former French colony for most of their lives, say the arms are loaded into motorized fishing boats several miles off Ream and brought to the village, where Chinese merchants transfer the boxes to trucks for the trek to the Vietnam border.

The arms are shipped through Ream, which also has a small Cambodian naval installation, without the knowledge of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in the opinion of these sources.

Sihanouk repeatedly has denied reports, based largely on American intelligence sources, that Communist arms move through Cambodia.

Sources here said the arms arrived just outside Cambodian waters on freighters from China and East European countries. The sources had no estimate of the amount of arms shipped through Ream but believed it was relatively small—mainly small arms and ammunition for use by the Viet Cong and not North Vietnamese troops.

The arms are believed sent to Vietnam's delta region. Observers believed the Communists sometimes preferred to ship through Ream to avoid the long the long trip from North to South Vietnam over the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos.

Sources here had no information that the Communists shipped arms through Sihanoukville, as has been claimed.

In fact these sources believed the Communists might purposefully avoid Sihanoukville, named for Prince Sihanouk and envisioned by him as Cambodia's major prestige port, to prevent the possibility of an embarrassing discovery that might reduce his sympathy for the Communist struggle in Vietnam.

(The report of the use of Ream came almost simultaneously with one from Washington that U.S. officials are becoming concerned over the possibility that Sihanoukville would become a major port of entry for Communist war supplies. Should this happen, said Washington sources, some ef-

fort to quarantine Cambodia might be necessary.)

Ream, a one-street village lined with Chinese shops that have their backs leading to small piers, is some 15 miles from Sihanoukville at the end of a narrow dirt road.

In a brief visit to Ream, packing boxes and oil drums were seen beside the shops.

Several motorized fishing boats, ranging from 15 to approximately 60 feet long, were moored at the piers. Shopkeepers said they were all strictly fishing boats, and a look at several of them revealed nothing of suspicious nature on board.

At the end of the road, several guards were assigned to stop traffic at a gate opening on the naval installation. Half a dozen small naval ships, including landing craft, were docked at the base. Authorities denied entrance to the facility on the grounds that formal permission was needed.

Planters, with contacts among Chinese merchants and Vietnamese fishermen living in Cambodia, say arms began moving through Ream only in the past couple of years. They also expressed the belief that arms were sometimes transferred from fishing boats to shore at other isolated points along the coast.

Sources here said the arms were shipped through Cambodia to a large extent in closed trucks whose drivers carried papers saying they were only loaded with rice for local use.

One source said these trucks sometimes traveled "with special military permission," indicating elements in the Cambodian army were working for the Viet Cong.

One key factor in moving the arms into Cambodia, according to the French planters, is Vietnamese employed on rubber plantations near the border. One source said the Vietnamese had dug tunnels at some points for moving goods out of sight of Cambodian soldiers and guards, who have orders to stop all such activity.

Although Sihanouk denies these and all other such claims, sources here confirmed that Frenchmen had unexpectedly spotted Communist troops on several occasions.

In Northeast Cambodia, a French school teacher took a wrong turn on a road and drove into a clearing which he described to acquaintances as "full of Viet Cong." The teacher, who taught geography in Phnom Penh, is said to have been turned over to Cambodian authorities and sent back to France.

In another incident, a chauffeur driving a French diplomat to the border near the Vietnam highlands turned onto the "wrong road," said a source here, and encountered approximately 25 black-clad peasants, most of them bearing arms.

The chauffeur, who was driving in a convoy sponsored by the government to prove there were no Viet Cong guerrillas in the area, realized he had made a mistake, turned back and rejoined the convoy on the main road.

Cambodian officials told the diplomat the black-clad men must have Cambodian militia, an explanation, said the source who repeated the story, that "convinced no one."

Despite such stories, Sihanouk claims no knowledge of the presence of Viet Cong or Communist troops here or the smuggling of arms—and also rice—across his borders to Vietnam.

He has, however, accused the Americans of sometimes "pushing the Viet Cong into Cambodia" during battles on the other side.

But the sources emphasized that Sihanouk himself was probably not aware of the extent of Vietnamese Communist activities.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 24, 1967]
FOR SAID TO USE CAMBODIAN PORT—SOME U.S. OFFICERS WEIGH SIHANOUKVILLE QUARANTINE TO BAR VIETCONG ARMS

(By William Beecher)

WASHINGTON, November 23.—Some American military leaders in Saigon and Wash-

ington are concerned about reports that major ammunition shipments are reaching North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces by sea through Cambodia. A staff study has been ordered on the value and implications of a quarantine of the Cambodian coastline.

Such a quarantine might involve stopping and searching Soviet, Chinese and other foreign-flag vessels.

Some civilian officials here suggest that if Saigon can produce persuasive evidence of arms shipments through the main Cambodian seaport, Sihanoukville, the evidence might be placed before Cambodia's Chief of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

"SIHANOUK MAY NOT KNOW"

"Sihanouk may not know the full extent of the North Vietnamese activities in his remote border areas, and wouldn't be able to do much with his 40,000-man army even if he wanted to," one official said.

"But he could very well control what moves through his port. And if military intelligence can come up with convincing proof of arms traffic, we think Sihanouk could make no reasonable excuse for not controlling it."

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of American military forces in Vietnam, is represented as being disturbed about shipments through Cambodia. But he is not believed to have made any quarantine recommendations to President Johnson or other high Administration officials during his recent stay in Washington.

Most of the military concern arises from the ability demonstrated by the enemy, first at Loc Ninh and now at Dakto, to stock up enough mortars, machine guns and ammunition for sustained operations. Both sites are close to the Cambodian border.

Military leaders say that most of four North Vietnamese regiments, approaching 10,000 men in strength, were preparing for battle in Cambodia last month. The officers estimate that 5,000 North Vietnamese, including many support troops, remain in Cambodia now.

Prince Sihanouk has repeatedly denied that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese use his country as a sanctuary. He was reported to be angry earlier this week over the discovery of a recently abandoned Vietcong camp four miles inside Cambodia. The camp was found and photographed by correspondents of The Associated Press and United Press International.

Military and civilian authorities agree that most arms and ammunition for enemy forces in Vietnam moves by land from North Vietnam, over the complex of roads and paths in Laos known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and from these into South Vietnam, or into supply caches in southeastern Laos and northeastern Cambodia.

The officials also agree that while some rice is acquired by enemy troops in South Vietnam, and a little is brought from North Vietnam, a substantial quantity is purchased in Cambodia for use of North Vietnamese and Vietcong units.

There are intelligence reports that large supplies of rice are bought in Phnompenh, the Cambodian capital, and moved by Cambodian Army trucks toward the Vietnamese border to the northeast.

"There is a good deal of corruption within the Cambodian Army, and much of this activity could very well be unauthorized," one official said.

WESTMORELAND CITES PATROLS

At a news conference in the Pentagon on Tuesday, General Westmoreland said that with the extension of South Vietnamese Government control into the countryside and with the imposition of coastal patrols, the enemy had to turn to Cambodia and buy rice. "A lot of Chinese merchants in Phnompenh, I suspect, have become rich because of this," he said.

There have been some intelligence reports that Chinese arms shipments, ostensibly destined for the Cambodian Army, have arrived in Sihanoukville and been carried over the Cambodian-American Friendship Highway, built with United States aid funds between Sihanoukville and Phnompenh. From there, according to the reports the goods have moved by road, river and canal to Vietcong or North Vietnamese troops.

Some Washington officials disparage this information as "low-level, low-confidence intelligence." Others insist that it is only a matter of time until conclusive evidence can be assembled on the reports of arms traffic.

One civilian official said there was no evidence of "knowing collusion" between Prince Sihanouk and those who might be aiding the North Vietnamese, whether in supplying rice or arms or in permitting them to operate from base camps along the Cambodian border.

The fact that Prince Sihanouk allowed the American news agency men, accompanied by Cambodian troops, to search for the enemy base camp on Cambodian soil is viewed here as support for the contention that he may not have realized the extent of Vietcong activity in the remote, jungle-covered border regions.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 30, 1967]

HANOI, NLF Bid To INCITE CAMBODIA

(By Donald Kirk)

PHNOM PENH.—The bland exteriors of the diplomatic missions of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong conceal machines for propaganda and infiltration aimed at turning Cambodia into a "third front" from which to fight the United States and Saigon government in South Vietnam.

Informed sources here report that the embassy of North Vietnam and the "representation" of the National Liberation Front, the official name for the Viet Cong, devote much of their time to developing a network of contacts, mainly among the country's 400,000 residents of Vietnamese ancestry, for shipping rice and other products from Cambodia to Vietnam.

Mastermind of the Viet Cong operation here is Nguyen Van Hieu, a member of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front. Hieu, once regarded as roving foreign minister for the Front, negotiated with Cambodia a year ago for raising the Viet Cong's diplomatic position here to that of a "representation," just one step below full embassy status. He now heads the mission.

Hailed as an "intellectual patriot" by the Viet Cong press, Hieu is viewed in some quarters as one of the half dozen top men in the NLF. A former secondary school teacher and "journalist" who wrote propaganda articles against the Americans and their "puppets" in Saigon, he headed Viet Cong missions in Prague and East Berlin before coming here four months ago. His presence indicates the importance the Viet Cong attach to bringing "neutral" Cambodia firmly into the conflict on the Communist side.

NOT UNSUBTLE

But Hieu is not so unsubtle as to offend the Cambodian government, especially its sensitive chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, by overtly urging it to join the war.

His first move, in fact, was to work out a declaration of "respect and recognition" for Cambodia's frontiers that meant the Viet Cong, if they were to win, would abandon all the Saigon government's claim for disputed territory along the border.

Hieu, who lives in a three-story apartment building behind the modern stone and concrete villa of the NLF, also has abandoned his request for "special status" for the local Vietnamese, who cannot own property, must pay high taxes and are generally subject to

prejudicial treatment reflecting the instinctive antipathy of Cambodians for Vietnamese.

Hieu reportedly was glad to compromise on both the border question and that of Vietnamese residents in return for Cambodia's support of the Front diplomatically—and hopefully militarily and economically as well.

Hieu's main partner here is Tran Buu Kiem, a member of the presidium of the Central Committee of the NLF and president of the Central Committee's Foreign Relations Commission.

Kiem participated in discussions that led to opening full-scale diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the Front and has a luxurious home here on a tree-shaded street in a fashionable residential section.

MINORITY FOCUS

Kiem, who spends much of his time in South Vietnam, is believed primarily concerned with the problem of mobilizing Cambodia's Vietnamese minority behind the Viet Cong.

In the past year he has enforced a system by which most Vietnamese here must contribute to the NLF cause, whether by donations or by ferrying or carrying bags of rice or even by digging tunnels linking Cambodia with South Vietnam.

"There is hardly a Vietnamese in the country who doesn't have some job to do for the Viet Cong," said one source. Since many of the Vietnamese here live on rivers as fishermen, they are particularly helpful in shipping rice by water.

And those employed on rubber plantations near the border are helpful in relaying the rice across the frontier and in helping Viet Cong units that hide here from the war.

A mainstay of support for Hieu and Kiem is the Liberation Press Agency, the Viet Cong propaganda machine, that has a separate office here in a villa on one of the city's main avenues.

Chief of the office is Pham Van Quang, one of the NLF's top propagandists, who turns out news bulletins in Vietnamese, Cambodian, Chinese and French, arranges for cultural presentations and spreads leaflets and magazines on the war among the local Vietnamese.

The appointment of Quang, like those of Hieu and Kiem, illustrates the importance the Viet Cong attach to Cambodia. While "covering" the war for the NLF in Vietnam, he reportedly wrote some of its most important statements and was wounded two times. Like Hieu, he served in Eastern Europe before his present assignment.

Since most of Cambodia's Vietnamese population is from South Vietnam, the activities of the NLF here appear sometimes to overshadow those of Hanoi. Some sources, in fact, suspect that North Vietnam is at odds with the Front over control of Cambodian operations despite the usual displays of unity.

North Vietnam, whose mission here was elevated from a "representation" to an "embassy" last year, desperately needs Cambodia's friendship so it can continue to filter some troops into Vietnam through the northeast Cambodian province of Rattanakiri.

Although Sihanouk violently denies such activities, observers believe he may have reached a tacit understanding not to bother the North Vietnam troops as long as they don't leave the dense jungle area that is far removed from Cambodian army outposts.

North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have persuaded the Prince of the rightness of their cause—a factor that is crucial in protecting the movement from Cambodia of rice as well as arms for the Viet Cong. The government theoretically prohibits this trade—and generally denies its existence—but has done little to stop it.

AN ULTIMATE STEP

The ultimate step for Communist Vietnam would be for Sihanouk completely to abandon his policy of neutrality, let Communist

troops freely base here until the end of the war and give carte blanche for the legal sale and shipment of rice, arms and other products from Cambodia to the Viet Cong.

Some observers, noting the Prince's increasing anger over American rocket and machine gun attacks from planes flying inside his borders, believe he might be on the verge of such a decision.

If so, the entire Cambodian frontier could turn into a full-fledged "third front," said one source, referring to the interior of South Vietnam as the "first front" and the Demilitarized Zone between the two Vietnams as the "second front."

But Sihanouk would face strong opposition from some of his countrymen, who may be just as fearful of the Communist Vietnamese as they are of the Saigon regime and the Americans.

"It was almost a scandal here when the Prince recognized the NLF," said one official. "The feeling was, after he broke off relations with Saigon in 1963, that he should never go all the way and recognize the Viet Cong. But he thinks the Communists are sure to win, and he wants to be on the right side from the start."

[From the U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 11, 1967]

CAMBODIA—GROWING BASE FOR VIETNAM REDS

SAIGON:—Suddenly it is Cambodia that has become critically dangerous to American military commanders already locked in a bloody war against Communists in Vietnam.

Americans and South Vietnamese killed and wounded in recent, costly battles at Dak To and Loc Ninh had, in effect, been fighting under a tight leash.

The reason: Communists used bases inside "neutral" Cambodia to build up their forces for those battles. U.S. plans and artillery were banned from attacking the build-up points.

When the tide of fighting turned against the Reds, they fled back to "safe sanctuaries" in Cambodia. Once across the border, the Communist forces were immune from superior American firepower.

"HOT PURSUIT"?

Now U.S. commanders in the field are demanding a change in the rules.

The White House is being pressed for permission to attack the known, important Communist bases inside Cambodia.

If this is "politically unpalatable," Gen. William C. Westmoreland's command wants, at a minimum, the right of "hot pursuit." The Communist enemy would be chased all the way back to and beyond base camps hidden in the Cambodian jungle whenever they broke off contact inside Vietnam.

Adding weight to pleas from the field were comments in a television interview on November 28 by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who said:

"If you're chasing some people and they just step over into Cambodia or Laos, I wouldn't—it wouldn't bother me. I'd go at them as long as they'd come in there in the first place."

General Westmoreland and the American Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, raised the question of "hot pursuit" in November when they were in Washington while the struggle for Dak To was at its height.

STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW

American officials in Saigon say the discussions in Washington were "too sensitive" for public comment. But it is known the U.S. State Department strongly opposes any military operations across the Cambodian frontier.

Field commanders in Vietnam hope the Bunker-Westmoreland team extracted some concessions from the White House. They are not optimistic.

Concern over the increasingly vital role Cambodia plays in North Vietnam's war

plans rose sharply when captured documents disclosed details of Hanoi's "winter-spring" campaign for 1967-68.

The plan calls for large-scale transportation of North Vietnamese troops by truck through Laos as far south as Cambodia.

From bases in those two countries, the Reds would launch more and bigger drives against American and South Vietnamese forces.

A U.S. intelligence analyst comments:

"The North Vietnamese are moving everything they've got down south as fast as they can. It's likely we will be in for big battles soon."

A documented study showing how Hanoi uses Cambodia to fight inside South Vietnam has been prepared by American officers in General Westmoreland's headquarters.

Most recent example was the campaign fought for control of the strategic hills around Dak To. The struggle there cost the U.S. 287 dead, 1,000 wounded.

Communist troops infiltrated the area from bases in Cambodia. After days of close-quarter fighting, the enemy had lost 1,641 confirmed dead. Estimates of additional dead and wounded carried away from the battlefield ranged from 1,000 to 1,500.

The survivors straggled across the border to two large hospitals set up by the North Vietnamese inside Cambodia. Both hospitals have modern surgical facilities, trained doctors and nurses.

Says a U.S. officer: Their wounded, or most of them, will be back fighting us one of these days. It's a shame we cannot go in after them."

A "RICE BOWL"

The Dak To campaign is just one example of how the Reds use the Cambodian "sanctuary" for immediate tactical advantage. It has other important uses as well.

Rice grown in Cambodia ends up in the hands of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units. The Cambodian Government openly sold 30,000 tons to the Viet Cong in 1966. Communist agents were able to buy at least that much, perhaps far more, on the open market.

From all accounts, shipments of Communist-bloc arms and ammunition into Cambodia are on the rise. Soviet, Polish, Chinese and Hong Kong-registered ships call in increasing numbers at Sihanoukville, Cambodia's principal seaport.

To speed up cargo handling, the port facilities are being expanded to five times the present capacity. French aid is going into construction of a railway line linking Sihanoukville and Phnompenh.

Although "hard" evidence of what the ships carry is not easily obtained, it is clear that Cambodia's small network of roads and large network of canals and riverways are rapidly becoming important supply routes.

Shallow-draft barges with steel hulls are being used to move cargoes from Sihanoukville to Ream, a nearby fishing village. Cargo is there transferred to motorized sampans that cruise along the canals interlacing the low, marshy border between Cambodia and Vietnam.

A small sampan intercepted recently three miles inside the Vietnamese side of the frontier was found to be loaded with 100-mm. mortars.

OUT IN THE OPEN

The Reds seem to be moving arms more openly than before. An intelligence officer in Saigon says this:

"We have pretty good evidence that just recently a ship unloaded cargo that included mines, consigned to a civilian import firm in Sihanoukville. The mines weren't even camouflaged."

Drugs and other supplies needed for treatment of wounded pour in openly from Singapore. Purchasing agent there is the Singapore branch of Peking's Bank of China.

Chinese businessmen in Cambodia are pur-

chasing and supply agents for other necessities. The telegraph office in Phnompenh, the capital, has a special section set aside to handle messages to and from Hanoi. Each day the area is jammed with Chinese merchants transacting business with North Vietnam.

Cambodians hire out as porters and boatmen to transport goods and weapons inside the country and across the border into Vietnam.

Some intelligence reports claim the Viet Cong have recruited a division of troops from among ethnic Vietnamese who are citizens of Cambodia.

LIFT FOR THE INFANTRY

Cambodia's contribution in food and facilities has become so large that Hanoi is able to use its trucks to transport troops into Laos and south to the Cambodian border. Until recently, trucks hauled supplies only. The infantrymen walked.

Some sources claim the volume of traffic from Southern Cambodia east and north to the battle areas inside Vietnam is bigger by far than the traffic from North Vietnam through Laos to the Cambodian border.

It is just now becoming clear what effect this increasing dependence on supply lines inside Cambodia is having on Communist strategy.

Hanoi has adopted what is called a "strategy of peripheral forces." Its major combat units are based just outside the frontiers of South Vietnam, are able to jump in and out of battle at will.

With divisions firmly anchored at the bases in Cambodia and Laos, as well as along the Demilitarized Zone separating North from South Vietnam, the captured documents calling for a "winter-spring offensive" take on new meaning.

That campaign, state the documents, is to consist of "large-scale, powerful and continuous attacks, conducted on all battlefields, to destroy as much U.S. and Vietnamese Army manpower resources as possible."

Knowing Hanoi's battle plan for the next six months, American officers are staring longer and harder at sanctuaries just across the Cambodian border.

A ranking U.S. commander says:

"There will certainly be more Dak Tos, and we will take heavy casualties. The enemy doesn't seem to mind losing a lot of men as long as he kills a lot of our men."

If the "green light" were to come from Washington, experts here say, the base camps in Cambodia could be cleaned out with a maximum of three U.S. divisions committed to the campaign.

There is little that Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's ruler, could do other than complain. His Army of 35,000 men has had no combat experience. Its equipment, much of which is supplied by Red China and Russia, has been poorly maintained.

Yet, a direct attack by U.S. forces is ruled out at present as politically inexpedient. A distinct possibility, it is felt here in Saigon is that "hot pursuit" will sooner or later be permitted.

Then, explains an American colonel, Communist troops fleeing into Cambodia will no longer be in line for a period of "wine, women and song." Instead, they will have to keep running.

WHY U.S. COMMANDERS WANT "HOT PURSUIT" INTO CAMBODIA

Problem: War supplies and weapons are pouring across "neutral" Cambodia in a growing stream, to help Red forces in South Vietnam. Freighters from Eastern Europe and Northern Asia unload at Cambodia's port of Sihanoukville. Supplies go by road to Phnompenh, move along the Mekong River and fan out to Communist troop bases along the border with South Vietnam. From those bases, Red troops cross into Vietnam to attack U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, then slip back into their Cambodian sanctuary to rest and refit.