

## **Vietnam's *Tây Tiến* expansion into Laos and Cambodia *Partie Deux* (Part II): Vietnamization<sup>1</sup>**

The genesis of the problems faced by today's non-ruling class of peoples of Cambodia and Laos stems from the World Communist Movement – *Comintern* – sponsored by Moscow, which sent Ho Chi Minh to create communist parties throughout South East Asia. Ho's dream was to ape his idol, the butcher Stalin, and create a Soviet-style SE Asia starting with Indochina. In 1930, Ho Chi Minh founded the "Indochinese Communist Party," not just the Vietnamese communist party, which was a forewarning of his intentions to dominate not only Vietnam but Cambodia and Laos as well. **Ho was responsible for the creation of the Khmer Rouge.**

Historical Vietnamese strategies of gaining more territory are termed *nam tiến* (southern movement (e.g., colonizing Kampuchea Krom – the Mekong delta – historically a part of Cambodia), *tây tiến* (westward movement/expansion (e.g., from the coastal plains into the *Tây Nguyên* mountains – translated as the Western or Central Highlands), and *đồn điền* (military colonization, whereby units of their conquering armies were demobilized and given land on which to settle, after which they then brought their families, relatives and friends (e.g., after their alleged withdrawal from Laos in the late '70s, and after their invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and their alleged departure after 10 years).

In 1835 Alphonse Karr coined the adage *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. (The more things changes, the more they remain the same.) As then, the adage is as appropriate today in regards to communist Vietnam's past and current aspirations toward France's former colonies of Indochina. Although Ho Chi Minh died in 1969, Ho's dream lives on through the Vietnamese communist party, not for all of SE Asia, but amoeba-like, as Cambodia and Laos are being invaded and swallowed by neighboring Vietnam. However, these three countries do share something in common: they are all ruled by brutal regimes that are no longer "communistic" but are kleptocratic. They no longer serve the people, but only themselves, stealing their countries' wealth, lining their own pockets and enlarging their bank accounts with treasure that should be used to improve the lives of their people.

### **The Vietnamization of Cambodia and Laos**

Cambodia and Laos face similar problems stemming from their aggressive and greedy neighbor – Vietnam – which continues to neo-colonize these countries by overwhelming them with "illegal migrants," who are virtually stealing the land beneath them and sucking the life-blood from the native inhabitants. Cambodia and Laos are no more than vassal states of Hanoi, which manipulates them through agreements and "advisors/controllers" placed at every level of both governments. The result is inept governance, nepotism, corruption and wide-scale environmental destruction.

### **LAOS**

Although the 1954 Geneva Convention stipulated that all communist forces be withdrawn from both Cambodia and Laos, Hanoi did not comply. Today, it continues to maintain a large number of mainline PAVN (People's Army Vietnam) troops in Laos. Global Security estimates that there

are currently as many as 70,000 PAVN forces still occupying military installations and border areas in Laos.<sup>2</sup> While Cambodia is more open and accessible, the xenophobic Vietnamese-influenced and repressive Lao regime hides behind a bamboo curtain of secrecy. Criticism of the government is strictly forbidden and has caused several Lao and Hmong-American and Lao citizens to simply “disappear.” The Vietnamese communists require the Laotian regime to grant citizenship and land to Vietnamese forces when they retire. Laotian civil servants must learn and speak Vietnamese in order to maintain positions in the government.

In 1977, the Vietnamese and the Laotian communists signed a treaty of “Friendship and Special Cooperation,” similar to the agreements Russia forced upon three of their own neighboring countries – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – after invading, occupying, and incorporating them into the Soviet Union.

The 1977 treaty guaranteed Hanoi's guardianship of Laos and legalized the permanent settlement of more than 100,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Laos at the time, all of whom were given Laotian citizenship and land.<sup>2</sup> (i.e., *đồn điền*). Each then brought in his family (including aunts, uncles, and cousins). In Laos, civil servants are required to learn and speak the Vietnamese language. At best, Kampuchea and Laos are becoming satellites of a new kind; at worse, they are destined to experience the fate of the forgotten Baltic countries.

## **CAMBODIA**

**The Vietnamization of Cambodia (Kampuchea):<sup>3</sup>** In the mid-1980's, the Cambodian Heng Samrin regime granted about 500,000 Vietnamese, who had no historical ties to Cambodia, citizenship and prudential land holdings. Samrin also conceded lands along the border that had been part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Vietnamese communists, thus moving the border with Vietnam several kilometers inside Cambodia.

In 1982, Vietnam forced its puppet regime in Phnom Penh to issue Circular No. 240 SR/MC/HH appealing to all Cambodians to assist the expansion of solidarity with the fraternal Vietnamese people by carrying out their duty to help Vietnamese nationals to settle in Cambodia. They followed up with a decree stipulating that “the Khmers have the obligation” to express solidarity with the Vietnamese brothers by helping the Vietnamese to settle, build new houses and share their lands. Each commune had to receive a variable number of Vietnamese families, up to 50. A Vietnamese dissident reported that in October 1982, Vietnamese demographers and settlement planners in Hanoi had been ordered by the party leadership to project “a comprehensive scheme of trans-border migrations within the new frame of Indochina (i.e., Cambodia and Laos). The program would affect some 7 million Vietnamese to be resettled over a period of 20 years.

By October 1982, reportedly some 60,000 Vietnamese fishermen had migrated to Cambodia and some 12,000 families were living in the lakesides of the Tonle Sap Lake.

In 1983, it was estimated that there were over 20,000 Vietnamese in Battambang City, some thousands in Siem Reap City, and between 200,000 to 300,000 in Phnom Penh and its surroundings. By 1986, it was estimated that 400,000 to 600,000 Vietnamese migrants had settled in Cambodia; however, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea said “there are 640,000 Vietnamese Settlers in Kampuchea. Whatever the

numbers of settlers, the Heng Samrin regime seems to have been obliged to tolerate the immigration, if not to administer it. A PRK electoral regulation made provisions for Vietnamese settlers, without regard to “duration of residence,” and eventually gave them the right to vote and to be elected to various positions formerly reserved for Khmer. By 1984, over 150,000 newly arrived settlers had reportedly settled in the “Parrot Beak” area causing Prince Norodom Sihanouk to declare it had been annexed by the Vietnamese colonists.

During its invasion of, occupancy of and alleged withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, the Vietnamese Armed Forces lost more than 52,000 dead and over 200,000 wounded.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the Army was on the verge of rebelling. As a sop to the retreating Army, Hun Sen rewarded a rather large contingent of demobilized veterans with assigned residences in Cambodian (as “ready reserve forces”), gave them an unknown amount of land, and granted them Cambodian citizenship. Before withdrawing, the Vietnamese placed Hun Sen in charge of the K-5 Plan in which tens of thousands more Cambodians were killed (often referred to as the Bamboo Curtain and the *Petite Génocide*).<sup>5</sup>

By 1989, it was estimated that the number of Vietnamese “settlers” in Cambodia had reached 1,250,000. Simultaneously, Vietnam developed new maps depicting borders expanding up to 40 kilometers into Laos and Cambodia. Hun Sen formally conceded these borders to Hanoi in violation of international law through a series of treaties. Reportedly, Vietnamese people are now a majority in Cambodia’s eastern provinces, such as Svay Rieng and Prey Veng.<sup>6</sup>

Through the July 20, 1983 “Open Border” Agreement regarding free crossing of Cambodian borders by Vietnamese, their number in Cambodia had reached 4 million in 2003 according to various reliable sources, although Cambodian authorities deny this fact.<sup>7</sup>

The number of Vietnamese who adopted Cambodian nationality and Khmer-ized their names is considered by researchers to have exceeded six million in 2015, nearly 40% of the total census population of the country. The number of Vietnamese “immigrants” is already a majority in some provinces and some major Cambodian cities. This is a deadly threat against the national unity of Cambodia that the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements aimed to defend and preserve.<sup>8</sup>

## **POPULATION**

It is extremely difficult to get any real facts about what is happening in Laos, for the xenophobic communist regime remains hidden behind a bamboo curtain of imaginary South East Asian tranquility. Population figures for Laos are as unreliable as those for Cambodia, even though the communist genocide in Laos wasn’t as extensive and sustained as in Cambodia, except for the Hmong and other minorities who fought on the side of the U.S. during the Vietnam War.

No one really knows with any accuracy the population of Cambodia after the genocide or the year that it stopped; figures given by the so-called experts are at best an educated guess. By 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took power and launched the genocide, the population of Cambodia was estimated at 7,551,988. It is reasonable to assume that during the slaughter, the population growth rate was zero or negative over the next five years while an estimated 1.5 to 2 million

people were killed. Women giving birth during this period were often killed along with their infant(s), yet the World Population chart below indicates a decrease of only 833,747 people.

The chart below shows a post-Khmer Rouge baby boom in the years of 1985 thru 2000 that pushed the Cambodian population above 10 million, although growth has slowed in recent years.<sup>9</sup> The UN attributes of the rapid population growth to a “baby boom” of Cambodian births, but it is much more likely due to a “Vietnamese boom” of migrants.

### **Cambodia’s Population History**

Year	Population	Growth Rate
2016	15,827,241	1.56%
2015	15,577,899	1.59%
2010	14,363,586	1.59%
2005	13,320,058	1.53%
2000	12,197,905	2.04%
1995	10,694,458	3.02%
1990	9,008,856	3.43%
1985	7,743,065	3.14%
1980	6,718,241	0.83%
1975	7,551,988	1.61%
1970	7,022,185	2.05 %
1965	6,467,196	1.87%
1960	5,722,370	2.59%

**Vietnam’s attempt to colonize Cambodia:** Already occupying Laos, on December 25, 1978, the communist Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, claiming they did so to free the Cambodian people from the Khmer Rouge; however, this was little more than a thinly-disguised attempt to colonize Cambodia. After U.S. politicians abandoned America’s South Vietnamese allies by cutting off assistance to the Republic of South Viet Nam, the Vietnamese communists thought they had *carte blanche* to colonize Cambodia and Laos. Never in their wildest dreams did they think that the U.S. would ally with the Chinese, the Cambodian non-communists, and the Khmer Rouge to drive them out of Cambodia. Nevertheless the U.S., China and the international community acquiesced to Hanoi’s installation of its puppet Hun Sen as Prime Minister, even before the withdrawal of communist Vietnamese main forces. Hun Sen had been deputy commander under Heng Samrin Commander of the Eastern-Zone “Vietnamese Viet Minh-Khmer Rouge,” and Tep Voung had been the intelligence and religious operations officer with them. Hun Sen later anointed Tep Voung with the ostentatious title of Supreme Patriarch and head monk in Cambodia for his performance in the Eastern-Zone and as a reward for his loyalty to the Hanoi communists. This was a very important appointment because Cambodian Monks had always been a moving force in Cambodian politics. Heng Samrin had become head of the Communist Party of Kampuchea – CPK.

Today, while Cambodia is somewhat more open and accessible, the xenophobic Vietnamese-controlled regime in Laos operates under a veil of secrecy. Needless to say, Vietnam is in the process of rapidly neo-colonizing and dominating both Laos and Cambodia through a series of

“agreements.” Vietnam’s goal is to dominate the two countries economically, commercially, politically, and culturally. Vietnam does this by infusing large numbers of Vietnamese “settlers” into these countries, and at the same time, imposing upon its vassal state regimes in Cambodia and Laos a series of “agreements” for land and resource concessions. In this way, they gain 99-year leases, grants, and outright sales of land (by law only Cambodian citizens can own land) through a myriad of faux shell companies, which are nearly impossible to untangle, that provide the Vietnamese with the façade of being Cambodian or Laotian companies.

## **AGREEMENTS: A MOVABLE FEAST**

**Advisors:** Through such “agreements,” the Vietnamese communist party assigned some 200 advisors-cum-controllers at the KPRP [Kampuchean (or Khmer) People’s Revolutionary Party] level, and some 600 others operated within the Phnom Penh government apparatus. The advisory group was headed by an important VCP (Vietnamese Communist Party) Central Committee member. Its mission was to work closely with policy-making officials of the KPRP and to follow-up through their assignments to key governmental posts to oversee implementation of VCP directives, concentrating on political administrative affairs.<sup>3</sup> In 1986, it was estimated that there were between 10,000-12,000 so-called expert civilian Vietnamese advisors, mostly from North Vietnam, at every level of government and civil society, including religious and social institutions in both the public and private sectors down to the village level. This scenario was likely not unique to Cambodia, but occurred in Laos as well. After Vietnam’s “withdrawal” from Cambodia in 1989, author Marie Alexandrine Martin noted: “Although Vietnamese were said to remain in the principal positions (presidency of the council, ministries of foreign affairs, interior, defense, information, radio) they showed great discretion; they now received instructions through diplomatic channels, that is, from the Embassy of Vietnam.”<sup>10</sup>

**UFCDK:** Through another “agreement,” chapters of the Cambodian-Vietnam friendship organizations (United Front for National Construction and Defense of Cambodia – UFCDK) have been established in all of Cambodia’s cities and provinces. UFCDK is no more than a façade created for propaganda purposes, owned and operated by Hanoi. UFCDK is a “front” for Vietnam’s Fatherland Front (*Mặt Trận Tổ Quốc Việt Nam*), “The Vietnam fatherland front and its member organizations constitute the political base of people’s power. The front promotes the tradition of national solidarity and strengthens the people’s unity of mind in political and spiritual matters....”<sup>11</sup> In Vietnam, thugs of the parastatal Vietnam Fatherland Front are used to beat up protesters/demonstrators, or anyone else the communist regime chooses, which sometimes results in death. They are also used to storm churches and pagodas and destroy property while posing as local villagers and city dwellers. One might assume that similar “friendship organizations” have also been established in Laos.

**Tri-border Development Triangle:** In November 2004, Vietnam cajoled the puppet communist regimes of Laos and Cambodia into signing the Development Triangle Agreement.<sup>12</sup> This agreement, under the guise of economic development and security, allows the Vietnamese to formalize their expansion through westward movement (*Tay Tiến*) and infuse large numbers of migrants into the three Northeastern provinces of Stung Trèng, Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri in Cambodia, and into the three Southeastern provinces of Attapeu, Sékong and Saravan in Laos.

**Fisheries:**<sup>6</sup> In January 1984, while still occupying Cambodia, Vietnam signed an agreement with its puppet regime in Phnom Penh to establish the Vietnamese parastatal "Production Office" (*Phong Tang Gia*) that would provide such things as boat motors, gas/diesel and nets and other fishing tools, cement and other materials, and technical aid for building fishing sites and shrimp and other boats for sea fishing in order to develop the Kampuchea-Vietnam solidarity in fisheries." In reality, at that time, it served only to sanction the near monopoly of the Vietnamese over the fisheries resources of Cambodia, including off-shore, the Mekong River and in particular the Sea-Lake area (Tonle Sap). Unfortunately, a large number of Vietnamese migrants began fishing on the lake, and the immersed forests surround the lake that were nurseries for the fish were cut, converted to charcoal and shipped to Vietnam. All fishing activities had to be registered, and for provision of these materials commodities would be exchanged for 90% of the 150 tonnes daily catch. Of that amount, Vietnamese occupying forces collected some 50 tonnes of fish and another 60 tonnes was sent daily by cargo ship to Vietnam. Later, the Vietnamese authority set up cold storage facilities in Kampuchea to reduce losses in storage and processing. The occupying troops were withdrawn but the agreement remains; however, it is unknown how much of the fish still goes to Vietnam without benefitting the Cambodian economy.

**Historical Waters:**<sup>6</sup> In July 1982, the Cambodian regime signed an agreement on the zone known as "Historical Waters." With this agreement Cambodia recognized, "given the actual condition," the annexation by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam of many Cambodian islands including Koh Tral and Poulo Panjang (Koh Krachak Sés), and of a considerable portion (30,000 sq. km.) of her territorial sea. The idea of "Historical Water belonging to the two countries, and placed under the legal jurisdiction of their internal water," which is in fact controlled exclusively by Vietnam was a new concept invented by Vietnam to appropriate Cambodia's continental shelf, rich in oil resources and seafood. In reality, Cambodian fishermen can no longer venture far from the coasts as they always could, without being violently pushed back or even killed by the Vietnamese coastal guards.

On August 11, 1997, Vietnam and Thailand signed a bilateral agreement that divided their respective maritime zones while encroaching on those of Kampuchea. This agreement conferred to Thailand an area of about 30,000 sq. km. of Cambodian maritime domain in double violations of (1) the French-Siamese treaties of 1904 and 1907, and (2) the "equidistance" principle as defined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

**Twinning:** It is within this new institutional framework that the Vietnamese are asserting their hold over the economy and future of Kampuchea. Fisheries, rubber and rice are the three main sectors affected by what should be termed the "Unequal Exchange between Vietnam and Kampuchea."

In 1983, the Vietnamese imposed upon the KPRP a policy of twinning Khmer provinces with provinces in Vietnam, to facilitate the economic integration of Kampuchea within Vietnam's economy; i.e., the exploitation of Cambodia's resources. Important examples included pairing Phnom Penh with Ho Chi Minh City, Kompong Cham with Tay Ninh, Kompong Som with Ha Tien, Siem Reap with Binh Tri Thien, and Battambang with Quang Nam. Thus the Vietnamese installed yet another institutional framework for an "unequal exchange." Indeed, this

technique **allows the Vietnamese to reap the full benefit of the national resources of Kampuchea** under the umbrella of the so-called “shining solidarity between Vietnam and Kampuchea,” since the twinning process **imposes all kinds of accompanying obligations upon the Khmer people.**<sup>3</sup>

After rice, rubber was Kampuchea’s most important export commodity, and a product systematically exploited by the Vietnamese. During the Khmer Rouge period, rubber production had totally collapsed, but with the intervention (i.e., takeover) and administration by the Vietnamese state-owned Dong Nai Rubber Company, production and processing of latex steadily expanded, and in 1981, 18,577 tonnes of rubber were exported through a twinned Vietnamese province exclusively to the Soviet Union as Vietnam War reparations.

Rice had been Cambodia’s main commodity export; however, in 1984 a rice shortage developed. This was attributed to the fact that Vietnamese occupying forces as well as the Vietnamese settlers were misappropriating a good part of the Khmer rice under the twinning agreement and shipping it to Vietnam. It was assumed under this seemingly deliberate policy that the Vietnamese would eventually control the commerce in Cambodia of basic products such as fabric and clothing, crockery, oil, salt, and soap, while the Khmers continued to contribute the traditional dried fish and the usual fruits.

**Border Agreements:** Through yet another set of agreements, the vassal states of Cambodia and Laos have lost a substantial amount of territory along their borders; perhaps as much of 40 kilometers inland encompassing that area known as “The Ho Chi Minh Trail” that was occupied by North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War.

The border delineations encompassing these three countries on the former maps of Indochina (referred to as the Bonne maps), were recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements and had been filed with the United Nations. During this period of national resistance, the coalition Government of Cambodia chaired by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, which was the only legitimate and legal government recognized by the United Nations, never ceased to vigorously denounce these treaties and agreements, and rejecting them as null and void (official Declaration made on March 12, 1986).<sup>13</sup>

The Agreements, Treaties and Statutes regarding border delineation of July 20, 1983, July 13, 1984 (referred to as the open borders agreement), November 6, 1984, and December 27, 1985 (the latter signed while Vietnamese armed forces still occupied Cambodia and Hun Sen had been installed as Prime Minister), which were imposed on the Cambodian regime (PRK) by the Vietnamese, allowed recognition of a very large number of new Vietnamese settlements on Cambodian land. Thus Vietnam was allowed to push the old borders established under the French Protectorate by several kilometers into Cambodia, from Rattanakiri province in the north to Kampot in the south, an overall length of 1,230 kilometers. Installation of new border markers began immediately in 1984. More seriously, with the ongoing application of the agreement on border statute of July 20, 1983 allowing the free crossing of Cambodian borders by Vietnamese people, their numbers in Cambodia never cease to increase, despite the official denial of the Cambodian authorities, totaling more than 4 million by 2003 according to reliable sources.<sup>13</sup>

On October 10, 2005, a supplementary agreement was added, and then on April 23, 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on land border adjustment was tacked on. Under this MoU, Hanoi announced that Vietnam and Cambodia had fulfilled land exchanges in Tay Ninh – Tboung Khmum, Tay Ninh – Svay Rieng, Dong Thap – Prey Veng, An Giang – Takeo, Kien Giang – Takeo and Kien Giang – Kampot provinces. Nevertheless, they have yet to reach consensus on land exchanges and mapping in six areas of Long An – Svay Rieng, Dak Lak – Rattanakiri and Dak Lak – Mondulakiri.<sup>13</sup> However, there was and is no exchange of Vietnamese land for Cambodian land, the latter is just conceded by the regime in Phnom Penh and added to Vietnamese territory. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese submitted new maps to their client states for compliance.

As a result of the border land-grabs, there have been a number of rather violent incidents where Cambodians have been stripped of their historical land rights, and Vietnamese have taken over not only their farmlands but their homes as well, such as the June 28 incident at Binh Bac village, Binh Hoa Tay commune, Moc Hoa district in Vietnam's Long An province.

In another incident, in an attempt to expunge Cambodian farmers from their historical farmlands and homes in the newly delineated border areas, a complaint was filed with the United Nations on the unlawful use of chemical and biological agents by the Government of Vietnam on food crops for the forced evacuation of farm lands. This included Phum Cheung village in the Srok Memot district of Tbong Khmum Province that had been cultivated for food by Cambodians. Similar incidents are reported to have taken place in the Memot and Krek districts of Kompong Cham Province of Cambodia, and also in the Khum Tao Bey township of Kratie Province on May 10, 2014, and in the Khasem commune, Snuol District, of Kratie Province, as well in a village Commune District Khmom province in early 2014. The spraying resulted in the destruction of crops and the forced evacuation and unlawful eviction of a large number of families from those areas. Official statements by a high-level Cambodian official appear to have facilitated and encouraged the illegal use of herbicidal agents by the Vietnamese armed forces in the disputed border territories, in order to illegally force the removal of the Cambodian land owners and farmers.<sup>14</sup>

Reports of freshly dug graves on contested Cambodian land, and reports that ancestral Cambodian graves have been bulldozed, sparked border clashes in Svay Rieng. One, descendant called her MP, Real Camerin, to report what had happened. MP Camerin, accompanied by MP Um Sam An, went to investigate. Vietnamese dressed in civilian clothes (assumed to be thugs from Vietnam's Fatherland Front), who were armed with wooden sticks with nails and protected by Vietnamese soldiers, crossed the border into Cambodian territory and severely beat them both. Instead of protesting the beatings, Defense Minister Tea Ban apologized to the Vietnamese, boasting to his Vietnamese counterpart how he had foiled the opposition's attempt to hold mass protests over the border posts.

No one, except those connected to the repressive regime, knows Cambodia's total loss of territory resulting from the new Vietnamese delineation of the border. Non-residents are banned from the new border areas by both the Cambodian and Vietnamese regimes, which fear they have GPS devices to record positions and prove border intrusions by Vietnam. Cambodian opposition members are also banned from discussions about the borders. Reportedly border



measurements are done by only Vietnamese officials with no Cambodian participants. Those who dare to speak out this issue are jailed, exiled, or killed. Victims include MP Um Sam An (US citizen), sentenced to 2 ½ yrs. in prison; Senator Hong Sok Hour (French citizen), accused of posting false information about the border, is also still in prison; Sam Rainsy (US citizen), exiled for seven years; and Dr Kem Ley, who was killed while documenting border intrusions by the Vietnamese. Protesters are referred to as “extremists,” and Vietnamese and Cambodia officials accuse the opposition of committing sabotage to divide bilateral friendship.

As a result of the border incidents, Vietnam’s Defense Minister and Cambodia’s Minister of National Defense met in June to “beef up defense ties” and agreed to fully and effectively cooperate to ensure a peaceful and stable environment for their economic development and foil plots to weaken relations.<sup>15</sup> (i.e., crack down on Cambodians protesting the new border agreements and their loss of land and homes).

### **Raping the Natural Resources and Agricultural Lands of Cambodia and Laos**

The Vietnamese as well as the Chinese, in collusion with the kleptocratic regimes in Cambodia and Laos, are raping the forests, pillaging natural resources and destroying the ecosystems in both countries through illegal regime-sanctioned concession leases. Many of these leases are for tracts of land inside National Parks and Preserves. Most often disguised as economic development, concession leases are granted to “foreigners” like Vietnam and China by the client regimes in Vietnam or China. The leases are most often for 99 years, which means that this land is lost to Cambodians for generations, and may never be recovered.

Cambodia and Laos are in the grip of a land-grabbing crisis, driven by illegal and illicit regime-sanctioned grants for logging, dam construction, and the establishment of commercial plantation crops. Vast amounts of land are being cleared for the production of crops such as rubber, sugar, cashews, pepper, bananas, and trees to be exported to Vietnam and China without benefit of revenue to the Cambodian and Laotian people. Commercial timber stripped from these lands is shipped to Vietnam and also to China.

This land is being taken from millions of historical inhabitants who depend on it for their food source and sustenance. They are being forced from their lands without due process, consultation, consent, or compensation, despite any laws to prevent this. This destruction is draining away the very lifeblood of the Cambodian and Laotian people.

**Dams:** Concessions for the construction of dams also result in large-scale forest loss, for before work begins, the area to be flooded, the watersheds, and the flood plain are stripped of trees. Most often the surrounding forests beyond scope of the legal concession for the dam site are illegally logged as well. All of the commercially viable timber is shipped to Vietnam or China.

This destruction of forest cover results in the loss of habitat for a myriad of species, accelerated rainwater runoff and erosion, decreased groundwater recharge, and increased flooding and siltation of dams, thus decreasing their capacity and useful life.

**In Northern Laos,** the construction of the Xayaburi Dam is setting a dangerous precedent for dam-building along the Mekong River. An estimated 204,000 people living near the dam site

will be directly affected. Even in the early stages of construction, many of these people already face threats to their food security. Eleven dams are proposed for the Lower Mekong River, nine of them in Laos. According to a Strategic Environmental Assessment published by the Mekong River Commission in 2010, these dams would affect millions of people living across the river basin. The costs of the Xayaburi Dam will be borne by the millions of people who live along the Mekong River, including in Laos and Thailand. Scientists expect that the dam will block critical fish migration routes for between 23 to 100 species, including the iconic Mekong Giant Catfish. Migration to spawning areas is necessary to replenish and sustain populations of these fish. The dams will also destroy the river's complex ecosystems that serve as important fish habitats and will block the flow of necessary sediments and nutrients, affecting aquaculture in the Mekong River, the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia and the Mekong Delta in Vietnam.

**In Cambodia:** the Royal Group (chaired by Cambodian tycoon Kith Meng) in partnership with China's Hydrolancang International Energy company will construct the Lower Sesan II Hydropower Dam, and in doing so will clear-cut the concession area of 36,000 hectares.<sup>16</sup>

Cambodia and Laos have seen more than 3.7 million hectares of land handed over to companies since 2000. Of this, 40% is for rubber plantations. Land grabbing has accelerated in Cambodia in recent years. According to Global Witness, as of 2012, 2.5 million hectares of land had been leased by the government, of which 20% was allocated to five of Cambodia's powerful tycoons, who are thought to be fronting for Vietnamese.<sup>17</sup> Local people have complained of increased food and water shortages, loss of livelihood without compensation and poor employment conditions. Indigenous communities have lost burial grounds and sacred forests. HAGL and VRG's financial involvement lies behind an intricate web of shell companies, which allows them to disguise the fact that they have exceeded Cambodia's legal limit on land holdings. Both companies are also involved in illegal forest clearance beyond their concession boundaries.

## LAOS

In 2012 the kleptocratic Laotian regime was ranked as the 16<sup>th</sup> most corrupt out of 176 countries. Due to on-going massive illegal wood trafficking, Laos' forests have been systematically destroyed and as a result the forest area of the country has reduced to "less than 40% against 70% thirty years ago," shortly before the communists seized the power in 1975. The Vietnamese army has played the pivotal role in the trafficking of wood; particularly through its Company for Economic Cooperation (COECCO).<sup>18</sup> Most timber harvesting in Laos is technically illegal because logging and trade do not comply with legislation. All exported "legal" timber now comes from conversion activities for infrastructure, hydropower, mining, and plantations. The primary destinations of Lao timber are: Vietnam (75% of roundwood and 47% of sawnwood), China (24% roundwood and 16% sawnwood) and Thailand (34% of sawnwood). Lao timber contributes 16% to Vietnam's annual round and sawnwood import and 14 % to Thailand's sawnwood import).

According to Radio Free Asia, on November 16, 2016, Lao Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong agreed to give the Simeuang Group Company, a Lao development firm, three parcels of land (of unknown size and location) in the Southern part of Savannakhet province in exchange to pay for the company's exorbitant estimated cost of 45 billion kip (US\$1 = kip 9,000 = U.S. \$5 million) for the construction of five red soil roads along the Lao-Vietnamese border

from the town Sepon to the town Phin. Bulldozers were used to clear/construct the roads but they were badly damaged from trucks transporting illegal logs to Vietnam.<sup>19</sup> Although the Simeuang Group was said to be a Lao development firm, it is most likely a front for a Vietnamese company since it built the roads to ship illegal logs to Vietnam, not to provide service to the Lao people.

Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL), a Vietnamese conglomerate, is currently expanding into the sugar industry. Construction of a \$100 million sugar refining industrial cluster started in Attapeu Province, and since a considerable amount of electricity will be required to power the cluster, it must be combined with dam construction. Therefore, there will be yet another outbreak of land grabbing associated with plantation concessions being granted to grow sugar cane for export, at the expense of the Laotian people.

## **CAMBODIA**

**Economic Land Concessions (ELCs)** are government-granted tracts of land under 99-year lease agreements that cost just a few dollars per hectare. ELCs cover more than 2.14 million hectares; over half of Cambodia's arable land, with 57 percent of that area controlled by foreign firms.

In Ratanakkiri province alone, the Vietnamese People's Army – Corps 15 Command – has quietly assumed control of nearly 40,000 hectares of land (an area larger than Kep province) for the establishment of rubber plantations according to The Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO). The four concessions run end-to-end from a 31-km frontier, bordering Vietnam's Gia Lai Province, and are effectively an extension of Vietnam's border area into Cambodia. Over the years, LICADHO and other rights groups and reporters have fielded a litany of abuse complaints against the four concessions: encroaching on communal land, destroying spirit forests and burial grounds, logging outside their boundaries, and illegally exporting luxury-grade timber across the porous border with Vietnam. The Jarai and Tampoun ethnic minority groups (also referred to as Montagnards) have been farming and harvesting forest products from this area for centuries and depend upon it for their livelihoods. The forests provided them not only with food and raw materials for shelter, but were also the resting place of their ancestors, whose spirits are believed to live on in the trees.<sup>16</sup>

Reportedly, one of the four concessionaires, the Dai Dong Duong ELC, had its contract canceled last month amid accusations that it had: engaged in illegal logging, allowed Vietnamese farmers to encroach on Cambodian land, and failed to develop its property (i.e., it had only planted rubber trees on about 800 hectares). However, the spokesman for the Agriculture Ministry said that Dai Dong Duong would be reviewed, and "did not know the fate of the plantation."<sup>20</sup>

A Vietnamese spokesman had announced that Vietnam and Cambodia had fulfilled most of its "agreed" land exchanges but they have yet to reach consensus on land exchanges and mapping of a few areas, one being Dak Lak – Rattanakiri.<sup>21</sup> This begs the question, "Was he referring to the Dai Dong Duong ELC? (See reference<sup>13</sup> above.) Nevertheless, due to the Cambodian government's double-speak and flimflam deal making, and the diabolical Vietnamese's shell game of disguising company ownership, one might reasonably expect that the Vietnamese will, in one way or the other, end up retaining the concession.

## **The Vietnamese and Chinese Rubber Robber Barons**

“Cambodia and Laos are in the grip of yet another land grabbing crisis, driven by Vietnamese ‘rubber barons’. They are among host of others who have gained concessions of large chunks of land for other plantation crops, such as cashews, pepper, bananas, sugar and non-native trees. These products are shipped to other countries with no benefit to those in the countries where they are grown. To prepare these lands for planting, all natural vegetation is stripped from them, and any commercially viable timber is harvested and shipped to Vietnam and China. Most of the concessions are held as 99-year leases.

Global Witness’ 2013 report *Rubber Barons*<sup>17</sup> reveals how two of Vietnam’s largest companies, Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL) and the Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG), have leased vast tracts of land for plantations in Laos and Cambodia, with disastrous consequences for local communities and the environment. Close ties to corrupt political and business elites provide them with impunity, deals are cloaked in secrecy and they are bankrolled by international finance such as Deutsche Bank and the International Finance Corporation. “Given the risks that human rights defenders, activists and other critics of government policy currently face in Cambodia and Laos, it is imperative that all actions taken to investigate and remedy the problems outlined in this report are done with specific efforts being taken to protect the communities in question, particularly the sources who provided evidence for this report.”

Vietnamese Rubber Barons and their subsidiaries have carried out forced land grabs without consultation or compensation, depriving tens of thousands of households of their livelihoods from forest products or subsistence agriculture. The laws require consultation with local communities over land use, but these laws are rarely enforced. Millions of hectares of land have been handed over without the knowledge or consent of the people who live on it.

### **LAOS**

A senior Laotian government spokesman has estimated that Laos has given concessions on 30% of its land to foreigners. Chinese firms have secured rubber concessions in the province covering 30,000 hectares (74,000 acres). The idea is that tens of thousands of Chinese workers will eventually be needed to tap the rubber. In the past decade the government has granted land concessions across the country for up to 100 years, often at artificially low prices, to Chinese, Vietnamese and, to a lesser extent, Thai operators. More land is now in the hands of foreigners than is used to grow rice. Deforestation stretches all the way to the Chinese border. The fear of one expert in Laos is the emergence of a landless poor.<sup>18</sup>

### **Hectares of rubber<sup>21</sup> (One square kilometer is 100 hectares.)**

**20,000 -- Saysetha, Attapeu Province**

**2,549 -- Attapeu Province**

**??,??? -- Unknown area in Thateng and Laman, Xekong Provinces**

**8,000 -- Thateng, Xekong Province**

**4,000 -- Xekong Province**

**5,737 to 8,650 -- Phin, Nong and Xepon, Savannakhet Province**

**10,016 -- Bachieng and Sanasombuon, Champasak Province**

6,397 -- Bachieng and Sanasombuon, Champasak Province and Laongman, Saravane Province and Laman, Xekong Province  
 358 -- Location unknown  
 923 -- Location unknown  
 10,000 -- Pathoumphon and Bachieng Districts, Champasak, Loangman District, Saravane and Attapeu Province

---

72,442 hectares GRAND TOTAL Land Concessions or 724.4 square kilometers

## **CAMBODIA**

### **Hectares of rubber<sup>21</sup>**

9,775 -- Ta Veang, Ratanakiri Province;  
 9,470 -- Lumphat Wildlife Sanctuary, Ratanakiri Province  
 9,000 -- Andong Meas, Ratanakiri Province  
 2,361 -- Andong Meas, Ratanakiri Province  
 7,591 -- Andong Meas, Ratanakiri Province  
 9,173 -- Lumphat Wildlife Sanctuary, Ratanakiri Province;  
 6,695 -- Ta Veng and Andong Meas, Ratanakiri Province  
 6,891 -- Vuensai, Ratanakiri Province  
 8,141 -- Sambo, Kratie Province  
 7,631 -- Sambo, Kratie Province  
 6,434 -- Snoul, Kratie Province  
 8,926 -- Keo Seima, Mondulkriri Province  
 5,059 -- Snoul, Kratie Province  
 7,972 -- Kratie Province  
 8,892 -- Kratie Province  
 8,100 -- Kampong Thom Province  
 6,155 -- Kampong Thom Province  
 9,235 -- Boeng Per Wildlife Sanctuary, Kampong Thom and Siem Reap Provinces  
 4,879 -- Kompong Thom Province  
 4,385 -- Prasat Balangk, Stoung district, Kampong Thom Province  
 5,095 -- Siem Reap, Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom Provinces  
 7,600 -- Oddar Meanchey Province  
 8,000; Beng Per Wildlife Sanctuary, Kampong Thom Province  
 8,400 -- Lumphat District, Ratanakiri Province  
 807 -- Vuensai, Ratanakiri Province; 31/7/2009  
 6,436 -- Location unknown  
 5,113 -- Pichrada, Mondulkriri Province  
 7,900 -- Rovieng, Preah Vihear Province  
 6,060 -- Rovieng, Preah Vihear Province  
 2,036 -- Boeng Per Wildlife Sanctuary, Preah Vihear Province  
?????? -- Size unknown, Kratie Province

341,706 hectares GRAND TOTAL Land Concessions or 3,417 square kilometers

In another example of how far the spider web of the Vietnamization of Cambodia and Laos extends, Viettel – the Peoples’ Army of Vietnam-owned multi-industries conglomerate – was recently awarded the contract to run the Post and Telecommunication (snail mail), the cellular phone network, the internet and social media for all Cambodia and Laos. Citizens beware, “Big Brother” is watching and listening to you!

## Along Comes China

Over time, China’s policies have changed and it has once again waded into Cambodia and Laos, with deep pockets filled with cash, in an attempt to counterbalance Vietnam’s influence in these countries. When Chinese companies undertake the construction of dams and other large projects, an added price is that **the laborers are Chinese, who after completion usually do not depart, and their families and relatives soon join them** (following the pattern of Vietnam).

## CAMBODIA

(Excerpts from *FT Investigation: How China bought its way into Cambodia*)<sup>22</sup> China has drawn Cambodia into a closer military and diplomatic relationship in recent years as part of its effort to quell regional opposition to its sea territorial claims in Asia. China is presently the largest investor in Cambodia. As China has sought to assert its authority in the South China Sea, some Southeast Asian nations have bolstered their ties with the US, including Vietnam and the Philippines, while Cambodia is China’s staunchest counterweight. With an effective veto in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s top diplomatic grouping, Cambodia has a weapon to wield on China’s behalf.

Cambodia used this effective veto to protect China in July. ASEAN was poised to issue an official statement mentioning an international tribunal’s ruling that there was no basis under UN law for China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. However, after Cambodia objected, a watered-down final communique was issued with no mention of the ruling. China, which had pledged \$600 million in aid for Phnom Penh just days before the ASEAN meeting, reacted with gratitude and public delight. Wang Yi, the foreign minister, said Beijing “highly appreciates” Cambodia’s stand in the meeting, which history would show was “correct.” A few days after the meeting, Beijing said it would also build a \$16 million National Assembly hall in Phnom Penh.

“In terms of money, China is the number one,” says Phay Siphon, a secretary of state within Cambodia’s council of ministers. “The power of China is getting much bigger. . . we choose China because [its investment] does not come with conditions.” (i.e., human rights) China invested \$9.6 billion in the decade to 2013; and about a further \$13 billion is yet to come, according to the think-tank Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. “A number of western investments come with attachments,” he adds. “[They say] we have to be good in democracy. We have to be good in human rights. But in Cambodia we went through a civil war and we understand that if you have no food in your stomach, you cannot have human rights.”

Fu Xianting represents China’s leading investment companies in Cambodia and has unfettered access to Hun Sen. The head of Hun Sen’s personal bodyguard unit calls him “Big Brother” and

has pledged “to create a safe passage for all of Mr. Fu’s endeavors.” Fu’s story shows how private Chinese companies, backed by Beijing’s diplomatic resources and the unrivalled muscle of its state-run banks, are spearheading a commercial engagement that helps form the foundation for China’s political and strategic ambitions.

Hun Sen’s personal assistance was critical in providing Mr. Fu with his early break. A letter written in October 2009 by the prime minister wishes Mr. Fu “complete success” in developing a 33 sq. km. area of coastal land on a 99-year lease – even though some of the land fell within a “protected” national park. Hun Sen also set up a special committee with representatives from seven ministries to assist with the project’s execution.

An investigation by the Financial Times reveals the favored treatment that Chinese companies have won from Cambodia’s leadership, resulting in the award of land that far exceeded legal limits, the apparent overriding of a state decree for the benefit of a Chinese investor and official support against the protests of dispossessed farmers.

Of some 8 million hectares (80,000 sq. km.) granted to companies between 1994 and 2012, nearly 60% or 4.6 million hectares – an area larger than the Netherlands – went to Chinese interests, according to estimates by the Cambodia Centre for Human Rights. A blend of secrecy and elite contacts is evident in two other large Chinese investments enabled by Hun Sen and his executives: one involved a 360 sq. km. land concession for a \$3.8 billion investment by Union Development Group; the other was a 430 sq. km. concession for a \$1 billion investment by Heng Fu Sugar. The combined size of these concessions is larger than Phnom Penh.

Over the past 15 years, Hun Sen has become China’s most reliable supporter in Southeast Asia, presiding over the sale of his country’s choicest assets to Chinese companies, forging military links and praising Beijing as a “most trustworthy friend.” “Cambodia gets a lot in return. It gets foreign aid, it gets debt forgiveness and for a government that is very dependent on foreign aid, it gets critical Chinese aid. And the Chinese don’t ask questions on human rights.”

An example is the \$800 million Lower Sesan II dam being built by HydroLancang, a state-owned Chinese company. The 400MW dam has been hit by protests from thousands of villagers who are set to be displaced or lose their livelihoods, but it remains on schedule for completion in 2019. Chinese companies have a reputation for delivering critical infrastructure projects quickly and without delays caused by human rights and environmental objections. And, as mentioned before, the companies also have a reputation of bringing in their own construction workers who remain after the job is finished and later bring in their families.

A Chinese company working with the diplomatic support of the People’s Liberation Army is close to completing construction of a deep-water port on a 90 kilometer stretch of Cambodia’s coastline, according to company executives and documents. The port – deep enough to handle cruise ships, bulk carriers, or naval vessels of up to 10,000 tonnes in weight – is located on the Gulf of Thailand just a few hundred kilometers from disputed territories in the South China Sea.

“The port is nearly finished,” says Soeng Songang, an executive at the Tianjin Union Development Group (UDG), the Chinese company developing a 360 sq. km. area of Cambodia’s

Koh Kong province. The area is owned on a 99-year lease from Phnom Penh, at an estimated cost of \$3.8 billion. “Big trading ships will be able to come to the port, which can take ships up to 10,000 tonnes because the sea is 11 metres deep.”

The UDG investment has received high-level political and military backing in Beijing since the private company, which is based in the northern city of Tianjin, secured its unusually large land concession – which cedes control of 20% of Cambodia’s total coastline – in 2008.

Mr Fu’s company recently donated 220 motorbikes to Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit, a 3,000-strong private army equipped with armored personnel carriers, missile launchers and Chinese-made machine guns. When the Obama administration suspended a shipment of about two dozen military vehicles to Cambodia in 2010, China promptly stepped in and donated over 250 military trucks; in October 2013, Cambodia received about 100 tanks and 40 APCs (from Ukraine but bought with Chinese money), 100 containers of bullets and mortar shells, 1,000 handguns and 50,000 rounds of ammunition for Cambodia’s Army and police forces.<sup>23</sup>

## LAOS

In January 2013, reports surfaced that Laos would borrow money from China to finance a \$7 billion, 260-mile rail project connecting the Lao capital of Vientiane to the Chinese border. The proposed 262-mile (421-km.) passenger and freight railway will connect Kunming, in the south-western Chinese province of Yunnan, to Vientiane, the Laotian capital. The \$7.2 billion price tag (including interest) is nearly as big as Laos’s entire formal economy. It will take 50,000 workers five years just to lay the tracks.

(Excerpts from *Laos & Chinese: Chinese migration riles norther provinces*)<sup>24</sup> For China, Laos is a critical source of natural resources to power its economic growth. Chinese companies have been Vientiane’s choice for executing high-profile projects including the Laos International Convention Center, the National Sports Complex for the 2009 SEA Games, and other key infrastructure, mining, hydropower, and telecommunications initiatives. With the announcement of recent mega-projects including the high-speed railway project, which China sees as critical to realizing a Trans-Asian Highway, it is not unreasonable to expect that Beijing’s contribution for 2012 of \$3.9 billion and 801 projects will only grow in the years to come.

In the provinces north of Luang Prabang one finds flashy casino zones, dams, vast banana and rubber plantations, and Chinese, who seem to be everywhere in the provinces of Luang Prabang, Oudomxay, Luang Nam Tha and Bokeo. Thousands of small farmers and entrepreneurs are leaving southern China, mostly from Guangxi and Yunnan provinces, to farm or set up business in northern Laos. Many Laotian farmers rent their land under long-term contracts to Chinese immigrants, who develop banana plantations spreading over hundreds of hectares. “Laotians let out their land to the Chinese because they see it as a way to earn money without working.” Most of the agriculture products are exported to China.

The degree of Chinese penetration is sometimes spectacular, as in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, a 101 sq. km. area given as a 99-year concession to China's Kings Romans group, where an architecturally exuberant casino capped by a huge fairy-tale crown dominates a



newly built Chinatown. Chinese companies are building no fewer than 30 hydroelectric dams in the region, including seven on the Nam Ou River, a tributary of the Mekong.

At the beginning of 2014, China became the largest investor in Laos with \$5.1 billion of accumulated investments – around 40% of total foreign investment – overtaking Thailand and Vietnam. Chinese companies dominate the mining, transportation, plantation, and hydroelectric sectors, and Lao exports to China increased by 300% between 2005 and 2013, largely as a result of shipments of agricultural products grown by Chinese companies.<sup>25</sup>

It is reported that Chinese emigrants to Laos receive payments from provincial Chinese authorities. “A Chinese man or woman who comes to Laos receives an amount of over \$10,000 (80.79 million Laotian kip), conditioned on not returning to China before a fixed number of years.”

## Conclusion

**Vietnam and China are sucking the resources from Cambodia and Laos at the expense of these countries peoples, and until there is a change in the communist dictatorship in Vietnam, there is no chance of changing the status quo in Cambodia and Laos. Also in Cambodia, until the opposition is able to find dynamic leaders, opposition groups join together and individuals stop selling their souls to Hun Sen can there be a chance to form democratic government -- even if there were free and fair elections. Under democratic governments, Cambodia and Laos can go to the international courts to cancel these unfair land concessions and other unfair agreements. Until then, China is “yuaning” to give the Vietnamese a run with its money.**

---

Paper presented by Michael Benge at the Southeast Asia Conference 2016: *The Paris Peace Accords and Vietnam's Annexation of Laos and Cambodia*. Washington DC. October 21-22, 2016.

## Literature Cited

<sup>1</sup>Michael Benge. *Vietnam's Tay Tién expansion into Laos and Cambodia Partie Premiere*. Paper presented at the National Conference October 20 & 21, 2007 to commemorate and assess “The Paris Peace Agreement” of October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1991.

<sup>2</sup>Bounchanh Senthavong, The Lao National Council for Democracy. Testimony on behalf of the Union for the Lao Nation and its affiliated Study and Research Center on Laos and Asia before the Tom Lantos Commission on Human Rights. 12.16.2015. Citing GlobalSecurity.org's review of *Laos-Vietnam Military Relations*.

<sup>3</sup>Esmeralda Lucioli. *The Vietnamization of Cambodia: A New Model of Colonialism*. Indochina Report. Issue No. 4. October 1984. Others in the series are: *The Military Occupation of Kampuchea*. Issue No. 3. July-September 1985.; and Marie Alexandrine Martin. *Vietnamized Cambodia: A Silent Ethnocide*. Issue No. 7. July-September 1986. Also see Marie Alexandrine Martin. *Cambodia: A Shattered Society*. University of California Press. July 11, 1994.

<sup>4</sup>Bui Tin. *"Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel."* University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI 1995.

<sup>5</sup>Esmeralda Lucioli. *Le Mur de Bambou - Le Cambodge après Pol Pot* (The Bamboo Wall: Cambodia after Pol Pot). Regine Deforges Edition - Medecins sans Frontières. 1988.

<sup>6</sup>Sean Péngsè. *Cambodia is becoming more and more Vietnamized*. Cambodia's Border Committee. Paris. 10/23/2007.

<sup>7</sup>Sean Péngsè. *Cambodia's Border Delineation*. For the Cambodia's Border Committee in France and Worldwide. 05/09/2005.

<sup>8</sup>Dy Kareth. V.P. Cambodia's Border Committee in France and Worldwide. *Notes from Cambodia's Border Committee in France and Worldwide Concerning the violations of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia*. Paris. 07/30.2016.

<sup>9</sup>World Population Prospects - Global demographic estimates and projections by the United Nations. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/cambodia-population/>

<sup>10</sup>Esmeralda Lucioli. *Daily Life in Cambodia*. Indochina Report #15, April-June. Vietnam Archives @ Berkeley. 1988.

<sup>11</sup><http://park.org/Thailand/MoreAboutAsia/vninfo/vff.html>

<sup>12</sup>Dy Kareth. *The expansionist 'Development Triangle*. Published by CFC-CBC. Paris. 08/22/2005.

<sup>13</sup>Sean Péngsè. *Memorandum of the Cambodia's Border Committee on the Violations of the Territorial Integrity of Cambodia and Violations of the Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia Dated October 23, 1991*. For the Cambodia's Border Committee in France and Worldwide. Paris, 05/09/2005.

<sup>14</sup>Morton Sklar, *The Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons by the Government of Vietnam for Food Crop Destruction in Cambodia*. Complaint filed with The Chair and Members of the Executive Council Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Hague. 06/25/2015.

<sup>15</sup>Vietnam News Agency. July 2015. <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-cambodia-work-closely-to-ensure-border-situation-spokesman/79707.vnp>  
Vietnamese News Agency. *Việt Nam, Cambodia beef up defence ties*. June, 06.02/2016. <http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/297627/viet-nam-cambodia-beef-up-defence-ties.html>