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


FIGURE 46

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the Laos Border. On 7 June, additional sorties were allocated into the Lomphat, Labansiek, Bakiev triangle. A fairly even distribution between the two areas was evident until 13 June when the Lomphat, Labansiek, Bakiev region became the primary interdiction area. This general pattern of sortie allocation continued until 20 June.^{43/}

The initial thrust of FREEDOM DEAL was interdiction, but it became obvious by the end of the second week in June that some air support for Cambodian ground units was vital. This became graphically clear in the case of Labansiek and Bakiev, the last holdouts of the FANK in the north-east. The VNAF had participated in the evacuation of Lomphat on 31 May, but by 20 June, U.S. aircraft had performed interdiction only in the FREEDOM DEAL area.

During the first week in June, the enemy attacked Labansiek on numerous occasions. He also increased his activity around Bakiev. As the heavy ground action continued after 13 June, USAF personnel applied interdiction in its broadest sense and fighters began attacking known enemy locations around Labansiek and Bakiev under FAC or COMBAT SKYSPOT control. Gunships also attacked enemy units threatening the towns; the gunships served as their own FACs, operating visually and with the assistance of a radar beacon installed at Bakiev. Because of troop losses and supply and reinforcement problems, the Cambodian government decided to evacuate the two northeastern strongholds. The evacuation began on 23 June under continuous USAF fighter cover. The primary evacuation aircraft were USAF C-123s and C-7s. An ARVN relief column also arrived at

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Labansiek on 23 June and by 1830H on the 26th, the last of more than 7,000 refugees had exited into RVN. The government withdrawal from northeast Cambodia left that entire area essentially under control of the enemy.^{44/}


Expanded Interdiction

On 15 June 1970, 7AF asked COMUSMACV to broaden the area of air operations and to interpret the interdiction function more broadly. 7AF stressed how limited the enemy logistic activity was along the LOCs in Cambodia, as compared to the situation in Laos, and suggested that U.S. air be used primarily for close air support and secondarily for interdiction. The 7AF plan involved the incorporation of U.S. and VNAF forces with FANK personnel in the control network, including TACPs and the DASC at Phnom Penh. It also envisioned an increased FAC/VR reconnaissance and intelligence effort. This anticipated increase in operations was to be absorbed by current 7AF resources without seriously curtailing existing operations.^{45/}

The following day COMUSMACV received a message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) stressing the need to broaden the interpretation of interdiction in Cambodia. Reporting on a meeting with President Nixon, Admiral Moorer, Acting CJCS, pointed out that the President had stressed the need to expand intelligence gathering, to be more effective in employment of air, and to apply a broad interpretation of the term interdiction, especially after U.S. troop withdrawals from Cambodia on 30 June.^{46/} On 17 June, a message from the JCS broadened the entire interdiction concept and established the basis for expanded interdiction in

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FREEDOM ACTION
FAC VR SECTORS

FIGURE 47

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what became known as Operation FREEDOM ACTION. With respect to the increased use of air, the message said, "...you are authorized to employ U.S. tactical air interdiction in any situation which involves a serious threat to major Cambodian positions such as a provincial capital whose loss would constitute a serious military or psychological blow to the country."^{47/}

On 18 June, COMUSMACV officially requested the interdiction area be expanded to include that part of Cambodia bounded by a line 200 meters west of the Mekong River on the west and Route 7 on the south (this eventually became the FREEDOM DEAL extension shown in Fig. 35). He further requested standby authority until 31 September 1970 to conduct tactical air interdiction and B-52 strikes outside the interdiction area on a case-by-case basis. The proposed strikes would exclude the area within 20 kilometers of Phnom Penh, national monuments and shrines, and areas of cultural value to the Cambodian people. All targets would be validated by the FANK.^{48/} CINCPAC interpreted the JCS message of 17 June as authorization to employ U.S. tactical air beyond the current limits of the Cambodian interdiction area and communicated this to COMUSMACV on 19 June.^{49/} In this way, the JCS message of 17 June became the justification for an expanded interdiction campaign that became FREEDOM ACTION.

As an initial step in implementation of FREEDOM ACTION, the TACC established six FAC/VR sectors, designated F through K, in that portion of Cambodia not covered by FREEDOM DEAL (Fig. 47). Four OV-10s from Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, covered sector Juliet beginning on 20 June and four

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OV-10s from Utapao RTAFB began coverage of sector India on 21 June; these sorties were subtracted from the STEEL TIGER allocations.^{50/} Sectors Foxtrot, Golf, Hotel, and Kilo were covered by 16 aircraft from the resources of III DASC in RVN beginning on 23 June. Foxtrot was handled by O-1s from Tay Ninh East, Golf by O-1s and O-2s from Chau Doc, Hotel by OV-10s from Bien Hoa, and Kilo by O-2s and OV-10s from Tay Ninh. Stormy F-4s also operated in all areas of Cambodia as needed. FACs dedicated to the Cambodian operation flew all FAC missions there. In addition to VR of major LOCs and photography of route structures and other possible target areas, the FACs closely monitored major cities and provincial capitals for signs of enemy activity. As possible targets were located, identified, and photographed, they were reported to 7AF TACC for validation by FANK officers.^{51/}

The primary air request channel to 7AF TACC was through the VNAF DASC at Phnom Penh, call sign Toulouse, which by 20 June had HF, UHF, and FM frequencies available. Backup communications for immediate airstrikes in sectors F, G, H, and K could be transmitted through III DASC to the TACC. FAC requests for immediates in sectors I and J went directly through III DASC (Fig. 48).^{52/} Flight following was provided by the Paris Combat Reporting Center at Tan Son Nhut.

It was initially believed sufficient French-speaking VNAF FACs qualified to direct U.S. strikes would be available to operate in sectors F, G, H, and K, so that communications with the Cambodians would not present a problem.^{53/} Fewer were available than anticipated, however,

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OPERATION FREEDOM ACTION

AIR REQUEST NET




FIGURE 48

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and there were also few FANK Liaison Officers who could speak English. As a result, it became necessary to use USAF officers and airmen who were fluent in French to act as airborne interpreters. Although 7AF was able to fill this need from SEA resources, none of the officers was on flying status and none had attended the appropriate survival schools; thus waivers had to be obtained to employ them.^{54/}

Procedures also had to be established for communication between USAF FACs, VNAF FACs, and Cambodian Air Force aircraft. This was facilitated by establishing three common frequencies for establishing initial contact by radio. A common frequency was also established for initial contact between ground personnel and FACs. Since a majority of the FANK Liaison Officers had never worked with any type of air support previously, an instruction sheet was prepared by the TACC on how to use airplanes for air support, how to signal them, and related items. Provisions were also established for a proposed communications network incorporating an Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).^{55/} The ABCCC concept had not been implemented as of 1 July.

The Rules of Engagement for FREEDOM ACTION were the same as those for FREEDOM DEAL. There were no Category B LOCs, however, and targets identified by the ground commanders were considered validated.^{56/}

USAF aircraft flew their first strikes in the FREEDOM ACTION area on 20 June. On that date, 16 sorties struck enemy positions in the vicinity of Kampong Thom.^{57/} That city had been under enemy pressure since

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4 June, when a force of at least regimental size attacked the city. Although the city had been reinforced, fighting continued in the vicinity for the next week. As the month progressed, the situation became more tenuous. On 15-16 June, VNAF helicopters airlifted additional Cambodian troops to Kampong Thom as enemy forces moved within .7 kilometers of the center of the city. By 20 June, it was feared the city might fall at any time,^{58/} and on that date MACV directed 7AF to provide air support for the defenders. Two AC-119G gunship sorties, two UC-123K flareship sorties, and six fighter sorties supported friendly positions on 20 June. Through 22 June, approximately 12 gunship and 46 tactical air sorties flew in support of the town and by the end of the month, 82 fighter sorties had struck enemy positions in the vicinity.^{59/}

Airstrikes also supported the defense of Siem Reap, a key point on Route 6 in the Northwest, the site of Cambodia's only international airport outside of Phnom Penh, and the gateway city to Angkor Wat. Siem Reap was unsuccessfully attacked by Khmer Rouge forces on 8 and 10 June, and by the middle of the month the enemy occupied Angkor Wat. The Lon Nol government expressed fear that enemy occupation of the ruins at Angkor Wat would lead to the establishment of Prince Sihanouk there as head of a government in exile, and that this would further undermine the popular strength of the present government. Although Siem Reap was not threatened during the latter part of June, the airstrikes did aid the defenders in dislodging enemy units in outlying areas.^{60/}

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AIRSTRIKES CAMBODIAN INTERDICTION AREA




FIGURE 49

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**EXPANDED INTERDICTION
STRIKE CONCENTRATIONS
20 - 30 June 1970**




FIGURE 50

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During the ten days of the expanded interdiction campaign, 20-30 June 1970, some 226 sorties were flown in the expanded interdiction area, outside the limits of FREEDOM DEAL (Fig. 49). Targets included vehicles, key points on LOCs, enemy weapon positions, storage areas, and known enemy troop locations. During the ten-day period, however, most of the tactical airstrikes in Cambodia were in the FREEDOM DEAL area, still primarily concentrated around Lomphat, Labansiek, and Bakiev (Fig. 50).

The stress that had been placed on the protection of cultural, historic, and artistic properties throughout Cambodia was again emphasized as the expanded interdiction effort progressed. On 19 June 1970, a list of cultural sites was issued along with a restriction prohibiting strikes within 1,000 meters. Aircraft were to withdraw if ground fire were received from the restricted area. As photographs of each area were produced by 7AF reconnaissance units, prints were sent to all FACs, gunship units, tactical air units, and headquarters concerned with the Cambodian operation to aid them in identifying these historic areas. In addition, books of pictures of these cultural sites with maps showing their location were made up by the 12th Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron and sent to the commanders of major air units and DASCs in RVN. Copies were also sent to the Thai and Cambodian governments. As more sites were successfully identified and photographed, pictures were forwarded to the major units and the books were updated. The restricted list was further expanded by the FANK representatives on 28 June.^{61/} The campaign requirement that all targets be validated by FANK representatives provided further safeguards.

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From the outset of the interdiction campaign, the Typhoon A-37 FAC operation had been viewed as a temporary measure. On 26 June, the FAC/VR sectors throughout Cambodia were slightly realigned. Echo sector was eliminated and A, B, C, D, and K were expanded to cover that area (Fig. 5T).^{62/} On 28 June, the FAC/VR activity of the A-37s from Bien Hoa was discontinued.^{63/}

On 29 June, COMUSMACV notified 7AF that the authority which had established the FREEDOM ACTION operation, JCS 172344Z June 1970, was not to be continued to indicate the establishment of a major interdiction campaign throughout Cambodia. All strikes outside the FREEDOM DEAL area, he pointed out, were to be approved by COMUSMACV on a case-by-case basis.^{64/} This apparent change in direction for the campaign was further clarified by two messages on 30 June which set out the limits of operations effective 1 July. The interdiction area was restricted to the FREEDOM DEAL area, except that the eastern limits were extended to the RVN Border rather than to the 30-kilometer line as previously approved. In addition, a FREEDOM DEAL Extension was identified for selective tactical air and B-52 strikes. Its limits were Route 13 on the north, a line 200 meters west of the Mekong River on the west, the RVN Border on the east, and a line 200 meters south of Route 7 from 200 meters west of the Mekong River to the intersection with Route 78 and thence south-southwest along Route 78 to the RVN Border (Fig. 35). Operations in the extended area were to be against only identified, highly lucrative targets that posed a substantial threat to Allied forces. Further provisions allowed air reconnaissance over all of Cambodia but with armed escort and flak suppression permitted only in

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PAC SECTORS
AFTER 26 JUNE 1970




FIGURE 51

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the original FREEDOM DEAL area. Search and rescue missions were allowed over all of Cambodia and were authorized to return ground fire received in the conduct of these operations.^{65/}

By 1 July, 7AF, through Operation FREEDOM DEAL and the expanded interdiction operations associated with it, had succeeded in establishing an ongoing interdiction campaign in Cambodia. The number of LOCs interdicted would make enemy travel more difficult. Air support of beleaguered towns, such as Kampong Thom, had enabled them to survive the concerted enemy drive to take them. In addition, 7AF had established a target base with an ever-growing file of information on Cambodian targets and LOCs.

Operation FREEDOM DEAL presented the enemy with a much more difficult situation in Cambodia than would have been the case otherwise. Confronted with the need to resupply his forces almost entirely through Laos, the enemy now faced an interdiction force in being, ready to strike his resupply efforts at the first sign of activity. Any effort to expand his LOCs was also inhibited, since road construction equipment and any similar signs of activity in the interdiction area would prompt airstrikes upon detection and validation. The enemy was thus faced with having to anticipate running the gauntlet of U.S. interdiction from the entry points of his materiel into Laos from NVN, through the Laos panhandle, and throughout his LOC and storage areas in northeast Cambodia. Resupply would be a costly effort for the enemy.

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CHAPTER IV
AIRLIFT SUPPORT

During the Cambodian campaign, the 834th Air Division provided the following airlift support within the borders of Cambodia: (1) between 23 May and 30 June, 169 C-7 sorties carried 245.8 tons of cargo and 328 passengers into O Rang Airfield; (2) on 23 and 24 June, 45 C-7 sorties and three C-123 sorties airlifted 3,130 refugees from Bung Lung and Ba Kiev Airfields in northeastern Cambodia to Pleiku, RVN; (3) on 29 and 30 June, eight C-130 sorties airlifted 110 tons of weapons and ammunition from Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa to Phnom Penh; (4) three C-130s airdropped 44 tons of ammunition to the 1st Air Cav Div at Firebase David near O Rang on 27 May; (5) a C-130 airdropped 4.4 tons of ammunition on 23 June and 5.6 tons of ammunition and radio gear on 29 June to Cambodian forces at Kampong Thom; (6) between 1 May and 27 June, C-130 aircraft delivered 20 COMMANDO VAULT weapons in dense jungle, clearing 16 helicopter landing zones. Figure 52 provides a statistical summary of airlift operations into 23 RVN airfields (Fig. 53) supporting operations in Cambodia between 28 April and 30 June 1967.

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TOTAL TONS (CARGO & PASSENGERS)

	<u>28-30 April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
C-7	455	4,042	3,512	8,009
C-123	751	6,463	7,448	14,662
C-130	<u>1,411</u>	<u>23,990</u>	<u>18,544</u>	<u>43,945</u>
Total	2,617	34,495	29,504	66,616
All RVN Airlift	9,116	110,344	98,065	217,525
% of all RVN Airlift	28.7%	31.3%	30.1%	30.6%

CARGO TONS

	<u>28-30 April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
C-7	300	2,733	2,346	5,379
C-123	466	4,860	5,534	10,860
C-130	<u>1,330</u>	<u>21,685</u>	<u>14,937</u>	<u>37,952</u>
Total	2,096	29,278	22,817	54,191
All RVN Airlift	5,423	69,920	54,421	129,764
% of all RVN Airlift	38.7%	41.9%	41.9%	41.8%

PASSENGERS

	<u>28-30 April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
C-7	1,174	10,907	9,710	21,791
C-123	613	13,361	15,955	29,929
C-130	<u>678</u>	<u>19,204</u>	<u>30,060</u>	<u>49,942</u>
Total	2,465	43,472	55,725	101,662
All RVN Airlift	30,779	336,868	363,698	731,345
% of all RVN Airlift	8.0%	12.9%	15.3%	13.9%

FIGURE 52

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(Fig. 52--Cont'd.)

SORTIES

	<u>28-30</u> <u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
C-7	213	2,656	2,363	5,232
C-123	129	1,510	1,516	3,155
C-130	194	2,326	1,603	4,123
Total	536	6,492	5,482	12,510
All RVN Airlift	4,472	35,885	30,496	70,853
% of all RVN Airlift	12.0%	18.1%	18.0%	17.7%

HIGH PRIORITY AIRLIFT SUPPORT
Tactical Emergency, Emergency Resupply, & Combat Essential

<u>High-Priority</u> <u>Tons</u>	<u>28-30</u> <u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
Tons	298	10,443	4,494	15,235
All-RVN Hi-Priority Tons	1,748	12,306	6,127	20,181
% of all-RVN Hi-Priority Tons	17.0%	84.9%	73.3%	75.5%
Avg High-Priority Tons/Day	99.3	336.9	149.8	238.0
Oct-Mar Avg Hi-Pri Tons/Day	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7
Hi-Pri Tons as % of Tons to Aflds Supporting Cambodian Ops	11.4%	30.3%	15.2%	22.9%
<u>High-Priority</u> <u>Sorties</u>	<u>28-30</u> <u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sorties	37	1,510	491	2,038
All-RVN Hi-Priority Sorties	276	1,761	909	2,946
% of all-RVN Hi-Pri Sorties	13.4%	85.7%	54.0%	69.2%
Avg High-Pri Sorties/Day	12.3	48.7	16.4	31.8
Oct-Mar Avg Hi-Pri Sorties/Day	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.2
Hi-Pri Sorties as % of Sorties to Aflds Supporting Cambodian Ops	6.9%	23.3%	9.0%	16.3%

FIGURE 52

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SUPPORTING AIRFIELDS

<u>Airfields</u>	<u>Total Tons</u> <u>28 April - 30 June</u>
Song Be	17,053
Bu Dop	12,989
DJAMAP	8,989
Pleiku	5,596
Katum	5,194
Loc Ninh	2,520
Thien Ngon	2,498
Tonle Cham	2,466
Tay Ninh West	1,709
Quan Loi	1,671
Moc Hoa	1,508
Duc Co	1,165
Ha Tien South	548
Don Phuoc	543
Plei Djereng New	404
Dau Tieng	361
Chau Duc	359
Duc Lap 2	232
Tieu Atar	194
Hon Quan	174
Thuy Dong	158
Duc Hue	157
Minh Thanh	128
	<hr/>
	66,616

FIGURE 53

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FOOTNOTES

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2. (TS) Interview, Col Scott Smith, Dep Dir, TACC, 14 Jun 70.
3. (TS) Msg, C/C MACV to UCMR, 7AF, 220404Z Apr 70;
(TS) Msg, CJCS to COMUSMACV, 250125Z Apr 70.
4. (TS) Msg, 7AF TACC to DASCs, 281310Z Apr 70;
(TS) Msg, 7AF TACC to Nakhon Phanom AB, 281300Z Apr 70.
5. (TS) Msg, 7AF TACC to 14th SOS, 280410Z Apr 70;
(TS) Msg, 7AF TACC, 291045Z Apr 70;
(C) Ltr, Brig Gen Roberts to Nguyen Dinh Lan, 30 Apr 70.
6. (C) Interview, Lt Col Robert G. Daugherty, ALO, 1st Air Div, 6 May 70. (Hereafter cited: Daugherty Interview.)
7. (C) Ibid;
(C) Interview, Lt Col Ronald E. Bryan, ALO, TF Shoemaker, 3 May 70.
8. (C) Daugherty Interview;
(C) Interview, Capt Michael C. Press, Head Beagle FAC, 7 May 70.
9. (C) Interview, Col Kingston, Comdr, 3d Bde, 4 May 70;
(C) Interview, Maj Lorenzo M. Dozz, G-2, 1st Air Cav Div, 7 May 70.

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10. (C) Interview, Capt Robert C. Kimball, Air Ops FAC, and TF Shoemaker, 3 May 70;
(C) Interview, Capt Joseph Kopec, G-2 Air, 1st Air Cav Div, 3 May 70;
(C) Interview, Maj Lorenzo M. Doss, G-2, 1st Air Cav Div, 7 May 70.
11. (C) Interview, Capt John A. Norden, Rash FAC, 3 May 70;
(C) Interview, Maj Don L. Brooks, Rash FAC, 3 May 70;
(C) Interview, Maj Robert E. Drawbaugh, Redmarker ALO, 3 May 70;
(C) Interview, Capt William F. Peavy, Nile FAC, 4 May 70;
(TS) Msg, Col Scott Smith to Brig Gen John W. Roberts, 011530Z May 70.
12. (C) Interview, Capt George N. York, S-3 Air, 3d Bde, 4 May 70;
(C) Interview, Capt George E. Patch, Asst S-3, 11th ACR, 4 May 70;
(C) Interview, Col Nguyen Van Tho, Comdr, 3d ARVN Abn Bde, 4 May 70;
(C) Daugherty Interview.
13. (TS) Interview, Brig Gen John W. Roberts, Dir, 7AF TACC, 6 Jun 70;
(C) Interview, Lt Col Bryan, ALO, TF Shoemaker, 6 May 70.
14. (S) Notes, Maj David I. Folkman, Jr., on TF Shoemaker Planning Meeting, 2-3 May 70.
15. (C) Interview, Capt David F. McAadoo, 3d Bde Aviation Platoon, 5 May 70;
(C) Interview, Capt John A. Norden, Rash FAC, 3 May 70.
16. (TS) Interview, Brig Gen John W. Roberts, Dir, 7AF TACC, by Maj David I. Folkman, Jr., and Maj Philip D. Caine, 6 Jun 70;
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17. (C) Interview, Capt William F. Peavy, Nile Control Duty Officer, 4 May 70.
(C) Interview, Door Gunners, C&C Ship, 1st Air Cav Div Arty, 5 May 70.
18. (C) Interview, Maj Robert E. Drawbaugh, ALO, 3d ARVN Abn Bde, 3 May 70.
19. (C) Interview Col Kingston, Comdr, 3d Bde, 5 May 70;
(C) Interview, Lt Col Norman H. Moffett, Comdr, 1/12 Bn, 6 May 70;
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21. (C) Response to Questionnaire, Lt Col Charles G. Maynaud, ALO, 25th ARVN Inf Div, "Air Support in Cambodia," 23 Jun 70.
22. (U) Ltr, Lt Gen Michael S. Davison, Comdr, Air Ops, MACV, 14 Jun 70.
23. (C) Rprt, 834th Air Div Ops, 1 Jul 70.
24. (C) Interview, SP4 Richard O. Grubb, Sr Analyst, Cambodian Desk, MACV J-2.
25. (C) PERINTREP Nr 21-70, II FFV;
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26. (S/NF) Briefing, Capt Richard E. Schroeder, OIC, Out-Country Log Desk, Logistics Section, OB Branch, CICV, Impact of Current Cambodian Cross-Border Ops, Annex C, 1 Jul 70.

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5. Ibid.
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8. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Info CJCS, 210918Z May 70.
9. (TS) Msg, CJCS to CINCPAC, Info COMUSMACV, 240136Z May 70.
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11. (TS) Msg, 7AF TACC to 504th TASG, 240452Z May 70.
12. (TS) Msg, 7AF to 366th TFW, Da Nang AB, 251200Z May 70;
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13. (S) Interview, Lt Col W. G. Ralph with Maj Philip Caine, 7AF,
8 Jun 70.
(Hereafter cited: Ralph Interview.)
14. (TS) Interview, Col Scott Smith with Majors David I. Folkman
(TS) and Philip D. Caine, 7AF, 15 Jun 70;
(TS) Memo of Agreement, ROE, Cambodia, 20 May 70;
Ryan Interview.
15. (TS) Memo of Agreement, ROE, Cambodia, 20 May 70;
(TS) Ryan Interview.
16. (TS) Ryan Interview.
17. (S) Briefing, 7AF DITT, "Target Development Process," 1 Jun 70.
(Hereafter cited: DITT Briefing.)
18. (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 202311Z May 70.
19. (TS) Ryan Interview;
(S) DITT Briefing;
(TS) Interview with Brig Gen John W. Roberts by Majors David I.
Folkman, and Philip D. Caine, 6 Jun 70. (Hereafter cited:
Roberts Interview.)
20. (S) DITT Briefing.
21. (TS) Memo for Brig Gen John W. Roberts, subj: Intelligence
Targeting in Cambodia, 21 May 70. (Hereafter cited:
Roberts Memorandum.)
22. (TS) Rprt, 7AF TACC, "Air Ops in Cambodia, 29 Apr-22 Jun 70,"
23 Jun 70. (Hereafter cited: TACC Report.)
23. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 210422Z May 70.
24. (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 222253Z May 70.
25. (C) Summary, 7AF, In-Country Reconnaissance (Published Daily),
1 Apr - 30 May 70.
26. (TS) Msg, 7AF to 460th TRW, 261100Z May 70;
(TS) TACC Report.
27. (TS) Ltr, Lt Col Bu Tith to USMACV, subj: Request and Authorization
for Airstrikes, 29 May 70.

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28. (TS) Msg, 7AF to MACV (J-3), 301240Z May 70.
29. (S) Ralph Interview.
30. (TS) TACC Report.
31. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 06324Z May 70.
32. (TS) Ryan Interview.
33. (TS) Msg, 7AF to II DASC, 091215Z Jun 70.
34. (TS) - Memo of Understanding, Brig Gen John W. Roberts, USAF: Maj Hin Nim, FANK; Maj Penn Randa, CAF, 6 Jun 70.
35. (TS) Msg, 7AF to 3d TFW, 110515Z Jun 70.
36. (S) DI Briefing.
37. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to Comdr, 7AF, 030755Z Jun 70;
(TS) TACC Report.
38. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to Acting CJCS, 091210Z Jun 70.
39. (TS) Msg, Adm Thomas H. Moorer, Acting CJCS, to Adm John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, 092333Z Jun 70.
40. (TS) TACC Report.
41. (C) Logs, TACC, "Sorties Flown in FREEDOM DEAL," (Hereafter cited: TACC Logs.)
42. (TS) TACC Report.
43. (C) TACC Logs.
44. (S) Cambodian Intelligence Briefing;
(TS) TACC Report.
45. (TS) Briefing (Proposed), TACC to COMUSMACV, 15 Jun 70.
46. (TS) Msg, Adm Thomas H. Moorer, Acting CJCS to Adm John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, Gen Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., COMUSMACV, 160424Z Jun 70.
47. (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 172344Z Jun 70.

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- 48. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 172344Z Jun 70.
- 48. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 181005Z Jun 70.
- 49. (TS) Msg, Adm John S. McCain, Jr., to Gen Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., 190213Z Jun 70.
- 50. (TS) Msg, 7AF to 23d TASS, 201145Z Jun 70;
(TS) Msg, 7AF to 23d TASS, 191455Z Jun 70.
- 51. (TS) Msg, 7AF to III DASC, 220955Z Jun 70;
(TS) Interview, Lt Col Alfred C. Baker, Jr., with Maj Philip Caine, 4 Jul 70.
- 52. (TS) Msg, 7AF to III DASC, 220955Z Jun 70;
(TS) Msg, 7AF to COMUSMACV, 250350Z Jun 70.
- 53. (TS) TACC Report.
- 54. (S) Msg, 7AF to CINCPACAF, 241125Z Jun 70.
- 55. (C) Ltr, TACO to VNAF TACC, Coordination between VNAF and USAF, 25 Jun 70.
- 56. (TS) Msg, 7AF to COMUSMACV, 250350Z Jun 70.
- 57. (C) TACC Logs.
- 58. (S) Cambodian Intelligence Briefings.
- 59. (TS) TACC Report;
(C) TACC Logs.
- 60. (S) Cambodian Intelligence Briefings.
- 61. (C) Msg, COMUSMACV to CG, DMAC, 201037Z May 70;
(C) Msg, 7AF to 3d TFW, 280945Z Jun 70.
(C) Msg, 7AF to 3d TFW, 191015Z Jun 70;
(C) Interview, Capt Louis Annacone by Maj Philip Caine, 20 Jul 70.
- 62. (TS) Msg, 7AF to CG, 1st MAW, 260955Z Jun 70.
- 63. (C) TACC Logs.
- 64. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to Comdr, 7AF, 290950Z Jun 70.
- 65. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 301100Z Jun 70.

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APPENDIX I
AIR SUMMARY
USAP

UNIT	ACFT TYPE	PSYWAR		FLARE DROP		AIRB ALERT		CBT TROOP											
		S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT
S= Sorties FD=Fly Time																			
1280S	C-123	5	11.5					2	4.0										
837ARD	C-123																		
950S	C-123	1	2.1																
1280S	UC-123	39	104.1	11	42.8														
315TAN	UC-123			1	5.3														
377TAN	C-130	3	8.6																
8TFN	C-130	4	18.6																
837ARD	C-130							10	20.0										
817CS	AG-47					1	3.3												
837ARD	C-7							136	273.7										
950S	C-47	36	93.8																
UNIT	ACFT TYPE	AIR ABORT		AIR INTERDICTION		ESCORT COVER		RES. GAP		PHOTO RECON		CLOSE AIR SUPPORT		STRIKE		FLACK SUPPRESSION		MUDY	
		S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT
S= Sorties FD=Fly Time																			
12TFN	F-4	30	41.9	71	94.5	2	4.0					121	167.5	592	808.3			56	74.9
866TFN	F-4	42	51.3	277	432.7			2	3.0			117	376.4	385	560.5				
8TFN	F-4	6	9.2	6	9.8									15	23.7				

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UNIT	ACFT TYPE	AIR ABORT		AIR INTERDICTION		ESCORT COVER	RES CAP	PHOTO RECON		CLOSE AIR SUPPORT		STRIKE		FLACK SUPPRESSION	NUDY
8TFW	F-37	24	34.1	142	212.9			1	1.9	1978	2488.6	58	74.7	2	3.7
8TFW	F-100	9	13.8	40	55.6					284	333.0	14	17.5		
81TFW	F-100	74	96.4	272	389.0					853	1297.8	1047	1545.6		
85TFW	F-100	30	33.4	138	208.2					1850	2713.7	100	135.2		43 62.4
132TFW	RF-4							1	2.8						
160TFW	RF-4	2	2.6					57	120.3						

UNIT	ACFT TYPE	AIR ABORT		AIR INTERDICTION		ARMED RECON		CLOSE AIR SUPPORT		FLARE DROP		STRIKE		VISUAL RECON		ESCAPES COVER		RECON ESCORT	
		S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT
SubSorties FT= Fly Time	AC-119	5	16.3	1	2.7	1	3.2	9	36.1	1	4.5								
	AC-119	14	49.6	9	35.8			127	311.7	20	76.0	9	36.0						
	AC-119	9	29.9	5	18.3	1	1.3	7	26.7	3	11.8	2	6.5						
2280S	A-1					2	6.8												
5650W	A-1	4	10.2	4	10.8	6	27.8	4	16.8			4	17.6			4	15.4	10	25.7
8TFW	AO-123	3	8.8			3	9.9							1	3.0				

UNIT	ACFT TYPE	ARMED FAC		CLOSE AIR SUPPORT		Fwd AIR CONT		PAINT		TRAINING		VISUAL RECON		PSYCH WAR		AIR ABORT		AIR REFUEL	
		S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT
S-Sorties	FT-Fly Time																		
197AS	OV-10	131	373.8	5	15.7	685	1896.3	4	2.3	4	3.5	420	633.6						
217AS	OV-10					8	24.9												
197AS	O-1					6	18.9					8	29.8						
217AS	O-1					138	399.0					99	197.6						

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UNIT	ACFT TYPE	ARMED PAC	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	FM AIR COMB	MAINT	TRAINING	VISUAL RECON	PSYCH WAR	AIR ABORT	AIR REFUEL
22TAS	0-1			232 590.8			352 616.4			
19TAS	0-2									
960S	0-2							2 7.5		
								2 9.3		
19TAS	0-2A			95 332.1			97 308.9			
21TAS	0-2A			129 404.5			88 163.9			
22TAS	0-2A			44 154.9			83 175.6			
960S	0-2A							6 1.6		
19TAS	0-2B									
21TAS	0-2B							2 11.5		
22TAS	0-2B							1 5.2		
960S	0-2B							1 3.3	1 1.5	
23TAS	0-2B							300 670.5		
								1 6.1		
30TSM	EC-135									26 104.0

UNIT	ACFT TYPE	AIR ABORT	RADIO DIR FIND	S	FT	S	FT
S-Scorties	FT-Fly Time						
360TSM	EC-47	18	72.7	409	2649.2		
361TSM	EC-47	2	1.4	66	454.5		
362TSM	EC-47			33	230.8		

UNIT	ACFT TYPE	PHOTO RECON	IR RECON	RADIO RELAY	AIR ABORT	VISUAL RECON
S-Scorties	FT-Fly Time					
460TSM	RF-4		35	65.2		99 198.2

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UNIT	ACFT TYPE	PHOTO RECON	IR RECON	RADIO RELAY	AIR ABORT	VISUAL RECON			
432TSM	RF-4C	15	39.4						
460TSM	RF-4C	79	153.8	64	130.7	1	2.3	5	6.3
									108 304.3
460TSM	RB-57	92	163.8	2	3.6	1	2.0		
460TSM	RF-101	216	441.2	1	1.8			7	14.1
								2	5.2

AIR SUMMARY
WAF

UNIT	ACFT TYPE	END AIR COMB	VISUAL RECON	AIR ABORT	PSYCH WAR	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	AIR INTERDICTION	AIRB ALERT	FLARE DROP
Scatteries FT-571y Time		S	FT	S	FT	S	FT	S	FT
1121S	O-1	69	170.6	40	68.4				
1141S	O-1	90	127.1	34	60.2				
1161S	O-1	57	144.3	88	190.3				
1121S	U-17			3	5.0				
1141S	U-17			1	2.5	49	80.7		
1161S	U-17			4	8.8				
						46	126.7		
514FS	A-1								
518FS	AA-1					272	602.4		
						257	399.1		
520FS	A-37					194	211.1	4	5.0
524FS	A-37			2	2.6	216	278.1		
817CS	AC-47			1	3.8	38	157.5	23	73.8
817TS	AC-47					5	45.5	1	2.8
									101.7
522FS	P-5					199	166.2		

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APPENDIX II
USING AIRPLANES

AIRPLANES CARRYING BOMBS, NAPALM, AND 20MM CANNON ARE AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE. YOU CAN REQUEST THESE AIRPLANES EITHER FROM PHNOM PENH OR AN AIRBORNE "FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER" (FAC) ON FM FREQUENCY 42.5. THIS WILL BE A COMMON FREQUENCY AND YOU MAY BE ASKED TO SWITCH TO ALPHA-46.80 BRAVO-59.65 CHARLIE-63.30 DELTA-63.65 ECHO-67.75 FOXTROT-69.00 (I.E. IF THE FAC SAYS "COME UP ALPHA" SWITCH YOUR PRC-25 TO 46.80). YOU MAY BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO THESE FACs IN CAMBODIAN OR FRENCH, BUT, IF ANYONE WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH IS AVAILABLE, KEEP HIM NEAR YOUR PRC-25 RADIO. TELL PHNOM PENH OR THE FAC YOUR SITUATION AND PROBLEM (I.E. CLOSE ENEMY TROOPS, TAKING MORTAR FIRE, ETC.) AND THEY WILL PROVIDE AIRPLANES IN ABOUT 45 MINUTES. KEEP TALKING TO THE FAC AT ALL TIMES, INFORMING HIM OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT ARRIVE, THE PILOTS WILL DEPEND ON THE FAC TO TELL THEM WHERE TO BOMB, AND THE FAC WILL DEPEND ON YOU TO TELL HIM WHAT YOU WANT BOMBED. IF THE ENEMY IS OVER 500 METERS OR SO FROM YOUR POSITION, PICK A BIG MOUNTAIN, RIVER, FIRE, ETC., THAT BOTH YOU AND THE FAC CAN SEE AND TELL THE FAC, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HIT 700 METERS ON A HEADING OF 250° FROM THAT POINT. IF YOU ARE GOING TO BE DEFENDING A POSITION FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, MAKE A LARGE, EASILY SEEN ARROW (20 FEET LONG) THAT YOU CAN PIVOT AND POINT AT THE ENEMY, AND THEN TELL THE FAC HOW FAR AWAY THE ENEMY IS. AT NIGHT, PUT OIL SOAKED RAGS IN A CAN ALONG THE ARROW AND BURN THEM. AS THE ENEMY GETS CLOSER WE WILL BE MORE INTERESTED IN YOUR POSITION THAN HIS. IF YOU HAVE SMOKE OF ANY KIND, USE IT TO IDENTIFY YOUR POSITION. IF NO SMOKE IS AVAILABLE USE PANELS MADE OUT OF RAGS, SHIRTS,

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BLANKETS, ETC., AND LAY THEM ON THE GROUND PARALLEL TO YOUR POSITION. THEN TELL THE FAC WHERE YOU ARE FROM THESE PANELS (IE NORTH OR SOUTHWEST ETC.). ONCE THE FAC KNOWS WHAT YOU WANT BOMBED, HE WILL MARK THAT POSITION FOR THE AIRPLANES TO HIT WITH HIS SMOKE. THE STRIKE WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY. ANOTHER WAY TO IDENTIFY A POSITION TO BE STRUCK IS TO MARK IT WITH ARTILLERY OR MORTAR FIRE. KEEP YOUR PEOPLE WELL PROTECTED BY BEING IN BUNKERS, HOLES OR JUST LYING DOWN WHILE THESE PLACES ARE BEING BOMBED. ALSO KEEP THE FAC AS WELL INFORMED AS POSSIBLE ON YOUR PRESENT SITUATION AND WHERE YOU WANT THE NEXT BOMBS. THE FAC IS YOUR KEY TO GOOD AIR SUPPORT. IF YOU HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR AIR YOU KNOW ABOUT MORE THAN 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE, PASS THIS ALONG TO PHNOM PENH OR THE FAC AND THEY WILL SCHEDULE IT FOR YOU. THIS WILL GIVE US TIME TO SET UP THE AIRCRAFT AND THE CREWS.

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AIR GROUND REQUEST NET




FIGURE 1

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
USE OF SIGNAL PANELS

1. Panels should also be used to mark the position of friendly patrols or other small units that do not have radios. The same panels cannot be used all the time or the enemy may learn of them and use the same panels to mark their positions. The following panel schedule is suggested to mark positions of friendly units that do not have radios:

25 June 70	L
26 June 70	T
27 June 70	A
28 June 70	□
29 June 70	X
30 June 70	✓
1 July 70	□
2 July 70	L
3 July 70	✓
4 July 70	X
5 July 70	L
6 July 70	□
7 July 70	T
8 July 70	A
9 July 70	X
10 July 70	✓

2. In addition to marking and validating the position of friendly forces without radios, panels can be used to indicate direction and distance to enemy forces. The suggested method is as follows:

a. An arrow to indicate direction:




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
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
b. Short Distances indicated by 100 meter panels paralleled to the arrow as follows:




100 meters




200 meters



300 meters




400 meters




500 meters


c. Longer distances (500 meters +) indicated by combination 500 meter and 100 meter panels. The 500 Meter panels are placed 90 degrees to the arrow, the 100 meter panels are placed paralleled to the panels. Examples follow:



600 meters



1200 meters



1500 meters

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APPENDIX III

FREEDOM DEAL LOC STATUS

At the time of the inauguration of the interdiction campaign in northeast Cambodia, the condition of the primary LOCs and their suitability for interdiction varied. Of the primary waterways, the Mekong River from the Laos Border south to Kratie was navigable for motorized watercraft as was Waterway 4 from Southern Laos to Stung Treng and Waterway 6 from Stung Treng east to the RVN border. Waterway 7 was navigable only by small craft from Stung Treng east to the RVN border.

The major north-south road was Route 13, which paralleled the Mekong from the Laotian border south to Kratie, and then turned to Snoul and the RVN border. The road was generally in good to excellent condition and a portion of it from Stung Treng to near Kratie was asphalt and concrete. There were 16 bridges and a ferry crossing the rivers along this route. The major eastwest route in the interdiction area was Route 19, which extended from Stung Treng to the RVN border. It was in generally good condition although not hard-surfaced. Route 194 was motorable southeast from the Laotian border to its junction with Route 19 at Bung Long; and Route 141 was motorable to just south of Lomphat, where it became a trail. Route 133 connected Routes 13 and 141 across the southern portion of the area and was motorable but in poor condition. Route 97 from the Laotian border south to Siem Pang was in trail status and portions of it were overgrown.

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GLOSSARY

ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AO	Area of Operation
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARVN	Army of Republic of Vietnam
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
Abn	Airborne
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
Bde	Brigade
Cav	Cavalry
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CJCS	The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC	Capital Military District
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COSVN	Central Office of South Vietnam (VC Hq)
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FANK	National Forces of Cambodia
FARK	Royal Forces of Cambodia
FFV	Field Forces Vietnam
FM	Frequency Modulation
GOC	Government of Cambodia
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HF	High Frequency
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
IDP	Interdiction Point
IR	Infrared
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese High Command)
KBA	Killed by Air
KHMER	Ethnic Cambodian
KHMER Rouge	Cambodian Communists
KIA	Killed in Action
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter
LRRP	Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LZ	Landing Zone
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Medevac	Medical Evacuation

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NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OpRep	Operations Report
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PW	Prisoner of War
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SAR	Search and Rescue
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SLAR	Side-Looking Airborne Radar
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TIC	Troops in Contact
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOT	Time over Target
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
USN	United States Navy
VNAF	Vietnam Air Force