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ANNEX B

CAMBODIA POLITICAL ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (S) Background. On 18 March 1970, both houses of the Cambodian legislature met at the Government's request and voted to withdraw confidence in Prince Sihanouk as Chief of State. The Prince, who was in Moscow at the time, flew to Peking where he decided to return to power with Communist support, which Hanoi and Peking readily offered. He subsequently established his Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK) and an umbrella-type political organization called the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), of which Sihanouk is chairman. For its part, the new leadership in Phnom Penh changed Cambodia from a monarchy to a republic and equipped it with the necessary accouterments. In effect, however, the Khmer Republic is largely the creature of Lon Nol and his confidants, whose main prop is the military. Political parties represented in the Government are, by and large, responsive to one or other of the political elite, and their influence does not extend much beyond major urban areas.

2. (S) The Current GKR

a. In the nearly 4 years of its existence, the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) has been plagued by internecine political infighting, a problem which has often adversely affected the war effort. Despite all the sniping and backbiting, however, President Lon Nol remains the single most effective and popular leader on the scene, and his presence at the head of the GKR assures a measure of stability and solidarity. As long as his health holds out and he can sustain his activities, the Khmer political situation will likely remain under control. In view of their preeminent

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position, the Armed Forces, particularly Chief of Staff
Sosthene Fernandez who ranks high in GKR councils, will play
a pivotal role in the choice of any successor to Lon Nol.

b. The GKR has been in fairly good shape politically for
the last year or so. Barring several periods of student-
teacher dissidence, primarily over economic issues,
Phnom Penh has remained relatively calm. Thanks largely
to the efforts of Prime Minister Long Boret, who has
close ties with Lon Nol, relations between civil and
military officials have improved. Nevertheless, power
struggles within the ruling Socio-Republican Party and
interparty squabbling at the national level remain serious
and could undermine the viability of the GKR. Moreover,
corruption and maladroitness leadership, endemic in all
Southeast Asian countries but frequently widely publicized
in Cambodia, remain pervasive. A growing problem
derives from the fact that Lon Nol and his chief aides
have become more and more identified with the war and the
worsening economic situation. Without aggressive action
to reverse these trends, they could in time produce
irresistible pressure for violent political changes/
the GKR's collapse.

3. (S) Khmer Communist (KC) Political Infrastructure

a. Political Organizations

(1) The key organization with the KC infrastructure
is the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Control of
the insurgency at the national level is exercised by the
Central Party Committee. This committee probably con-
ducts political liaison and coordination with the North
Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi. It is
also likely that there is military liaison and coordination

with the supreme Vietnamese Communist organization
(COSVN) in South Vietnam and, possibly, the North
Vietnamese High Command.

(2) The Standing Committee of the Central Party
Committee handles day-to-day administrative, military,
and political decisions; more sensitive policy decisions
are deferred to the Central Committee, some of whose
members probably also function as the key leaders in the
six KC military regions in Cambodia.

(3) Standing Committee directives are passed down
to the six KC regions, which are subdivided into sectors
(roughly equivalent to province in echelon), districts,
subdistricts, villages, and hamlets. At each echelon,
control is exercised by a local committee responsible
for political, military, and administrative matters.

(4) CPK members fill virtually all key positions
within the infrastructure, especially at the higher
levels. Only at village, and possibly district, level
are non-Communist officials found. According to recent
reports, however, even these few personalities are
being retrained or replaced by CPK cadre. Purges of
non-Party military leaders in all areas of the country
since January 1974 have further strengthened the grip
of the CPK on the insurgent movement.

b. CPK Leagues

(1) The control and social organization of the popu-
lace under KC rule is also implemented by KC leagues.
These leagues, structured along CPK lines, are
covert Party organizations which organize and direct
the populace through their control of a number of front
organizations. In KC-controlled territory, all persons

are categorized by age, sex, and occupation and placed under the responsibility of the various front groups.

(2) Like other Southeast Asian Communist insurgencies, the Cambodian Communists have also made use of national-level front organizations.

(a) FUNK. The most important of the front organizations is the FUNK, which will supposedly serve as the replacement instrument for the Lon Nol Government. FUNK, which exists in little more than name only, was established in 1970, primarily to unite and incorporate under one umbrella organization the various components of the insurgency in Cambodia. Thus, the front encompasses such organizations as the GRUNK and the Cambodia People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF) and serves to tie together the divergent Communist and non-Communist forces in-country.

(b) GRUNK. Sihanouk formed his GRUNK in Peking in 1970 after he was ousted as Khmer head of state. In practice, it is little more than a figurehead leadership group giving a facade of legality to Communist activities in Cambodia and serving as a rallying point for international opinion.

(c) CPNLAF. The CPNLAF is the front organization for KC-led military forces in Cambodia. Like FUNK, the CPNLAF exists in little more than title only. Actual control resides in the Military Affairs Committee of "High Headquarters," an alias for the CPK Central Committee.

c. Role of Outside Powers. The KC depend on North Vietnam and the PRC for materiel and political support. However, few specifics are known about the mission and structure of the liaison/advisory effort existing between the KC and these two important supporters.

(1) Vietnamese/KC Relations. COSVN is the primary Vietnamese Communist headquarters that coordinates with and advises the KC. To this effect, a liaison section in COSVN was established in 1970 with the following missions: to exchange planning data; to train KC forces in military techniques and tactics; to assist the KC in their budget and finance systems; to provide medical training and establish dispensaries; and to collect intelligence data.

(2) Liaison committees subordinate to the COSVN liaison section serve as the primary and official point of contact between the KC and Vietnamese Communist elements throughout most of Cambodia. In addition, a limited number of liaison/advisory cadre assist KC personnel at regional and sector training centers, although it is unlikely that any of these personnel are actually instructors.

(3) In northeastern Cambodia, the North Vietnamese apparently have their own organization to deal with the KC. Some reports have indicated that an NVA security group, located in Kratie Province, serves in this capacity and that it has the following missions: to control the activities of NVA military units and Vietnamese civilian residents in the area; to maintain good relations with KC in order to facilitate the

purchase and shipment of supplies; to advise local KC
military and administrative organizations; and to
settle conflicts between NVA and KC regional forces.

Another NVA security group trains medics for KC
regional forces.

(4) Few, if any, Vietnamese Communist advisers have
operated with KC tactical units since the withdrawal
of North Vietnamese combat forces from Cambodia in 1972.

Although the Vietnamese Communists were instrumental in
establishing an infrastructure and expanding the KC
insurgency in 1970, they currently retain little direct
influence over the movement. How this occurred is not
clear, but it is certain that the insurgency grew
quickly and, perhaps, became too large to be effectively
influenced by a relative handful of Vietnamese advisers.
In any case, the KC have established firm control over
the movement, remaining dependent on the Vietnamese
for munitions and equipment. In return, the KC provide
rice and travel rights to Vietnamese Communist units in
Cambodia.

(5) High-level KC cadre are aware of the possible
limitations on their autonomy by overreliance on
Vietnamese. The latter, on the other hand, are aware
of Khmer resentment toward their presence in Cambodia
and have apparently instructed the liaison committees
(estimated at 1,000-2,000 personnel) and all military
units to cooperate with the KC. This policy does not,
however, preclude the use of force or disruptive tactics
when the KC block Vietnamese Communist objectives.
Thus, the reported NVA support of Khmer insurgent
splinter groups in northeast Cambodia and the fighting

which has occurred between the KC and the now deactivated NVA 1st Division elements in the southwest may have resulted from the failure of more peaceful means of achieving NVA goals. In any case, it is likely that common needs and ideology will override traditional animosities and suspicions and will insure a lasting, if somewhat strained, relationship of mutual support. There is some evidence that the North Vietnamese, concerned about the long-term reliability of the KC, have placed a ceiling on their military aid for the Khmer insurgents.

d. PRC/KC Relations. While the KC depend on both North Vietnam and the PRC for support, they are reportedly aligned politically with the Chinese. Beginning with open Chinese support for Sihanouk's government in exile in 1970, the PRC has consistently given vocal support to the KC and has funneled munitions and funds to the KC through the North Vietnamese. Although few details of Chinese aid are available, there is some evidence that much of the equipment previously thought to have been provided by the North Vietnamese may have been sent by the PRC, with the North Vietnamese acting only as transporting agents. As KC leader Khieu Samphan's China visit in April-May 1974 demonstrated, the PRC has publicly increased its support of the KC, apparently even at the expense of Prince Sihanouk. This new prestige for KC leaders provides them a political boost and could ultimately mean increased financial and logistical support from the PRC.

e. USSR/KC Relations. Moscow, in effect, signed on in support of Sihanouk in 1970 but has little influence with the KC. At present, there are no known Soviet-KC trade or military aid agreements; however, this could change if the Soviets wish to increase their influence with the KC.

4. (S) Sihanouk/Khieu Samphan Contest for Leadership. For the first time since Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970, a real alternative to the exiled Prince's leadership has emerged in the person of Khieu Samphan, KC in-country Commander in Chief and "Defense Minister." Khieu Samphan was given a post on the FUNK Politburo and the title of Minister of National Defense in Sihanouk's Peking-based government-in-exile in May 1970. He was appointed commander in chief of the military arm of Sihanouk's united front organization in June 1971 and acting Prime Minister in November 1973.

a. Khieu Samphan's recent 2-month tour, which took him to Peking, Hanoi, Pyongyang, and several Eastern European and African states, represents a significant step in his steady rise to prominence at Sihanouk's expense. Long before this, however, Sihanouk had acknowledged the leading role of the KC in the Cambodian insurgency, especially of Samphan and other ministers in the "interior." This was further evidenced when Sihanouk transferred all of the remaining GRUNK ministerial portfolios to in-country KC leaders in November 1973 in a move that was also designed to remove the stigma of "exile" from his Peking-based government. The KC leadership quickly snatched this opportunity to assert an added degree of independence from their head of state, and Sihanouk's personal influence on the KC has declined even more since then.

b. Although Samphan's recent trip abroad was apparently designed to enhance both his and the KC's international stature, it was probably also intended to sell the argument that the KC represent the primary political force in Cambodia and that their views, not Sihanouk's, must be reckoned with before any negotiated solution to the war is possible.

c. While the KC most likely believe that they will have to live with Sihanouk at least temporarily after the war, the buildup that Samphan has received casts a shadow over Sihanouk's political future and will make it easier for him to be dumped. At this point, however, Sihanouk is by no means out of the picture, and it is doubtful that either the insurgents or Peking can jettison the Prince while the fighting continues, since he has appeal to the Cambodian peasantry. For his part, Sihanouk knows he is in a poor position to contest the KC threat to his position and may in fact have resigned himself to the fact that they have gained permanent ascendancy. Sihanouk is remaining active in the political scene to retain what influence he can. He has volunteered to represent the KC at the UN session this fall, perhaps in an attempt to preserve what remains of his prestige.

5. (S) Current Developments in the Political Situation

a. The GKR's July 1974 Peace Initiative

(1) On 9 July 1974, the Cambodian Government issued a new statement on peace negotiations. The formal declaration invited the KC to enter immediately into discussions at a mutually agreeable time and place to find a solution to the conflict. The proposal also expressed Phnom Penh's hope that such talks would in turn lead to a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation. In addition, it appealed to all countries to assist in effecting a dialogue.

(2) This was the GKR's first major peace initiative since 6 July 1973 when it issued a proposal that stressed the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops and a cease-fire before negotiations could start. Phnom Penh is

optimistic that its more flexible approach to negotiations will elicit favorable world reaction and gain support for this fall's contest over the Cambodian seat in the United Nations.

(3) The KC response, however, has been wholly negative. Prince Sihanouk, for example, lashed out immediately at continued US involvement in Cambodia and categorically ruled out negotiations with the Lon Nol Government. He had previously contended that a peaceful solution to the conflict could be reached after US support for the GKR had been terminated, and then by direct talks with the United States.

(4) The KC, who have the final say on the matter, also reacted negatively, but more guardedly, than Sihanouk. In the past, the KC have consistently rejected any negotiations with the present Phnom Penh leadership. Recognizing that a withdrawal of US aid would likely cause the fall of the Lon Nol Government, they have also insisted on an end to US aid for the GKR as a precondition.

(5) Peking's comments on the GKR's peace bid have been straightforward and descriptive, and the PRC has thus maintained a public "hands off" attitude. Hanoi has also been cautious. So far, the United States, South Vietnam, and the United Kingdom are the only countries that have publicly endorsed the GKR's 9 July initiative.

b. Teacher/Student Unrest and the GKR

(1) During the past year, the scene within the Khmer Republic has been marked by teachers' strikes and other public protests to dramatize demands for higher wages. The teachers were joined on occasion by students airing such familiar grievances as the government's

failure to reduce corruption and control inflation. On 1
4 June, such demonstrations resulted in the abduction and 2
murder of the GKR Minister of Education and a Presidential 3
adviser. Although the exact circumstances of their death 4
are not clear, Communist complicity is suspected. 5

(2) Although the security forces kept the lid on in 6
the wake of violence triggered by agitators, the political 7
situation in Phnom Penh could deteriorate drastically if 8
the GKR does not demonstrate that it is taking effective 9
action to satisfy widespread demands that the runaway 10
inflation be brought under control. 11

(3) Partly as a result of machinations by the Secretary 12
General of Lon Nol's ruling Socio-Republican Party and 13
partly because of the student disorders and murders of 14
early June, opposition party members and independents in 15
the cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Long Boret was 16
ultimately forced to tender the resignation of his entire 17
cabinet to resolve the impasse, but he succeeded in putting 18
together a new government in mid-June. 19

C. Prospects for the New GKR. 20

(1) Long Boret has exhibited vigor and executive 21
initiative but, as was the case with his predecessors, 22
has had little success in controlling divisive political 23
infighting, fueled by continued feuding between the 24
Cabinet and National Assembly and compounded by recurring 25
student-teacher activism, that resulted in the dissolution 26
of Long Boret's first cabinet. 27

(2) President Lon Nol and the Prime Minister were 28
irritated over the Assembly's harassment of the Cabinet 29
and were also displeased over its refusal to give the GKR 30
a vote of confidence for its handling of student-teacher 31
unrest. Although all 126 Assembly deputies are members 32

of Lon Nol's Socio-Republican Party, they have shown an increasing disregard for party discipline. In addition, many have tended to their own political ambitions first and have seriously strained the delicate alliance between the ruling Socio-Republicans and minority Republicans.

(3) The composition of the 17-man Cabinet announced on 16 June reflects a carefully contrived formula for damping political antagonisms, but it is questionable whether it will be more effective than its predecessor, since professional qualifications were largely subordinated to partisan political considerations in choosing the new ministers. The Cabinet consists of eight members of the dominant Socio-Republican Party, seven independents, and two military men (including FANK Chief of Staff General Fernandez). The exclusion of the minority Republican Party, which held four portfolios in the previous Cabinet, was designed to placate the Socio-Republican-controlled Assembly. Although the Republicans were given increased representation on the Executive Council, the country's top policymaking body, the GKR has been weakened by inclusion of key ministers who are critics of Long Boret. Thus, the future of the most recent GKR is tenuous and its prospects for a long life doubtful.

d. The 1974 UN Representation Battle

(1) Once again the Phnom Penh government is preparing for an autumn contest over the Cambodia seat in the UN. Last year's challenge by the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNK) was deferred, but this guaranteed that a pro-Sihanouk resolution would be inscribed on the Assembly agenda this year.

(2) The PRC and other countries supporting the GRUNK's claim to the Cambodian UN seat passed up opportunities to contest Phnom Penh's credentials at the special UN session this spring, apparently in the view that a victory at the Assembly session this fall would be better publicized. For its part, the GRUNK has been preparing for the UN battle for some time, and KC "Defense Minister" Khieu Samphan devoted considerable effort to gaining Third World support during his 2-month international tour earlier this year. Samphan was able to sign joint communiques in many capitals that either specifically mentioned the UN issue or referred to an earlier endorsement of the GRUNK claim to the UN seat.

(3) At this point, the GKR's prospects for retaining its seat are poor. A recent preliminary assessment by the Department of State indicated that the Lon Nol government was behind by a margin of seven votes, an assessment which springs in part from the fact that the GRUNK now leads the GKR in official recognition. As of June 1974, 55 countries had established diplomatic relations with or recognized the GRUNK, compared with 50 for the GKR.

(4) Phnom Penh's efforts to improve its international position have not been as effective as hoped. Prime Minister Long Boret and Foreign Minister Keiky Lim have worked hard to gain international support during various trips abroad this year but have been unable to offset KC political gains. For example, attempts to line up or regain support in Africa and the Middle East, where Phnom Penh has lost the most ground, have not been very productive. GKR efforts have been limited for the most part to countries that cast favorable votes last year and, even in these

circumstances, there has reportedly been some erosion of
Phnom Penh's position.

(5) The support of Cambodia's Asian neighbors is critical
to Phnom Penh's retention of its UN seat. Last year a
number of these nations formed an Asian Working Group that
helped lead the fight to postpone debate. Since then,
Phnom Penh's standing with some of these nations has
slipped somewhat because they believe the GKR has made no
significant economic or military progress. Although many
may ultimately vote for Phnom Penh, there is a certain
regional reluctance to campaign for the Lon Nol side.

(6) The GKR would pay a high price for failing to retain
its UN seat. If that institution were to endorse the
GRUNK as the legitimate government of Cambodia, KC leaders
would have little incentive to negotiate. On the contrary,
they would likely view an international vote of no
confidence in the GKR as significantly offsetting their
own failure to win any lasting victories during the 1973-1974
dry season military campaign. KC resolve to achieve a
military solution to the conflict would probably be
reinforced.

(7) A defeat at the UN would also adversely affect the
domestic political situation in Phnom Penh. The inevitable
loss of vital international support and recriminations
within the Cambodian Government might well be enough to
topple Long Boret. In more tangible terms, Phnom Penh
would probably stand to lose a considerable portion of
its non-US foreign economic aid. Although such aid
amounted to about only \$20 million last year, not great in
relation to the overall US economic and military aid
expenditures, its loss would cause Cambodia's isolation

in more stark terms. In the final analysis, the GKR's 1
loss of its UN seat could even adversely affect the nature 2
and type of US support authorized by Congress. 3

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ANNEX C

CAMBODIA ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (S) Background. The Khmer Republic has an agrarian economy based largely on rice and rubber cultivation; rice and rubber have been the usual exports. Industry, consisting mostly of food processing plants and factories producing consumer goods, is small and hampered by the destruction caused by the war. Commercially exploitable natural resources are limited, and the economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The United States has been, and continues to be, the foremost donor of aid to the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR).

2. (S) General Economic Overview. The nearly continuous interdiction of key GKR land LOCs has turned Phnom Penh into an "economic island"; essentially, the capital is dependent on Mekong River convoys for POL, rice, and other essential commodities needed for survival. Some domestic supplies of food are available but cannot be properly distributed. Production of agricultural commodities as well as manufactured goods has declined in recent years, which in turn has shrunk the tax base. Prices throughout the country, especially in Phnom Penh, have soared as steadily increasing military expenditures in the face of reduced tax revenues have led to a severely imbalanced budget. Export earnings in 1973 amounted to an estimated \$15 million, \$73.5 million lower than the 1968 level. Import requirements have increased, especially for rice, resulting in enormous trade deficits. Government foreign exchange holdings remain under severe pressure. Indeed, the economic situation in Phnom Penh over the past year can only be characterized as governed by "hyperinflation." (Rate of inflation for 1974 could reach well over 200 percent.) A more

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detailed discussion of GKR economic problems is contained in paragraph 4.

3. (S) Khmer Communist Economic Base. The Khmer Communists (KC) control approximately 60 percent of the land--30 percent of the total rice crop area. The exodus of refugees to the GKR-controlled cities has, however, reduced the capacity of the insurgents to maintain rice production. The KC evidently trade rice, salt, sugar, animal fats, soy beans, and gasoline to the Vietnamese Communists for arms, ammunition, and medicine. Rice is the most important KC commodity for sale, and KC in the northern provinces have made profits of up to 500 percent on transactions.

a. Population Control. It is estimated that 30 percent of Cambodia's population of 8 million is in enemy-controlled areas. Harsh population-control measures have, however, induced more than 100,000 people to flee to GKR-occupied areas this year alone. But this trend has not yet significantly affected the Communist hold on the countryside.

b. Assistance from Outside Powers

(1) PRC. A new open-ended military aid agreement between the KC and the PRC was publicly announced in Peking on 26 May 1974. The agreement states that the aid remains "at previous levels, with no intention of new programs." Most Chinese aid is believed to consist of crew-served and individual weapons, ammunition, uniforms, medicines, and medical instruments.

(2) North Vietnam. North Vietnamese aid includes communications equipment, weapons, and vehicles. North Vietnam also serves as a conduit for Chinese aid.

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Some NVA supplies are believed to be tied to "arms for rice" agreements with the KC, reportedly made during late December 1973. Other aid arrangements are believed tied to KC assistance for NVA personnel in and transiting southern Cambodia. As previously stated in the political assessment, there is some evidence that Hanoi is providing less aid than it could to the KC.

(3) North Korea. Pyongyang reportedly provides the KC an estimated \$1 million in military and economic aid annually.

(4) USSR and Other Communist Countries. No meaningful data are available on the amounts of economic and military aid provided by the USSR and other Communist donors.

4. (S) GKR Economic Base. The GKR's economic problems are compounded by the refugee problem, interdicted LOCs, and shortages of goods.

a. Refugees. The population of Phnom Penh has doubled in the last 4 years and now contains approximately 1.6 million people; some 800,000 of these are refugees. There are not enough jobs or other constructive activities for the population, and many are completely dependent on the government for support. This same problem prevails on a smaller scale in provincial capitals, particularly as people flee from the countryside to escape being caught up in the fighting and, more recently, to be free of the KC.

b. Interdicted LOCs. For all essential purposes, the only LOC available to resupply Phnom Penh is the Mekong River. This means that the city's reliance on imported rice has increased since 1970 as the land LOCs between

the capital and the major rice growing area in the north-
 west have been either cut or blocked by the KC. For
 example, the railroad linking Battambang with Phnom Penh
 has been effectively closed to through traffic since 1970;
 Route 5 to the rice-rich northwest has been closed since
 September 1973; and Route 4, between the port of Kompong Som
 and Phnom Penh, has been closed, except for a very brief
 period, since November 1973. During 1973, 103,100 metric
 tons of milled rice had to be transshipped from Kompong
 Som and Saigon to Phnom Penh via the Mekong to insure
 GKR survival. During the first 6 months of 1974, 158,000
 metric tons of rice and 108,300 metric tons of POL were
 transported up the Mekong to the capital.

c. Shortage of Goods. Until 1972, Cambodia was a net
 exporter of rice. Since that time the country has
 periodically experienced food shortages, including rice,
 thereby increasing its reliance on imported commodities.
 In 1972, total rice imports amounted to 120,000 metric
 tons; in 1973, 207,000 metric tons. Projections for
 1974 indicate 291,000 metric tons of rice will be required.
 In addition to rice and POL, the major nonmilitary
 commodities that must be imported include iron and steel,
 pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, machinery, textiles,
 motor vehicles, plastics, sugar, chemicals, and dairy
 products.

d. Lack of GKR Control Over the Economy. Measures
 taken by the GKR to stabilize the domestic economy in
 1973 and 1974 have been aimed at such anti-inflationary
 goals as checking monetary expansion, reducing expenditures
 in the civil sector, and increasing the availability of
 consumer goods. These programs have had little success.

Since January 1973, the Phnom Penh Working Class Consumer Price Index has risen over 500 percent. The shortage of consumer commodities was a major factor in this inflationary increase. The Government's efforts to hold the lid on prices did little but encourage the operation of a black market. There is very little prospect of a substantial improvement in the GKR economic situation through FY 1975.

e. Dependence on US Aid. The GKR receives a nominal amount of aid from countries other than the United States--mainly Singapore, Hong Kong, France, Australia, and Japan--but for all practical purposes is totally dependent on US support. Comparative values of US economic aid to Cambodia follow:

	(US \$ MILLIONS)		
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75 (PROPOSED)</u>
Humanitarian	1.2	13.4	20.0
Commercial Import Program	45.0	62.1	71.0
Exchange Support Fund	20.5	18.3	17.5
Technical Support & Training	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.5</u>
SUBTOTAL	67.3	95.0	110.0
Public Law 480	<u>27.5</u>	<u>170.9</u>	<u>77.0</u>
TOTAL	94.8	265.9	187.0